LIFE OF WASHINGTON. CHAPTER XIX. Campaign of 1781. of THE Revolutionary War was now fast approaching its crisis. The union between the French and American armies was complete, and both parties felt that the opening season could not fail to bring with it decisive events and results. And so it proved. What were the plans of operation of the British Commanders, it is difficult to determine, with positiveness. It seems to have been their chief aim, to divide the forces, and distract the attention, of the American Commander-in-chief, by simultaneous, vigorous invasions and movements, in different and distant parts of the country. It was the purpose Washington, to call forth the energies of the Colonies to the utmost possible extent, to meet and withstand the enemy, wherever he might show himself; but, while he sought to do this, at the same time he resolved to strike some signal blow, by concentrating as large a force as could be spared from other assailed or assailable points, and, by utterly overwhelming one of the larger divisions of the British army, bring the war to a close. The following extracts from a letter, addressed by Washington to General Knox, show the views of the Commanders of the American and French allied armies, in entering upon the campaign of 1781. "SIR,-In the conference between Count de Rochambeau and myself, it was agreed, that, if, by the aid of our allies, we can have a naval superiority through the next campaign, and an army of thirty thousand men, or double the force of the enemy at New York and its de pendencies, early enough in the season to operate in that quarter, we ought to prefer it to every other object, as the most important and decisive. And applications have been made to the court of France, in this spirit, which, it is to be hoped, will produce the desired effect. "I give you this communication of what is in prospect, that you may take your measures accordingly, by making such estimates, demands, and other arrangements, as may appear to you best calculated to produce what we want. And you may rely upon all the assistance and support, it will be in my power to give. In your calculations, you will estimate the force on our side at about twenty thousand men. The remainder, with a proportionate field and siege apparatus, are to be supposed to be furnished by our allies. You are well acquainted with New York, and its defences, and you can, therefore, judge of the means requisite for its reduction by a siege. "The general idea of the plan of operations, if we are able to procure the force we count upon, is, to make two attacks; one against the works on York Island, and the other against the works of Brooklyn, on Long Island. The latter will, probably, be conducted by our allies. Ulterior operations must depend on circumstances. If we should find ourselves unable to undertake this more capital expedition, and if we have means equal to it, we shall attempt, as a secondary object, the reduction of Charleston; and Savannah, Penobscot, and other places, may come successively into contemplation. Your dispositions will refer to these different objects; though, indeed, a preparation for the principal one will substantially comprehend the less." In the meanwhile, circumstances seemed to favor an attempt to concentrate a sufficient land and naval force in Virginia, and in the Chesapeake, to surround and cut off General Arnold, who was operating, at the head of a British force, in that quarter. It was natural, that a very strong desire should have been cherished to get possession of Arnold; and, in making arrangements to this end, some delay was interposed to a meeting, which had been agreed upon, of the American and French Commanders, at New port, in Rhode Island. Washington thus writes to Count de Rochambeau, on the 19th of February, 1781 "The destruction of the corps, under the command of Arnold, is of such immense importance to the welfare of the southern States, that I have resolved to attempt it, with the detachment I now send, in conjunction with the militia, even if it should not be convenient for your Excellency to detach a part of your force, provided M, Destouches is able to protect our operation, by such a disposition of his fleet, as will give us the command of the Bay, and prevent succors being sent from New York. By a letter I have just received from Baron Steuben, who commands in Virginia, it appears we may expect every thing, from the temper of the militia, of which militia are capable; but an additional regular force to that I am sending would, no doubt, make the success much more prompt and certain." These measures did not meet with the desired success. The French squadron, despatched to the Chesapeake, after having attempted, in vain, to reach Arnold, put to sea, and returned to Newport. The attention of Washington continued to be fixed upon his favorite project of an attack upon New York, as appears from the following passage of a letter to the President of Congress. "Upon General Knox's return from the eastward, I desired him to form an estimate of the artillery and ordnance stores, necessary for an operation upon the largest scale, which would be that against New York. He has accordingly furnished one, a copy of which I do myself the honor to enclose, for the information of Congress, that application may be made, in time, to the States possessed of the heaviest cannon, for the loan of them, and other stores, should they be wanted, and that directions may be given to the Board of War, and those Boards whose Business it is to provide ammunition and other articles, to endeavor to procure the deficiency of the estimate. We Dught, without doubt, to be prepared for an operation against New York. Should circumstances make it requisite to lessen the object, the overplus stores would, |