actual or probable, nor were fupplied with any account tending to fhew the prefent ability or inability of the company to bear it; fo that the Lords were to affert facts, and on thefe facts to ground a law, altering the condition, and fufpending the charter rights of the company, without a poffibility of knowing whether the facts be true or false; and that with a determination to continue uninformed, it had been refufed to call for the evidence of the directors concern ing the expence; or in a matter of fuch importance, both in itself and its example, to follow the ancient fettled parliamentary courfe of defiring a conference with the commons, in order to be acquainted with the evidence which they received as the grounds of their proceeding.

It was faid, that it must be a matter of astonishment to the public, who had for a long time earnestly and anxiously looked to the company, or to parliament, for redress of the grievances in India, to find at length, that the latter is only employed in preventing the former from doing its duty; that instead of correcting the abuse, they oppose themselves to the reformation; that when it was expected, that thofe who had wronged the company fhould have been brought to exemplary punishment, the fuffering company itself is deprived of its right; and inftead of calling delinquents to account, the perfons legally empowered to correct or restrain them, are by parliament fufpended from their office.

On the other fide. befides many of thofe arguments which we have before feen stated in fupport of the bill, it is faid, that the charge upon administration, of having at one time given a fanction to the commiffion for fuperintending the company's affairs, was pofitively denied, with refpect to fuch of its members as belonged

longed to that houfe; and reafons were brought to fhew, why it could not be well founded with refpect to others. As to the dangers that were apprehended from this measure with refpect to the national credit, they were reprefented as merely imaginary; and it was faid, that it would have a totally contrary effect, as the Dutch, who had much more money in our public funds, than any other foreigners, would think themfelves much fafer, when they found that the India Company was under the care and protection of parliament, than if they had been abandoned to their own wild fchemes of regulation and management.

That they had no evidence that this bill was contrary to the company's inclinations, any more than to theit interefts; that the petition they had heard at the bar, was no corporate act, and was figned only by fourteen proprietors, out of about seventeen hundred, of which the company confifted; that the vast majority by which it was carried through the other house, where the most ample information was obtained of the Company's affairs, and the very fmall number that had diffented to it, fufficiently fhewed the juftice, propriety, and expediency of the meafure. Other charges or cenfures were aufwered, by the fhortnefs of the time, and the advantage the company might take of parliament during the recefs. Upon a divifion, the bill was carried by nearly a proportional majority, to that which had attended it in the houfe of commons, 26 lords having voted for it, to 6 only who oppofed its pafling; it was, however, followed by a remarkably pointed and fevere proteft."

What paffed in the houfe of Lords upon this fubject, will appear manifeft from the protefts of a num. ber of noble Lords, against the regulating bill, and upon the motion made by the Duke of Richmond, for making

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making certain entries relative to the East India company, and the holding of a conference with the commons upon that fubject. "Becaufe," say they, "the preamble to this bill, ftating defects in the powers of the Eaft India company, abufes in its adminiftration, and injuries to public and commercial credit ought to have been fupported by evidence adapted to the nature of the feveral matters alledged. But the production of charters has been refufed by the houfe; no witneffes have been called to afcertain the existence or quality of the fuppofed abufes; no enquiry has been made into the condition of public credit; and no state of the company's commercial affairs have ever been laid before us.

2dly, Because, if the defects in the charters, and abuses in the administration of the company, exift in the manner stated in the preamble, no effectual provifion is made in the enacting part of the bill for fupplying the one or reforming the other: on the contrary, the utmost distraction is introduced into the whole economy of their affairs. The nomination to the fubordinate prefidencies, and inferior offices in India, is left to the company; but a fuperior prefidency is appointed by parliament to govern thofe inferior officers. The fuperior prefidency is to receive orders from the court of directors; but it is left to the private will of the king how far thefe orders fhall be obeyed. The prefidency is appointed to make ordinances and regulations, but neither directors or company are to determine on their validity. The king alone is to allow or difallow thofe acts, as he fhall chufe to fignify his pleasure under his fign manual. This mode of vefting ultimately the whole management of the company's weighty political affairs, their vaft revenues and their extenfive commerce in the king's private direction,

without

without any provifion in the bill for the intervention of any public body, (either the Eaft-India company or the privy-council) or any refponfible public minifter, is, we infift, not only a high and dangerous violation. of the yet unqueftioned charters of the company, but a total fubverfion of all the principles of the law and conftitution of this kingdom.

3dly, Becaufe the election of executive officers in parliament, is plainly unconstitutional, and an example of the most pernicious kind, productive of intrigue and faction, and calculated for extending a corrupt influence in the crown. It frees minifters from refponsibility, whilft it leaves them all the effect of patronage. It defeats the wife defign of the conftitution, which placed the nomination of all officers, either immediately or derivatively, in the crown, whilst it committed the check upon improper nominations to parliament. But this bill, by confounding thofe powers which the conflitution meant to keep feparate, has destroyed this controul, along with every wife provifion of the laws to prevent the abuses in the nomination to, or exercise of office,

4thly, Becaute this ufurpation of the company's rights in appointing the fervants is loaded with the additional injuftice of a compulfory payment of falaries, arbitrarily fixed and chargeable on the company's revenues, without their confent.

5thly, Because the violation of the charter is not juftified by the importance of the provifions of this bill, which operates only to transfer patronage without conferring new powers, it being exprefly provided by the bill, that these powers fhould be the fame as were formerly exercifed by the company's fervants, under the company's authority; neither is any advantage gained with regard to the particular officers nam

ed

ed in this bill, the perfon first in rank and importance in the new parliamentary prefidency, being the very fame now at the head of the company's prefidency at Bengal. We mean to reflect neither upon that gentleman, nor any other, who (for any thing we know to the contrary) may be men of competent ability and good character; but we think ourselves bound to declare against the manifeft contradiction and abfurdity of this bill, which, ftating abuses as now exifting in India, for the ground of its regulations, yet appoints the very perfon to prefide there, who, if the allegations in the bill be true, must be concerned, either by neglect, or actual commiffion in all the abufes complained of.

6thly, Because the appointing judges by the nomination of the crown, with large falaries, payable out of the company's revenue, without the company's confent, either to the appointment or the payment, is an act of flagrant injuftice, and an outrage on all the rights of property. No neceflity can be pleaded in favour of this violence, as the company did last year voluntarily propose a nomination of judges, with far better provifions for fecuring a proper appointment, than any contained in this bill.

7thly, Becaufe the claufe of this bill, which deprives of all fhare in the management of their own property, all proprietors not poffeffed of 1000l. capital stock, disfranchifing without the affignment of any delinquency or abufe, no lefs than 1240 perfons legally qualified, is an heinous act of injuftice, oppreffion, and abfurdity, and a grofs perverfion of the high powers entrufted to legislature; the part of the charter which regulates the right of voting, was made to establish exclufively that clafs of voters which this act has deftroyed; the charter knows of no right of voting, but

the