part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; 3 Cond. Rep. 575.

57. The judicial power is delegated by the constitution in the most general terms, and may, therefore, be exercised by congress under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction. Ibid.

58. Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; 3 Cond. Rep.

575.

59. The constitution of New Jersey confers general powers of legislation. The legislature has power to regulate fisheries on the Delaware, by prohibiting the exercise of a common law right. The only restraint upon the power is, that they cannot, by any law, impair the obligation of a contract. Bennett v. Boggs, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 74.

60. If a right is not founded in a contract, or secured by the constitution of the United States, it may be taken away by a state law; however long it may have been exercised. Ibid.

61. The circuit court of the United States can inquire only into the constitutional power of the legislature of a state; not on the policy, justice, or wisdom of their acts. Ibid.

62. The right to take private property for public use, is an incident to all governments; but the obligation to make compensation is concomitant. Bonaparte v. The Camden and Amboy Railroad Company, 1 Baldwin's C. C. R. 219.

63. The constitution protects property against arbitrary seizure or divestiture; not against seizure or divestiture by legal process, and on compensation made. İbid.

64. The legislature may prescribe the process of taking property for the public use; also the mode of ascertaining compensation without trial by jury. lbid.

65. A law cannot authorize the taking private property for any other than public use. Ibid.

66. Under the clause of the constitution giving the power to congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," congress possesses the power to punish offences of the sort enumerated in the ninth section of the act of 1825. The power to regulate commerce, includes the power to regulate navigation, as connected with the commerce with foreign nations, and among the states. It does not stop at the mere boundary line of a state; nor is it confined to acts done on the waters, or in the necessary course of the navi gation thereof. It extends to such acts done on land, which interfere with, obstruct, or prevent the due exercise of the power to regulate commerce and navigation with foreign nations, or among the states. Any offence which thus interferes with, obstructs, or prevents such commerce and navigation, though done on land, may be punished by congress, under its general authority to make all laws necessary and proper in execute their delegated constitutional powers. The United States v. Coombs, 12 Peters, 72.

67. Although the constitution does not, iɛ terms, extend the judicial power to all controversies between two or more states, yet it, in terms, excludes none, whatever may be their nature or subject. The State of Rhode Island v. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.

68. The supreme court, in construing the constitution as to the grants of powers to the United States, and the restrictions upon the states, has ever held, that an exception of any particular case presupposes that those which are not excepted are embraced within the grant or prohibition; and have laid it down as a general rule, that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. Ibid.

69. In the construction of the constitution, the court must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things existing when it was framed and adopted, to ascertain the old law, the mischief, and the remedy. Ibid.

70. The supreme court cannot presume that any state which holds prerogative rights for the good of citizens, and, by the constitution, has agreed that those of any other state shall enjoy rights, privileges, and immunities in each, as its own do, would either do wrong or deny right to a sister state or its citizens, or refuse to submit to those decrees of the supreme court rendered pursuant to its own delegated authority, when, in a monarchy, its fundamental law declares that such decree executes itself. Ibid.

71. In the case of Olmstead, the supreme court expressed its opinion, that if state legislatures may annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and the rights thereby acquired, the constitution becomes a solemn mockery, and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by its own tribunal. So fatal a result must be deprecated by all; and the people of every state must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so destructive of the Union, and in averting consequences so fatal to themselves. Ibid.

72. An action was instituted in the circuit court of Louisiana, on a promissory note given in the state of Mississippi, for the purchase of slaves in that state. The slaves had been imported in 1835-36, as merchandise, or for sale, into Mississippi, by a non-resident of that state. The constitution of Mississippi, adopted on the 26th October, 1832, declared that the introduc tion of slaves into that state as merchandise, or for sale, shall be prohibited from and after the first day of May, 1833. The parties to the note contended, in the circuit court, that the contract was void, asserting that it was made in violation of the provision of the constitution of Mississippi, which, it was insisted, was operative after May 1, 1833, without legislative enactment to carry it into effect. Held, that the prohibition of the constitution did not invalidate the contract, but that an act of the legislature of the state was required to carry it into effect; and no law on the subject of the prohibition in the constitution was passed until 1837. Groves et al. v. Slaughter 15 Peters, 449.

74. The language of the constitution obviously points to something more to be done, and looks to some future time, not only for its fulfilment, but for the means by which it was to be accomplished. But the mere grammatical construction ought not to control the interpretation, unless it is warranted by the general scope and object of the provision. Ibid.

75. Under the constitution of Mississippi of 1817, it is declared that the legislature shall have power to prevent slaves being brought into the state as merchandise. The time and manner in which this was to be done, was left to the discretion of the legislature; and, by the constitution of 1832, it is no longer a matter of discretion when this prohibition is to take effect; but the first day of May, 1833, is fixed on as the time, before which the provision shall not operate. But there is nothing in this provision which looks like withdrawing the whole subject from the action of the legislature. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe, from the mere naked prohibition, that it looked to legislative enactment to carry it into full operation; and, indeed, this is indispensable. There are no penalties or sanctions provided in the constitution, for its due and effectual operation. The constitution of 1832 looks to a change of policy on the subject, and fixes the time when the entire prohibition shall take effect; and it is a fair and reasonable conclusion, that it was the only material change from the constitution of 1817. Ibid.

76. Admitting that the constitution is mandatory upon the legislature, and that they have neglected their duty in not carrying it into execution, it can have no effect upon the construction of this article. Legislative provision is necessary to carry into effect the object of the prohibition. It requires the sanction of penalties to accomplish this object. Ibid.

77. What would become of the slaves thus introduced, if the construction is such as to give the provision immediate operation? Will they become free immediately on introduction, or do they become forfeited to the state! These are questions not easily answered; and although these difficulties may be removed by subsequent legislation, yet they are proper circumstances to be taken into consideration, when inquiring into the intention of the convention, in forming the constitution. It is unreasonable to suppose, that if this prohibition was intended to operate, per se, without any legislative aid, that there would not have been some guards and checks thrown round it, to insure its execution. Ibid.

78. The proviso in this article, that actual settlers shall not be prohibited from bringing in slaves for their own use, until the year 1845, must, necessarily, be considered as addressed to the legislature, and must be construed as a restriction on their power. The enacting part of

this provision in the constitution was not understood but as directory to the legislature. Ibid.

79. The enactment of a law in 1837, to carry the provision of the constitution into effect by imposing penalties, from and after the passing of the law, shows the sense of the legislature on the subject, and that, in the opinion of the legis lature, such a law was necessary. The laying of a tax on slaves brought into the state for sale after May 1st, 1833, also shows that the provision in the constitution was not considered in operation without some legislative provisions to carry it into effect. Ibid.

80. To declare all contracts made for the purchase of slaves, introduced as merchandise or for sale, from the 1st of May, 1833, until the passage of the law of 1837, illegal and void, when there was such an unsettled state of opi nion and course of policy pursued by the legis lature, would be a severe and rigid construction of the constitution, and one that ought not to be adopted, unless called for by the plainest and most unequivocal language. Ibid.

81. The court do not mean to say, that if there appeared to have been a fixed and settled course of policy in the state of Mississippi, against allowing the introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for sale, after the first day of May, 1833, that a contract made in violation of such policy would not be void. But the court cannot think that this principle applies to this case; as, when the sale of the slaves in question was made, there was, certainly, no fixed and settled course of policy which could make void or illegal such contracts. Ibid.

82. The legislature of Illinois, on the 27th of February, 1841, passed an act which directed the appraisement of real estate taken in execution, and if the property should not bring, at the offer for sale, two-thirds of the amount of the appraisement, it should not be sold. The law also provided that all property mortgaged should be sold according to the provisions of the act, and that the law should extend to all judgments rendered prior to May 1, 1841. On the 19th of June, 1841, the circuit court of the United States for the district of Illinois adopted a rule, by which property taken in execution under process from that court, should be appraised according to the law of Illinois of February 27, 1841, if the case came within the law. The court, by rule, adopted the section of the act which regulates the sale of property mortgaged, except where special directions should be given in the decree of sale. A mortgagee having obtained a decree of foreclosure and sale, moved for an execution, without being subject to the rule of court, or to the provisions of the act of 1841. On this motion the judges of the circuit court were divided in opinion, and the division was certified to the supreme court. The court held :-The laws of the states regulating the process of their courts, and prescribing the manner in which it shall be executed, do not bind the courts of the United

States, whose proceedings must be governed by the acts of congress. By the act of congress of 1828, on the subject of process used in the courts of the United States, the process on judgments and the proceedings therein shall be the same as were then used in the courts of the states respectively; and it authorizes the courts of the United States, in their discretion, by rules of court, to alter the final process, so far as to conform the same to any changes which might be adopted by the legislatures of the states respectively. Any acts of the legislature relative to final process passed since 1828, are of no force in the courts of the United States, unless adopted by rules of court, according to the provisions of the act of congress; and although such laws may have been so adopted, they are inoperative and of no force, if in conflict with the constitution of the United States. Bronson v. Kinzie et al., 17 Peters, 28.

83. The obligation of the contract of mortgage depends upon the laws of Illinois, as they stood at the time the mortgage deed was executed. Those laws, as then existing, created and defined | the legal and equitable obligations of the mortgage contract. Ibid.

84. If the laws of the state, passed after the contract of mortgage, had done nothing more than change the remedy on such contracts, they would be liable to no constitutional objection. A state may regulate, at its pleasure, the modes of proceeding in its courts, in relation to past contracts as well as future. It may shorten the period of time within which claims may be barred by the statutes of limitations. It may direct that necessary implements of agriculture, or the tools of the mechanic, or articles of necessity in household furniture, shall not, like wearing apparel, be liable to execution on judgments. Regulations of this description have always been considered, in every civilized community, as properly belonging to the remedy to be exercised or not, by every sovereign, according to its own views of policy and humanity. Ibid.

85. Whatever belongs to the remedy may be altered according to the will of the state, provided the alteration does not impair the obligaon of the contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy, or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the con

stitution. Ibid.

86. There is no substantial difference between a retrospective law, declaring a particular class of contracts to be abrogated and void, and one which took away all remedy to enforce them, or encumbered it with conditions which rendered it useless or impracticable to pursue it. Ibid.

87. The law of Illinois, of February 19, 1841, acts not only on the remedy, but directly on the contract itself, and engrafts upon it new conditions, injurious and unjust to the mortgagee. The law gives to the mortgagor and to the judgment creditor an equitable estate in the premises which neither of them would have been entitled to under the original contract; and these new interests are directly and materially in conflict with those which the mortgagee acquired when

the mortgage was made. Any such modification of a contract by subsequent legislation, against the consent of one of the parties, unquestionably impairs its obligations, and is prohibited by the constitution. Ibid.

88. The act of February 27th, 1841, deprives the party of a pre-existing right to foreclose the mortgage by a sale of the premises, and imposes upon him conditions which would frequently render any sale impossible. Where, by the law existing at the time of the execution of the mortgage, certain rights to enforce the collection of the debt due by it were given, the existence of a covenant in it, as to the manner of enforcing the mortgage by entry on the premises and their sale by the mortgagee, creates no material difference in the right of the mortgagee. As the law of Illinois invaded the right secured by the covenant, there can be no sound reason for a different conclusion, where similar rights are incorporated by the law into the contract, and form part of it at the time it is made. Ibid.

89. The constitution of Michigan does not restrict the legislature from creating more than one corporation in the same act. Falconer v. Campbell, 2 M'Lean, 195.

90. Every act of incorporation requires the sanction of two-thirds of each house. Ibid.

91. The act, having the usual solemnities, must be received as law. Ibid.

92. The number of bank corporations is a question of policy, and not of principle. Ibid. 93. The act of 15th March, 1837, is constitutional.__Ibid.

94. The effect of a state judgment in every other state, is a question under the constitution and act of congress; consequently, the decision of the supreme court is paramount. Westerwelt v. Lewis, 2 M'Lean, 511.

2. Constitutionality of Laws passed by Congress.

95. The act of congress of the 5th of June, 1724, laying "a tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, kept for the use of the owner," is a constitutional law, and is within the authority granted to congress by the eighth section of the first article of the constitution. Hylton, Plaintiff in Error v. The United States, 3 Dall. 171; 1 Cond. Rep. 83.

96. The justices of the supreme court having by practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, sat as circuit judges, this practical exposition of constitution is too strong to be shaken or controlled. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; 1 Cond. Rep. 316.

97. An act of congress giving to the United States a preference over all other creditors, in all cases, is constitutional and valid. United States v. Fisher et al., 2 Cranch, 358; 1 Cond. Rep. 421.

98. The twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act of September 24th, 1789, ch. 20, is supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution. Ibid.

99. Congress has power to incorporate a bank. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; 4 Cond. Rep. 469.

100. The act of April 10th, 1816, ch. 44, (3 Story, 1547,) to "incorporate the subscribers to

Ibid.

102. The state, within which a branch of the bank of the United States may be established, cannot, without violating the constitution, tax that branch. Ibid.

103. Congress has authority to impose a direct tax on the District of Columbia, in proportion to the census directed to be taken by the constitation. Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317; 4 Cond. Rep. 660.

104. The clause in the act of incorporation of the bank of the United States, which authorizes the bank to sue in the federal courts, is warranted by the third article of the constitution of the United States, which declares "that the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. Osborn et al. v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738; 5 Cond. Rep. 741.

105. The clause in the patent law, authorizing suits in the circuit court, stands on the principle that they are cases arising under a law of the United States. Ibid.

106. The act of February 28th, 1795, ch. 277, to provide for calling out the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions, is within the constitutional authority of congress. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; 6 Cond. Rep. 410.

107. An act of congress laying an embargo for an indefinite length of time, is constitutional and valid. United States v. The William, 2 Hall's Am. Law Journ. 255.

108. The act of the 3d of March, 1819, ch. 76, sec. 5, referring to the law of nations for a definition of the crime of piracy, is a constitutional exercise of the power of congress to define and punish that crime. United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153; 4 Cond. Rep. 619.

they do not contravene the rule established by the authority of the Union. Collet v. Collet, 2 Dall. 294.

113. A resolution or law of the state of Connecticut, setting aside a decree of a court, and granting a new trial to be had before the same court, is not void under the constitution as an ex post facto law. Calder and Wife v. Bull and Wife, 3 Dall. 386; 1 Cond. Rep. 172.

114. The legislature of Connecticut, on the second Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which set aside a decree of the court of probate for Hartford county, made 21st of March, 1793, disapproving of the will of N. M., and refusing to record the will. The act of the legislature authorized a new hearing of the case before the court of probate, and an appeal to the superior court. Afterwards the will of N. M. was confirmed by the court of probate, and by the superior court at Hartford; and on an appeal to the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, the judgment of the superior court was confirmed." More than eighteen months had elapsed from the first decree of the court of probate, during which the right of appeal had been lost; and there was no law of Connecticut, before the passing of the special act of the legislature, by which a new hearing of the case could have been obtained. Held, that the act of May, 1795, was not an ex post facto law, prohibited by the constitution of the United States. Ibid.

115. The several state legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the state constitutions, which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States. Ibid.

116. An act of a state legislature, banishing the person and confiscating the property of cer tain individuals therein named as traitors, passed before the establishment of the federal constitution, is not void. Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; 1 Cond. Rep. 211.

a portion of the debt due by him, did not operate to protect the debtor from a suit for such debt after the treaty of peace in 1783. The statute of Virginia, if it was valid, and the legislature could pass such a law, was annulled by the fourth article of the treaty; and under this arti cle, suits for the recovery of debts so due might be maintained, the provisions of the Virginia law to the contrary notwithstanding.. Ware, Adm'r. of Jones, Plaintiff in Error v. Hylton et al., 3 Dall. 199; 1 Cond. Rep. 99.

118. The legislature of a state cannot annul the judgment, or determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch. 115; 2 Cond. Rep. 202.

119. An act of the legislature of New Jersey, declaring that certain lands which should be purchased for the Indians, should not hereafter be subject to any tax, constituted a contract which could not be rescinded by a subsequent

that it should be exercised exclusively by congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state legislatures as if they had been expressly forbidden to act upon it. Ibid.

126. To release the future acquisitions of a debtor from liability to a contract impairs its obligation. Ibid. 198.

127. Statutes of limitation and usury laws, unless retroactive in their effect, do not impair the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the constitution. Ibid.

128. The right of the states to pass bankrupt

254.

121. In respect to public corporations which exist only for public purposes, as counties, towns, cities, &c., the legislature may, under proper limitations, have a right to change, modify, enlarge, or restrain them; securing, however, the property for the uses of those for whom, and at whose expense, it was originally purchased. Ibid. 122. But the legislature cannot repeal statutes creating private corporations or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of previous laws, and by such repeal vest the property exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same to such purposes as they may please, without the consent or default of the corporations. Ibid.

123. The act of assembly of Pennsylvania, of March 28th, 1814, providing that the officers and privates of the militia of the state, neglecting or refusing to serve when called into actual service, in pursuance of any order or requisition of the president of the United States, shall be liable to the penalties defined in the act of congress of February 28th, 1795, or to any penalty which may have been prescribed by any law of the United States; and also providing for the trial of such delinquents by a state court martial; and that a list of the delinquents, fined by such court, should be furnished to the marshal of the United States, and also to the comptroller of the treasury of the United States, in order that the further proceedings, directed to be had thereon by the laws of the United States, be completed, is not repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1. 124. Since the adoption of the constitution of the United States, a state has authority to pass a bankrupt law, provided such law does not impair the obligation of contracts, and provided there be no act of congress in force to establish an uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such law. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; 4 Cond. Rep. 409.

125. The mere grant of a power to congress does not imply a prohibition on the states to exercise the same power. Whenever the terms in which a power is granted to congress, require

uniform bankrupt law throughout the Union by congress; it is only suspended. The repeal of that law cannot confer that power upon the states; but it removes a disability to its exercise, which was created by the act of congress. Ibid.

129. The act of the legislature of the state of New York, of April 3d, 1811, which not only liberated the person of the debtor, but discharged him from all liability for any debt contracted previous to his discharge, on his surrendering his property in the manner prescribed, so far as it attempted to discharge the contract, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, and is not a good plea in bar of an action brought upon such contract. Ibid.

130. A state bankrupt, or insolvent law, which not only liberates the person of the debtor, but discharges him from all liability for the debt, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States: and it makes no difference whether the law was passed before or after the debt was contracted. M'Millan v. M'Neill, 4 Wheat. 209; 4 Cond. Rep. 424.

131. The act of assembly of Maryland, of 1793, incorporating the bank of Columbia, and giving to the corporation a summary process by execution in the nature of an attachment, against its debtors, who have, by an express consent in writing, made the bonds, bills, or notes by them drawn or endorsed, negotiable at the bank, is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States, or of Maryland. But the last provision in the act of incorporation, which gives this summary process to the bank, is no part of its corporate franchises, and may be repealed or altered at pleasure by the legislative will. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235; 4 Cond. Rep. 439.

132. The state within which the bank of the United States has a branch establishment, cannot constitutionally tax that branch. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; 4 Cond. Rep. 469.

133. The state governments have no right to tax any of the constitutional means employed by the government of the Union, to execute its constitutional powers. Ibid.

134. The states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner to control the operations of the constitu tional laws enacted by congress, to carry into effect the powers vested in the national govern ment. Ibid.