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framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.

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Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that inter

course.

"If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the government, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood when the Constitution was framed.. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary objects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have understood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late.

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"The word used in the Constitution, then, comprehends, and has always been understood to comprehend, navigation; and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce." "

After defining the term "commerce," as used in the Constitution, and having decided that it embraced navigation, Marshall then proceeded to consider the question: "To what commerce does this power extend?" He said: "The Constitution informs us, to commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."

Later in the decision he continued: "It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other, to which this power does not extend. . . . Commerce, as the word is used in the Constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term."

He next came to the subject of commerce between the States. He said: "The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce among the several States.' The word among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, can not stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior." In order to distinguish what may be called State commerce from the broader expression of commerce among the States, and to establish the rule for the discrimination in such cases, Marshall said: "It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to, or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.

"Comprehensive as the word among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would not

have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language, or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns, which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself.

"But in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction, pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State.

"This principle is, if possible, still more clear, when applied to commerce among the several States.' They either join each other in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other States lie between them. What is commerce among' them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce among the States, must, of necessity, be commerce within the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian Tribes, the action of the law, especially when the Constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of Congress, then, whatever

it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States.

"We are now arrived at the inquiry — what is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation within the limits of every State in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian Tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now under consideration applies."

By analyzing this great opinion we see that Marshall defined with masterful genius the important term and words in this clause, and settled many questions arising out of their consideration, and made them all so clear that no mistake could be made in the meaning of his language.

(1). He defined commerce, and said it was traffic and intercourse, and that it described commercial intercourse between nations, and parts thereof.

(2). Said that the language of this clause shows that commerce includes navigation.

(3). Decided that every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations is comprehended; that no sort of trade can be carried on between this and other countries to which this power does not extend; that commerce as used in the Constitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term.

(4). Defined the word "among" as meaning "intermingled with." Made it quite plain that it was restricted to that commerce which concerned more States than one.

(5). Commerce that is completely internal not comprehended in this clause, and concerns only the State where carried

on.

(6). In regulating commerce with foreign nations the power of Congress does not stop at State lines, because it is that of the whole United States.

(7). Commerce among the States must be commerce with

the states necessarily, and the power of Congress must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the States.

(8). In regard to "what is this power of Congress?" he said, it is the power to regulate, the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce shall be governed. That it is vested in Congress, is complete in itself, and may be exercised to its utmost extent, for it has no limitations beyond those found in the Constitution.

Every definition of commerce which has been given by the courts since this decision, reflects the definition given by Chief Justice Marshall.

In regard to power of Congress over commerce among the States, Marshall says:

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"In regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists, and this principle, if possible, is still more clear when applied to commerce among the States." "

This important case which is so often discussed is given a place here for several reasons. One of them being to show what the method of the Expounder of the Constitution was like, and the thorough manner of attacking the various details. Many think that this opinion is overlauded, and that it lays down too barely and didactically, with too small a basis of argument and history, the American doctrine of Constitutional law.

80 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 195.

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