13. CARRIERS-TERMINATION OF LIABILITY-REFUSAL OF CONNECTING CARRIER TO RECEIVE GOODS-NOTICE.The refusal of a connecting carrier to receive goods and assume the freight charges accrued, without notice thereof to the shipper or consignee, does not relieve the original carrier from any further attempt to deliver, or the performance of other duties on its part, nor terminate its liability as a carrier. (Grand Rapids etc. R. R. Co. v. Diether, 385.) See Bills of Lading; Railroads, 8-14. CASHIER. See Banks, 8, 9. CHARACTER. See Evidence, 18; Homicide, 4-6. CHARITIES. See Bequest CHATTEL MORTGAGES. 1. CHATTEL MORTGAGE, LIEN OF ON PROCEEDS, WHEN DOES NOT EXIST.-If a mortgagee of chattels authorizes the mortgagor as his agent to sell the mortgaged property, and to deposit the proceeds in a bank, to be applied on the mortgage debt, and a sale is made under such authorization, the lien of the mortgage does not attach to the proceeds, and they are subject to attachment by the other creditors of the mortgagor. (Maier v. Freeman, 151.) 2. CHATTEL MORTGAGES-PROCEEDS OF SALE-APPLICATION OF, AS A PAYMENT.-If a sheriff, on execution, seizes mortgaged chattels, and the mortgagee replevies them from the sheriff and sells under a power in his mortgage, the mortgagee must, in a proceeding by him to prove up the mortgage debt against the estate of his deceased joint debtor, be charged with the proceeds of the sale, although the action pending, involving the title, is undecided. The money received from such a sale is not in the custody of the law, and should be applied as a payment on the mortgage indebtedness. (Boynton v. Spafford, 274.) 3. NEITHER A TRUST NOR AN EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT is created in favor of a mortgagee of chattels on the proceeds of their sale when he authorizes the mortgagor to sell them, to collect the proceeds of the sale, and to deposit them in a bank, to be applied on the mortgage debt. (Maier v. Freeman, 151.) See Insurance, 13. CHILDREN. See Descent. 2; Marriage and Divorce, 1, 8; Negligence, 21-25; Rallroads, 23, 24. CHECKS. BANKING-CHECK AND GARNISHMENT, CONFLICT BETWEEN.-A check drawn on a bank does not, until accepted, operate as a transfer of the funds of the drawer therein, and therefore is subject to a garnishment served after the drawing and delivery of the check and before its payment or acceptance by the bank. (Commercial Bank v. Chilberg, 873.) CHURCHES. CIRCUMSTANTIAL. CLERKS. See Injunctions; Innkeepers; Insurance, 25, 26. COHABITATION. COLLATERAL ATTACK. See Executors and Administrators, 1-4; Guardian and Ward, 2, & COLLATERAL SECURITY. COLOR OF TITLE. See Adverse Possession, 2 COMITY. COMMON LAW. See Legislature, 2. COMMUNITY PROPERTY. COMPROMISE. See Instructions, 4; Insurance, & CONCEALED WEAPONS. CONFESSIONS. See Evidence, 6-8; Larceny, & CONFLICT OF LAWS. 1. CONFLICT OF LAWS.--THE FORM OF REMEDIES and the order of judicial proceedings are to be according to the law of the state where the action is instituted, without regard to the domicile of the parties, the origin of the right, or the country of the act. (La Selle v. Woolery, 855.) 2. CONFLICT OF LAWS.-REAL PROPERTY is exclusively subject to the laws of the country of which it is a part, and title therein can only be acquired or lost agreeable to those laws. (La Selle v. Woolery, 855.) See Evidence, 2, 3; Husband and Wife, 2; Trial, 1; States, 1. CONSPIRACY. CONSPIRACY, LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS.-If several persons combine to carry out a fraudulent conspiracy to cheat another, each and all are liable to him without reference to the amount of the fruits of the transaction each obtains, or the degree of his activity in the scheme. (Fountain Spring Park Co. v. Roberts, 917.) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Constitutions; Legislature, 1, 3, 4, 7; Limitations of Actions, 9; Statutes, 1-7, 20-27. CONSTITUTIONS. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-The term "laws of a general nature," when employed in a constitution, includes those laws which, before its adoption, experience had shown ought to have a uniform operation throughout the state. Statutes providing for the relief of the poor are of this character. (State v. Bargus, 628.) 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-DUE PROCESS OF LAW means that notice or summons by which a party is tendered his day in court, with the right to frame an issue and be heard before a judgment can be rendered or execution issued which shall take away his liberty or property. (Rouse v. Donovan, 457.) 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HEARING.—“ DUE PROCESS OF LAW," like the term "police power of the state," is not susceptible of a precise definition; but the constitutional requirement as to "due process of law" does imply a hearing according to the established practice in courts of common law or equity, and is satisfied, if the citizen, whose property is taken or damaged for public use, is afforded an adequate remedy therefor in a court of competent jurisdiction. (Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 557.) 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RESERVED POWERS.-To require persons and corporations to so exercise and enjoy their rights as not unnecessarily to injure others is one of the powers which has been reserved by the people of the state, and which cannot be surrendered; and the principle is especially applicable to existing rights, without regard to the time of their acquirement, or to the source whence they are derived. (Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. State, 557.) 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, MANDATORY PROVISIONS.-A provision of the constitution that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the state is mandatory. (State v. Bargus, 628.) 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, THEATRICAL REPRESENTATION, RESTRAINT OF IS A RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.-A play purporting to represent the facts involved in a criminal case then pending in the courts, and which, if produced, it is alleged, will deprive the accused of a fair trial, cannot be prohibited by the court having jurisdiction of the case, and its order purporting to impose such prohibition is void, if the constitution of the state guarantees to every citizen the right to freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects. (Dailey v. Superior Court, 160.) CONSTRUCTION. See Statutes, 8-13; Trusts, 2, 3. CONTEMPT. 1. A CONTEMPT OF COURT CANNOT BE RESTRAINED by an order of court made in advance. Hence a court has no power by order to prevent a theatrical representation which it is alleged will, if allowed to be produced, prevent the accused from having a fair and impartial trial on a capital offense for which he has been indicted. (Dailey v. Superior Court, 160.) 2. CONTEMPTS.-THE INHERENT POWER OF COURTS TO punish summarily for contempt any act committed in their presence, or so near their sittings as to disturb their proceedings, or that is calculated to disturb their business or impair their usefulness or bring them into disrespect or contempt cannot be taken away by legislation. (In re Robinson, 596.) 3. CONTEMPTS - POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO REGULATE.-The common-law power of courts to punish, for contempt, acts not committed in their presence, but calculated and intended to impair their usefulness and bring them into disrespect, may be regulated by the legislature. (In re Robinson, 596.) 4. CONTEMPT-INTENT-CONCLUSIVENESS OF ANSWER. In a proceeding to punish a person for contempt for a publication made in a newspaper, the answer of the respondent, as to the intent with which the publication was made, is conclusive. (In re Robinson, 596.) 5. CONTEMPT-RIGHT TO TRIAL-PUBLICATION OF COURT PROCEEDINGS.-Under a statute providing that "no person can be punished as for contempt for publishing a true, full, and fair report of any trial, argument, decision or proceeding had in court," a person cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt in publishing a report of a case tried in court, who answers, stating that he believed his publication to be correct and fair, and that it was not made to bring the court into contempt or ridicule, is entitled to have the issue tried, either by the court or by a jury, if there is nothing on the face of the publication showing it to be grossly incorrect, or calculated to bring the court into contempt or disrespect. (In re Robinson, 596.) CONTINUANCE. CONTRACTS. 1. CONTRACT.-TIME IS NOT REGARDED as of the essence of a contract in equity, unless expressly made so by the contract itself. (Tate v. Pensacola Gulf etc. Co., 251.) 2. A CONTRACT IS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A WHOLE and according to its general effect, and not by the name which the parties give it, and the purpose declared in one clause cannot overcome or alter the whole contract or change its manifest purpose apparent from all the parts taken together. (Stockton Savings Soc. v. Purvis, 210.) 3. CONTRACT, PLACE OF PERFORMANCE.-If in a contract no place for its performance is mentioned, it is to be performed to the obligee in person, who may designate any reasonable place of performance. (Tuttle v. Burgett, 649.) 4. CONTRACT, PLACE OF PERFORMANCE OF AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT ANOTHER.-One who, by virtue of an agreement, is entitled to receive support from another, and to be furnished with comfortable rooms, food, clothing, medicines, and medical attendance, cannot be required to receive them at the house of the promisor. The obligation of the latter is to supply them at any reasonable place designated by the former. (Tuttle v. Burgett, 649.) 5. CONTRACTS FOR SUPPORT, made by and in favor of persons of declining years with children or relatives, upon adequate consideration, should receive a liberal construction in favor of the obligees, and must be understood as entitling them to be comfortably situated, as well as to be supplied with adequate food, clothing, and other necessaries. They should be allowed reasonable liberty in the choice of their situation and surroundings, and not compelled to remain under the roof and within the control of the parties whose pecuniary interest it is to be relieved of the burden at the earliest moment. (Tuttle v. Burgett, 649.) 6. CONTRACT FOR SUPPORT, ATTEMPT TO RESCIND DOES NOT WAIVE RIGHT TO ENFORCE.-The fact that the mortgagee of a mortgage conditioned for his support during life brings suit to set it aside and a conveyance preceding it on the ground of alleged fraud and undue influence does not preclude him from subsequently maintaining a suit to foreclose the mortgage. (Tuttle v. Burgett, 649.) See Damages, 1, 2, 4; Equity, 6-8; Fraud; Instructions, 5; Mechanic's Lien, 7; Mistake, 2; Municipal Corporations, 10. CONTRACTORS. See Negligence, 3-8; Suretyship, 2. CONTRIBUTION. See Negotiable Instruments, 1 CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. CONVERSION. CORPORATIONS. 1. CORPORATIONS.-PROMOTERS OF A CORPORATION CANNOT LEGALLY TAKE ANY ADVANTAGE over the members thereof, and are accountable to it for any profits realized from a violation of their duty in this regard. (Fountain Spring Park Co. v. Roberts, 917.) 2. CORPORATIONS-PROMOTERS, PERSON CONSPIRING WITH.-Persons who conspire with promoters of a corporation to procure it to take property at a designated price, upon the represen tation that such is a reasonable price and the one which is agreed to be paid therefor, whereas it is greatly in excess of the sum agreed to be paid, are, equally with such promoters, liable for the profits realized on the sale of the property to the corporation at such extravagant price, though it is not alleged that such persons, other than the promoters, had any dealings with the corporation or its members, or occupied fiduciary relations toward them, or that they made misrepresentations to the stockholders, or personally knew that any were made. (Fountain Spring Park Co. v. Roberts, 917.) 3. CORPORATIONS-EXERCISE OF POWERS.-While corporations are creatures of the law and can exercise such powers only as are granted by the law of their creation, an express grant of power is not necessary. (Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 778.) 4. CORPORATIONS-LIMIT OF IMPLIED POWERS.-A business corporation has implied power to do that which is reasonably necessary to the business, or that which is usually incident to its prosecution, but this is the limit of its implied power. It cannot exercise abnormal and extraordinary powers to carry out its purpose. (Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 778.) 5. CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS.-In every express grant of power to a corporation there is implied a power to do whatever is necessary or reasonably appropriate to the exercise of the authority expressly conferred. (Northside Ry. Co. v. Worthington, 778.) 6. CORPORATIONS-IMPLIED POWERS-BUSINESS STATED BY STATUTE.-A corporation created for the purpose of carrying on a business under a statute which merely states the nature of the business, and does not further define its powers, may exercise such |