Art. 3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings.

Great immunity is attached to words spoken or written in the due course of parliamentary proceedings. Woods v. Wiman, 47 Hun, 362 (365).

The law affords immunity from any action for damages on account of the defamatory character or effect of words spoken or written in the course of parliamentary proceedings. Perkins v. Mitchell, 31 Barb. 461 (468).

It is said that members of legislative bodies, such as boards of supervisors, county commissioners, city councils and the like, are not liable for their acts or neglects. Cooley (2d ed.), 443, citing Baker v. State, 27 Ind. 485; Morris v. People, 3 Den. 381.

No action will lie against a judge for any acts done or words spoken in his judicial capacity in a court of justice. Pollock, 138, quoting Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Exch. 220. The American note. adds that the text substantially states the American rule.

No judicial person, whether a judge of a Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or other inferior magistrate, a member of a court-martial, or a juror is for any judicial act within his jurisdiction, however erroneous, mistaken, or even corrupt, answerable in a civil suit to the party aggrieved. They are liable in certain cases to impeachment. Bishop, §§ 781, 782.

No action for damages can be maintained against a person for anything said or done in the discharge of a judicial duty except it be an action for false imprisonment. Bigelow on Torts, 30, citing Chatterton v. Secretary of State, 1895, 2 Q. B. 189; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 183.

No judicial officer invested with power to imprison is liable to an action for false imprisonment, unless he acted beyond his jurisdiction. Underhill, 283.

Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is power lawfully conferred to

Art. 3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings. adjudge concerning the general question involved, to act upon the general abstract question, and to decide whether particular facts call for the exercise of the abstract power, but it does not depend upon the ultimate existence of a good cause of action in the particular case. Parker, Ch. J., in O'Donoghue v. Boies, 159 N. Y. 87 (109), citing Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; Bergman v. Wolff, 33 St. Rep. 499, 11 N. Y. Supp. 591; Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 436; Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12.

It is said in Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray, 120, that, “In all cases, therefore, where the cause of action against a judicial officer, exercising only a special and limited authority, is founded on his acts colore officii, the single inquiry is whether he has acted without any jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or has been guilty of an excess of jurisdiction. By this simple test, his legal liability will at once be determined. 1 Chit. Pl. (6th Am. ed.) 90, 209, 213; Beaurain v. Scott, 3 Campb. 388; Eckerley v. Parkinson, 3 M. & S. 425, 428; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Bigelow v. Stearns, 19 Johns. 39; Allen v. Gray, 11 Conn. 95. If a magistrate acts beyond the limits of his jurisdiction, his proceedings are deemed to be coram non judice and void; and if he attempts to enforce any process founded on any judgment, sentence, or conviction in such case, he thereby becomes a trespasser. 1 Chit. Pl. 210; 19 Johns. 39."

In Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282, 291, Kent, Ch. J., said: "The doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit or indictment for any act done or omitted to be done by him, sitting as a judge, has a deep root in the common law. It is to be found in the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily maintained by an undisputed current of decisions in the English courts, amidst every change of policy, and through every revolution of their government."

This was followed by Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 394, in the Court of Errors, where it was held that a judge of a court of record is not liable to answer personally in a civil suit for any act done by him in his judicial capacity, nor for errors of judgment.

Where the court has jurisdiction of the person of the delinquent. and of the subject-matter, its members are not answerable for their sentence in an action at the suit of the party. So held as to members of a court-martial, where the party arrested had waived objection to the jurisdiction of the court by pleading guilty. Vanderheyden v. Young. 11 Johns. 150.

Art. 3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings.

In Tompkins v. Sands, 8 Wend. 462, the rule was laid down that for a judicial act no action lies, but for the injury arising from the misfeasance or nonfeasance of a ministerial officer, the party has redress in an action.

Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Den. 117, holds that a public officer is not responsible in a civil suit for a judicial determination in a matter over which he had jurisdiction, however erroneous it may be, or however malicious the motive which produced it. This rule is to apply only where the judge or officer has jurisdiction and is authorized to determine that fact; if he transcends the limits of his authority, he ceases to act as judge, and is responsible for consequences, citing a large number of English authorities.

This rule is followed in East River Gas Light Co. v. Donnelly, 93 N. Y. 557.

A very careful consideration of this question was had upon very full briefs of counsel, citing numerous authorities, in Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12, where it is said that the subject has been much considered and the principles well settled; and that the difficulty in disposing of a particular case is not, in finding the rule of law upon which it is to be decided, but in determining on which side of that rule the facts of the case lie. The court cites with approval Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 351, holding that judges of superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously and corruptly.

It is held that in order that a judge may be free from liability for his act, it must have been done in his judicial capacity and must have been a judicial act, leaving the question to be determined when an act is done as a judge and when it is performed in a judicial capacity. The court states the question to be considered as follows (p. 28): "The inquiry then, at this stage of our consideration of the case, is this: Whether the defendant, sitting upon the bench of the Circuit Court, and being on that occasion. de jure et de facto the Circuit Court, and having as such jurisdiction of all persons by law within the power of that court, and jurisdiction of all subject-matters within its cognizance; whether he had jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff, and of any subject-matter wherefrom he had authority to hear and adjudge whether the facts in the case of the plaintiff, as then presented to him, fell within any of those subject-matters. It is not the in

Art. 3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings.

quiry whether the act then done as the act of the court was erroneous and illegal; that is but another form of saying whether it could or could not be lawfully done as a court by the person then sitting as the judge thereof. It is whether that court then had the judicial power to consider and pass upon the facts presented, and to determine and adjudge that such an act based upon them would be lawful or unlawful." Appeal dismissed, 99 U. S. 68.

The question is again considered in Austin v. Vroman, 128 N. Y. 229, collating the authorities, and it is held that a determination by a judge, whether his jurisdiction had ceased in a particular case or not, is not such an erroneous decision as renders him liable to an action. It is said that his erroneous decision, while conferring no jurisdiction upon him, is still such a judicial determination of the matter already pending before him, and over which up to a certain time he had jurisdiction, that he must be protected from a civil action in regard to it.

In Handshaw v. Arthur, 9 App. Div. 175, 41 N. Y. Supp. 61, affirmed 161 N. Y. 664, on opinion below, Austin v. Vroman, 128 N. Y. 229, was followed. It is said, citing Jones & Crawford v. Reid, 1 Johns. Cas. 20, that the sound rule of construction in respect to the courts of justices of the peace is to be liberal in reviewing their proceedings as far as respects regularity and form, and strict in holding them to the exact limits of jurisdiction prescribed to them by the statute. The principal case holds that as the justice has jurisdiction both of the subject-matter and of the parties, a judgment and execution, although erroneous and voidable, were not void, and the justice was entitled to protection as in an ordinary case of judicial error. Horton v. Auchmoody, 7 Wend. 200, is cited with approval.

A very full note on this question, citing numerous authorities, will be found in Case v. Shepard, 2 Johns. Cas. 27, at p. 28, where authorities are cited to the proposition that where a court has jurisdiction of the cause and proceeds erroneously, an action does not lie. That nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court but that which specially appears to be so, and on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of an inferior court but that which is so expressly alleged.

In Rutherford v. Holmes, 66 N. Y. 368, it was held that a justice was liable in an action for false imprisonment at the suit of

Art. 3. Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings.

one imprisoned in pursuance of his warrant for commitment for contempt, where the justice exceeds his jurisdiction. The court said that the fact that a justice of the peace "had jurisdiction of the person of the plaintiff and of the subject-matter then pending, did not give him judicial authority to adjudge her guilty of a contempt and to imprison her therefor. To have that authority there must have arisen before him facts which gave him power to consider the question whether there had been a contempt committed by her. When facts arose which gave him that power, he had a right to adjudicate upon them, and is not liable to an action, though he may have held erroneously as matter of law."

The latter case does not appear to be referred to in the opinion in Austin v. Vroman, 128 N. Y. 229.

A justice is liable for damages for an unauthorized entry of judgment. Earl v. Brewer, 20 Misc. Rep. 437, 46 N. Y. Supp. 527. But is not liable because of failure to render judgment in an action tried before him within four days after its final submission. Evarts v. Kiehl, 102 N. Y. 296.

See McGuckin v. Wilkins, 75 App. Div. 167, holding that a judicial officer, so far as his duties are ministerial, is required to exercise reasonable diligence in the discharge thereof, but he is not required at his peril to meet engagements. Holding further that a justice of the peace was, under the circumstances, not guilty of negligence in failing to attend upon the adjourned day, so as to render him liable in damages to the plaintiff. s. c., 11 Annot. Cas. 216. Followed by note on "Action for damages from neglect in discharging official duties."

SUBDIVISION 2.

Quasi-Judicial Officers and Proceedings.

Quasi-judicial functions are those which lie midway between the judicial and ministerial ones. The lines separating them are necessarily indistinct. When the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion, in its nature judicial, the function is termed quasi-judicial; and he is responsible to one injured by his wrongful act only if it is negligent or malicious, or both. Bishop, §§ 785, 786. 17 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d ed.), 887, quotes from School