is brought under the control of the court and subjected to its judg ment, or where the judgment is sought simply as a means of reaching such property or affecting some interest therein, or to cases where the action relates to the personal status of the plaintiff in the state."

But I see nothing in this language or the rule as there laid down, which supports or gives countenance to the position of the plaintiff, unless it be in the statement that the statute giving the right to proceed by publication against non-residents of the state is valid only when restricted "to cases where, in connection with the process against the person, property in the state is brought under the control of the court and subjected to its judgment."

Now, the property was "brought under the control of the court and subjected to its judgment" in Mitchell v. Neff, if at all, by the execution which issued upon the judgment. This process against the property of Neff was issued to enforce the judgment given in pursuance of the process against his person. The one was the inception and the other the completion of the proceeding, and so they were connected together as the links in a chain. Certainly, the process against the property could issue in connection with the cess against the person without being exactly simultaneous with it. They were related parts of the same proceeding.

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Besides, this judgment, though personal in forin, was procured, intended and used simply as a means of reaching the property of Neff then within the state, and according to the rule in Galpin v. Page, supra, is so far valid and binding.

But the power of the state over the property within its limits, of non-residents, being supreme, and it being admitted on all hands that the state may subject such property "to such disposition by their tribunals as may be necessary to protect the rights of its own citizens," in my judgment, the mode of exercising this power is a matter for the state to determine. In the exercise of this power it may require that the proceeding be strictly in rem and commenced by the seizure of the property, or it may, as provided in this state, upon the proper preliminary showing, permit a suit to be maintained against the non-resident by name-nominally-for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff therein to first judicially establish his right or claim against such non-resident, and then authorize the seizure and disposition of the property so as to satisfy the

same. In either case the result is the same; while the latter mode of proceeding has this to commend it over the former, that it does not permit the seizure or interference with the property of the non-resident until the right or claim of the citizen in or to it is satisfactorily established.

Nor does it appear to me that the state is bound in any case to provide for giving notice to the absent party by publication of the summons or otherwise. That matter pertains to the mode of proceeding over which the state has absolute control. The notice. usually given is merely constructive, and in a large number, if not in a majority, of cases, gives no information to the absent party. Of course it is the duty of the state to deal justly and considerately with non-residents who have property within her jurisdiction, and therefore it should provide as far as practicable that no proceeding should be taken in her courts to affect such property, without notice to the owner.

It being shown that the state has the power to subject the property of non-residents to the payment of debts owing to her citizens by such a proceeding as may by law be provided, including one in which such property is not seized prior to judgment, but thereafter, and then only for the purpose of satisfying said judgment, it remains to be considered whether the judgment in Mitchell v. Neff was given by a court having jurisdiction to do so according to the laws of the state.

[The learned judge then proceeds to consider, in detail, the objections to the proceedings, and decides that, as the affidavit on which the order of publication was based did not comply with the requirements of the statute, the court had never obtained jurisdiction, and the proceedings were void. This part of the opinion is omitted as purely local.]

Judgment for plaintiff.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.2

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.*

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

Regularity Presumed.-The regularity of an acknowledgment taken before a reputable acknowledging officer is presumed, and the burden of proof is with the party contesting an acknowledgment to show misconduct on the part of the officer, or forgery or other irregularity which he ought to have discovered: Hourtienne v. Schnoor, S. C. Mich.

ADMIRALTY.

Collision-Pilot.-In cases of collision, where there is a great conflict of testimony, the court must be governed chiefly by undeniable and leading facts, if such exist in the case. The court so governed in this case: The Great Republic, 23 Wall.

A pilot, when he is close to a vessel before him making movements which are not intelligible to him, ought not, in a case which is in the least critical, to be governed by his "impressions" of what the vessel is going to do. He should make and exchange signals, and ascertain positively her purposed movements and manoeuvres : Id.

A steamer close to the right bank of a broad river-one, ex. gr., a half a mile broad-which means to cross over and land on the left shore, is not bound, in the first instance, to give three or more whistles, which is the signal for landing It is enough that she give two whistles, which is the signal that she is going to the left. The three or more whistles may be given later: Id.

Constructions not favorable put on the testimony and manoeuvres of a pilot who, it was proved, was addicted to drinking when ashore," and who confessed to having been drinking on the day when his vessel left port, and within an hour of which time a collision occurred; though he swore that he had not taken any drink for six hours before his boat left its dock: Id.

Similar constructions put on the conduct of a captain whose watch it was, but who, instead of being engaged in a proper place in superintending the navigation of his vessel, was on the lower deck conversing with a passenger: Id.

A large and fast-sailing steamer is bound to act cautiously when overtaking and getting near to a small and slow one; and a collision having occurred between two steamers of this sort, a miner fault of the small and slow steamer was held not to make a case for division of damages

1 From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 23 of his Reports. 2 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 42 Maryland Rep.

3 From Hoyt Post, Esq., Reporter, and Henry A. Chaney, Esq. Cases decided at January Term 1876. The volume in which they will be reported cannot yet be indicated.

From P. Frazer Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 78 Pa. State Reports.

where such fault bore but a little proportion to many faults of the large and fast one: Id.

When, in a case of collision, it appears that one of the vessels neglected the usual and proper measures of precaution, the burden is on her to show that the collision did not occur through her neglect: Id.

Negligence-Collision-Tug-boat for Assistance against Fire-The owners of a vessel in flames towed by a tug and no longer in command of her own captain and crew, are not liable for injury done by her to another vessel, by the negligence of the captain of the tug; the said owners not having employed the tug, she being a tug whose regular business was the assistance of vessels in distress, and she having gone, of her own motion, to the extinguishment of the fire in this case: The Clarita and The Clara, 23 Wall.

A vessel anchored in the Hudson, opposite to the Hoboken wharves, if anchored three hundred and fifty yards from their river front, is anchored so far from shore that in case of a collision with a vessel towed in flames out of the Hoboken docks, no allegation can be made that she is anchored too near the shore: Id.

A vessel at anchor having an anchor-light and one man on deck, though not strictly an anchor-watch, is guilty of no fault in not being better lighted or watched: Id.

A vessel whose business it is to give relief to vessels on fire is bound to have chain hawsers or chain attachments on board; and if having only manilla hawsers, she is compelled to tow a vessel out of its dock with such a hawser, which is burnt, so that the vessel on fire gets loose from the tug, and, drifting, sets fire to another vessel, the tug is liable for the damages caused: Id.

The owners of a vessel who through their own carelessness (or that of their captain) set fire to another vessel, cannot claim salvage for putting that fire out: Id.

AGENT.

Proof of Authority-Res gesta.-In an action for goods sold, the plaintiff testified that defendant said, "if he concluded to take them he would have George come there and tell us so; give us the order." This was not proof that defendant had authorized George to act as his agent to buy the goods, nor justified the admission of the evidence of his statements: Grim v. Bonnell, 78 Penna.

An agent may prove his authority when by parol, but his declarations in pais are not proof of it: Id.

An agent's declarations may be evidence against his principal as part of the res gestæ, if made in conducting his agency, after his agency has established his authority to speak for his principal: Id.

George told plaintiff that defendant had concluded to take the goods, and gave plaintiff a memorandum to ship the goods to defendant, to whom George was indebted. Defendant testified that he had given no order for the goods. Evidence that at the time of the delivery of the goods to defendant he said he had bought them from George and gave him credit on his books for the price, was admissible: Id.

Declarations to become part of the res gestæ, must have been made at the time of the act done: ld.

ALLUVION.

What is Boundary-Where a survey begins "on the bank of a river" and is carried thence "to a point in the river," the river-bank being straight and running according to this line, the tract surveyed is bounded by the river. It is even more plainly so when it begins at a post on the bank of the river, thence north five degrees east up the river and binding therewith :" County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 23 Wallace.

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Alluvion means an addition to riparian land, gradually and imperceptibly made, through causes either natural or artificial, by the water to which the land is contiguous: Id.

The test of what is gradual and imperceptible is that, though the witnesses may see from time to time that progress has been made, they could not perceive it while the process was going on: Id.

It matters not whether the addition be to streams which do overflow their banks or those that do not. In each case it is alluvion: Id.

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS.

BANKRUPTCY.

See Limitations.

Consent of Debtor to Judgment.-A judgment-debtor having purchased land before the lien had expired, agreed by amicable scire facias to revive the judgment so as to create a lien on the after-acquired land. Within four months he was declared bankrupt. Held, that the agreement was not in fraud of the bankrupt law: Kemmerer v. Tool et al., 78 Penna.

The circumstance that a debtor consents to do what was for his own advantage would not affect the creditor with knowledge of insolvency, which from other facts he had no reasonable cause to believe: Id.

The bankrupt's real estate was sold by the sheriff, who paid the judg ment-creditor in the revived judgment. Held, that the Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction to entertain a suit by the assignees in bankruptcy for the recovery of the money so paid, if the judgment had been in fraud of the bankrupt law: Id.

Attachment-Construction of Sections 14, 35 and 39 of the Bankrupt Act of 1867.-The failure of the defendant to appear and defend an attachment against his property, is no evidence of his having done any act to procure the attachment within the meaning of section 35 of the Bankrupt Act of 1867, or to procure or suffer his property to be taken under legal process within the meaning of section 39 of said act: Henkelman and others v. Smith, Assignee, 42 Md.

Section 14 of the Bankrupt Act refers, and can only refer, to attachments which are pending at the time the petition in bankruptcy is filed, and not to such as have been prosecuted to a judgment prior to the filing of such petition: Id.

The attachment having been properly issued and prosecuted to judg ment, that judgment is final, imports absolute verity, is conclusive with respect to the subject-matter adjudicated, and cannot be re-examined or impeached in a collateral proceeding: Id.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Forged Draft-Recovery from prior Endorser.-An Indiana bank