at all times commanded the price of his own products, and, in selling them, stood on as high vantage ground as the manufacturer? Is not every person like a coin possessing two sides, a buyer's side and a seller's, and if, through the operation of the tariff system, the buyer has paid more than he wished, could he not increase the price of his own product and thus equalize the gain? This was possible when both buyer and seller were in the same country, but would not have been had the buyer lived here and the seller elsewhere.

Of course, every increase of price to the protected buyer was a diminution of his protection. Those who sold to him and others, however, in most cases, had a better way than that of advancing prices to regain their seeming loss. The area of their sales was enlarged and their aggregate profits were consequently maintained, or increased. The farmers, especially, if they paid more for many things, and yet added nothing to the price of their products, had a constantly widening market with the industrial development of the country, and so added to their wealth. Friction has, indeed, existed between the several classes; there has never been an hour of perfect harmony in the industrial world anywhere. Whether the friction in this country has been increased by the presence of the protective system, whether one class of persons, or interests, have thriven at the loss of another, is regarded by many as an open question; by free-traders as settled affirmatively; by protectionists as settled the other way. The evidence pertaining to the subject would fill many a volume, and is constantly accumulating. The popular judgment, certainly, is that every important industry has been helped more than injured by the presence of the others. The correctness of this judgment is daily questioned, and will be, doubtless, so long

as the existing system shall stand; and if it shall be displaced by another, that one, whatever it may be, will never satisfy all. A harmony of interests, though the universal longing of the world, is a long way off, yet the clearest marks of progress are everywhere visible, and, especially, in the more intelligent production and fairer distribution of wealth.

Thus in a brief way we have gone over a great subject, whose earlier history was closely bound up with the origin of the government, and whose later history is glorified with an accumulation of wealth, experience, and general well-being that is the marvel of the world. The taxation of imports, which, in the beginning, prevented a closer union of the States than the feeblest combination, and possessing no common life, finally drew them by the imperious force of necessity into a union which has been strengthening with the years, and which long ago gained sustenance from a more enduring principle than that from which it sprung. In this long interval the taxing of imports has always held a prominent place in the national legislation, and has caused no little debate and ill-feeling. Is the gap between the contending parties as wide as ever? In this long controversy several great facts have clearly emerged into view, with the statement of which we may fitly close our chapter.

The first fact is that the principle of protection is more completely embedded in public sentiment than in any former period. The evidence is abundant. If we turn to the conduct of political parties, we see that the platforms built from time to time by the Republican party have been growing stronger. The Democratic party, while not equally pronounced on this subject, have, nevertheless, been building in the same direction. At one time that party strongly favored free-trade,

passed the tariff of 1846, and adhered to it; but within the last fifteen years especially their platforms have been changing.1

The leaders of both parties are desirous of getting and retaining the votes of the wage-workers, who also are consumers. The political leaders clearly see that the great body of wage-workers favor protection, and why? Because they are surer of the preservation of the market for the American manufacturer and, consequently, of employment for themselves; and because prices generally are not unreasonably high in comparison with those received for their labor. The second fact is, that the people are more and more opposed to those radical forms of protection whereby great fortunes can be swiftly acquired. Whence it follows that opinion on this subject is nearing a central line, that of reasonable protection, or the kind that is truly for the general welfare. That line is unassailable, and behind it our manufacturers can work and thrive in security. If they attempt to go beyond, they expose themselves to assault, with the certainty of ultimate defeat. 1 See Appendix A.

CHAPTER VIII.

COLLECTION OF THE CUSTOMS REVENUE.

THE administration of the customs-revenue law has always been difficult and unsatisfactory. New York has been the chief port of entry, and the main interest of this chapter centres, therefore, around the New-York Custom-house.

When President Lincoln assumed the presidential office, Hiram Barney was confirmed as collector of that port. Republicans soon filled most of the offices at the other ports, except the Southern ones, which were closed. When the war ended the Southern ports were opened, and from Eastport to Brownsville on the Eastern coast, and from Port Townsend to San Diego on the Pacific, and along the Northern border from Duluth to Ogdensburg, the custom-house existed, and a large army of officials were administering the law. When Mr. Sherman became secretary of the treasury, he strongly recommended the closing of many of these offices which yielded an insignificant return, and so did Secretary Folger. Their recommendations were disregarded.

The principal custom-house officers have been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Generally their selection has been from the State in which they were to serve, although there was no reason for doing so. The revenue has been collected for a publie purpose, and the mere accident of location of the ports ought not to have been considered in selecting the officers for adr the law.

If a different principle had been observed in making selections, the local power of political leaders would have been neutralized. From 1875 to 1881, when Mr. Conkling was the only Republican senator from New York, he was a powerful political boss, because he largely controlled the appointments, and through them exercised a demoralizing influence. His power culminated in 1878. An investigation into the affairs of the New-York Custom-house, which began immediately after the inauguration of President Hayes, revealed no little inefficiency, and the President determined to supersede the collector, surveyor, and naval officer. Messrs. Merritt, Graham, and Burt were selected for the places. Senator Conkling was madly opposed to the change. The Jay Commission had rendered their report, giving a clear and dispassionate history of the administration of the custom-house under General Arthur. Mr. Sherman transmitted the report to the House, and afterward sent a letter to the Senate, in which he briefly and calmly summarized the chief charges against the collector.1

General Arthur replied, showing that some of the secretary's statements were erroneous, though not the weightier matters therein set forth; for they were unanswerable. No fraud was imputed to the officers removed, but their administration was marked with inefficiency; and the frauds of subordinates, while always perpetrated, doubtless, to some extent, had grown much. The contest in the Senate continued for several weeks, ending in the confirmation of the new appointees by nine votes. The secretary of the treasury exerted himself to the utmost to succeed, for defeat would have been a serious thing for the administration. Senators were personally solicited to vote for confirmation, and these appeals were effectual. At first, the 1 For letter and reply, see N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1879. 2 For collector.