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Jury, then the confession of the accused will be sufficient to justify i conviction: Note to Daniels v. State, 6 Am. St. Rep. 251.

Attention was called to the principal case in Anderson v. State, 104 Ala. 83, an indictment for seduction, with respect to the admisbion of extrajudicial confessions of the prisoner,' which comprehend any statement made by him out of court, that tends to involve him in guilt of the crime wiih which he is charged. In that case a witness testified on the trial that, after the defendant's arrest for bastardy, growing out of the alleged seduction, the witness told him that be could not get out of the charge; that it would be better for him to tell witness all about !t, and he would buy defendant's crop and assist him to leave the country; and that the defendant replied: “I have no way of proving myself clear, and am going to leave." The officer who arrested the defendant on the charge of bastardy also testified that he told the defendant that the brothers of the prosecutrix were going to force him to leave the country; that it would be lighter on him to own up, as he could not deny the charge; and that the defendant thereupon replied: “I have no witness to prove myself out, and it may be that I had better own up." These conTesslons, instead of being shown by the state to have been voluntary, were expressly and unmistakably shown to have been involuntary, and were, therefore, held not to be admissible in evidence. “There 18,” said the court, “no necessity, if the trial courts will observe proper care, for doubtful questions being brought before us, touching confessions in those cases where mere formal proof of the voluntary character of, the confessions would obviate all question. Nothing in this or that case is intended to impair the rule that invol. untary confessions may be admitted when they point to the discovery of physical facts wbich are discovered and proven in connection with the confession."


[104 ALABAMA, 160.) ATTACHMENT_WHAT DEMANDS ARE SUBJEOT TO GARNISHMENT.-The controlling characteristic of the remedy by garnishment is, that the liability of the garnishee must originate in, and be dependent on, contract. Hence, with the exception of convey. ances, transfers, or agreements to defraud creditors, a garnishment cannot be employed to reach or subject any debt or demand, which the debtor, suing in his own name, could not recover in an action ex contractu. An unliquidated demand, having in it no element of contract, or unliquidated damages, or the right of action for a tort, Is not, therefore, the subject of garnishment.

ARREST AND DETENTION-COMPLIANCE WITH STAT. UTE.--If the matter of apprehension and detention of a criminal is regulated by statute, the statutory mode of procedure must be observed, and arrest and detention otherwise are illegal.

ARREST FOR CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER STATE -PREREQUISITES.-Conceding that an officer, having authority to make arrests, can, without warrant, arrest a person in this state whom he has reasonable cause to believe has committed a felony in another state, such authority cannot be exercised unless there is reasonable cause to believe that the crime supposed to have been committed is a felony, not a less offense, under the law of the state in which it was committed, that the person arrested committed it, and that he is a fugitive from the justice of that state.

ARREST FOR CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER STATEWHEN UNLAWFUL.-If two persons are arrested in this state, by a city police officer, upon the strength of a telegram addressed to him by a city police officer of another state, requesting him to see the conductor of an approaching train, and to “keep track of” the pair, and describing them as "swindling commission merchants," the arrest is illegal and unjustifiable, because the telegram furnishes no reasonable ground to believe that such persons, or either of them, had committed, or intended to commit, a felony.

DEFINITIONS.—THE WORD "SWINDLING” has no legal or technical meaning.

ARREST UPON GROUND OF BELIEF THAT A FELONY HAS BEEN COMMITTED_WHEN JUSTIFIABLE.-An officer cannot justify an arrest upon the ground that he had reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested had committed a felony, unless he has information of facts, derived from those reasonably presumed to know them, which, if submitted to a judge or magistrate having jurisdiction, would require the issue of a warrant of arrest, and the holding of the accused to await further examination.

ARREST–JUSTIFICATION.-An illegal arrest cannot be justi. fied by facts subsequently ascertained; nor can an arrest, made for one purpose, be justified for another.

ARREST.-A SEARCH OF THE PERSON ARRESTED Is justipable only as an incident to a lawful arrest; If the arrest be unlawful, the search is unlawful, and is aggravated by the illegality of the arrest.

ATTACHMENT-UNLAWFUL SEARCH OF PERSON-GARNISHMENT.-If a police officer unlawfully arrests the defendant in an attachment suit, and searches his person, the search is unlawful, and money or other effects thus obtained are not subject to garnishment, in the hands of such officer, by a creditor of the person arrested, as there is no contractual relation between the debtor and the garnishee.

ATTACHMENT-UNLAWFUL SEARCH OF PERSON-GARNISHMENT.-The fact that the plaintiff in an attachment suit bad nothing to do with the act of an officer in unlawfully arresting the defendant in attachment, searching him, and taking possession of money, or other effects, found on his person, does not give the plain. tiff the right to garnish such property in the hands of the officer,

Garnishment suit. An action of assumpsit was brought by the appellants, Cunningham & Son, against the appellees, Baker, Peterson & Co. This suit was instituted by suing out a writ of attachment against the defendants, which was executed by the service of a sheriff's garnishment upon A. Gerald, the chief of police of the city of Montgomery, who had previously arrested the defendants, Frank Baker and James Peterson, who had been engaged in business in the city of New Orleans under the firm name of Baker, Peterson & Co. The defendants moved for an order to show cause why the writ of attachment and its levy by sheriff's garnishment should not be vacated, annulled, discharged, and quashed. The motion set up, in avoidance of the attachment, by levy of the garnishment and the proceedings thereon, the fact that the defendants were illegally arrested, that their property was taken from them through persons by unlaw

ful force, by a trespass, that the said property was not, therefore, liable to said attachment, and that the levy was void. The facts alleged in support of this contention were as follows: Baker and Peterson came to the city of Montgomery by railroad, each of them having upon his person certain money, clothing, and other personal property, as well as railroad checks for his baggage; but before their arrival, the city chief of police had received a telegram from the chief of police in New Orleans, Louisiana, to the following effect: "See conductor of Louisville & Nashville train to arrive this evening, and keep track of Baker and Peterson, swindling commission merchants." Upon the arrival of the defendants, they were arrested on the train, and taken from the train to the police station. There each of them was searched; the money and effects which each had upon his person were taken therefrom; the hand baggage of each was taken from him; the checks for the baggage of each were taken from his pockets, and the baggage stopped, and taken to police headquarters. Gerald, the chief of police, took possession of all the property. When such search was made, there was no warrant for the arrest of defendants, no capias or other process charging them with any criminal offense, in the hands of the Alabama authorities. There was no requisition or demand for them from any other state, nor did said authorities ever get any process of any kind, during the time of their detention in the city of Montgomery. After the arrest and search, the attachment in this case was sued out and executed as above stated. There was a demurrer to the motion, one of the grounds being that it was not averred therein that the plaintiffs authorized or connived at the arrest of defendants, or that they participated in or had any connection with the arrest. The demurrer was overruled, and the plaintiffs then showed cause for the arrest as follows: A short time before the issuance of the attachment, Baker and Peterson had gone to New Orleans, as strangers, without any visible means, and at once began to advertise themselves very extensively to the public in places distant from that city as dealers in country produce, offering, in some instances, to receive and sell on commission, and in others, to buy directly from the shippers, and offering extra prices. In this manner they obtained large quantities of such goods from the appellants and others, in states near by, without intending to pay, or to account, for the same. They sold nearly all of the goods so procured at any price obtainable, and appropriated the proceeds to their own use, paying the shippers nothing. After so doing and delaying payment for the goods as long as possible, they suddenly disappeared from New Orleans, under very suspicious circumstances, and boarded a train on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad at a small station, a few miles from that city, en route to Montgomery, Alabama. There was a passenger on this train, at the same time, who knew Baker and Peterson, who had heard of their conduct in New Orleans, and who had noticed their suspicious actions in boarding the train. He wired the chief of police of New Orleans of the same, and that officer at once communicated by wire with Gerald, sending the telegram above described, and which led to the arrest of defendants at Montgomery, where they had separated, having taken trains to different places. A short time afterward, they were delivered to the officers of the law from New Orleans, who returned to that city with them, where they were subsequently indicted for frauds growing out of said business, after which they were released on bond and then left for parts unknown. Baker and Peterson, while under arrest in Montgomery, were taken to the police headquarters and searched by certain police officers; a portion of the property in question was taken from their persons, and a portion was taken out of a trunk belonging to them, but which trunk was received by the officers from the railroad company. All of the property was delivered by the officers to the chief of police, A. Gerald, and while it was in his possession, the attachment was sued out, and executed by service of the sheriff's garnishment on Gerald, and notice thereof given to the defendants. But it was averred that this was done without knowledge or information, on the part of the appellants, as to the manner of the arrest, and without their aiding, procuring, or directing the same in any way. The plaintiffs, in their angwer, further averred "that the police officers, in making said arrests, acted in good faith, honestly believing that the said Baker and Peterson had violated the laws of the state of Louisiana as aforesaid, and were fleeing from said state to avoid arrest; that the chief of police of Montgomery was personally acquainted with the chief or superintendent of police of New Orleans, and knew him to be reliable; and that said arrests were made and said property obtained from them for the purpose of preventing the escape of said Baker and Peterson, and honestly believing that the said property might be useful as evidence against them, the said Baker and Peterson, upon a trial of the charges against them growing out of their said fraudulent dealings." This answer of the plaintiffs was demurred to by the defendants upon the grounds: 1. That it was shown therein that,

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at the time of the arrest of the defendants, they were guilty of no offense justifying their arrest under the laws of Alabama; 2. That it was shown therein that if any violation of law was committed by the defendants, it was in a foreign state, and that no requisition had been made upon, and no warrant of arrest issued by, the governor of Alabama, authorizing their arrest; 3. That it undertook to set up, in justification of the arrest, the conduct of the defendants in a foreign state; 4. That it showed that the levy of attachment by service of a sheriff's garnishment was unlawful and illegal; 5. That it was not sufficient in law. The court sustained this demurrer, and, as the plaintiffs declined to plead further, the motion to dissolve and quash the attachment and levy was granted, and the cause dismissed. The plaintiffs then appealed, upon the ground that the court erred in overrul. ing their demurrer to the defendants' motion, in sustaining the defendants' demurrer to their answer, and in the judgment rendered.

Farnham & Crum, for the appellants.
Lomax & Ligon, for the appellees.

167 BRICKELL, C. J. The levy of the attachment was made only by the service of a garnishment. The judgment of the court below, from which the appeal is taken, was rendered, sustaining or overruling demurrers the parties interposed. From these rulings, the counsel have evolved, as the principal question of the case, to which they have directed argument, the liability to garnishment of the moneys or effects in the possession of the garnishee, the attaching creditor seeks to reach and condemn.

The nature and office of a garnishment is defined and declared by the code, in these words: "A garnishment, as the word is employed in this code, is process to reach and subject money or effects of a defendant in attachment, or in a judgment or decree, or in a pending suit commenced in the ordinary form, in the possession or under the control of a third person, or debts owing such defendant, or liabilities due him on contracts for the deliverty of personal property, or on contracts for the payment of money which may be discharged by the delivery of personal property, or on contract payable in personal property; and such third person is called the garnishee”: Code, sec. 2994. This section of the code is but the expression of the nature of a garnishment, as 168 it had been defined and declared in effect by a long course of judicial decisions. It is obvious that under the statute, and under prior judicial decisions, a garnish

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