his principal that he could not effect insurance as ordered, will make him liable. Ibid.

72. An action cannot be maintained against the agent for transactions with his principal through him, unless the agent has specifically agreed he will be answerable for his principal. Bradford v. Eastburn, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 219.

73. Where the agent has acted illegally, in refusing to deliver goods sent by his principal to him for others, upon a contract for their sale or delivery made with the principal, the remedy is by action against the principal, and not against the agent. Ibid.

74. Where an agent voluntarily disobeys the instructions of his principal, and converts to his own use a sum of money belonging to his principal, to which a definite and specific destination is given by the principal, and the article into which the agent is directed to convert the money subsequently acquires great additional value, the agent is not only responsible for the money so misapplied with legal interest, but is accountable for the article into which it ought to have been converted. Short v. Skipwith, 1 Brockenb.

C. C. R. 103.

75. A, the principal, residing in Europe, directs his agent, B, residing in Virginia, by letter bearing date December 20, 1787, to convert the funds in his hands belonging to his principal, into certificates, which B fails to do. In the spring of 1788, B'determines to relinquish the agency, and places A's funds in the hands of C, except a certain sum which is not accounted for. C invests the funds in certificates, according to previous instructions. Held, that B is chargeable with the certificates which he ought to have purchased with the remaining funds, at the rate at which C purchased the certificates in 1789. But he is accountable for the certificates with their legal interest only, and not with the certificates into which the interest might have been annually converted. Ibid.

76. Where a commission merchant takes a bond for a simple contract debt due to him for goods sold on commission, and includes in the same instrument a debt due to himself, he makes himself answerable to his principal for the amount of the goods, as he has deprived him of the means of pursuing his debtor, by extinguishing the debt due by simple contract. Jackson v. Baker, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 394.

77. Plaintiff employed defendant to sell goods on commission. He sold part, and entrusted the other part to his clerk, who ran away with the goods and money. The agent was liable for the money received by him, and lost by the perfidy of his clerk. Read v. Bertrand, 4 Wash. C. C.

R. 514.

78. A merchant of Philadelphia sent a cargo of coffee to his correspondent in Bordeaux, and wrote as follows: "Make sale of the coffee immediately on arrival, and forward the returns in the articles mentioned by the same vessel." It was the duty of the agent to sell immediately on arrival, no matter at what loss, if he could, or as soon as he could. He had no right to exercise a discretion. Courcier v. Ritter, 4 Wash. C.

C. R. 559.

62*

81. Where a factor makes advances, it is legally to be inferred, independent of any actual agreement to that effect, that they were not made without recourse to the principal: the general rule is, that they are made on the joint credit of the fund and the party; and the factor may relinquish his lien on the fund, without at all affecting his personal remedy. Burrell v. Phillips, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 360.

82. If he agree that for advances made, "he will hold for reimbursement on the amount and nett proceeds of the goods," which are only considered answerable for said amount advanced," it is a waiver of any personal claim. Peisch v. Dixon, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 9.

83. A promise by a factor that he would write to his principal to get insurance done, does not bind the principal to insure. Randolph v. Ware, 3 Cranch, 503; 1 Cond. Rep. 608.

84. It is believed to be a general rule that an agent, with limited powers, cannot bind his principal when he transcends his power. It would seem to follow, that a person transacting business with him on the credit of his principal, is bound to know the extent of his authority. Yet, if the principal has, by his declaration or conduct, authorized the opinion that he had given more extensive powers to his agent than were in fact given, he could not be permitted to avail himself of the imposition, and protest bills of exchange, the drawing of which his conduct had sanctioned. Schimmelpennich et al. v. Bayard et al., 1 Peters, 264.

85. Whatever an agent does or says in reference to the business in which he is at the time

employed, and within the scope of his authority, is done or said by the principal; and may be proved as well in a criminal as a civil case, in like manner as if all the evidence applied personally to the principal. American Fur Company v. The United States, 2 Peters, 358.

86. The general rule is, that the principal is bound by the act of his agent no further than he authorizes that agent to bind him; but the extent of the power given to an agent, is decided as well from facts, as from express delegation. In the estimate or application of these facts the law has regarded the public security; and often applies the rule, that he who trusts must pay. So, also, collusion with an agent to get a debt paid through the intervention of one in failing circumstances, has been held to make the prin

4 s

cipal liable on account of immoral dealing. Parsons v. Armor & Okey, 3 Peters, 413.

87. Where the agent has acted illegally, in refusing to deliver goods sent by his principal to him for others, upon a contract for their sale or delivery made with the principal, the remedy is by action against the principal and not against the agent. Ibid.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT.

It is false imprisonment to detain another by threats of violence to his person, or deprive him of the freedom of going where he will, by the well grounded apprehension of personal danger, though no assault is committed. Baldwin's C. C. R. 600.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

1. The powers of the federal government are limited. United States v. Bailey, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 236.

2. It possesses no principal powers but such as have been delegated to it. Ibid.

3. Congress have power to regulate commerce among the Indian tribes, which affords a wide scope for legislation. Ibid.

4. It has a right to select the means which have a direct relation to the object, in the regnlation of commerce with the Indians. Ibid.

5. Such are the provisions of the intercourse law of 1802. Ibid.

6. But congress cannot, under this investure of power, exercise a general jurisdiction over an Indian territory within a state. Ibid.

7. Congress cannot punish for an offence within the Indian territory, in a state which has no relation to the Indians, and which cannot affect their commerce. Ibid.

8. The act of 1817, which assumes to exercise a general jurisdiction over Indian countries, within a state, is unconstitutional, and of no effect. Ibid.

9. The crime of murder charged against a white man in the Cherokee country, within the state of Tennessee, cannot be punished in the courts of the United States. Ibid.

10. Under the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, congress have power to prohibit all intercourse with them, except under a license. United States v. Cisna, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 257.

11. The power is the same as to regulate commerce among foreign nations. Ibid.

12. Under the treaty-making power, certain political relations have been established between the United States and the Indian tribes. Ibid.

13. The laws regulating intercourse with the Indians, were intended to operate on communities somewhat remote from a white population. Ibid.

14. The exception in the act of 1802, refers to Indian tribes at that time surrounded by a white population. Ibid.

17. But, if no such acts take place, and the Indians occupy a territory of very limited extent, surrounded by a white population, which necessarily have daily intercourse with the In dians, and it becomes impracticable to enforce the law, the federal jurisdiction must cease. Ibid.

18. Congress have the power to authorize the President to lease lead mines within the state of Illinois. The United States v. Gratiot et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 454.

19. A lease for smelting ore is within the law. Ibid.

20. The exercise of such a power by the federal government does, in no respect, interfere with state sovereignty. Ibid.

21. The federal government has no criminal jurisdiction, except what is given by statute. United States v. Lancaster, 2 M'Lean's C. C. R.

431.

FEES.

1. Counsel fees in the courts below cannot be allowed as damages. Arcamble v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306; 1 Cond. Rep. 135.

2. Where they have been allowed in the cir cuit court, the charge may be expunged by en tering a remittitur. Ibid.

3. The jurors in civil cases attending the cir cuit court of the United States for the Pennsyl vania district, are entitled to one dollar and twenty-five cents each for each day's attendance. Ex parte Lewis et al., 4 Cranch, 433; 2 Cond. Rep. 162.

4. Each party is liable to the clerk of the supreme court, for the fees due for services performed for such party; it is immaterial to the clerk which party recovers judgment. Caldwell v. Jackson, 7 Cranch, 276; 2 Cond. Rep. 490.

5. A charge for a copy of the record is not part of the taxable costs of suit, to be recovered by one party against the other; but the party who requests the copy must pay the clerk for it. Ibid.

6. Where a writ of error is dismissed in the supreme court, for want of jurisdiction, costs are not allowed. Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; 4 Cond. Rep. 155. S. P. M Iver et al. v. Wattles, 9 Wheat. 650; 5 Cond. Rep. 717.

7. The fees and compensation to the marshal, where the government is a party to the suit, are chargeable to the United States, and are to be paid out of the treasury, upon a certificate of the amount, to be made by the court, or one of the judges. The Antelope, 12 Wheat. 546; 6 Cond. Rep. 629.

8. The counsel fees are allowed as expenses attending the prosecution of an appeal to the cir cuit court and to the supreme court, in an admi

9. Where several claims had been filed by the district attorney, and, before any further proceedings in the cause, congress remitted the forfeiture, on the payment of duties, costs, and charges: Held, that the district attorney of Massachusetts was entitled to seventeen dollars on each claim. The Frances, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 453. 10. The transcript of the record had been lodged by the plaintiffs in error with the clerk of the court on the 24th of October, 1835, who refused to file it or docket the cause, until the plaintiffs had given the fee bond, in pursuance of the thirty-seventh rule of the court. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error moved to have the transcript filed and docketed; alleging they had done all the law required to be done in order to bring the case before the supreme court. On the part of the defendant in error, his counsel filed and read in open court certified copies of the writ of error, citation and appeal bond, and of the judgment of the circuit court; and having stated that the plaintiffs in error had failed to have the case docketed according to the thirtieth rule of the court, they moved to have the case docketed and dismissed. The court overruled the motion to docket and dismiss the cause; and also the motion to have the transcript filed, and the cause docketed without the fee bond being first given. These motions were overruled on the 11th of January, 1836; and the court allowed the plaintiffs in error until the 1st day of March following to give to the clerk the fee bond: on the failure so to give the same, the writ of error to be dismissed. Owings v. Tiernan, 10 Peters,

447.

11. Where three members of the bar enter appearance for the defendant, to suits instituted against him, and are all equally called upon, and act as the attorneys of the defendant, no warrant of attorney having been given by the defendant to either, the attorney's fee in the bill of costs is to be equally divided among all who have acted in the case, and who have appeared to the suits. Hurst v. Durnell, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 438.

12. Query, If, in an action for the violation of a patent, the plaintiff recover five hundred dollars damages, or the damages when trebled amount to that sum, the plaintiff is, at all, entitled to costs. Kneas v. The Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash.

C. C. R. 106.

13. The common law gave costs in no case; and the statute of Gloucester gave them only where damages were recoverable at common law. Ibid.

2. If the felony be not cognizable under the criminal law of the country where civil redress is sought, the civil rights of the party seeking redress are not thereby suspended. Ibid. See CRIMES, Ante, page 503.

FEME COVERT.

1. In Virginia and Kentucky, the modes of conveyance by fine and common recovery, have never been in common use; and in these states, the capacity of a feme covert to convey her estate by deed, is the creature of the statute law; and to make her deed effectual, the forms and solemnities prescribed by the statutes must be pursued. Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 328.

2. It seems, that an assignment by the husband of a debt actually due and payable to the wife, divests in equity the title of the wife. Cassell v. Carroll, 11 Wheat. 134; 6 Cond. Rep. 249.

3. By the statute of Rhode Island, respecting conveyances of real estate, no deed of the wife's estate by the husband and wife, conveys any title but that of husband, unless the same deed be duly acknowledged by the wife, before a magistrate, in the manner prescribed by the statute. Manchester v. Hough, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 67.

4. By the customary and ancient law of Rhode Island, a feme covert may pass her estate by a deed, in which her husband is joined, which is duly executed and acknowledged. Ibid.

5. A marriage settlement, conveying the wife's land and slaves to trustees, by a deed to which the husband was a party, although not recorded, protects the property from the creditors of her husband. Pierce v. Turner, 5 Cranch, 154; 2 Cond. Rep. 219.

6. In Massachusetts, a feme covert may convey her estate by deed joining with her husband, as fully as the same could be conveyed in England by a fine or recovery. Ibid.

7. A deed of land executed by husband and wife, but conveying no words of grant by the wife, does not convey her estate in the land, nor her right of dower. Powell et ux. v. The Monson and Brimfield Manufacturing Co., 3 Mason's C. C. R. 347.

FELONY.

1. At common law, the civil rights of a party injured by a felonious act are only suspended

not pass her interest, by the force of its execu tion and delivery, as in the common case of a deed by a person under no legal incapacity. In such cases, an acknowledgment gives no additional effect between the parties to the deed. It operates only as to third persons, under the provisions of recording, and kindred laws. The law presumes a feme covert to act under the coercion of her husband, unless before a court of record, a judge or some commissioner in England, by a separate acknowledgment, out of the

116.

9. Where a deed was executed in Massachusetts by a husband, of lands owned by him in that state, in March, 1808, and afterwards, in November, 1808, his wife signed and sealed the same deed, with the following words written over her signature: "I agree in the above conveyance in witness whereof," &c., giving the date, &c., it was held, that by the local law such a conveyance did not operate as a release of her dower in the estate so conveyed. Hall v. Savage, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 273.

17. By the Virginia statute of 1748, "when any deed has been acknowledged by a feme covert, and no record made of her privy examination, such deed is not binding upon the feme and her heirs." This law was adopted by Kentucky, at her separation from Virginia, and is understood never to have been repealed. Ibid. 339.

18. It is the construction of the act of 1810, that the clerks of the county court of Kentucky have authority to take acknowledgments and privy examinations of femes covert, in all cases of deeds made by them and their husbands. Ibid. 339.

11. The form of the certificate of the execution and acknowledgment of a deed by a feme covert, is in conformity with the law of Pennsylvania, if it appear by the certificate that the directions of the act of assembly are substantially complied with. Lessee of Talbot v. Simpson, Peters' C. C. R. 188.

12. When the certificate of a magistrate, who took the examination of a feme covert, does not state that she was at the age of twenty-one years, the presumption is that the person examined was of fuli age, until the contrary is shown by proof. Lessee of Batten v. Bigelow, Peters' C. C.

R. 452.

13. The payment of part of the purchasemoney of land, the property of a feme covert, in her presence, cannot prejudice her right to claim the land, after termination of the coverture. Lessee of Delancey v. M-Keen, 1 Wash. C. C. R. 354.

14. The title of a feme covert to land, cannot be affected by acts of commission, short of those required by law to bind her; much less by acts of omission. Even if by any acts during coverture other than those which by the provisions of the law may clearly bind her, a feme covert may have bound herself, they are proper for the decision of a court of equity, but not of law. Ibid. 15. In order to protect the rights of a feme covert in property forfeited, as belonging to her husband, on his attainder it is not necessary that tre husband should put in a claim to the same for her; as by the supplement to the attainder Jaws of Pennsylvania, passed 29th March, 1779, the rights of persons claiming paramount to the attainder are saved. Ibid.

there be an acknowledgment or privy examination in form or not, if there be no record made of the privy examination; for, by the express provisions of the law, it is not the fact of privy examination only, but the recording of the fact, which makes the deed effectual to pass the estate of a feme covert. Ibid. 340.

20. A deed from baron and feme, of lands in the state of Kentucky, executed to a third person, by which the land of the feme was intended to be conveyed for the purpose of a reconveyance to the husband, and thus to vest in him the estate of the wife, was endorsed by the clerk of Woodford county court, "acknowledged by James Elliott and Sarah G. Elliott, September 11th, 1816," and was certified as follows:"Woodford County, ss. September 11th, 1816.

"This deed from James Elliott and Sarah G.

Elliott, his wife, to Benjamin Elliott, was this said James and Sarah to be their act and deed, day produced before me, and acknowledged by and the same is duly recorded.

"JOHN M'KENNEY, Jun., C. C. C.”

Held, that subsequent proceedings of the court of Woodford county, by which the defects of the certificate of the clerk to state the privy exami nation of the feme, (which, by the laws of Kentucky, is necessary to make a conveyance of the estate of a feme covert legal,) were intended to be cured upon evidence that the privy exami nation was made by the clerk, will not supply the defect, or give validity to the deed. Ibid.

21. Defects in the certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed of a feme covert, were not cured by subsequent proceedings of the county court of Woodford county, Kentucky, intended to supply the defect, and give validity to the deed. Ibid.