A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF BANKRUPTCY.* On the 1st of April, 1840, Mr. Webster obtained leave of the Senate to introduce a bill to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, which was referred to the Standing Committee on the Judiciary. On the 3d of April, another bill for the same purpose was introduced, on leave, by Mr. Tallmadge of New York, and referred in like manner to the Judiciary Committee. These bills on the 18th of the same month were reported back to the Senate, without amendment. On the 22d of April, Mr. Clayton of Delaware, a member of the Judiciary Committee, reported a bill on the same subject; and on the same day, Mr. Wall of New Jersey, chairman of the committee, and on behalf of a minority, submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to the original bill introduced by Mr. Webster. The subject thus brought before the Senate was discussed for many successive days, principally in reference to the amendment proposed by the minority of the committee to Mr. Webster's bill. The character of the bill and of the amendment will sufficiently appear from the following speech. I FEEL a deep and anxious concern for the success of this bill, and, in rising to address the Senate, my only motive is a sincere desire to answer objections which have been made to it, so far as I may be able, and to urge the necessity and importance of its passage. Fortunately, it is a subject which does not connect itself with any of the party contests of the day; and although it would not become me to admonish others, yet I have prescribed it as a rule to myself, that, in attempting to forward the measure, and to bring it to a successful termination, I shall seek no party ends, no party influence, no party advancement. The * A Speech delivered in the Senate of the United States, on the 18th of May, 1840, on the proposed Amendment to the Bill establishing a Uniform System of Bankruptcy. subject, so far as I am concerned, shall be sacred from the intrusion of all such objects and purposes. I wish to treat this occa'sion, and this highly important question, as a green spot in the midst of the fiery deserts of party strife, on which all may meet harmoniously and amicably, and hold common counsel for the common good. The power of Congress over the subject of bankruptcies, the most useful mode of exercising the power under the present circumstances of the country, and the duty of exercising it, are the points to which attention is naturally called by every one who addresses the Senate. In the first place, as to the power. It is fortunately not an inferred or constructive power, but one of the express grants of the Constitution. "Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." These are the words of the grant; there may be questions about the extent of the power, but there can be none of its existence. The bill which has been reported by the committee provides for voluntary bankruptcies only. It contains no provisions by which creditors, on an alleged act of bankruptcy, may proceed against their debtors, with a view to subject them and their property to the operation of the law. It looks to no coercion by a creditor to make his debtor a subject of the law against his will. This is the first characteristic of the bill, and in this respect it certainly differs from the former bankrupt laws of the United States, and from the English bankrupt laws. The bill, too, extends its provisions, not only to those who, either in fact or in contemplation of law, are traders, but to all persons who declare themselves insolvent, or unable to pay their debts and meet their engagements, and who desire to assign their property for the benefit of their creditors. In this respect, also, it differs from the former law, and from the law of England. The questions, then, are two: 1st. Can Congress constitu tionally pass a bankrupt law which shall include other persons besides traders? 2d. Can it pass a law providing for voluntary cases only, that is, cases in which the proceedings originate only with the debtor himself? The consideration of both these questions is necessarily in volved in the discussion of the present bill, inasmuch as it has been denied that Congress has power to extend bankrupt laws farther than to merchants and traders, or to make them applicable to voluntary cases only. This limitation of the power of Congress is asserted on the idea that the framers of the Constitution, in conferring the power of establishing bankrupt laws, must be presumed to have had reference to the bankrupt laws of England, as then existing; and that the laws of England then existing embraced none but merchants and traders, and provided only for involuntary or coercive bankruptcies. Now, Sir, in the first place, allow me to remark, that the power is granted to Congress in the most general and comprehensive terms. It has one limitation only, which is, that laws on the subject of bankruptcies shall be uniform throughout the United States. With this qualification, the whole subject is placed within the discretion and under the legislation of Congress. The Constitution does not say that Congress shall have power to pass a bankrupt law, nor to introduce the system of bankruptcies. It declares that Congress shall have power to "establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States." This is the whole clause; nor is there any limitation or restriction imposed by any other clause. What, then, is "the subject of bankruptcies"? or, in other words, what are "bankruptcies"? It is to be remembered that the Constitution grants powers to Congress by particular or specific enumeration; and, in making this enumeration, it mentions bankruptcies as a head of legislation, or as one of the subjects over which Congress is to possess authority. Bankruptcies are the subject, and the word is most certainly to be taken in its common and popular sense; in that sense in which the people may be supposed to have understood it, when they ratified the Constitution. This is the true rule of interpretation. And I may remark, that it is always a little dangerous, in construing the Constitution, to search for the opinions or understanding of members of the Convention in any other sources than the Constitution itself, because the Constitution owes its whole force and authority to its ratification by the people, and the people judged of it by the meaning most apparent on its face. How particular members may have understood its provisions, if it could be ascertained, would not be conclusive. The |