Piracy. a foreigner being on board of such vessel, upon or when or where the vessel was armed and another foreigner being on board of a foreign equipped; but it did appear in proof, that the vessel. It is not necessary to produce docu- captain and crew were chiefly Englishmen, mentary evidence, in order to prove the national Frenchmen, and citizens of the United States; character of a vessel, on an indictment for piracy. that the captain was by birth a citizen of the Ibid. United States, domiciled at Baltimore, where the privateer was built: Held, that the burden of proof of the national character of the vessel was on the prisoners. Ibid. 94. The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of a murder committed by one foreigner on another foreigner, both being on board a foreign vessel. Ibid. 95. It is competent, in an indictment for piracy, for the jury to find that a vessel within a marine league of the shore, at anchor, in an open roadstead, where vessels only ride under shelter of the land at a season when the course of the winds is invariable, is upon the high seas. Ibid. 96. The act of the 3d of March, 1819, ch. 76, sec. 5, furnishes a sufficient definition of piracy; and it is defined to be "robbery on the seas." Ibid. 97. A vessel loses her national character by assuming a piratical character; and a piracy committed by a foreigner, from on board such a vessel, upon any other vessel whatever, is punishable under the eighth section of the act of the 30th of April, 1790, ch. 36. Ibid. 98. On an indictment for piracy, the jury may find the national character of a vessel upon such evidence as will satisfy their minds, without the certificate of registry, or other documentary evidence, being produced; and without proof of their having been seen on board. Ibid. 99. On an indictment for piracy, the national character of a merchant vessel of the United States may be proved without evidence of her certificate of registry. Ibid. 100. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction under the act of the 30th of April, 1790, ch. 36, of murder or robbery committed on the high seas, although not committed on board a vessel belonging to citizens of the United States, as if she had no national character, but was held by pirates, or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. 412; 4 Cond. Rep. 708. 101. In the same case, and under the same act, if the offence be committed on board of a foreign vessel by a citizen of the United States, or on board a vessel of the United States by a foreigner, or by a citizen or foreigner on board of a piratical vessel, the offence is equally cognizable by the courts of the United States. Ibid. 102. It makes no difference in such a case, and under the same act, whether the offence was committed on board of a vessel, or in the sea; as by throwing the deceased overboard and drowning him, or by shooting him when in the sea though he was not thrown overboard. Ibid. 103. In such a case, and under the same act, where the vessel, from on board of which the offence was committed, sailed from Buenos Ayres, where she had enlisted her crew; but it did not appear by legal proof that she had a commission from the government of Buenos Ayres, or any ship's papers or documents from that government, or that she was ever recognised as a ship of that nation, or of its subjects, or who were the owners, where they resided, 104. General piracy, or murder, or robbery committed by persons on board a vessel, not at the time belonging to the subjects of any foreign power, but in possession of a crew, acting in de fiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no government whatever, is within the eighth section of the act of congress of April 30th, 1799, ch. 36, and is punishable in the courts of the United States. U. S. v. Furlong, 5 Wheat. 185; 4 Cond. Rep. 623. 105. There is a distinction between the crimes of murder and piracy. The latter is an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations: not so with murder, it is punishable under the laws of each state. Ibid. 106. It is not necessary to produce documentary evidence to prove the national character of a vessel, on an indictment for piracy. Ibid. 107. Upon a piratical capture, the property of the original owners cannot be forfeited for the misconduct of the captors, in violating the municipal laws of the country where the captors have carried the property. The Josefa Segunda, 5 Wheat. 338; 4 Cond. Rep. 672. 108. Pirates may be lawfully captured by the public or private ships of any nation, in peace or in war; for they are hostes humani generis. The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1; 6 Cond. Rep. 201. 109. On a question of probable cause of seizure, under the piracy acts of 3d of March, 1819, ch. 75, and of the 15th of May, 1820, ch. 20, although the crew may be protected, by a commission bona fide received, and acted under, from the consequences attaching to the offence of piracy, by the general law of nations; although such commission was irregularly issued; yet, if the defects in the commission be such as, connected with the insubordination and preda tory spirit of the crew, to excite a justly founded suspicion, it is sufficient, under the act of congress, to justify the captors for bringing in the vessel for adjudication, and to exempt them from costs and damages. The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; 6 Cond. Rep. 337. 110. Whatever difficulty there may be, under our municipal institutions, in punishing as pirates citizens of the United States who take from a state at war with Spain, a commission to cruise against that power, contrary to the fourteenth article of the Spanish treaty; yet there is no doubt that such acts are to be considered as piratical acts for all civil purposes, and the offending parties cannot appear, and claim in our courts the property thus taken. The Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. 152; 5 Cond. Rep. 45. 111. To constitute the offence of piracy, within the act of 1790, ch. 9, by "piratically and feloniously" running away with a vessel, per Revolt.-Running away with a Vessel.-Robbing the Mail of the United States. sonal force and violence is not necessary. United | the lawful authority and command of the master States v. Tully, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 247. and officers of the ship. It is, in effect, an endeavour to make a mutiny among the crew of the ship. United States v. Smith, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 147. 112. The "piratically and feloniously" running away with a vessel, within the act, is the running away with a vessel, with an intent to convert the same to the taker's own use, against the will of the owner. The intent must be animo furandi. Ibid. 122. On an indictment for an endeavour to make a revolt in a ship, founded on the twelfth section of the act of the 30th of April, 1790, ch. 113. The circuit court has cognizance, under 9, it is not necessary to prove that it was comthe act of congress of 1790, ch. 9, sec. 8, of pi-mitted on the high seas. United States v. Haracy on board of an American ship, although milton, 1 Mason's C. C. R. 443. committed in an open roadstead adjacent to a foreign territory, and within half a mile of the shore. United States v. Ross, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 524. 114. Where the defendant was indicted for robbery and piracy on the high seas, on board a brig called L'Eclair, a foreign vessel, belonging exclusively to French owners, and sailing under the French flag: Held, that under the acts of congress, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to try and punish the offence. The United States v. Kesser, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 25. 115. Whether the offence was committed within or without a marine league of the coast of the United States, makes no difference. Ibid. 10. Revolt, and endeavouring to make a Revolt. 116. Although the crimes act of 1790, ch. 36, sec. 12, does not define the offence of endeavouring to make a revolt, it is competent for the court to give a judicial definition of it. United States v. Kelly, 11 Wheat. 417; 6 Cond. Rep. 370. 117. The offence consists in the endeavour of the crew of a vessel, or any one or more of them, to overthrow the legitimate authority of the commander, with intent to remove him from his command; or against his will to take possession of the vessel, by assuming the government and navigation of her; or by transferring their obedience from the lawful commander to some other person. Ibid. 118. A revolt is an usurpation of the authority and command of the ship, and an overthrow of that of the master or commanding officer. Any conspiracy to accomplish such an object, or to resist a lawful command of the master for such purpose; any endeavour to stir up others of the crew to such resistance, is an endeavour to commit a revolt, within the meaning of the twelfth section of the statute of 1790, ch. 9. United States v. Hemmer, 4 Mason's C. C. R. 105. 119. An endeavour to make a revolt, is an offence within the twelfth section of the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 36, if committed in a foreign port; the section does not confine the penalty to cases on the high seas. United States v. Keefe, 3 Mason's C. C. R. 475. 120. To constitute an endeavour to commit a revolt within the crimes act of 1790, ch. 36, it is necessary that there should be some effort or act to stir up others of the crew to disobedience of the master. United States v. Savage, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 460. 121. An endeavour to make a revolt within the act of the 30th of April, 1790, ch. 9, sec. 12, is an endeavour to excite the crew to overthrow 123. What constitutes an "endeavour to make a revolt," under the act of congress of the United States? Mere insolent conduct to the master, disobedience of orders, or violence committed on the person of the master, unaccompanied by other acts showing an intention to subvert his command as master, is not sufficient. Mere conspiracy of the crew to displace the master, unaccompanied by overt acts, is not sufficient. Neither is concert among the crew to that event, essential to constitute the offence. The United States v. Kelly et al., 4 Wash. C. C. R. 528. 124. The offence of revolt, or endeavouring to make a revolt, may be committed in any kind of a vessel. Ibid. 125. "The making a revolt in a ship," in the twelfth section of the act of April 30th, 1790, ch. 36, is not a clear and unambiguous description of an offence. Ibid. 126. One who joins in the general conspiracy, and by his presence countenances acts of violence, but who does not individually use force or threats, to compel the master to resign the command of the vessel, is guilty of the offence of confining the master. Ibid. 11. Running away with a Vessel. 127. To constitute the offence of running away with a vessel, it must appear that the command of the vessel must be taken from the captain by the accused, or without the consent of the captain, for some time, no matter how long; and that the act was done feloniously, and with the intent to convert the vessel and cargo to the use of the person or persons concerned in the act. United States v. Haskell & François, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 402. 12. Robbing the Mail of the United States. 128. The defendant was indicted upon the twenty-fourth section of the act of congress of 3d March, 1825, entitled "an act to reduce into one the several acts establishing and regulating the post-office department," for advising, procuring, and assisting one Joseph I. Staughan, a mail-carrier, to rob the mail, and was found guilty. Upon this finding, the judges of the circuit court of North Carolina were divided in opinion on the question, whether an indictment founded on the statute for advising, &c., a mailcarrier to rob the mail, ought to set forth or aver that the said carrier did in fact commit the offence of robbing the mail? By the supreme court:The answer to this, as an abstract question, must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put is, whether there must be a distinct substantive averment of that fact, it is Slave-Trade. not necessary. The indictment in this case | to hold or sell such persons as slaves, but that sufficiently sets out that the offence had been of hovering on the coast of the United States committed by the mail-carrier. United States v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138. 129. The offence charged in this indictment, is a misdemeanour where all are principals, and the doctrine applicable to the principal and accessory in cases of felony does not apply. The offence, however charged against the defendant, is secondary in its character; and there can be no doubt that it must sufficiently appear upon the indictment, that the offence alleged against the chief actor had been committed. Ibid. 130. Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the person having the custody of it in jeopardy, under the nineteenth section of the act of April 30th, 1810, ch. 262, a sword, &c., in the hand of the robber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon within the act, putting the life in jeopardy, though it be not drawn or pointed at the carrier. So a pistol in his hands by means of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon; and it is not necessary to prove that it was charged; it is presumed to be so until the contrary is proved. The United States v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 440. 131. It is not necessary to a conviction, under the twenty-second section, that the carrier of the mail should have taken the oath prescribed by the second section of the act of 1825, or that the whole mail be taken. The United States v. Wilson et al., 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 102. 132. All persons present at the commission of a crime, consenting thereto, aiding, assisting, or abetting therein, or in doing any act which is a constituent of the offence, are principals. Ibid. 133. The word "rob," in the act of congress of 1825, section twenty-two, is used in the common law sense. Ibid. 93. 134. "Jeopardy," as used in the section, means a well-grounded apprehension of danger to life, in case of refusal to yield to threats, or resistance. Ibid. 135. A mail-carrier is within the eighteenth section of the "act regulating the post-office establishment," subjecting to a penalty in certain cases, "persons employed in any of the departments of the general post-office." United States v. Belew, 2 Brock. 280. 136. The twenty-fifth section of the post-office law, which prescribes a penalty for the detention of a letter, refers to a letter or packet detained before it reaches its destination. United States v. Pearce, 2 M'Lean, 14. 137. The stealing or taking a letter in the twenty-second section means a clandestine taking. Ibid. 13. Slave-Trade. 138. The offence against the law of the United States, under the seventh section of the act of congress, passed the 2d of March, 1807, entitled an act to prohibit the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the 1st of January, 1808," is not that of importing or bringing into the United States persons of colour with intent with such intent; and although it forfeits the vessel and any goods or effects found on board, it is silent as to disposing of the coloured persons found on board, any further than to impose a duty upon the officers of armed vessels who make the capture to keep them safely, to be delivered to the overseers of the poor, or the governor of the state, or persons appointed by the respective states to receive the same. The United States v. Preston, 3 Peters, 65. 139. The persons of colour, held as slaves under an order of the district court of Louisiana, in a case in which the decree of the district court was afterwards reversed; were illegally sold, and they are free. Ibid. 140. The African slave-trade is contrary to the law of nature, but is not prohibited by the positive law of nations. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66; 6 Cond. Rep. 30. 141. Although the slave-trade is now prohibited by the laws of most civilized nations, still it may be lawfully carried on by the subjects of those nations who have not prohibited it by municipal acts and treaties. Ibid. 142. The slave-trade is not piracy unless made so by the treaties or statutes of the nation to whom the party belongs. Ibid. 143. The right of visitation and search does not exist in time of peace. A vessel engaged in the slave-trade, even if prohibited by the laws of the country to which it belongs, cannot, for that cause alone, be seized on the high seas and brought in for adjudication in time of peace, in the courts of another country. But if the laws of that other country be violated, or the proceeding be authorized by treaty, the act of capture is not, in that case, unlawful. Ibid. 144. Upon an indictment under the slave-trade act of the 20th of April, 1818, ch. 373, against the owner of a slave ship, testimony of the declarations of the master, being a part of the res gestæ connected with acts in furtherance of the voyage, and within the scope of his authority, as agent of the owner, in the conduct of the guilty enterprise, is admissible in evidence against the owner. United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460; 6 Cond. Rep. 572. 145. Upon such an indictment against the owner, charging him with fitting out the ship, with intent to employ her in the illegal voyage, evidence is admissible that he commanded, authorized, and superintended the fitment, through the instrumentality of his agents, without being personally present. Ibid. 146. In such an indictment, it is not necessary to specify the particulars of the fitting out: it is sufficient to allege the offence in the words of the statute. Ibid. 147. Nor is it necessary that there should be any principal offender to whom the defendant might be aiding and abetting. These terms in the statute do not refer to the relation of principal and accessory in cases of felony; both the actor and he who aids and abets the act are considered as principals. Ibid. 148. It is necessary that the indictment should Slave-Trade. aver that the vessel was built, fitted out, &c., or | 10th of May, 1800, ch. 205, the owner of the caused to sail, or be sent away, within the jurisdiction of the United States. Ibid. 149. An averment that the ship was fitted out, &c., "with intent that the said vessel should be employed" in the slave-trade, is fatally defective, the words of the statute being "with intent to employ" the vessel in the slave-trade, and exclusively referring to the intent of the party causing the act. Ibid. 150. It is not necessary, to incur the forfeiture under the slave-trade acts, that the equipments for the voyage should be completed. It is sufficient if any preparations are made for the unlawful purpose. The Plattsburgh, 10 Wheat. 133; 6 Cond. Rep. 43. slaves transported contrary to the provisions of that act, cannot claim the same in a court of the United States, although they may be held in servitude according to the laws of his own country. But if, at the time of the capture by a coinmissioned vessel, the offending ship was in possession of a non-commissioned captor, who had made a seizure for the same offence, the owner of the slaves may claim; the section only apply. ing to persons interested in the enterprise or voyage in which the ship was employed at the time of such capture. Ibid. 156. The offence of sailing from a port with an intent to engage in the slave-trade, is not committed unless the vessel sails out of the port, under the act of April 20, 1818, ch. 86, sections 2 and 3. The United States v. La Coste, 2 Mason, 129. 151. Certain persons, who were slaves in Louisiana, were, by their owners, taken to France as servants, and after some time, were, by their own consent, sent back to New Orleans; some 157. If, under the act of April 20, 1818, ch. of them under declarations from their owners, 86, sections 2 and 3, the offence of causing a that they should be free; and one of them, after vessel to sail from a port of the United States, his arrival, was held as a slave. The ships in with an intent to engage in the slave-trade, be which these persons were passengers, were, after alleged in the indictment to be on a day now their arrival in New Orleans, libelled for alleged last past, and on divers days and times before breaches of the act of congress of April 20, 1818, and since that day, the allegation is sufficient; prohibiting the importation of slaves into the for the words "now last past" mean last past, United States: Held, that the provisions of the before the caption of the indictment; and the act of congress do not apply to such cases. The words "on divers days and times" may be reobject of the law was to put an end to the slave-jected as surplusage, if the offence be but a sintrade, and to prevent the introduction of slaves gle offence. Ibid. from foreign countries. The language of the statute cannot properly be applied to persons of colour who were domiciled in the United States, and who are brought back to the United States, to their place of residence, after their temporary absence. The United States v. The Garonne, 11 Peters, 73. 152. A libel or information, under the ninth section of the slave-trade act of March 2, 1807, ch. 77, alleging that the vessel sailed from the ports of New York and Perth Amboy, without the captain's having delivered the manifests required by law to the collector or surveyor of New York and Perth Amboy, is defective; the act requiring the manifest to be delivered to the collector or a surveyor of a single port. The Mary Ann, 8 Wheat. 380; 5 Cond. Rep. 471. 153. Under the same section, the libel must | charge the vessel to be of the burden of forty tons or more. In general, it is sufficient to charge the offence in the words directing the forfeiture; but if the words are general, embracing a whole class of individual subjects, but must necessarily be so construed as to embrace only a subdivision of that class, the allegation must conform to the legislative sense and meaning. Ibid. 154. The prohibitions in the slave-trade acts of the 10th of May, 1800, ch. 205, and of the 20th of April, 1818, extend as well to the carrying of slaves on freight, as to cases where the persons transported are the property of citizens of the United States; and to the carrying of them from one port to another, of the same foreign empire, as well as from one foreign country to another. The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391; 5 Cond. Rep. 623. 155. Under the fourth section of the act of the 158. It is not necessary, in an indictment under the act of April 20, 1818, ch. 16, sections 2 and 3, for the offence of causing a vessel to sail from a port in the United States, with an intent to engage in the slave-trade, to allege that the negroes, &c., were to be transported to the United States or their territories; or that they were free and not bound to service; or that the defendant was a citizen or resident within the United States; or that the offence was committed on board an American vessel. It is sufficient if the indictment follow, in these respects, the language of the statute, and is as certain. Ibid. 159. One of the phrases used in the statute being "persons of colour," it is sufficient, in the indictment, to use the same words, without more definite specification of the meaning of the words. Ibid. 160. An act of congress declares that no person shall build, fit, equip, load, or otherwise prepare any ship or vessel, &c., within any port of the United States, nor shall cause any ship or vessel to sail from any port of the United States, for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in slaves, to any foreign country: and it declares that "if any ship or vessel shall be so fitted out as aforesaid, or shall be caused to sail as aforesaid, such ship or vessel, &c., shall be forfeited to the United States." And the second section inflicts a penalty of two thousand dollars on any person who shall build, fit out, &c., &c., any such ship or vessel, knowing or intending that the same shall be so employed. Held, 1st. That the forfeiture of the vessel is not incurred by the building of the vessel for the illegal purpose aforesaid. 2d. An information against the vessel, which charges "that she was built, fitted, Treason. equipped, loaded, or otherwise prepared, &c., or | place of rendezvous is not sufficient; but the 170. A mere conspiracy to subvert the government of another country is not treason. Ibid. 171. It is not necessary that the individual should appear in arms against his country, to constitute treason. Ibid. 161. The act of congress of the 28th of February, 1803, forbidding any master or captain of a ship or vessel to import or bring into any port of the United States, any negro, mulatto, or other person of colour, under certain penalties, where 172. In the case of the United States v. Vigol, the admission or importation of such persons is circuit court of Pennsylvania, 1795, on the trial prohibited by the laws of such state, does not of the defendant for treason, the court said: apply to coloured seamen employed in navigat-"The fear which the law recognises as an exing such ship or vessel. The Brig Wilson, 1 Brockenb. Rep. 384. 163. It is sufficient, in the indictment for such offence, to allege that the defendant, "as master for some other person, the name whereof being to the jurors yet unknown," did cause the vessel to sail, &c. United States v. La Coste, 2 Mason, 129. 163. It is not necessary, on an indictment on the slave-trade act of April 20, 1818, ch. 86, sections 2 and 3, to aver that the defendant knowingly committed the offence. United States v. Smith, 2 Mason, 143. cuse for the perpetration of an offence, must proceed from immediate and actual danger, threatening the very life of the party. The apprehension of any loss of property by waste or fire, or even the apprehension of a slight or remote injury to the person, furnishes no excuse." United States v. Vigol, 2 Dall. 347. 173. The defendant was indicted for treason in levying war against the United States. He had accompanied, and was one of the most active of the party who had attacked the house of the excise officer, with guns, drums, &c., insisted upon the surrender of his official papers, and 164. Africans, who were first captured by a extorted an oath from him that he would never belligerent privateer, fitted out in violation of the act again in the execution of the excise law. neutrality of the United States, or by a pirate, The party afterwards went to the house of anand then recaptured and brought into the United other collector, ransacked it, and burned it with States, under a reasonable suspicion that a vio- its contents, including his books and papers. lation of the slave-trade acts was intended, are The collector was made to swear he would not not to be restored without full proof of the pro-again act under the excise law. The general prietary interest; for in such a case the capture is lawful. The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66; 6 Cond. Rep. 30. 165. If a foreign claimant of a vessel, seized for being engaged in the slave-trade, sets up a title derived from American owners, he must give affirmative evidence that the case has no admixture of American property. United States v. La Jeune Eugene, 2 Mason, 409. 166. The African slave-trade, abstractly considered, is inconsistent with the law of nations; and a claim founded upon it may be repelled in any court where it is asserted, unless the trade be legalized by the nation to which claimant belongs. Ibid. 14. Treason. 167. To constitute a levying of war, there must be an assemblage of persons for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable purpose. Enlistment of men to serve against government is not sufficient. Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Cranch, 75; 2 Cond. Rep. 32. 168. When war is levied, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are traitors. Ibid. 169. An assemblage of men, for the purpose of revolutionizing by force the government established by the United States in any of its territories, as a step to or the means of executing some great projects, amounts to levying war, and is treason. The travelling of individuals to the combination in which the defendant participated was to prevent by force the execution of the excise law. The defendant was found guilty under the charge of the court. Ibid. 174. The court said: "A technical objection has been suggested in favour of the prisoner. It is said that the offence is not proved to have been committed on the day, and the number of the insurgent party was not so great, as the indictment states." But both these exceptions, even if well founded in fact, are immaterial in point of law. The crime is proved to have been committed as laid, before the charge was presented; and whether it was committed by one hundred or five hundred, cannot alter the guilt of the defendant. Ibid. 175. The defendant, a Spaniard by birth, was indicted for high treason against the United States, "in having entered on board a French privateer, and capturing an American vessel." He had taken an oath of allegiance to the United States, before the mayor of the city of Philadel phia, in 1793, according to the act of assembly of Pennsylvania, of 13th March, 1789. The circuit court of the Pennsylvania circuit held that he was not a citizen of the United States, and could not commit treason. The United States v. Velatto, 2 Dall. 370. 176. In cases of trials for treason, as the act of congress does not fix the number of jurors, nor expressly adopt any state rule for the purpose, it is the necessary consequence that the subject must depend on the common law; and by the common law, the court may direct any |