General Principles.

order to establish an objection in the decree, [ on its merits. It is too important in in its cha founded on the supposed mistake of the court, racter, and the interests concerned too great, to in its own deductions from the evidence. Whiting be decided on the mere technical principles of et al. v. The Bank of the United States, 13 Peters, 6. chancery pleading. Ibid. 251. No party to a decree can, by the general principles of equity, claim a reversal of a decree upon a bill of review, unless he has been aggrieved by it; whatever may have been his nights to insist on the error at the original hearing, or on an appeal. Ibid.

252. A bill of revivor is not the commencement of a new suit, but is the mere continuance of the old suit. It is upon ground some. what analogous that the circuit courts are held to have jurisdiction in cases of cross bills and injunction bills, touching suits and judgments already in those courts. Clarke v. Mathewson et al., 12 Peters, 164.

253. A decree for a specific performance of a contract to sell lands, refused, because a definite and certain contract was not made; and because the party who claimed the performance had failed to make it definite and certain on his part, by neglecting to communicate, by the return of the mail conveying to him the proposition of the vendor, his acceptance of the terms offered. Carr v. Duval et al., 14 Peters, 77.

254. If it be doubtful whether an agreement has been concluded, or is a mere negotiation, chancery will not decree a specific performance. Ibid.

259. In ordinary cases between individuals, the court of chancery has always exercised an equitable discretion in relation to its rules of pleading, whenever it has been found necessary to do so for the purposes of justice. In a case in which two sovereign states are contesting a question of boundary, the most liberal principles of practice and pleading ought, unquestionably, to be adopted, in order to enable both parties to present their respective claims in their full strength. If a plea put in by the defendant may in any degree embarrass the complainant in bringing out the proofs of his claim, on which he relies, the case ought not to be disposed of on such an issue. Undoubtedly, the defendant must have the full benefit of the defence which the plea discloses; but, at the same time, the proceedings ought to be so ordered as to give the complainant a full hearing on the whole of his case. Ibid.

260. According to the rules of pleading in the chancery courts, if the plea is unexceptionable in its form and character, the complainant must either set it down for argument, or he must reply to it, and put in issue the facts relied on in the plea. If he elects to proceed in the manner first mentioned, and sets down the plea for ar 255. A bill for an injunction was filed, alleg-gument, he then admits the truth of all the facts ing that the parties who had obtained a judg-stated in the plea, and merely denies their suffi ment at law for the amount of a bill of exchange, ciency in point of law to prevent the recovery. of which the complainant was endorser, had, If, on the other hand, he replies to the plea, and before the suit was instituted, obtained payment denies the truth of the facts therein stated, he of the bill from a subsequent endorser, out of admits that if the particular facts stated in the funds of the drawers of the bill obtained by the plea are true, they are then sufficient in law to subsequent endorser from one of the drawers. bar his recovery; and if they are proved to be It was held, that it was not necessary to make true, the bill must be dismissed, without a referthe subsequent endorser, who was alleged to ence to the equity arising from any other facts have made the payment, a party to the injunc-stated in the bill. Ibid. tion bill. Atkins v. Dick and Company, 14 Pe- 261. If a plea, upon argument, is ruled to be ters, 114. sufficient at law to bar the recovery of the com256. By a rule of the supreme court, the prac-plainant, the court of chancery would, according tice of the English courts of chancery is the practice in the courts of equity of the United States. In England, the party who puts in a plea which is the subject of discussion, has the right to begin and conclude the argument. The same rule should prevail in the courts of the United States, in chancery cases. The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 14 Peters, 210.

257. In a case in which two sovereign states of the United States are litigating a question of boundary between them, in the supreme court of the United States, the court have decided, that the rules and practice of the court of chancery should substantially govern the conducting the suit to a final issue. 12 Peters, 735-739. The court on re-examining the subject are fully satisfied with the decision. Ibid.

258. In a controversy in which two sovereign states are contesting the boundary between them, it is the duty of the court to mould the rules of chancery practice and pleading in such a manner as to bring the case to a final hearing

to its uniform practice, allow him to amend, and put in issue, by a proper replication, the truth of the facts stated in the plea. But in either case the controversy would turn altogether upon the facts stated in the plea, if the plea is per mitted to stand. It is the strict and technical character of those rules of pleading, and the danger of injustice often arising from them, which has given rise to the equitable discretion always exercised by the courts of chancery in relation to pleas. In many cases, when they are not overruled, the court will not permit them to have the full effect of a plea; and will, in some cases, leave to the defendant the benefit of it at the hearing; and, in others, will order it to stand for an answer, as, in the judgment of the court, may best subserve the purposes of justice. Ibid.

262. The state of Rhode Island, in a bill against the state of Massachusetts, for the set tlement of the boundary between the states, had set forth certain facts, on which she relied in support of her claim for the decision of the su

General Principles.

preme court, that the boundary claimed by the state of Massachusetts was not the true line of division between the states, according to their respective charters. To this bill, the state of Massachusetts put in a plea and answer, which the counsel for the state of Rhode Island deemed to be insufficient. On a question, whether the plea and answer were insufficient, the court held, that as, if the court proceeded to decide the case upon the plea, it must assume, without any proof on either side, that the facts stated in the plea are correctly stated, and incorrectly set forth in the bill, then it would be deciding the case upon such an issue as would strike out the very gist of the complainant's case, and exclude the facts upon which the whole equity is founded, if the complainant has any. Ibid.

263. It is a general rule, that a plea ought not to contain more defences than one. Various facts can never be pleaded in one plea; unless they are all conducive to the single point on which the defendant means to rest his defence. Ibid.

other equitable rights; and any attempt to give effect to these rights at law, through the instru mentality of a jury, must lead to confusion and uncertainty. Equitable and legal jurisdictions have been wisely separated; and the soundest maxims of jurisprudence require each to be exercised in its appropriate sphere. Ibid.

269. A decree of a perpetual injunction on suits instituted on the common law side of the circuit court of the District of Columbia, reversed, and the bill dismissed; the accounts between the parties having been erroneously adjusted in the circuit court. Nixdorff v. Smith, 16 Peters, 132.

270. The court, under the prayer in a bill in chancery for general relief, will grant such relief only as the case stated in the bill and sustained by the proof will justify. Hobson v. M'Arthur, 16 Peters, 182.

271. On the dissolution of a partnership in 1822, it was agreed with the outgoing partners, H. and B., that the debts due to the partnership should be collected by the remaining partners, 264. In the case of Livingston v. Story, which K. and M'I., and that the debts due by the partcame before this court in 1835, (9 Peters, 655,) nership should be paid by them, and a fixed sum the court took occasion to examine the various should be paid to H. and B., when a sufficient laws of the United States, establishing and orga-sum was collected for that purpose, beyond the nizing the district court of Louisiana, and to de-amount of the debts due by the firm. In 1829, cide whether that court had equity powers; and K. and M'I. having gone on under this agree if so, what should be the mode of proceeding in the exercise of such powers. The various cases which had been before the court, involving, substantially, the same question in relation to the states where there were no equity state courts, or laws regulating the practice in equity causes, were referred to; and the uniform decisions of the court have been, that there being no equity state courts did not prevent the exercise of equity jurisdiction in the courts of the United States; and it was, accordingly, decided that the district court of Louisiana was bound to proceed in equity causes, according to the principles, rules, and usages which belong to the courts of equity, as contradistinguished from courts of common law. Gaines et al. v. Relf et al., 15 Peters, 9.

ment to collect the debts due to, and pay the debts due by the partnership, H. and B. filed a bill in the circuit court of South Carolina district against K. and M'I., charging that there was a surplus of the partnership effects, after paying all the debts, sufficient to pay them the sum which, by the agreement made on the dissolution of the partnership, was to be paid to them, and claiming certain bridge bills, which were to be delivered to them; and praying for an account. The circuit court, after proceeding in the case, the accounts having been frequently before a master, and after evidence had been taken, made a decree in favour of H. and B. for a certain sum of money, &c., and the defendants appealed to the supreme court. It was contended by the appellants, that the circuit court, sitting in chancery, had no jurisdiction beyond that of compelling a discovery of the amount which K. and MI. had received under the agreement; and that if any thing was found due to H. and B., they were bound to resort to their action at law on the covenant entered into at the dissolu266. It is one of the most familiar duties of a tion of partnership, to recover it. By the court: court of chancery to relieve against mistake;-This is a clear case for relief, as well as for especially where it has been produced by the discovery in chancery. H. and B. were entitled misrepresentations of the adverse party. The to an account; and if, upon that account, any State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts, 15 Peters, 233.

265. The supreme court has not the power to compel the circuit court to proceed according to established rules in chancery cases. All that the court can do, is to prevent proceedings otherwise, by reversing them, when brought here on appeal. Ibid.

267. Courts of chancery, acting in personam, may well decree the conveyance of land in any other state, and may enforce their decree by process against the defendant. But neither the decree itself, nor any conveyance under it, except by the person in whom the title is vested, can operate beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Watkins v. Holman, 16 Peters, 25.

268. It is not perceived why a court of law should regard a resulting trust more than any

thing was found to be due to them, they were, upon well-settled chancery principles, entitled to relief also. Kelsey et al. v. Hobby et al., 16 Peters, 269.

272. According to the ordinary proceedings of a court of chancery, the court should pass upon each item of an account reported by a master, when the amount actually received by a party is in controversy. This is necessary to enable the appellate court to pass its judgment on the items allowed or disallowed in the inferior court. But in a case where the remaining partners had

General Principles.

received the sum claimed from them, beyond | written within two or three days before the conthe debts they had agreed to pay, it mattered veyance was executed, that the estate was held not how much more they had received; and such a case does not require a statement of the exact amount. The evidence, and accounts, and exceptions, being all in the record brought into the appellate court, the court can determine whether the sum mentioned is proved to have been collected or not. Ibid.

273. There is no propriety in requiring technical and formal proceedings, when they tend to embarrass and delay the administration of justice, unless they are required by some fixed principles of equity law or practice, which the court would not be at liberty to disregard. Ibid. 274. The defendants had disclaimed the ownership of certain lots which were described in the bill, and of which they were charged with being owners. The circuit court dismissed the bill as to these lots. Held, That this was proper. There was no probable cause for retaining this part of the bill, to obtain an account from the respondents. Obviously, no claim exists that can be made available for the complainants, in regard to this portion of the property. Harpend ing v. The Dutch Church, 16 Peters, 456.

275. It is not merely on the presumption of payment, in analogy to the statute of limitations, that a court of chancery refuses to lend its aid to stale demands. There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of the court. M'Knight v. Taylor, 17 Peters, 197.

276. In matters of account, where they are not barred by the act of limitations, courts of equity refuse to interfere after a considerable lapse of time, from considerations of public policy, and from the difficulty of doing entire justice where the original transactions have become obscure by time, and the evidence may be lost. lbid.

277. A bill was filed in the circuit court of the eastern district of Pennsylvania, by Thomas Morris, against Nixon and others, claiming a conveyance of certain real estate in the county of Philadelphia, which the bill alleged had been conveyed by Morris to Nixon, as a security for money loaned by him to Morris, with an offer to repay any balance which might be due to Nixon; and for an account of all moneys received by Nixon and others for sales of parts of the estate, with a prayer for general relief. The defendants answered the bill separately. Nixon alleged that the conveyance of the estate had been an absolute one, for a full, legal, and sufficient consideration. A bond for the sum paid by Nixon was given by Morris, which Nixon asserted was only to be enforced if the property conveyed should be found of insufficient value; or in the event of insolvency in Morris, it might be used for the benefit of his family. At the time the conveyance was made, asserted to have been absolute and for full consideration, a correspondence was had between Morris and Nixon. The court held that, from the situation of the parties, the pecuniary embarrassments of Morris at the time of the conveyance, and the evidence furnished by one of the letters of Nixon to Morris,

in trust for Morris by Nixon; and decreed that the executors of Nixon should convey the estate to Morris, all accounts between the parties being previously adjusted, and any balance which might be due to the estate of Nixon being previously paid. Morris v. Nixon et al., 17 Peters,

109.

278. Courts of equity will not permit an uncertain benefit, such as was expressed in reference to the bond for five thousand dollars, to weigh at all, in their consideration of cases like this before the court. If they did, it might become a contrivance to give plausible covering to an originally meditated fraud, or to one induced by the temptation of gain. Ibid.

279. Where an answer to a bill in chancery is not responsive to the bill, but sets up distinct affirmative matter of defence and bar, the defendant must prove the matter set up; or it can have no effect for defence or in bar. The Bank of the United States et al. v. Beverly et al., 17 Peters, 128.

280. A bill in chancery had been filed, alleging fraud and trust in the defendant, and had been decided against the complainants. Held, That if the jurisdiction in equity was properly exercised, it concludes all questions of fraud in the case. Mercer's Lessee v. Selden, 17 Peters, 61.

281. Where a party seeks relief from the chancery jurisdiction, in the circuit court of the United States for Louisiana, the chancery practice must be followed. M'Collum v. Eager, 2 Howard, 61.

282. The bringing up for review a decree in chancery cannot be by writ of error, but by an appeal. Ibid.

283. An appeal will lie only from a final decree. Ibid.

284. It is not necessary that all the parties shall join in the appeal bond. It is sufficient if they all appeal, and the bond be approved by the court as satisfactory and complete security, by whomsoever it may be executed. Brockett v. Brockett, 2 Howard, 238.

285. The appeal lies from the refusal of the circuit court to open the former decree. Ibid.

286. Where an appeal is prayed during the term of the decree, in open court, no citation is necessary. Ibid.

287. Courts of equity do not act upon the subject of set-off, in respect to distinct and unconnected debts, unless some other peculiar equity has intervened, calling for relief. Dade v. Irwin's Executor, 2 Howard, 391.

288. A claim of set-off, made after a silence of thirteen years, is stale and clouded with presumptions unfavourable to its original foundations or present validity. In cases of this sort, in the examination and weighing of matters of fact, a court of equity exercises the same functions as a jury. lbid.

289. A bill is not multifarious when it charges a number of defendants owning property by separate conveyances, but derived under the same original will. They may have been proceeded against by separate bills, but as all the

General Principles.

defendants are alike interested to sustain the rights of the executors under the will, they may be sued by one bill. But when there are other defendants claiming under another will, the bill as against them must be amended. Gaines and Wife v. Chew et al., 2 Howard, 643.

290. Where a will made in 1811 had been admitted to probate in the probate court of Louisiana, and a will was set up as having been made subsequently, but of which probate had not been obtained, it was held, that as probate was required by the local law of Louisiana, before any title could be set up under it, application should be made to the court of probate to revoke the probate of the will of 1811, and establish the will of 1813; but the defendants, who have been called upon in chancery for answers, relating to the alleged will of 1811, must answer, and their answers may be used before the court of probate, to establish the will of 1813, and revoke that of 1811. Ibid.

291. The principles laid down in the case of Taylor and others v. Savage, 1 Howard, 282, examined and confirmed. Taylor v. Savage, 2 Howard, 395.

ance of land, sold under an order of court by an executor. Ibid.

301. Chancery will refuse relief where the plaintiff has been grossly negligent. Mitchell v. Thompson and Williams, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R.

108.

302. Nor will it give relief even in cases of fraud, where great lapse of time has intervened after the fraud was discovered. Ibid.

303. The rule that chancery will not decree where doubt exists, refers to the intention of the parties from the facts, and not to any particular fact in the cause. Walton and Payne's Heirs v. Coulson, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 125.

304. Chancery will not decree against infants, without full proof, though their guardian ad litem confesses the ground of action. Ibid.

305. On its own rules, and independently of the statute of limitations, chancery will refuse relief on the ground of the lapse of time. Piatt Vattier et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 164.

V.

306. A decree in Virginia for land in Kentucky cannot affect the title. Carrington's Heirs v. Brents et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 175.

307. A suit in chancery is not notice to a pur chaser, unless it has jurisdiction over the thing. Ibid.

308. A decree cannot be rejected as evidence for irregularity, if the court had jurisdiction. Ibid.

292. When an issue is directed by a court of chancery, to be tried at law, and in the course of the trial at law, questions are raised and bills of exception taken, these questions must be brought to the notice and decision of the court which directs the issue, which may order a new 309. Where a devise of land charges the detrial, if necessary. Brockett v. Brockett, 3 How-visee with the payment of certain legacies, ard, 691.

293. It has been decided in the case of Austin v. Eckhart, 2 Howard, 375, that an equitable title is no defence, in a suit brought by the United States to recover possession of land. An imperfect title derived from Spain, before the cession, unless it has been confirmed by act of congress, cannot be supported against a party claiming under a grant from the United States. United States v. King et al., 3 Howard, 773.

294. Chancery ought not to decree a deed to be delivered up to be cancelled, if void upon its face. Elliot v. Piersoll, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 15. 295. Otherwise, if void for matters extrinsic. Ibid.

296. Chancery will decree a contract to be rescinded, where a good title cannot be made, or where delays have occurred in making the title, and the land has become less valuable. M'Kay v. Carrington, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 59. 297. A title made under a decree against one or more infants, is defective. Ibid.

298. Chancery will not decree damages on a failure to make a good title; but when the title cannot be made, it will decree a rescision of the contract, the return of the purchase-money and interest; and where there are outstanding negotiable notes, will also decree that they shall be delivered up. Ibid.

299. It will not aid a defective power, but will give relief from the defective execution of a power. Heirs of Piatt v. Heirs of M'Cullough, 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 82.

300. When the consideration has been paid, chancery will decree heirs to make a convey

chancery will direct the sale of so much of the land, though conveyed to a stranger, as shall pay the legacies. Morancy et al. v. Buford, M'Lean's C. C. R. 195.

310. Chancery will not compel a vendee to accept a title which has an outstanding dower interest, or where the husbands of femes covert have not joined in the conveyance, or where a suit which involves the title is pending. Watts et al. v. Waddle et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 202.

311. A decree in Kentucky for the conveyance of land in Ohio cannot operate on the land. Ibid.

312. The deed of the commissioners under such a decree constitutes only a part of the decree. Ibid.

313. A plea in bar to the relief sought in the bill, must extend to every part of the bill; and if fraud be charged, it must be denied in the plea, and also by an answer in support of the plea. Piatt v. Oliver et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R.

295.

314. Courts of chancery will not interfere by injunction to prevent a threatened wrong, unless the danger is imminent, and the injury is irremediable in any other form. Spooner v. M'Connell et al., 1 M'Lean's C. C. R. 338.

315. The right set up by the complainant, as a citizen of the United States, to navigate certain waters, is an abstract right, and such a one as chancery cannot protect from violation. Ibid.

316. He does not state that he is engaged in navigating the Maumee, which he charges the defendants threaten to obstruct. Ibid.

317. Chancery does not deal with abstractions

General Principles.

343. Á general rule in equity proceedings is, that after publication of the testimony, no new witnesses can be examined, and no new testimony be taken, unless where the judge himself, upon or after the hearing, entertains a doubt, or 327. Where a party wishes to rescind a con- when some additional fact or inquiry is indistract, he must, generally, return the purchase-pensable to enable him to make a satisfactory money. Ibid. decree. Wood v. Mann, 2 Sumner's C. C. R. 316.