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Acknowledgment of a Debt.-Statute of Limitations.

18. Where the defendant promised to pay the defendant in consideration of forbearance, the acceptance of this promise is to be presumed, when followed by the forbearance required; and such promise is a sufficient answer to the statute. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.

the original assumpsit being satisfactorily proved, 17. If the promise is conditional, the remedy the defendant relied upon the statute of limita- is not revived, unless the condition is performed tions; and one witness deposed, that the defen- The creditor must take the promise on the terms dant told him that the plaintiff need not have sued offered, or not at all. Ibid. him; for if he had come forward and settled certain claims, which defendant had against him, the defendant would have given him his powder. To another witness defendant said, that he should be ready to deliver the powder whenever the plaintiff settled a suit, which Dr. E. had brought against him, &c. Held, that those declarations did not amount to an unqualified and unconditional acknowledgment of the debt, but that the plaintiff ought to have proved a performance, or a readiness to perform the condition, on the new promise made. Ibid.

10. If the new promise be connected with circumstances which, in any manner, affect the claim, or if it be conditional, it may amount to a new assumpsit, for which the old debt is a sufficient consideration; or, if it be construed to revive the original debt, that revival is conditional, and the performance of the condition, or a readiness to perform it, must be shown. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 368.

19. In assumpsit on a promise to pay a debt due by the promissor, if the plaintiff would give time, whenever the promissor should be able, the declaration need not state that the plaintiff accepted the promise. It is sufficient to aver that time was given, and the ability of the defendant.

Ibid.

20. A promise to pay, on condition of forbearance, when the defendant shall be able, is good; and is to be construed, until he is able. Ibid.

21. A promise was made by the drawer of a protested bill of exchange, that he would pay the bill when he should be able, if the holder would give time. In an action on the new pro11. An acknowledgment of a debt by the per-mise, the plaintiff is entitled to no more than the sonal representatives of the original debtor, deceased, will not take the case out of the statute of limitations. Thompson v. Peter, 12 Wheat. 565; 6 Cond. Rep. 649.

12. After a dissolution of partnership, no partner can create a cause of action against the other partners by acknowledging a debt, except by a new authority communicated to him for that purpose. It is wholly immaterial what is the consideration to raise such cause of action; whether it be a supposed pre-existing debt of the partnership, or any auxiliary consideration, which might prove beneficial to them. Unless adopted by them, they are not answerable. Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 373.

13. The including a demand in the schedule of an insolvent's debts, is sufficient evidence to sustain an issue on a replication of a new promise, to a plea of the statute of limitations, if the period of limitation has not expired after the date of the schedule. Bowie v. Henderson, 6 Wheat. 514; 5 Cond. Rep. 157.

14. An admission of mutual unliquidated accounts, on which each party claims a balance, takes a case out of the statute. Ellis v. Jarvis, 3 Mason, C. C. R. 457.

15. Any offer on the part of a debtor, if upon fair interpretation it amount either to a promise to pay, or to the acknowledgment of the debt, or of some debt, is sufficient to remove the bar of the statute; or if he says he will pay if the creditor will prove his demand; or a promise to account, though he should add, that he owes nothing. Read v. Wilkinson, 2 Wash. C. C. R.

514.

16. But any thing which is added, going to negative a promise, must be considered as qualifying every other expression, and amounts to a refusal to pay, which cannot be construed into a promise to pay; as if he says he owes a debt but will not pay it, and will avail himself of the statute of limitations. I'

sum stated in the bill, and to interest from the time when the defendant was able, and not to damages. If the jury give more, the court will set aside the verdict, unless the plaintiff enter a remittitur for the residue. Ibid.

22. An exposition of the statute of limitations, which is consistent with its true object and im port, is that expressed by the court, in the case of Wetzell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat. 309, "an acknowledgment which will revive the original cause of action, must be unqualified and unconditional; it must show, positively, that the debt is due, in whole or in part. If it be connected with the circumstances which, in any manner, affect the claim, or if it be conditional; it may amount to a new assumpsit, for which the old debt is a sufficient consideration; or if it be construed to revive the original debt, that revival is conditional, and the performance of the condition, or a readiness to perform it, must be shown." Bell v. Morrison, 1 Peters, 362.

23. If the bar of the statute is sought to be removed by the proof of a new promise, that promise, as a new cause of action, ought to be proved in a clear and explicit manner, and be in its terms unequivocal and determinate; and if any conditions are annexed, they ought to be shown to have been performed. Ibid.

24. The admission of a party of the existence of an unliquidated account, on which something is due to the plaintiff, but no specific balance is admitted, and no document produced at the time, from which it can be ascertained what the parties understood the balance to be, would not, by the courts of Kentucky, be held sufficient to take the case out of the statute, and let in the plaintiff to prove, aliunde, any balance, however large it may be. It is indispensable for the party to prove, by independent evidence, the extent of the balance due to him, before there can arise any promise to pay it, as a subsisting

Ibid.

General Rules and Principles.

25. The principle clearly to be deduced from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, on the statute of limitations, is, that in addition to the admission of a present subsisting debt, there must be either an express promise to pay, or circumstances from which an implied promise may fairly be presumed. Moore v. The Bank of Columbia, 5 Peters, 86.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS.

1. A deed executed on the 30th of May, 1800, but not acknowledged until the 14th of June following, is to be considered as made the 30th of May, and was not within the provisions of the act of congress for the establishment of a uniform system of bankruptcy, passed April 4, 1800, which came into effect on the 1st of June, 1800; a commission of bankruptcy having issued against the grantor on the 1st of July, 1800. The deed was not an act of bankruptcy. Wood v. Owings & Smith, 1 Cranch, 239; 1 Cond. Rep. 302.

2. Where a deed has been acknowledged, the title of the officer before whom the acknowledgment is made must appear, to show that he acted officially. Lessee of Patton v. Brown, 1 Cooke, 119.

3. The acknowledgment of a deed before a person who states himself to be a judge of the court of common pleas, is prima facie evidence that he is such, and it is not necessary to produce the commission of the judge, until some evidence is given to render the fact questionable. Lessee of Willink v. Miles, Peters' C. C. R. 429.

4. In Virginia and Kentucky, a privy examination and acknowledgment of a deed by feme covert, in Virginia or Kentucky, so as to pass her estate, cannot be proved by parol testimony. Elliott et al. v. Piersoll, 1 Peters, 338.

5. In Virginia and Kentucky, the modes of conveyance by fine and common recovery, have never been in common use; and in these states, the capacity of a feme covert to convey her estate by deed, is the creature of the statute law; and to make her deed effectual, the forms and solemnities prescribed by the statutes, must be pursued. Ibid. 338.

6. By the Virginia statute of 1748, "when any deed has been acknowledged by a feme covert, and no record made of her privy examination, such deed is not binding upon the feme and her heirs." This law was adopted by Kentucky, at her separation from Virginia, and is understood never to have been repealed. Ibid. 339.

7. It is the construction of the act of 1810, that the clerks of the county court of Kentucky, have authority to take acknowledgments and privy examinations of femes coverts, in all cases of deeds made by them and their husbands. Ibid. 339.

8. What the law requires to be done, and appear of record, can only be done and made to appear by the record itself, or an exemplification of it. It is perfectly immaterial whether there be an acknowledgment or privy examination in form, or not, if there be no record made of the privy examination; for, by the express provi

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sions of the law, it is not the fact of privy exa mination only, but the recording of the fact, which makes the deed effectual to pass the estate of a feme covert. Ibid. 340.

9. A deed from baron and feme, of lands in the state of Kentucky, executed to a third person, by which the land of the feme was intended to be conveyed for the purpose of a reconveyance to the husband, and thus to vest in him the estate of the wife, was endorsed by the clerk of Woodford county court, "acknowledged by James Elliott and Sarah G. Elliott, September 11th, 1816," and was certified as follows:—

"Woodford County, ss.

"September 11th, 1813.

"This deed from James Elliott and Sarah G.

Elliott, his wife, to Benjamin Elliott, was this day produced before me, an acknowledged by said James and Sarah to be their act and deed, and the same is duly recorded.

"JOHN M'KENNEY, Jun. C. C. C." Held, that subsequent proceedings of the court of Woodford county, by which the defects of the certificate of the clerk to state the privy exami nation of the feme, (which, by the laws of Kentucky, is necessary to make a conveyance of the estate of a feme covert legal,) were intended to be cured upon evidence that the privy examination was made by the clerk, will not supply the defect, or give validity to the deed. Ibid. 340.

10. Defects in the certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed of a feme covert, were not cured by subsequent proceedings of the county court of Woodford county, Kentucky, intended to supply the defect, and give validity to the deed.ˆ Íbid. 340.

11. A deed executed by a married woman, of real property, acquired by her when she was a feme sole trader, while she was abandoned by her husband, is void by the law of Maryland. Rhea et al. v. Rhener, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 109.

12. Under the act of assembly of Pennsylvania, of 1715, which requires a deed to be acknowledged before a justice of the peace of the county where the land lies, it had been long the established practice, before the year 1775, to acknowledge deeds before a justice of the supreme court of the province of Pennsylvania. And although the act of 1715 does not authorize such a practice; yet as it has prevailed, it is to be considered a correct exposition of the statute. M'Keen v. Delancey's Lessee, 5 Cranch's Rep. 22; 2 Cond. Rep. 179.

13. To authorize the recording of a deed by the law of Pennsylvania, a certificate of its acknowledgment by a justice of the peace of the state of New York, and a certificate of the court of common pleas of that state, that he was such justice, is not sufficient, unless it also certify that he was a chief officer in the county. Lessee of Rhoades and Snyder v. Selin et al. 4 Wash. C. C. R. 714.

14. It is no objection to the exemplification of a deed in Pennsylvania, that the justice who wrote and certified the acknowledgment, did not also state himself a justice of the peace in the certificate, if the omission be supplied by proof

General Rules and Principles.

of the fact at the trial. If he do so style him- | after the recovery in ejectment, the legislature self, this is prima facie evidence of the fact. passed an act, the object of which was to cure Ibid. all defective acknowledgments of this sort, and to give them the same efficacy as if they had been taken in the proper form. The plaintiffs in ejectment claimed title to the premises under James Mercer, the husband; and the defendants, as heirs at law of his wife, who died with

15. By the statute of Rhode Island, respecting the conveyances of real estates, no deed of the wife's estate, by the husband and wife, conveys any title but that of the husband, unless the same be duly acknowledged by the wife before a magistrate, in the manner prescribed. Man-out issue. This ejectment was brought after the chester v. Hough, 5 Mason's C. C. R. 67.

16. By the customary and ancient law of Rhode Island, a feme covert may pass her estate by a deed, in which her husband is joined, which is duly executed and acknowledged. Ibid.

17. Under the statute of Rhode Island for the conveyance of real estate, if there be a defective acknowledgment of a deed by which the title is intended to be conveyed, the deed is void to all persons except the grantor and his heirs; and therefore a subsequent purchaser, for a valuable consideration, from the grantor may acquire a good title." Richards v. Randolph, 5

Mason's C. C. R. 115.

passage of the act of 1826. The authority of the supreme court to examine the constitutionality of the act of 1826, extends no further than to ascertain whether it violates the constitution of the United States; the question whether it violates the constitution of Pennsylvania, is, upon the present writ of error, not before the court. Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters, 88.

23. The act of 1826 does not violate the obligation of any contract, either in its terms or in its principles. It does not even affect any title acquired by a patent or any other grant. It supposes the title of the femes covert to be good, however acquired; and even provides that deeds of conveyance made by them shall not be void, because there is a defective acknowledgment of the deeds, by which they have sought to transfer the title. So far then as it has any legal operation, it goes to confirm and not to impair the contract of the femes covert. It gives the Simp-very effect to their acts and contracts which they intend to give; and which, from mistake or accident, has not been effected. Ibid.

18. The form of the certificate of the execution and acknowledgment of a deed by a feme covert, is in conformity to the laws of Pennsylvania, if it appear by the certificate that the directions of the act of assembly of that state, have been substantially complied with. Lessee of Kemp v. Kennedy; Lessee of Talbot v. son, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 188.

19. When the certificate of the magistrate who took the acknowledgment of a feme covert, does not state that she was twenty-one years of age, the presumption is that the person examined was of full age, until the contrary is shown by proof. Lessee of Battin v. Bigelow, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 452.

24. A deed was executed and acknowledged under a decree, "W. M. Duncanson, guardian for Marcia Burnes;" and acknowledged by the guardian "to be his act and deed as guardian aforesaid, and thereby the act and deed of the said Marcia." This is a good execution and acknowledgment. Van Ness v. The Bank of the United States, 13 Peters, 17.

20. By the law of Maryland, a married woman cannot dispose of real property without the consent of her husband, nor can she execute a deed 25. The acts of the assembly of Maryland, good and valid, to pass her real estate, unless he prescribing the mode in which deeds should be shall join in it. The separate examination and acknowledged for the conveyance of real proother solemnities required by law, are indispen-perty, were adopted by Congress in the act as sable, and must not be omitted. A deed therefore executed by a married woman, on real property acquired by her while a feme sole trader, while she was abandoned by her husband, is void. Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Peters, 109.

21. The act of the legislature of Maryland, enacting that no estate shall pass, &c. except the deed shall be acknowledged, does not so operate as that the instrument is not a deed until it is acknowledged. Until acknowledged it is inoperative to pass real estate. Wood v. Owings, 1 Cranch, 239; 1 Cond. Rep. 302.

22. In 1785, M and wife executed a deed conveying certain lands of the wife to T, who immediately reconveyed them to M. The object of the reconveyance was to vest the lands of the wife in the husband. The deed of M and wife to T was not acknowledged according to the forms established by the law of Pennsylvania, of 20th February, 1770, to pass the estates of femes covert; and after the death of the wife of M, the land was recovered in an ejectment from the heirs of M, in a suit instituted against him by the heirs of the wife of M. In 1826,

suming jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, together with the other laws of Maryland then in force. The acts of the assembly of Maryland relating to the acknowledgment of deeds, do not require that justices of the peace, or other officers, who have authority to take acknowledgments, shall describe in their certificates their official character. Whenever it is established by proof that the acknowledgment was made before persons authorized to take it, it must be presumed to have been taken by them in their official capacity. Ibid.

26. The constitution of Mississippi declares that clerks of the circuit court, probate, and other inferior courts, shall be elected by the electors of the county for two years. The legis lature of Mississippi, by statute, declared that when, from sickness or other unavoidable causes, the clerk of the probate court shall be unable to attend the court, the judge of probate may appoint a person to act as clerk pro tempore, who shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of the office, &c. Deeds of trust and mortgages are declared to be void against creditors

General Principles.

and purchasers, unless they shall be acknowledged or proved, and delivered to the clerk of the proper court to be recorded; and they shall be valid only from the time they are so delivered to the clerk. Robert P. Haden was elected clerk of the court of probate for the county of Lowndes; and during the two years for which he was so elected, he went to the state of Tennessee on business; and being absent when the court of probate sat, William P. Puller was, by the judge of the court of probate, appointed the clerk pro tempore; and having taken the oath of office, he executed the duties of clerk during the session of the court, and afterwards, until the return of the regularly elected clerk. After the adjournment of the court, a deed of trust, duly executed, by which certain personal property was conveyed for the benefit of creditors, was delivered to William P. Puller, and was by him entered for record. An execution was levied on the property thus conveyed by a creditor of the party who had executed the deed; the regularity of the recording of the deed was denied, on the ground that the clerk of the probate court, pro tempore, had no authority to receive the deed of trust for record after the adjournment of the court of probate. Held, that the clerk pro tempore was authorized to record the deed of trust, under the constitution and law of Mississippi. Cocke v. Halsey, 16 Peters, 71.

ACTION.

1. General principles.

2. Writ of right ..

3. Actions on statutes....................

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4. Actions on judgments, decrees and recognisances.. 49

5. Action of covenant ...................

6. Action of debt and detinue

7. Action of assumpsit..

8. Action of trespass.....

9. Action for a malicious prosecution.

10. Action for deceit..........................

11. Action of trover........................

12. Action on a commercial guarantee..
13. Action on a warranty
14. Action of account......

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slave trade, by his partners in the joint concern; nor against an agent who is party to the original traffic, and has the proceeds in his hands. Fales et al. v. Maybury, 2 Gallis. 560.

5. If a vessel be sold in a foreign port to evade a forfeiture incurred to the United States, no action will lie for the proceeds. Ibid.

6. A contract founded upon transactions in fraud of the law of the United States, can furnish no lawful cause of action; and the courts of this country will not lend their aid to enforce a demand so tainted. Executors of Cambroso v. The Assignees of Maffitt, 2 Wash. C. C. R. 98.

7. Nor is the general principle affected by the circumstance that the plaintiff is a foreigner; nor is it important whether he had notice of the law or the facts on which it is to operate. Ibid.

8. In some cases, a foreigner is not bound to take notice of foreign revenue laws; for if he make a firm and final contract in his own, or a foreign country, it is immaterial to him what use may be made of it, in the violation of foreign revenue laws. But, in similar cases, if a citizen be knowingly instrumental in a breach of the laws of his country, the tribunals of that country will not afford him a remedy; as if he sells goods for the purpose of smuggling. Ibid.

9. Forbearance to sue for a short time, is not a sufficient consideration to support a promise; but if it be for a reasonable time, it will. If it be general to forbear, it will be construed into a total forbearance, and after a reasonable time, the party may sue on the new promise. So if the promise be to forbear until the defendant be able to pay, it is reasonable and legal. Lonsdale v. Brown, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 404.

10. When an action is in its origin instituted in the name of A for the use of B, the cestui que trust is, by the law of Maryland, regarded as the 54 real party to the suit. Gaither v. The Farmers 56 & Mechanics Bank of Georgetown, 1 Peters, 42. 11. Damages to the promissee constitute as 59 good a consideration as benefit to the promissor. Townley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters, 176.

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15. Action of account render.............................................. 64 16. Action of ejectment............................. 65 17. Assumpsit for the use and occupation of lands..... 68 1. General Principles.

1. The suit does not terminate with the judg ment; and proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit. The Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Peters, 99.

2. The marshal of the District of Columbia is bound to serve a subpoena in chancery as soon as he reasonably can, and he will in case of neglect be answerable to the plaintiff, who has, in consequence of such neglect, sustained any loss. Kennedy v. Brent, 6 Cranch's Rep. 187; 2 Cond. Rep. 345.

3. A creditor shall not be permitted to split up a single cause of action into many actions, without the assent of the debtor. Mandeville v. Welsh, 5 Wheat. 277; 4 Cond. Rep. 642.

4. No action can be maintained against the master and part owner of a ship engaged in the

12. In England, any instrument or claim, though not negotiable, may be assigned to the king, who may sue upon it in his own name. No valid objection is perceived against giving the same effect to an assignment to the government in this country. The U. S. v. Buford, 3 Peters' Rep. 30.

13. Where money is wrongfully or illegally exacted, it is received without any legal right or authority to receive it, and the law, at the very time of payment, creates an obligation to refund it. A notice to recover back the money, does not, even in such a case, create the right to recover it back; that results from the illegal exaction of it, and the notice may serve to rebut the inference that it was a voluntary payment, or made through mistake. The Bank of the U. S v. The Bank of Washington, 6 Peters, 8.

14. Generally speaking, all joint obligors, and persons bound by covenants, contracts, or quasi contracts, ought to be made parties to the suit, and the plaintiff may be compelled to join them all, by a plea in abatement for the non-joinder But such an objection can only be taken advan

General Principles.

tage of by plea in abatement; for if one party only is sued, it is not matter in bar of the suit, or in arrest of judgment upon the finding of the jury, or of variance in evidence in the trial. But the same doctrine does not appear to have been acted upon, in the full extent, in cases of recognisances and judgments, and other matters of record, such as bonds to the crown. If in cases of this sort, it appears by the declaration, or other pleadings, that there is another joint debtor who is not sued, although it is not averred he is living, the objection need not be pleaded in abatement, but it may be taken advantage of upon demurrer or arrest of judgment. Gilman v. Rives, 10 Peters, 298.

15. The assignee of a fee farm rent, being an estate of inheritance, has a right to sue for the rent in his own name, on the principles of the common law. It is an exception from the general rule, that choses in action can be transferred, and stands on the ground of being not a mere personal debt, but a perdurable inheritScott v. Lunt's Administrator, 7 Peters,

ance. 596.

16. An action on an open account, which has been assigned to a third person, is properly brought in the name of the original creditor; but the debtor may offset, in such action, all payments made to the assignee on account of the original claim. Winchester v. Hackley, 2 Cranch, 342; 1 Cond. Rep. 415.

17. An action cannot be maintained on an original contract for goods sold and delivered, by one who has received a note as conditional payment, and has passed away that note, and at the time of action brought, has not reacquired a property in it. Harris v. Johnston, 3 Cranch, 311; 1 Cond. Rep. 543.

18. A suit on a recognisance of bail is an original proceeding. A scire facias on a judgment, is, to some purposes, only a continuation of the former suit. But an action of debt on a judg. ment, is an original suit. Davis v. Packard, Peters, 276.

19. An action of debt on a recognisance of bail, may be brought in a different court from that in which the original proceedings were commenced. Ibid.

20. A bond executed by a public officer, for the due performance of his official duties, in the disbursement of public moneys, is to be governed by the laws of the United States, as they operate in the District of Columbia; the accounts of the officers being required to be settled at the treasury department. Duncan's Heirs v. The U. S. 7 Peters, 435.

21. The defendant accepted an order to pay certain debts out of the proceeds of a bill of exchange, which bill was protested for non-payment. The plaintiff declared on this promise. The bill not being paid, the obligation was at an end, and the plaintiff failed in his action, so far as it was founded on that promise. The clear meaning of the promise was, to pay, provided the bill was paid. Hutz v. Karthause, 4 Wash.

C. C. R. 1.

22. Promise by A, "that the freight of certain goods shipped by B, being adjusted with him by

the plaintiffs, he, A, would pay the freight if B did not." Query, if it was incumbent to give due notice to A, of the adjustment of the freight, and of his non-payment before action brought. Trask v. Duval, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 181.

23. On a new promise to pay a continuing debt, the creditor may sue on the old debt, and give the new promise in evidence, to avoid the act of limitations; or he may sue on the new promise. Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 148.

24. The officers of a revenue cutter may join in an action of assumpsit against the collector, for their proportion of a forfeiture under the laws of the United States. Sawyer v. Steele, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 227.

25. The rule as to joinder in actions is, that where the legal interest is joint, the parties cannot sue in their action, unless the interest is first severed; because, if they might do so, the court could not know for which plaintiff to give judg ment. Sawyer v. Steele, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 228.

26. If one of two persons, having a joint interest in a claim or demand, receives his proportion, the other may sue alone for his share, as this amounts to a severance. Ibid.

27. A being indebted to B, assigns to him certain recognisances, to be held by him as a collateral security for the debt due him, to be collected by him as he may think proper. This assignment is no bar to A's action against him for the original debt. If B had collected any thing on the securities, and this it is incumbent on A to prove, the sum collected is to be considered as payment pro tanto. B's right to sue may be suspended by a special contract to that effect. It would be otherwise, if the security had been a negotiable instrument. Kemmil v. Wilson, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 308.

28. Where a charter party had been entered into by one Smith, and the defendant, although in the body of it he stated himself the agent of Clark, yet all the covenants having been made with Smith, and the instrument having been executed in his own name, without reference to Clark, the action cannot be sustained in the name of Clark. Clark's Executors v. Wilson, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 560.

29. In a joint action against the assignees of a bankrupt, the plaintiff cannot recover against any one, unless the claim against all is supported by evidence. Blight v. Ashley, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 15.

30. A person beneficially interested in a suit of an alien enemy, cannot support the suit in the name of his trustee who is an alien. Crawford et al. v. The William Penn, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 106.

31. Enemy interest will not defeat a suit brought on a contract arising out of a licensed trade. Ibid.

32. There is no principal of law which will sanction an action by a creditor against the debtor of his debtor, upon the ground of a contract, for there is no privity between them. King of Spain v. Oliver, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 276.

33. The principle that a partner cannot sue a partner, on a partnership transaction, does not

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