Art. 2. Civil Remedies for Wrongs. Restraining Combinations Affecting Employees; Boycotting; Interfering with Electric Wires. The foundation of the jurisdiction of equity by way of injunction against torts rests in the probability of irreparable injury, the inadequacy of pecuniary consideration, and the prevention of a multiplicity of suits. High, § 697. It is a very old head of equity, as Lord Eldon observed, in Evans v. Bicknell, 6 Ves. 174, that if a representation be made to another person going to deal in a matter of interest, upon the faith of that representation, the former shall make that representation good, if he knew that representation to be false. He held, that if there was a jurisdiction at law upon the doctrine, in Paisley v. Freeman, 3 T. R. 151, there was a concurrent jurisdiction in equity; and that "Case," upon the principle of many decisions in equity, might have been maintained. There is no dispute about that doctrine. It is a principle of universal law. Fraud and damage, coupled together, will entitle the injured party to relief in any court of justice. Bacon v. Bronson, 7 Johns. Ch. 194 (200). It is not sufficient to authorize the remedy by injunction that a violation of a naked legal right of property is threatened. There must be some special ground of jurisdiction, such as injury to the plaintiff's property, inadequacy of the legal remedy, or some pressing or serious emergency or danger of loss or other special ground of jurisdiction shown by the complaint. McHenry v. Jewett, 90 N. Y. 58. The mere allegation of great or irreparable injury apprehended or threatened, which is not supported by facts or circumstances tending to justify it, is clearly insufficient to authorize an injunction restraining a tort. Brass v. Rathbone, 153 N. Y. 435 (442). A court of equity is not bound to issue an injunction when it will produce great private or public mischief, merely for the purpose of protecting a technical or unsubstantial right. Wormser v. Brown, 149 N. Y. 163, and cases cited. While it has very often been held that ordinarily courts of equity will not wield their power simply to redress a trespass, yet they will interfere under peculiar circumstances, and have often done. so where the trespass was a continuing one, and a multiplicity of suits was involved in the legal remedy. Where the facts were in doubt, or the right not clear, a court of equity will act only after Art. 2. Civil Remedies for Wrongs. plaintiff's right has been established at law; but where the occupation of premises threatened to be continuous, and the injury partakes of that character, this is more a rule of discretion than of jurisdiction. Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N. Y. 179, citing Avery v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 106 N. Y. 142. Equity will interfere only when irreparable injury is threatened, and the law does not afford adequate remedy for the contemplated wrong. Thomas v. M. M. P. Union, 121 N. Y. 45 (57). Injury, material and actual, not fanciful or theoretical or merely possible, must be shown to be the necessary or probable result of the action sought to be restrained. Genet v. D. & H. C. Co., 122 N. Y. 505 (529), citing People v. Canal Board, 55 N. Y. 390. Equity does not undertake to relieve from all the annoyances caused by those who are inconsiderate of the feelings and business interests of others. On the contrary it is a general rule, which has some exceptions, that it will not undertake to interfere where a party has an adequate remedy at law, and when it does interfere it is guided by principles of equity, which during the long course of its administration have become established. Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384 (389). The right to injunction to restrain wrongful acts will be considered under the different causes of action sounding in tort. SUBDIVISION 4. Action for Damages. The most frequent and familiar damage for torts is the awarding of damages. Whenever an actionable wrong has been done, the party wronged is entitled to recover damages therefor. Pollock on Torts, 211. The chief remedy given by law for a wrong is an award of money estimated as an equivalent for the damage suffered. Cooley Elements of Torts, 19. For most wrongs an award of a pecuniary recompense is the sole remedy afforded. Hale on Damages, 2, citing 2 Bl. Comm. 438; 1 Sutherland on Damages, § 7; 1 Sedgwick on Damages, § 5. Damages may be recovered where a legal wrong has been committed whenever the conduct of the person causing damage is forbidden by law, malicious, negligent, or done at the peril of the person causing such damage; and the law affords compensation for pecuniary losses, direct and indirect; physical pain and inconvenience, and mental suffering. Hale on Damages, 23, 86. Art. 3. Jurisdiction. For pe Damages may be recovered in three classes of cases: cuniary loss where the injury is to person or property; or physical pain and inconvenience suffered — where the injury is to the person; and for mental suffering. Hale, 86. Recovery can be had, however, for mental suffering only in those cases where the same act that causes such suffering also injures plaintiff in a right protected by law in regard to his person, property, or reputation. Hale, 95. No recovery can be had for injury sustained by fright occasioned by negligence of another where there is no immediate personal injury. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107. But in Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div. 223, 71 N. Y. Supp. 291, it is held that this rule is not applicable to actions to recover damages for a willful tort and applies only to actions for negligence. Citing Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. 569, 62 N. Y. Supp. 890. A statute conferring a new right and a remedy to enforce it will usually be regarded as excluding by implication any resort to a common-law action if the statutory remedy is adequate. 1 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 42; 8 Wait's Actions and Defenses, 4. See Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Small v. Herkimer Mfg. Co., 2 N. Y. 330. The right to recover damages and the rule as to the measure of damages are both fully considered under "Damages." 2. Jurisdiction of actions for injuries to the 3. Jurisdiation of courts as to wrongs relating SUBDIVISION 1. Courts Having Jurisdiction of Actions for Wrongs. 209 210 The Supreme Court, by virtue of its general jurisdiction under section 217 of the Code, has jurisdiction of all actions for torts, Art. 3. Jurisdiction. costs being regulated by subdivision 3 of section 3228 in certain classes of torts therein specified in such a manner that if plaintiff recovers less than $50 damages, the amount of his costs cannot exceed his damages. This rule is doubtless made in view of the fact that a justice of the peace cannot take cognizance of certain torts as provided by section 2863, subdivision 3. Jurisdiction of the City Court of the city of New York extends to a case against a person or corporation where judgment is demanded for a sum of money not to exceed $2,000. Code, $$ 315, 316. And substantially the same provision is made as to jurisdiction of County Courts, where the action is between residents of the same county. Code, § 348. SUBDIVISION 2. Jurisdiction of Actions for Injuries to the Person and Personal Property Outside the State. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction. of an action between nonresident individuals, where the wrong or trespass is committed in another jurisdiction. But it can decline jurisdiction in an action of this character, even between natural persons. Collard v. Beach, 81 App. Div. 582 (585), 81 N. Y. Supp. 619, citing Ferguson v. Nelson, 11 N. Y. Supp. 524, and strongly rebuking the habit of importing such litigations into this jurisdiction, consuming the time of the courts and compelling the people of this State to bear the burden and expense of trying actions which should have been brought in other jurisdictions where the home courts are open to and afford adequate remedies, stating that it has become a great nuisance and a just subject of complaint and protest, citing the language of Hoes v. N. Y. & H. R. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 435 (441), to the effect that if actions are allowed to be brought in this jurisdiction for injuries sustained in other States upon devices as simple and transparent as the one employed in that case it "will open wide the flood gates of litigation in similar cases, establish a new legal industry, and impose thereby upon our already overworked courts the obligation of trying actions imported from a foreign jurisdiction." The subject is very fully considered and authorities cited in Wertheim v. Clergue, 53 App. Div. 122, 65 N. Y. Supp. 750, Art. 3. Jurisdiction. citing the language of Follett, Ch. J., in Burdick v. Freeman, 120 N. Y. 420, that "the courts in this State may, in their discretion, entertain jurisdiction of such an action between citizens of another State actually domiciled therein, when the action was begun and tried, though the injury was committed in the State of their residence and domicile." The opinion proceeds, however, to say that the rule has been fully established in the courts in this State that they will, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, decline jurisdiction in actions between foreigners or nonresidents founded upon personal injuries or purely personal wrongs, unless special circumstances are shown to exist which require the retention of jurisdiction. In Colorado State Bank v. Gallagher, 76 Hun, 310, 27 N. Y. Supp. 688, as also in the authorities above cited, Robinson v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 112 N. Y. 315, is distinguished upon the ground as stated in that case that an action cannot be maintained against a foreign corporation upon a cause of action for a tort which did not arise within this State, the rule differing in that respect as to corporations from that which exists as to indidivuals; but in that case it is said that "the discrimination between resident and nonresident plaintiffs is probably based upon reasons of public policy; that our courts should not be vexed with litigations between nonresident parties over causes of action which arose outside of our territorial limits. Every rule of comity and of natural justice and of convenience is satisfied by giving redress in our courts to nonresident litigants when the cause of action arose, or the subject-matter of the litigation is situated within this State." The distinction is based upon section 1780, Code. Damages recoverable in tort can only be recovered under the law of the place where the injury occurred. Torrance v. Third Nat. Bank, 70 Hun, 44, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1073, citing Greene v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 666; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, citing authorities. Same principle, Stewart v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 168 U. S. 445. SUBDIVISION 3. Jurisdiction of Courts as to Wrongs Relating to Real Estate Outside the State. It was held in Home Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 11 Hun, 182 (1887), that in an action brought in this State by an |