No particular class of persons are named in this last clause. The words "influence and intimidate," employed in the first clause, are dropped, and "due administration of justice in court" added, showing an intention to extend the application of the statute. Applying the provisions last quoted to the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th counts of the indictment, it will be necessary for you to find that the defendant, Bittinger, did some act or acts which obstructed or impeded the due administration of justice. We have seen, so far as an interference with a witness who had a duty in the United States court to discharge is concerned, the offence comes within the first subdivision of the act. This being the case, the defendant, in order to be found guilty of obstructing the due administration of justice in any court of the United States, must have done, if not more, at least some act or acts in addition to those specified in the first subdivision of the statute we are considering, in order to find him guilty of having corruptly obstructed the due administration of justice. There seems to be no other act of the defendant interfering with the due administration of justice testified to, than his interference with the witness Rendelman, and unless this interference can be construed into an obstruction of the due administration of justice, there would seem to be no evidence supporting the last four counts of the indictment. It would be, to say the least, a very doubtful construction, to seek to bring the offence from under the first and more definite description, for the purpose of applying the more general provision to the second class of offences, and you are not to do so unless you are satisfied the testimony in the case will justify it. You will have to determine from the evidence whether a case is made out against the defendant on the 1st, or the 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th counts of the indictment. These last four counts charge the corruptly endeavoring to obstruct and impede the due administration of justice before the U. S. Commissioner and in the District Court. There is but one offence charged to have been committed, and it is your duty to say, if you find the defendant guilty, under what count of the indictment, bearing in mind, that the first count charges the corrupt interference with the witness, and the four last the corrupt obstruction of the administration of justice in the District Court. Verdict, "Guilty on all the counts." The principal legal point made by the defence in the above reported case was, that, as the statute only punishes the corrupt influencing of a witness in the discharge of his duty, the witness must have had a duty resting upon him which could only have been imposed by the service of a subpoena. In the case of The State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, Chief Justice REDFIELD, decided that if a person knew he was to be a witness in a public prosecution he was not only a witness, but was in duty bound not to secrete himself, so as to prevent the service of process, and the authorities seem to be conclusive to the effect that process need not actually have been served: State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9: State v. Early, 3 Harrington 562; 2 Wharton on Crim. Law (7th ed.), % 2287; 4 Black. Com. 126; 1 Bish. Criminal Law, 665; 1 Russell on Crimes 183; 2 Bish. Crim. Pro., 897; Commonwealth v. Reyn lds, 14 Gray 87; State v. Biebusch, 32 Mo. 276. H. B. JOHNSON. ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.1 COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.2 SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.* ARBITRATION AND AWARD. Umpire. By a parol agreement to submit a matter in controversy to the arbitration of two persons, it was stipulated that, in case they could not agree, they should select an umpire, and that the decision of such umpire and any of said arbitrators should be final, &c. Held, that the decision of the umpire was all that was required. If one or both the arbitrators had agreed with him, it would still have been the decision of the umpire: Sanford et al. v. Wood, 49 Ind. BANKRUPTCY. Plea of-Plea in bar that since the commencement of suit, the de fendants had been adjudged bankrupts, and the plaintiff had proved its debt in bankruptcy, and that the bankruptcy proceedings were still pending. Held, bad on general demurrer: Brandon Manufacturing Co. v. Frazer, 47 Vt. BILLS AND NOTES. Partnership-Want of Authority-Defence against Bond fide Holders. -Adams, a partner of Moorehead & Co., drew a note in favor of Whitten & Co., of whom also he was a member, and, after it was endorsed by the payees, endorsed the name of Moorehead & Co.; the note was sold to the plaintiff by a known bill-broker. Held, that these circumstances were not notice to the plaintiff that the endorsement was without authority: Moorehead v. Gilmore, 77 Pa 1 From Jas. B. Black, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 49 Indiana Reports. 2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 41 Maryland Reports. 3 From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter, to appear in 77 Pa. State Reports 4 From Hon. J. W. Rowell, Reporter; to appear in 47 Vermont Reports. If the note had been offered by Whitten & Co., that would have been notice that Moorehead & Co. were merely accommodation endorsers, and sufficient to put the plaintiffs upon inquiry: Id. The broker was the agent of Whitten & Co. to sell, and not of the plaintiff to buy; plaintiff was not bound to inquire by whom he was employed, nor would the broker, if asked, be bound to inform him: Id. Each partner has the same right to raise money for the use of the firm by endorsemeut of negotiable paper as to do so by means of paper already issued, and the public is not affected by the private restriction on the power of each partner: Id. On the face of the note, it had come to Moorehead & Co., by endorsement of Whitten & Co.; that it was originally given by Adams for his individual debt was immaterial. The presumption was that the endorsement of Moorehead & Co. was in the usual course of business: Id. Nothing but clear evidence of knowledge or notice, fraud or malâ files can impeach the prima facie title of the holder of negotiable paper taken before maturity: Id. Note taken in Payment of a Pre-existing Debt.-One who takes a negotiable note before maturity, at its full value, in payment of a preexisting debt, in good faith, and without notice of anything that would invalidate it in the hands of the payee, is a bonâ fide holder for value, and not affected by any equities existing between the original parties: Russell v. Splater, 47 Vt. Warrant of Attorney to confess Judgment destroys Negotiability.A note payable to order with interest, with an addition "in case of nonpayment at maturity, five per cent. collection fees to be added;" with warrant of attorney to enter judgment for amount of the note and the five per cent., with costs of suit, release of errors, without stay of execution, waiving exemption, inquisition and condemnation, and to sell on fi fa: Held, not negotiable, by reason of the warrant of attorney contained in it: Sweeney v. Thickstun, 77 Pa. BROKER. See Usage. For Sale of Real Estate-Right to Commission.-Where the owner of real estate agreed with a real estate broker that he would pay him a certain amount if he would find a purchaser within a reasonable time, who would pay a certain price for his real estate, if within such time the broker procured such purchaser, he was entitled to recover his commission, though the owner of the real estate sold the same before the broker found the purchaser Lane v. Albright, 49 Ind. : COMMON CARRIER, Owners of Tow-boats are not.-The owners of a tow-boat are not common carriers; in an action by them for towing barges where, under a plea of set-off and payment, the defendant alleged that the tow was lost by the negligence of the owners of the boat, the burden was on him to show such negligence: Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. The defendant having given evidence tending to show that the loss was from the negligence of the plaintiff's pilot and engineer, evidence that those officers were competent, skilful and careful, was inadmissible: Id. A master is responsible for the negligence of his servants in the course of their employment, without regard to their character for care or skill; except in the case of fellow-servants, or of a servant employed by him in some independent work. When an act or omission of defendant is proved, whether it be actionable negligence, is to be determined by the character of the act or omission, not by the defendant's character for care and caution: Id. Bill of Lading-Construction of-Where a railroad company received freight to be transported partly by rail and partly by water, and it was stipulated in the bill of lading, that "it is especially agreed and understood that the company is not responsible *** for loss or damage on the lakes or rivers, unless it can be shown that such damage or loss occurred through the negligence or default of the agents of the company;" and the freight, after being carried by the defendant, was placed upon a wharf-boat, awaiting the arrival of a packet wherein to ship it, and the wharf-boat sunk without the fault of the railroad company, and the freight was lost. Held, that the loss was not one occurring on the lakes and rivers within the meaning of the bill of lading. Held, also, that the bill of lading should be construed to mean, that the carrier was not to be responsible, in the absence of negligence, for loss or damage occurring in the navigation of the lakes or rivers: The St. L. & S. E. Railway Co. v. Smuck et al., 49 Ind. CONFLICT OF LAWS. Foreign Judgment for Alimony-Service by Publication.-A judg ment for alimony rendered in another state, where the only notice to the defendant was by publication, and he did not appear, and the record does not show that he was a resident of that state, can have no force in this state: Middleworth et ux. v. McDowell, 49 Ind. CONTRACT. See Usage. Whether Entire or Separate-Rescission- Custom.-Defendant bought 4000 barrels of oil from plaintiff, and eight similar papers of same date were executed by them, each for the delivery of 500 barrels on the last day of consecutive months, payment to be made on each delivery. Held, not to be an entire contract: Morgan v. McKee, 77 Pa. The plaintiff, on demand, refused to deliver the oil due on one of the appointed days; the defendant on the next day for delivery, gave notice of rescission, on the ground of the previous default. Held, the plaintiff might recover for refusal of defendant to accept and pay for the oil which was tendered on the days appointed for the subsequent deliveries: Id. The right to rescind a contract must be exercised within a reasonable time after the breach. What is a reasonable time, is for the court: Id. Evidence was inadmissible, that at the time of the purchase it was agreed that it was an entire contract, and that the several papers were executed with that understanding and according to the custom of the trade: ld. Novation.-C. purchased the defendant's millinery goods, and in part consideration thereof, agreed to pay the defendant's debt to the plaintiff. C. thereupon wrote the plaintiff that her husband proposed to give his note on six months for said debt, and the plaintiff replied, accepting the proposition The note was never given, but C. made remittances to the plaintiff from time to time, to apply on said debt. Held, a mere accord, and that the defendant was not thereby discharged from the balance of" the debt: Rising v. Cummings, 47 Vt. Waiver of a promise to pay the debt of another that is without consideration and within the Statute of Frauds, or refusal to receive such payment, does not discharge the original debtor: Id. COVENANT. See Lease. CRIMINAL LAW. Evidence-Character of Person assaulted.—To make it competent for a party complained of for assault and battery, to show that the person assaulted was quarrelsome and fractious, he must show that he had knowledge of such fact; for the theory upon which such evidence is admitted is, the influence which such knowledge may be supposed to exert upon the conduct of the party in preventing or repelling an assault State v. Meader, 47 Vt. CUSTOM. See Contract; Evidence; Usage. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Bills and Notes; Contract. Application of Payments.-Payments made to a creditor holding demands both due and undue, without direction by the debtor as to their application, must, ordinarily, be first applied by the creditor upon the demands due: Early v. Flannery, 47 Vt. DOWER. See Husband and Wife. DURESS. Duress of Imprisonment-Rescission of Contract.-If one, claiming that he has purchased property, but knowing that he has not, maliciously, and without probable cause, sues out a writ in trover for it, for the purpose of frightening and coercing the owner to sell it to him; and the owner, being a man of ordinary firmness, is thereby induced, through fear of arrest and imprisonment, to make such sale, the sale is void for duress of imprisonment. Held, that it was not necessary, to make the defence of duress of imprisonment available, that the pretended vendor should have offered to rescind the contract, and return a note given for the purchase-money: Brownell v. Talcott, 47 Vt. Avoidance of Promise for.-A promise extorted by terror or violence, whether on the part of the person to whom the promise or obligation is made or that of his agent, may be avoided on the ground of duress : Bush v. Brown, 49 Ind. If a party execute an instrument from a well-grounded fear of illegal imprisonment, he may avoid it on the ground of duress Id. To a suit upon a promissory note, it is a good answer to allege that the plaintiff induced the defendant to go with him to a secluded place, and there accused the defendant of having performed an abortion upon the plaintiff's wife, and that a certain person who was then present was an officer, having power to arrest and imprison the defendant, and that the plaintiff there threatened the defendant with immediate arrest and imprisonment, unless the note in suit was made, and fearing such arrest |