It is not a compounding of a felony for the holder of forged paper to accept payment of the same and surrender it up, although he knows it to be forged, no proceedings having been taken against the forger. Kissock v. House, 23 Hun, 35, 36.

§ 126. Conviction of primary offender, etc. -- Upon the trial of an indictment for compounding a crime, it is not necessary to prove that any person has been convicted of the crime or violation of statute, in relation to which an agreement or understanding herein prohibited was made.

See § 32, ante.

A party indicted for compounding a larceny cannot plead the acquittal of the person charged with larceny as a bar to his own conviction. People v. Buckland, 13 Wend. 592.

§ 127. Intimidating, etc., public officer. - A person who directly or indirectly addresses any threat or intimidation to a public officer, or to a juror, referee, arbitrator, appraiser or assessor, or to any other person authorized by law to hear or determine any controversy or matter, with intent to induce him. contrary to his duty, to do or make, or to omit or delay any act, decision or determination, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

See §§ 61, 62, 63, ante, § 464, post; Smith v. Botens, 36 State Rep. 53. An attorney is guilty of contempt for sending to a grand jury, while engaged in the discharge of its duties, an accusatory and threatening letter for the purpose of exasperating the jurors by the aspersions upon their official conduct which it contained, or of deterring them from performing their duties by the threats of public clamor which it expressed, or of creating a distrust and want of confidence in any action which might be taken as the result of their investigation. Matter of Tyler, 71 Cal. 351.

§ 128. Suppressing evidence. - A person who maliciously practices any deceit or fraud, or uses any threat, menace or violence, with intent to prevent any party to an action or proceeding from obtaining or producing therein any book, paper or other thing which might be evidence, or from procuring the attendance or testimony of any witness therein, or with intent to prevent any person having in his possession any book, paper or other thing which might be evidence in such suit or proceeding, or to prevent any person being cognizant of any fact material thereto from producing or disclosing the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor. See §§ 110, 111, ante

§ 129. Buying lands in suit. A person who takes a conveyance of any lands or tenements, or of any interest or estate therein, from any person not being in the possession thereof, while such lands or tenements are the subject of controversy, by suit in any court, knowing the pendency of such suit, and that the grantor was not in possession of such lands or tenements, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

See Chamberlain v. Taylor, 12 Abb. N. C. 473.

§ 130. Buying pretended titles. A person who buys or sells, or in any manner procures, or takes or makes any covenant or promise to convey any right or title, real or pretended, to any lands or tenements, unless the grantor thereof or the person making such covenant or promise has been in possession, or he and those by whom he claims, have been in possession of the same, or of the reversion and remainder thereof, or have taken the rents and profits thereof for the space of one year before such covenant or promise made, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

See Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.). §§ 136-140; Chamberlain v. Taylor, 12 Abb. N. C. 473; Danziger v. Boyd, 120 N. Y. 628; 30 State Rep. 893.

131. Mortgage of lands under adverse possession not prohibited. The last two sections shall not be construed to prevent any person having a just title to lands, in the adverse possession of another, from executing a mortgage upon such lands, nor shall said sections apply to any conveyance or release of lands or tenements to any person in the lawful possession thereof.

§ 132. Common barratry defined.-Common barratry is the practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings.

See 4 Bl. Com. 134, 135; 2 Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.), §§ 63-69; 2 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 127; 21 Alb. L. J. 440; Com. v. Davis, 11 Pick. 432; Com. v. McCullock, 15 Mass. 227; Com. v. Tubbs, 1 Cush. 2; Com. v. Mohn, 52 Penn. St. 243.

§ 133. Declared a misdemeanor.- Common barratry is a misdemeanor.

§ 134. What proof is required. No person can be convicted of common barratry, except upon proof that he has excited

actions or legal proceedings, in at least three instances, and with a corrupt or malicious intent to vex and annoy.

A single instance not barratry. Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580, 581.

§ 135. Interest.

Upon a prosecution for common barratry, the fact that the defendant was himself a party in interest or upon the record to any action or legal proceeding complained of, is not a defense.

§ 136. Buying demands for suit by an attorney. - An attorney or counselor who violates section seventy-three of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to buying demands, or section seventy-four of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to certain promises and gifts, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

See 3 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 68; 39 Alb. L. J. 427; 2 Whart. Crim. Law (8th ed.), § 1854; 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 1050; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 936; The Carl Jackson, 29 Fed. Rep. 396; 4 Civ. Proc. Rep. 414, note; Hoag v. Weston, 10 id. 95; 1 N. Y. State Rep. 585.

Sections 73, 74 and 75, Code of Civil Procedure, read as follows:

"73. An attorney or counselor shall not, directly or indirectly, buy, or be in any manner interested in buying, a bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action thereon."

"§ 74. An attorney or counselor shall not, by himself, or by or in the name of another person, either before or after action brought, promise or give procure to be promised or given, a valuable consideration to any person, as an inducement to placing, or in consideration of having placed, in his hands, or in the hands of another person, a demand of any kind, for the purpose of bringing an action thereon. But this section does not apply to an agreement between attorneys and counselors, or either, to divide between themselves the compensation to be received."

"§ 75. An attorney or counselor, who violates either of the last two sec tions, is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished accordingly, and must be removed from office by the supreme court."

In West v. Kurtz, 15 Civ. Proc. 426, the court say: "The statute prohibiting attorneys and counselors at law from buying bonds, promissory notes, etc., with the intent and for the purpose of bringing actions thereon, was enacted to prevent an evil more common in former times than now; hence, there are not many recent decisions on the subject; but we think former adjudications fully establish the following;

"1st. The mere fact of the purchase of a bond, mortgage, etc., by an attorney, is not evidence of a purchase with the intent, and for the purpose of bringing an action thereon. Hall v. Bartlett, 9 Barb. 297; Bristol v. Dann, 12 Wend. 142; Williams v. Matthews, 3 Cow. 252; Warren v. Helmer, 8 How. Pr. 421.

"2d. An attorney may purchase bonds, etc., for investment, or for profit, or for the protection of other interests, and the purchase is not made illegal by an intent to bring suit, if necessary, for collection. Moses v. McDivitt, 88 N. Y. 62. [Baldwin v. Latson, 2 Barb. Ch. 306.]

3d. To constitute the offense, the primary purpose must be to bring suit, and that intent must not be merely incidental and contingent. Moses v. McDivitt, 88 N. Y. 62.

"And 4th. That the purchase must be made for the very purpose of bringing suit. Moses v. Mc Divitt, 88 N. Y. 62; 8 Abb. N. C. 47."

The statute is not applicable to a demand purchased with the intent of prosecuting it in a justices' court. Goodell v. People, 5 Park. 206.

The statute does not forbid the buying a judgment for the purpose of collecting it by execution. Warner v. Paine, 3 Barb. Ch. 630; Brotherson v.

Consalus, 26 How. 213.

Buying stock and bringing suit as a stockholder not within the statute. Ramsey v. E. R. R. Co., 8 Abb. (N. S.) 17.

The statute covers purchases at judicial sales, made under direction of an officer of court. Mann v. Fairchilds, 2 Keyes, 106; 14 Barb. 548; Hall v. Gird, 7 Hill, 586; Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. 44; Barry v. Whitney, 3 Sandf. 696; Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 587; Ramsey v. Gould, 57 id. 396.

An attorney who is a junior judgment creditor may purchase a prior judgment for his own protection. Van Rensselaer v. Sheriff of Onondaga, 1 Cow.

443.

An attorney may stipulate with his client for an agreed compensation, and may make it absolute or contingent, but he cannot agree to advance the money needed to carry on the prosecution as an inducement for the placing the claim in his hands. Coughlin v. Railroad Co., 71 N. Y. 433; reversing 8 Hun, 136. Contingent fees not within the statute. Ely v. Cooke, 2 Abb. Dec. 14; Marsh v. Holbrook, 3 id. 176.

§ 137. Buying demands by a justice or constable, for suit before a justice. - A justice of the peace or a constable who, directly or indirectly, buys or is interested in buying, anything in action, for the purpose of commencing a suit thereon before a justice, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

138. Corruption in obtaining claims for collection. -A justice of the peace or constable who, directly or indirectly, gives, or promises to give, any valuable consideration to any person as an inducement to bring, or in consideration of having brought, a suit thereon before a justice, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

§ 139. Forfeiture of office. A person convicted of a viola tion of any of the three preceding sections, in addition to the punishment, by fine and imprisonment, prescribed therefor by this Code, forfeits his office.

140. Receiving claims, in what cases allowable.— Nothing in the four preceding sections shall be construed to prohibit the receiving in payment of anything in action for any estate, real or personal, or for any services of an attorney or counselor actually rendered, or for a debt antecedently contracted; or the buying or receiving of anything in action for the purpose of remittance, and without any intent to violate the preceding sections.

The purchasing of a note by a practicing attorney not unlawful where he is a creditor of the holder and the purchase is made for the purpose of securing a debt, without intent to evade the statute. Watson v. McLaren, 19 Wend. 557; Baldwin v. Latson, 2 Barb. Ch. 306. See Mann v. Fairchild, 2 Keyes, 106. Does not prohibit purchase of a mortgage by an attorney, and a foreclosure by advertisement and sale. Hall v. Bartlett, 9 Barb. 297.

Attorneys and counselors at law are prohibited from the receiving of any promissory note, etc., except in payment for real estate or personal sold, for services rendered, for a debt antecedently contracted, or for the purpose of making a remittance, although such note, etc., be not purchased for collection, or for the purpose of bringing a suit thereon. People v. Walbridge, 3 Wend.

120. See, also, Gerdell v. People, 5 Park. 206.

The purchase of the stock of a corporation by an attorney is not a violation of the statutes, it not being one of the securities mentioned. Ramsey v. Gould, 57 Barb, 398.

§ 141. Application of previous sections to persons prosecuting in person. The provisions of sections one hundred and thirty-six, one hundred and thirty-eight and one hundred and forty, relative to the buying of claims by an attorney, counselor, justice of the peace or constable, with intent to prosecute them, or to the lending or advancing of money by an attorney or counselor, in consideration of a claim being delivered for collection, apply to every case of such buying a claim, or lending or advancing money, by any person prosecuting in person an action or legal proceeding.

§ 142. Witness' privilege restricted. - No person shall be excused from testifying, in any civil action or legal proceeding, to any facts showing that a thing in action has been bought, sold or received contrary to law, upon the ground that his testimony might tend to convict him of a crime. But no evidence derived from the examination of such person shall be received against him upon a criminal prosecution.

See 5 Harv. L. Rev. 24.