measure of withdrawing from thence our troops extremely neceffary; particularly from the feparate peace made by the Emperor, leaving us to contend, fingle handed, against an Enemy, who, by their vigour and energy, had beaten, and by their policy difunited, the moft formidable confederacy against them that ever Europe witneffed. Under thefe circumftance, it became us to draw home and concentrate all our forces to preferve our Conftitution, and maintain our independence against the attacks of a ferocious and fuccessful Enemy. It now became a measure of prudence; for their fuccefles were fuch, that were the mind to give way to any thing like fuperftition in the events with which this was attended, it would look like a political retribution.--Let the Houfe recollect the commencement of the war; did they recollect the manifefto of the Duke of Brunfwick, which threatened Paris with vengeance and defolation? And now let them fee its termination against that Power under the walls of Vienna, and the terms dictated by the power of a triumphant Enemy.-- The conduct of the war had frequently been difcuffed- in this Houfe, where there was more difference of opinion than without. In almost every difcuffion out of doors the majority concurred in the fentiment that it had been fhamefully mifmanaged, and even it had been obferved of the laft Parliament, by a great man no longer in the Houfe (Mr. Burke), that though Administration had the Votes, Oppofition had the opinions of the majority of the House of Commons. Whether this would hold true of the prefent Parliament time would fhew. No where, however, had the misconduct of Minifters been more confpicuous than in the West Indies. Those who confidered the object of the war to be the restoration of Monarchy and Defpotifm in France thought that warfare a bad diverfion of our ftrength, but even upon the principle that the object of West Indian warfare was good, the conduct which Minifters had followed was improper. The Ifand of St. Domingo was of great extent, and it remained to fee whether the means for fubjugating that country were adequate to the end propofed. He knew it might be af ferted, that we expected great affiftance from the inhabitants; but, of this he should fay more hereafter. Another point of view was, whether it was not likely to create the jealoufy of the Naval Powers, and particularly of Spain? and therefore, whether, inftead of procuring their co-operation, they were not more likely to defert and abandon us? Another confideration was, the actual Military Force then in thofe Iflands, and whether we could fend a fufficient number to contend with them with the hopes of fuccefs. The Commiffioner Santhonax took with him 6000 men, of those who were fuppofed to be the best Republicans, namely, the National Guards. In the Inland there there was a force of 9000, making, in the whole, 15,000 difciplined men; add to thefe, 10,000 difciplined Blacks, and a number of revolted Negroes, to the amount of 40,000, who would fall upon either party, if they could do it with hopes of fuccefs, and therefore, to be equally guarded against as profeffed enemies. To meet this force, the first force under General Whitlocke confifted of the number of 870 men. If, even had the inhabitants been willing to throw themselves under the protection of this country were they likely to do so when they faw no force to defend them? Nor was it probable that they were fo inclined. The fame fentiments of liberty which animated France at the commencement of the Revoluti on extended to the planters, who fent 18 'deputies to the Tiers Etat. The reprefentations of Emigrants were not good ground, and these were not juftified by what appeared. The infurrections which had broken out between the planters and the people of colour, were believed to have been fomented by the royalifts, and any expedition which was undertaken by this country under the direction of men of this defcription was not likely to meet with a favourable reception. However, it was in concert with them that the enterprise was attempted. The idea known to be entertained of this enterprife had likewife first prompted Santhonax to iffue a proclamation giving liberty to the flaves, in order to induce them to defend the Island. This was a measure of defence, not the refult of any principle of general liberty which the French entertained. The moft important acquifition of the troops under Colonel Whitlock, was Cape Nicholas Mole, where there was a very strong harbour. But as foon as it was given up by the garrifon, the inhabitants left the town, a pretty ftrong proof that they were not favourable to our views. In the next attempt our forces were repulfed, and every thing fhewed that nothing was to be expected from the co-operation of the inhabitants. After this experience of the difficulties of the undertaking, and of the difpofition of the inhabitants, it ought to have been abandoned. Admitting the object to have been great, it had been tried, and promised no fuccefs. Reinforcements, however, were brought from Jamaica, frefh attempts were made without fuccefs, till the yellow fever, with its deftructive ravage, appeared. In May, 1794, General White arrived with forces from England; the yellow fever had begun its deftructive pro grefs; as foon as they arrived the troops feemed death-ftruck; 40 officers and 600 men died in the space of two months. Two years experience fhewed that nothing towards the complete fuccefs of the defign could be achieved. This was the time then for Minifters to have confidered the propriety of per fevering in the measure. The ravages of the yellow fever were fo fatal that No. 37. our forces were obliged to confine themselves to acting on the defenfive, and were under no lefs apprehenfion from those who were called their friends than from their open enemies. After four years war, in fhort, it appeared that no acquifitions of any importance, except Port au Prince, had been obtained, more than had been acquired within the first ten days. The places which were in our poffeffion did not afford any produce beyond the reach of the cannon. There were no imports from the part of St. Domingo in our poffeffion. Notwithstanding that the harbour of Cape Nicolas Mole continued ours, the enemy, with their privateers from Aux Cayes, committed great depredation on our fhipping, and no advantage with which our acquifitions were attended could counterbalance the expence and mortality with which they were purchased. The expence had been found to be progreffive. In 1794 it was 296,000l. in 1795, 772,000l. in 1796, 2,211,000l. and in January, 1797, alone, it had been 700,000l. Minifters certainly would be most criminal if they had not endeavoured to control this expence, but it feems they had attempted it in vain. Were we to go on then with this uncontrolled expence? In four years the Bills on the Treasury, from every part of the world, had been 16 millions, thofe from this fingle ifland were between 4. and 5 millions, more than a fourth of the whole ! For a large army of 30,000 men, on the Continent, in 1794, Bills to the amount of 2 millions, and in 1795, 3 millions, were drawn, while this enterprife in St. Domingo had alone confumed fuch enormous fums. But Minifters faid, they had endeavoured to control the expence. What occafion was there, in the circumstances of our poffeffion, for a civil establishment. A perfon, however, with the title of Chief Judge, and first Président, the only one appointed in England, which fufficiently explained the circumftance, had an allowance of 2500l. a-year, a perfon who had been found unfit for his fituation, and had returned to this country, but ftill enjoyed his falary. This was a good fpecimen of the jobs which it afforded. The civil eblifhments were in the hands of men who amafled immenfe fortunes at the expence of the country. The French, who adhered to our caufe, were actuated by motives of intereft alone, and by the advantages which they derived from its fervice. But the mortality which attended our continuing to occupy thefe poffeffions, were ftill more ferious. It was facrificing a number of gallant men to certain death, without the confolation of being ufeful to their country. Up to the 3d of September laft, 7500 had died, and few of thefe by the fword of the enemy. Till November, 1795, not more than an hundred had fallen in the field. In March 1796, there had died 129 officers, and 5840 men. So the number of those who had fallen victims to the peftilence of the climate, might eafily be gathered. Nor were the men seasoned by time to the climate. The attack of the yellow fever was almost always mortal, and it was even apt to recur. After the year 1795, Ministers must have been fentible of the impoffibility or fucceeding in their de fign. In their perfevering in it against every confideration of prudence and regard for the lives of fo many gallant men, they had evinced a degree of mifconduct which no part of their admi nistration furpalled. As Minifters, however, had failed to advife his Majefty to withdraw the troops from St. Domingo, it became the duty of the Houle to fupply their neglect. He then read a paffage from Mr. Burke's Regicide Peace, in which the fyftem pursued in the Weft Indies is feverely reprobated; and concluded with moving, "That an humble Address thould be "prefented to his Majefty, praying that he would be graciously "pleafed to give directions that the troops in St. Domingo "fhould forthwith be withdrawn." Mr. Fox feconded the Motion. Mr. Secretary Dundas faid, that if he were to indulge his own private inclinations, he fhould occupy but a small portion of the time and attention of the Houfe, being difpofed, from the view he took of the Motion, to confine himself to a very few fentences. If he were to confine himself folely to the Question propofed by the Honourable Gentleman for the concurrence of the Houfe, it would not be neceffary for him to fay many words; but, from certain general expreffions which had fallen from the Honourable Gentleman in the courfe of his fpeech, the Houfe would allow it was impoffible for him to remain filent under the general charges which had been laid to him and his colleagues; charges of a conduct, for which if they were held blameable, they were blameable in common with every Administration, and every Minister entrusted with the conduct of military affairs, in every war in which the country had been engaged for the pre fent century. But before he adverted particularly to the feveral charges of the Honourable Gentleman, he would make an obfervation or two on the conclufion of his speech. The Honourable Gentleman had concluded with an extract from a book written by a Right Honourable Gentleman, to whofe perfon, and to whose writings he was very willing at all times to pay the tribute of respect. With regard to the fentiments expreffed by that Gen. tleman, in the Extract which had been read, they had been long known to him; he knew, that it was that Gentleman's opinion, that if the troops which had been fent to the Weft In dies were applied to continental operations, the war would have 802 been been better conducted; he knew, too, that this was the Right Honourable Gentleman's opinion, before it was thrown into the fhape in which the Houfe had just heard it read. But, highly as he respected the fentiments of that respectable person, he could not fubfcribe to them, nor to any authority, however refpectable, when his own understanding did not coincide with it to convince him. He would, therefore, fay, that nothing he had heard from that Right Honourable Gentleman, nor from the Honourable Gentleman who made the Motion, could induce him to believe that it was the duty of Administration, in any war, to abandon the interefts of the colonies, and to employ the ftrength which fhould be applied to that purpose, in expeditions of a different nature. If Gentlemen would look back to our history, they would find that in no war which was well conducted, had ever fuch a principle entered into the minds of Minifters; nor was there ever a war in which it had not been held the best and wifeft policy to direct our force against theColonial interefts of the enemy, and to the protection of our own. Therefore, when the Honourable Gentleman or any other stated that the West India war was criminal, because there had been a great expence of money, and what was much worse, a great expenditure of lives, they were, in fact, uttering a grofs libel on every Administration which had ever conducted a war for Great Britain.. For his part, he was old-fashioned enough to feel a ftronger difpofition to follow up the steps of those of his predeceffors, whofe good conduct had obtained the fuffrage of the nation, than to adopt the new-fangled ideas of peace or war, which he fometimes heard broached be the talents or fituation of the perfon who broached them what they might. In the war of 1763, which no one would deny had a most glorious and advantageous termination for England, how was our force directed? Against Canada, against Marigalante, against Martinico, againft St. Lucia, &c. The refult was fortunate--while France had not been able in that war to make one Weft India conqueft. Not only the perfons who conducted that war thought that they directed the force well, but every one fince had allowed it. The prefent war, upon which the epithet of inglorious had been fo often liberally bestowed, was, in respect to West India acquifitions, ftill more glorious than that of 1763, or any former war; for, with the exception of the Ifland of Guadaloupe, Britain was now in poffeffion of every one of the Leeward Iflands; fo that, as a war in which we were contending for colonial intereft with Franee, we stood, in point of fuccefs, in a more elevated fituation than ever. And as to the qeftion, whether it was found policy or not, to direct our force to that quarter, he would, upon the authority he had al ready |