Held, That the damages to be al-
lowed in an action for the collision
were to be arrived at by a reference
to the cost of those repairs, instead of
the result of the sale;

That interest was to be allowed on
the value of the cargo and freight and
on the repairs. The Empire State,

178

6. Where, in a collision case, on con-
tradictory evidence, the commissioner
to whom it was referred to ascertain
the damages, reported a certain
amount as the value of the vessel that
was lost:

Held, That though, if the question
were before the court as an original
one, the court would be inclined to
fix a lower value, yet, as the prepon.
derance of evidence was not palpable,
the finding would not be disturbed.

Net freight only is recoverable in
such a case, and not gross freight;
nor can the freight allowed exceed
that which was claimed in the libel.

Interest on the value of the vessel,
and on the net freight, from the time
of the loss, may be allowed, though it
was not claimed as such in the libel.
Egbert v. The Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Company,

See COLLISION, 3, 11, 24, 26.

DELIVERY OF CARGO.

223

See BILL OF LADING, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8.

DEMURRAGE.
See BILL OF LADING, 1.

E

EVIDENCE.

1. On an examination, before a United
States commissioner, of a person
charged with crime, his confession of
the crime, without any proof of the
corpus delicti, is sufficient to warrant
his being held for trial. The U. S.
v. Bloomgart,
356

2. On such an examination, evidence of
the actual existence of a certain na-
tional bank, and of acts done by the
accused as president thereof, is suffi-

FRAUDULENT NATIONALITY.
Where a vessel was libelled for advances,
and no one but a mortgagee appear-
ed to contest the suit; and where, on
the proofs, it appeared that the ves-
sel, though nominally a British ves-
sel and owned by a British subject,
was really the property of American
citizens residing in New York, who
thus sailed her under false colors,
and with a fraudulent nationailty,
and, while they were so using her,
agreed with the respondent for a loan
on the security of their personal obli-
gation and a mortgage on the vessel,
to be executed by the fictitious owner,
and the latter accordingly executed to
the respondent the mortgage under
which alone he claimed:

Held, That, before the English Ad-
miralty, the claim of the mortgagee

would be rejected as founded on a
sham title, created in violation of
law;

That, on principles of comity, it was
the duty of this court to apply the
same rule;

That the transaction in question
was contrary to public policy, and was
not to be upheld under our own
laws;

That the claim of the mortgagee,
therefore, must be rejected.
The
Acme,
386

FREIGHT.

Where the master and owner of a canal-
boat, which was in Hudson, with a
cargo on board, bound to Philadelphia,
agreed to sell her for $1,000, and to
take on board at Philadelphia an en-
gine belonging to the purchasers, and
deliver it to them with the boat at
New York, on or before a certain day,
they to pay all tolls; and the vessel
went to Philadelphia and took on board
the engine and brought it to New York,
and the owner of the boat was not then

able to give the purchasers a good
title to the boat, and the latter tendered
the tolls and demanded the engine,
which the master did not deliver, and
they libelled the boat to recover its
value:

Held, That the purchasers were not
bound to pay or tender the $1,000 till
they received the boat and a good
title to her, and the engine;

That any freight on the engine was
part of the $1,000;

That the purchasers, having ten-
dered the tollage, were entitled to the
engine, free of all lien for freight. The
Canal-boat Excelsior,

See DAMAGES, 6.

H

434

HABEAS CORPUS AND CERTIO-
RARI.

1. Where a party was charged, before a
United States commissioner, with
embezzlement of the funds of a na-
tional bank, and with having made
false entries in its books, and, an ex-
amination having been had, was held
for trial, and the proceedings were

2. Where, on writs of habeas corpus and
certiorari to a United States commis-
sioner, it appeared that the commis-
sioner had issued a warrant to arrest
the petitioner, on a charge of conspir-
ing to defraud the United States in
the Eastern District of Michigan, who
had been arrested and brought before
him, and demanded an examination,
and on the examination the evidence
consisted of an indictment found
against him in the Eastern District of
Michigan, and proof that on that in-
dictment the District Court of that
District had issued a warrant for his
arrest, the indictment averring that
the prisoner, with certain others
named, did, at the city of Washing-
ton, conspire, combine, confederate,
and agree together to defraud the
United States, in a manner particu
larly set forth, and that one of the
parties to said conspiracy, named
Lee, at Detroit, in the Eastern District
of Michigan, in pursuance of said
conspiracy, did do an act to effect the
object of said conspiracy, said act
being particularly set forth, and on
such proof the commissioner commit-
ted the prisoner for trial in the East-
ern District of Michigan, and there-
upon this habeas corpus was issued,
and the discharge of the prisoner
claimed, on the sole ground that the
indictment produced did not aver
that an offence against the United
States had been committed in the
Eastern District of Michigan:

Held, That the question whether
the indictment sufficiently averred an
offence committed in the Eastern
District of Michigan should not be
prejudged on a proceeding like this;

That on such a proceeding the in-
dictment must be considered sufficient,
unless it be so defective in its mater-
ial averments that it would be the
manifest duty of a court, before which

1. Revenue laws are not penal in the
sense that requires them to be con-
strued with great strictness in favor of
defendants.

There cannot be a reappraisement,
on appeal, of imported goods, unless
there has been an entry of the goods.

Therefore, where, on the trial of an
action to forfeit goods for an alleged
undervaluation, no invoice or entry of
the goods was proved, but it appeared
that papers purporting to be an in-
voice and entry had been in the pos-
session of the District Attorney, but
had disappeared, and it also appeared
that the goods had been appraised at
the Custom House, but the papers on
such appraisement had also disap-
peared, and that an appeal was taken
from that appraisement, on which ap-
peal a reappraisement was had, the
papers on which were proved:

Held, That it was not error for the
court to tell the jury that they had a
right to presume from the evidence,
that there was an entry of the goods.
Twenty-eight Cases, Marked M. & B.,
Containing Wine,

63

dervaluation, certain importations of
sherry wine, from Cadiz, which had
been invoiced at $16 a quarter cask
of 40 gallons, it appeared that agents
in New York received, and sent to
the manufacturers at Cadiz, orders for
the wines, and delivered them on the
wharf in New York, free of duty, at
$1.10 a gallon, effecting insurances on
them in New York at the higher
value:

Held, That if the jury were satisfied
that this course of business was
adopted for the purpose of concealing
the real prices of the wines at Cadiz,
they would be authorized to find that
the sales upon such orders were sales
at Cadiz prices, and that such sales
might be considered in determining
what was the actual market value at
Cadiz, and the jury might consider
the rate of insurance in determining
that question; but if they found that
this course of business was not
adopted for that purpose, then such
sales were not to be considered, be-
cause they would then be sales at
New York prices, and, in the latter
case, the rate of insurance was imma-
terial;

That if the jury found that the in-
voice value was below the market
value at Cadiz, they must then con-
sider whether that undervaluation
was either made "with intent to de-
fraud the revenue," as is said in the
Act of May 28th, 1830 (4 U. S. Stat.
at Large, 409), or made "knowingly,"
as is said in the Act of March 3d,
1863 (12 Id. 737);

That there is no real difference in
meaning between these two expres-
sions.

That evidence given to show the
value of certain wine, previously sent
to this country by the same manufac-
turers, and not under seizure in this
case, was only to be considered in de-
termining the question of intent;

That evidence as to the cost of
manufacturing a part of the wines,
called Burgundy Port, might be con-
sidered by the jury in determining its
market value in Cadiz, no evidence of
sales in Cadiz of wines of a similar
quality having been given; but that
similar evidence as to the cost of
manufacture of the sherries, was not
to be considered on the question of
the market value of the sherries;

That the jury must be satisfied, be-
fore they could forfeit the wines, that
there was a guilty knowledge, on the
part of the manufacturers, that the
wines were undervalued; and that
"guilty knowledge" means no more
than "knowledge;"

That the record of the appraise-
ment and reappraisement of these
wines at the custom house in New
York, previous to their seizure, was
to be taken into consideration on the
question of the market value of the
wines at Cadiz, but was not the high-
est evidence on that question. id.

5. Where letters purporting to contain
propositions for the purchase of wines,
were received by the manufacturers
abroad, and in reply they named
their prices for wines for export for
cash:

Held, That if the manufacturers be-
lieved that the letters contained regu-
lar mercantile propositions, and an-
swered the letters and gave the prices
on that supposition, the jury might
infer that they would have sold the
same wines to any body at the same
prices, and that there was a market
value thus made and fixed by them;
that it was a question for the jury
whether the manufacturers believed
that the letters contained real pro-
posals or not; and that, if they did so
believe, it made no difference whether
the proposals in the letters were in
fact real or not.

id.

9. Telegraph cable, composed of iron-wire
and gutta-percha, iron being the mate-
rial of chief value, is embraced in the
words of the twenty-second section of
the Tariff Act of March 2d, 1861 (12
U. S. Stat. 192), and the thirteenth
section of the Act of July 14th, 1862
(Id. 557), as a manufacture, not other-
wise provided for, of which iron is
the component material of chief value.

10.

It is, therefore, not embraced within
the provision of the twentieth section
of the Act of August 30th, 1842 (5 U.
S. Stat. 565), which provides, that, on
non-enumerated articles, manufac-
tured from different materials, the
highest duty shall be assessed which
is chargeable upon any of their com-
ponent parts.

Such telegraph cable, therefore,
was held to be chargeable with
thirty-five per cent. duty, notwith-
standing the fact that gutta-percha
was chargeable with forty per cent
The United States v. The United States
Telegraph Company,

362

Under the twenty-third section of the
tariff Act of March 2d, 1861 (12 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 193, 195). goats' hair,
uncleaned and unmanufactured, is
exempt from duty, notwithstanding
the provisions of the fourth section of
the Act of June 30th, 1866 (13 Id.
205). 51 Bales of Goats' Hair,

INDICTMENT.

See HABEAS CORPUS, 2.

INFORMER.

479

Where C., being advised that whiskey
was being taken from a distillery with-
out payment of tax, went to the Dis-
trict Attorney of the United States,
and stated the facts in general, with-
out naming any place, and afterward
procured and gave to the District At-
torney an affidavit, made by T., set-
ting forth certain specific violations of
law, and T. afterward made an affida-
vit contradicting his first one, and al-
leging that he was drunk when he
made it, and made it from purposes of
revenge, and the property was after-
ward seized, and a libel filed to con-
demn it, and R., a special revenue
agent, being directed to examine into
the case, found conclusive evidence of