convert it to some other use until it shall be limited by the conditions of its donation to the State. I presume there is no doubt about that; but a good deal has been said. This debate has taken a wide range. I do not feel disposed to go into what I consider outside matters, any further than to express a little surprise that some charges have been made before this Committee, as I learn, not having heard them myself, intending to impute corruption, not only to the executive officers of the State, but to the members of the General Assembly. I am not aware, gentlemen of the Committee, that the General Assembly of the State of Ohio has yet come to be a corrupt body. I do not believe it. The General Assemblies of some States have been charged, perhaps with reason, but I never heard a charge squarely made or the effort to maintain it, against the Legislature of the State of Ohio, or any of its members. The charge was made, as I understood it, by the gentleman from Erie [Mr. Roor] when I was absent-I do not want to state any thing incorrectly as coming from him-that, for instance, the sale of the old Central Lunatic Asylum grounds and the purchase of the new grounds was a swindle on the State from beginning to end. "A put up job," as I understand it. That is a broad charge. It covers a great many people. It is scattering mud pretty extensively. It covers the General Assembly as well as those executive officers who had to do with the sale, one of whom it happened to be my good fortune or misfortune to be; and I mention it here because it connects me with those wholesale charges, that were brought before the Committee and that, without contradiction, ought not to be made here. Mr. ROOT. Will the gentleman from Morgan [Mr. POND] give way? Mr. POND. I will, with pleasure. what it was as my attention was called to it, as showing perhaps an endeavor to reflect on the commission appointed by the General Assembly, as well as upon the Legislature. Mr. ROOT. I hope the Attorney General knows me too well to think that I would venture such an assertion in his absence. I would not have made it anywhere. I never thought of it. If I had any thing to say, I would take occasion to speak in his presence or inform him of it as soon as I had said it! not question it at all. But, Mr. Chairman, if Mr. POND. I presume that is true. I do corruption has crept into the General Assembly, if that body has come to be tampered with, these arrangements, inasmuch as they affect the benevolent institutions of the State, or have been doing it, and are such as to leave it unsafe to entrust to these Representatives of the people the care of those institutions as well as others, it is a fact that ought to be known to this Committee, not by general declaration but by absolute proof. And those facts ought to be brought to the knowledge of this body, as it appears to me. Now, so much for that portion of the subject. I wish now to call the attention of the Committee a few moments to what I conceive to be a mistake in the Report of the Committee on Public Institutions. The people of the State, it is expected, will be called to act upon the products of this Convention, to determine whether they are such as in their judgment should be adopted, and made the fundamental, permanent law of this State, for perhaps twenty years to come. the desire of every man in this Convention, It is expected, and I have no doubt it is common mind of the people as that while the to so adapt the work of this Convention to the Convention shall, in its own judgment, have sensibly calculated to further the ends of good Mr. ROOT. I understand that you were not govenment, the people shall be able to see it, present when I made the remarks. Mr. POND. I was not present. and at the polls ratify the work of the ConMr. ROOT. I do not propose to go out of my are desired by this Convention to go hand vention. I apprehend that those two things way to repeat my speech. I made no charges in hand with each other. It appears to me, affecting him. I know exactly what he was re- Mr. Chairman, that in connection with that quired to do, and I suppose I know all that he subject, it might be as well to look at what the did do. I have no idea that he did anything effect of this proposition might be upon the more than discharge the duty that was imposed popular mind, as well as what it may be in part upon him by the act. He, with others that were on the minds of the members of the Convenofficers of the State government, and made tion. The Constitution of our State has created trustees or agents on the part of the State to sell different departments of government. We are a piece of property, and the minimum price not a pure Democracy; we are a Representawas fixed. I understand the sale was made in tive Republic, as I understand it, and it is the strict accordance with the terms. It never en- expectation of most of the people, when they tered my mind, I never thought of imputing to elect officers, a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, the honorable gentleman from Morgan, [Mr. Auditor, Treasurer, and members of the GenPOND], the Attorney General then as now, any eral Assembly, that they shall come here, and mis-conduct or any participation in what I deem for the people do certain work that is pointed was a most undoubted fraud-a fraudulent tran-out and assigned to them. That work, it is exsaction. I have nothing to take back. I say, however, it never entered my mind to impute to him anything unworthy in all that he had to do with it, for, as I understand, he simply executed a prescribed commission. In that I believe he acted as almost any man would act, and acted properly. pected that they shall do, and it is not expected or designed by the people, that the people, as individuals, shall have anything to do with that work which is assigned to their agents. That, I believe, is the system under which we are operating. Certain bureaus have been created here; certain departments of government Mr. POND. I saw the gentleman from have been created, the Legislative, the ExecuErie [Mr. ROOT] was here, and I am glad tive, the Judicial-three departments. In the he made the statement he has, because it Executive department, the different officers of leaves the thing in a different shape from the State. Now, then, several of these are 19 POND, HOADLY, POWELL. elected by the people, some of these are appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Comptroller of the Treasury is one not provided for by the present Constitution. The Commissioner of Railroads and Telegraphs, is another, appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their duties are prescribed by law. Mr. HOADLY. Will the gentleman allow me to ask when the Comptroller's office was taken away from the people? Mr. POND. It is an elective office. I did not mean the Comptroller of the Treasury, but the Commissioner of Railroads,is the only officer not elected by the people. The reason why the General Assembly saw that this commissioner should not be elected by the people, is a matter for us to consider a little. The Representatives of the people, when they come here to sit as a General Assembly, for the purpose of determining these matters, are presumed to reflect the wishes of their constituency. They are elected for two years by the people of the State. They come here fresh from the people,acquainted with their wishes, it is presumed. They have made this office an appointive office. For a series of years, they have been appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. It appears to me that this Convention, after it shall have matured its work and its plans with regard to the management of the benevolent institutions in the fundamental law of the State, to be used twenty years to come, more or less, and the system on that plan, that they will inquire very naturally why was this change made? Cui bono? To whom will it be for good? Now, I am not in favor of any other. Are members of this Convention in favor of this merely for the purpose of making changes or experiments; simply for the purpose of experimenting? This Convention knows, everybody in the outside world knows, that this class of experiments, tinkering with the affairs of government, with matters that go into the fundamental law of the State, this experimenting with matters of that sort for the sake of experimenting,-it strikes me, no one is desirous of, who has the good of his country at heart. It appears to me, this is an experiment, and nothing but an experiment, in the history of the country. So far as I can discover, I find none of the States around us, which has a commission of this sort elected by the people. I have not been able to find any. Perhaps the inspectors of New York are elected by the people. So far as my observation goes in the system adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, there is some reason-a good deal of reason for it. The Governor of the State of Ohio is not overly burdened with labor. His functions are not so extensive as to make it onerous upon him to perform this work. The people choose him as the chief officer of State, and it is presumed are satisfied when they elect him that they are electing a man for the office in whom they have confidence. Now, they are willing, so far as I can discover, and I have heard no general clamor through the country desirous of removing from this officer any of the duties imposed upon him by the Constitution of the State. They are satisfied that the duties per [THURSDAY, formed by him will be performed well. I have not heard a member of this Committee of the Whole who has advocated the new plan that has been proposed here, who has been disposed to discount that fact, and was willing to trust the honesty, the integrity, and the good sense of the Governor in making nominations. He is directly from the people; he has the Senate of the State to aid him, just as this new system of commissioners will have the Senate of the State to aid them in making these selections. If his nominations, which sometimes happens, are not suitable for the position, the Senate can reject them. His nominations go for nothing, and a new man must be selected who will suit the wishes of the Governor, and the wishes of the Senate of the State, before such an appointment can be made. It appears to me to be eminently safe. Let me call the attention of the Committee to another thing. Something has been said here in regard to the executive power being very intimately connected with the purse of the State. I think my friend from Mahoning [Mr. WILSON] said something in that connection in regard to the care the people of this State should have in the fundamental parts of the law of the land to divorce these two as wide asunder as possible. The Governor of the State has nothing to do with the finances of the State. In the management of these institutions he has not a thing to do with disbursing the funds of the State. He stands alone and outside of all these influences. There is no money in him. There is no money to be made out of him. All these arrangements that are made for the building of our institutions are so fixed up, tied up by law of the General Assembly, that it is impossible for the Governor to get his finger in the pie by direction or indirection. The only thing he has to do in this connection is after the General Assembly, for instance, shall have determined by its vote upon an institution of this this sort, determined what the cost of the institution shall be, provided the general details upon which the institution shall be built, the general plan, the chief architects are called upon by the trustees of the institution, who are appointed by the Governor, to draw plans and specifications for that work. They are drawn, and when drawn, they are, by the trustees, submitted to the Governor, Secretary of State, and Auditor of State, for their approval or disapproval. That board consisting of three State officers, and are independent, so far as anybody can possibly see, of any suspicion in any direction, through whose hands none of this money can go, are called upon to determine whether the plan of the building, the specifications and details of it, accord with what the Legislature has enacted, and the best interests of the State require. If those officers, holding that they are suitable, approve them, and that is all that the Governor has to do with the transaction. With the general current expenses of these institutions the Governor has nothing in the world to do; and I mention this in this connection for the purpose of showing the committee why I am satisfied that there is the proper place in which to leave this appointing power. Mr. POWELL. I would inform the gentleman that the practice has been for these trus tees to make a detailed report of the expenditures of money that goes through their hands, to the Governor, and, of course, he has supervision of that, and from that he makes his report to the Legislature, and all that is returned to the Legislature. He, therefore, is in duty bound to as carefully examine these reports as if he were the commissioner appointed under the proposed amendment. the interests of the State, whatever it may have been in 1865, 1866, and 1867, and through the war. The General Assembly at that time delegated to Governor Brough a sort of supervisory power for the erection of that institution. In the excitement of the great struggle, when his hands were full, it was not to be expected that the Governor would pay that attention that it required. If I recollect, the Governor appointed two Mr. POND. As I understand it, these Re- or three commissioners to look after it; perports are directed to be made to the Governor haps authorized by the law of the General Asfor his information, more than anything else, sembly at that time. But it was in the wrong to enable him to suggest to the General Assem- place; he could not attend to it, or give it, in its bly from this mass of matter, that shall be sub- details, that careful scrutiny that it required. It mitted to him, to suggest to the General Assem- was a mistake, a temporary mistake; and in 1868, bly such action as he thinks may be necessary for that was seen by the General Assembly of the the interests of the State. So far as revising the State of Ohio, and I think that is the safest accounts, to see whether the details are correct place to repose this discretion-and this thing or not, I apprehend the Governor of the State has been corrected. Now the State buys no has nothing to do with it. These are simply material, the State furnishes no material, the submitted to him for his information, to enable State makes its contract with persons to furhim in his message to give to the General As-nish the material, and do the work, and erect sembly his ideas with regard to the institutions the building, at a certain fixed sum. That is of the State. The Governor then, as I said, is the plan upon which the State goes now, under entirely independent of this expenditure of the present system. These trustees, who are apmoney. He stands entirely away and aloof pointed by the Governor, are appointed, as I from the expenditures, in the position where he said before, by him without any chance, or any can appoint trustees entirely clear and indepen- appliances being used, or any thing unlawful. dent of any charge of fraud or corruption; that These trustees do not expect any favors from is the very situation I want to see a commission him; they do not expect any favors from him occupy, if one be appointed. in revising their accounts. They go on here, good men as they are, and do their work for the love of it, because they are willing to do something in this age of ours, to make mankind a little wiser and a little better. That, I believe, is the feeling by which they have been induced to do this work. I think it is the true plan for the government of these institutions. Now, what is the system proposed here? You go before the people with it; what merit has it su The Governor, then, appoints these men, making the best appointments he may. Whether these appointments have been successful, or whether they have not been successful, has been argued sufficiently on this floor. I do not wish now to call attention to it. What I want to say is this, that this appointing power, that shall have the appointing of these trustees, and these officers of the public institutions, should be entirely divorced from the State, as was sug-perior to the merit of the system I have been gested by my friend from Mahoning, [Mr. WIL- discussing? It is proposed to elect three SON]. I do not want him to have anything to commissioners by the people at large who are do with reference to their action or work after to supervise all the benevolent and punitive they shall have been put in power. I want institutions of the State. Three individuals are them to be an independent board, who shall to be elected to regulate and supervise all the have nothing to do with the creation of these benevolent and punitive institutions of the offices, that have no paternal relation to the State. The proposition goes further than that. board. That is the true principle upon which It provides for a new distinctive department of these affairs ought to be conducted. The Gov- the State Government; it provides for these ernor, then, stripped of all this patronage, stands persons elected by the people without providutterly independent of all these influences that ing for vacancies which may occur, that these are brought to bear upon this commission that persons shall be superior to all legislative powis proposed and brought here, and organized er, The Legislature cannot control them at for the benefit of the State. Now, what re- all, has no power over them. The people, when sults? I admit, as has been stated here by my they once tie up their hands by the adoption of friend from Franklin, [Mr. BABER], that frauds this section, will have their hands tied for have been perpetrated upon the State. That twenty years; and if there be abuses the peofrauds were perpetrated on the State in the ple are powerless to help it, for it is their work erection of the Deaf and Dumb Asylum, there and they have done it, unless an amendment is is no doubt about that. Now, as stated, we adopted. You create an independent buhave kept under the same constitutional system, reau, a new department of government. but not entirely under the same legislative sys- You give to these persons power to sutem. The State in those days bought its own pervise all the institutions. They appoint material, made its own contracts for material. these trustees, who go on on and supervise Now, the system is entirely changed; the whole the work of their appointees, from beginning system is a contract system. Every contractor to end. These trustees are no better trustees furnishes material and does the work according to the plans and specifications, and he is compelled to live up to the contract as he has made it with the State. This system now, as I take it, is complete and ample for the protection of than you have now. They are the same class, only appointed by different power-appointed by a commission instead of by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. So far as their functions are concerned, they will POND, HILL, VORIS. be exactly the same. You have made one difference only, that of the appointing power. The Governor stands independent of all appliances and plans. These three commissioners, elected by the people of the State, will come here and appoint the trustees of these different institutions. They will appoint them because they think well of them-because they like them. I will give them all the credit in the world on that matter. The man who receives an appointment esteems it a compliment-looks towards the commissioners with the kindly feeling that a child would towards a parent. There is a kindlier feeling and a warm hearted feeling growing up between them. Then what results? The trustees go into the performance of their office, making repairs, making additions to their buildings, erecting new structures, examining the accounts of their stewards, as is appointed by law. All these things have to be reported and supervised to, and by this board of commissioners. The board of commissioners supervises the work of its own hands. I submit, if this is a state of things that recommends itself to the good sense of this committee, as a proper thing to do. Is it a safe thing to do, to let the power that appoints and that can remove, have the power to supervise and examine all these accounts? Is it safe? We have got to take the world as we find it. We have got to take mankind as we find them. We have got to take into consideration all the frauds that have been perpetrated and will be perpetrated. You have got in this arrangement a circle that is susceptible of more frauds than any appliance that has ever been had. There is another thing; if you elect them and prescribe their duties in this provision at all, why not say they shall be appointed just as you say in regard to the members of the Board of Public Works? "So long as the State has a Board of Public Works there shall be three members elected." There it is left to the General Assembly to fix the duties that shall devolve upon that Board. But not satisfied with this, the hands of the people must be tied up to this experiment for the next twenty years. Notwithstanding what the people, thro' their Representatives, may desire, their hands are tied. I say it is a mistake to make an experiment of that sort. If I could be induced to vote for this provision in any shape whatever, it would be to leave it in the hands of the General Assembly to determine what the power and duties of this commission shall be. These are some of the reasons, gentlemen of the Committee, why I do not think I ought to support this proposed amendment. Now, it has been suggested that one individual might be appointed to supervise these institutions. I see a fault in all of it. I do not believe there ought to be a commission appointed of this kind. I will tell you what my theory about this whole thing would be: I would let the appointing power remain where it is, and I would do something equivalent to what is done in Pennsylvania and several other States. Perhaps exactly in the same shape, something equivalent to what is done in Ohio. I would have lodged the power in some one of the State officers, just such power as you have to appoint a visiting commission to examine the treasury of your [THURSDAY, State a power lodged in the Governor, or Mr. POND. I do not think it necessary to put it in the fundamental law of the State. I think it is competent for the General Assembly to do that. Now, these are the main reasons why I can not vote for this. I think I can see that the proposition is a mistake. I have no doubt the design is good, and there is an honest belief in the minds of some that it will ultimate in great good. But I think I can see in it an experiment, that it is a mistake, and inasmuch as look upon it as a mere experiment, I am unwilling to tie up the hands of the people by putting that experiment into the fundamental law. I have said more than I intended, and I thank the Committee for listening to me. Mr. HILL. I move that the Committee do now rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again. Mr. VORIS. I would ask if the Committee had not better exhaust the twenty minutes yet remaining until six o'clock? The motion of Mr. HILL was agreed to by a rising vote of 43 to 35. The PRESIDENT, [Mr. WAITE], resumed the Chair. Mr. COOK. Mr. PRESIDENT: The Committee of the Whole have had under consideration the substitute for Article 7 of the Constitution, and having come to no conclusion thereon, have instructed me to ask leave to sit again. The PRESIDENT. Does the Convention grant leave? Cries of "Leave! leave!" The PRESIDENT laid before the Convention the following communication from the Auditor of State, transmitting the accompanying statement as to the amount of money paid by the State to Architects: STATE INSTITUTIONS. the services of nominal or assistant architects or superintendents of construction, performing the duties of architects independent of any other duty. tion on the 9th inst., requesting a requesting a statement as to the amount of money that has been paid by the State on account of services rendered by architects since January 1, 1867; to whom and on account of what public buildings The amount aggregates $67,853 79 for he six years such payments were made. I hand you herewith, in tab-named, being an average cost of $11,308 96 per annum. ular form, the statement desired, for the years 1867 to 1872 Very respectfully, yours, inclusive, and embracing all the public buildings for which it appears the services of architects have been paid. In some of the institutions this has been held to include JAMES WILLIAMS, |