rule, corporations may be sued and served as natural persons may. Thus, in Nelson v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. (8), a railroad company incorporated in Illinois, where the suit was brought, sought to escape service, procured on it by publication of notice in a newspaper, on the ground that the statute did not provide for reasonable notice. The court held, however, that the statute was constitutional, the notice reasonable, and the service valid. The underlying principle governing such a case is very similar to that in the case of Douglas v. Forrest (9). Corporations must submit to forms of notice that are reasonable, and private individuals are governed by similar requirements.

§ 103. Same: Service on agents beyond domicile. At an earlier period in American law it was impossible to serve a corporation outside of the incorporating state. Modifications of this rule have been made, until it is now possible to serve a corporation outside of its domicile by serving some officer or agent, who appears in the state on business for the corporation. It is, however, essential that he should be there on the corporation's business, and service on an agent in a foreign state who is accidentally there, and who has no authority to represent the corporation there, is not valid to bind the corporation. As was stated by the court in a case (10): "When service is made within the state upon an agent of a foreign corporation, it is essential, in order to support the jurisdiction of the court to render a personal judgment, that

(8) 225 Illinois, 197.

(9) See 898, above.

it should appear somewhere in the record-either in the application for the writ, or accompanying its service, or in the pleadings or findings of the court-that the corporation was engaged in business in the state. The transaction of business by the corporation in the state, general or special, appearing, a certificate of service by the proper officer on a person who is its agent there would, in our opinion, be sufficient prima facie evidence that the agent represented the company in the business".

§ 104. Domicile of defendant may supply court for suit. The preceding cases suggest a rule of Conflict of Laws to the effect that the court of the nation where the defendant, in a suit for a personal judgment, is domiciled is the proper court in which to take judgment in case of his temporary absence. As will be shown later, it is not the only court. If the defendant leaves his domicile and goes into the plaintiff's domicile and is there served, the judgment will be good (11). It is essential that the defendant be subject to the court's jurisdiction, either because domiciled there, or because he came there voluntarily and was served while there. That this is the rule is not merely left to inference from Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (12), but the court there expressly said that "the plaintiff must sue in the court to which the defendant is subject at the time of suit."

§ 105. Judgment based on foreign service of process is void. If a defendant to a proceeding is domiciled in a nation, even though absent temporarily, and that nation serves him with process properly, a judgment rendered

(11) $107, below.

against him is valid. But the service cannot be made beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In Permanent Building Association v. Hudson (13) the plaintiff brought a suit in the province of New South Wales in Australia, against Hudson, a citizen and inhabitant of the province of Queensland. The officer did not find him in New South Wales, but served him in Queensland, beyond the boundaries of the province in which the court was sitting. A judgment was entered on the service and the plaintiff sued on it in Queensland. The court of that province held the judgment invalid, saying: "International law does not, as far as I know, require any country to recognize the jurisdiction or authority of any foreign body or tribunal over its citizens, or over any one who was not a citizen of the country within which that foreign body or tribunal has jurisdiction. Writs in New South Wales run as far as the border of New South Wales and no further. Beyond that they are mere pieces of paper-mere notices. This judgment, there

fore, was obtained in the supreme court of New South Wales against a person who owed no allegiance to that court. The document served on him was only a piece of paper, to which, in my opinion, he was in no way bound to pay attention, and which had no effect in this colony."

§ 106. Same: Further illustration. In Isett v. Stuart, (14) John M. Stuart brought a suit in Illinois against Thomas M. and Edward B. Islett, to set aside a mortgage from the former to the latter, on the ground that it had been made in fraud of creditors. Stuart was an assignee

(13) 7 Queensland Law Journal, 23.

in bankruptcy of Thomas M. Isett, appointed in a proceeding brought against him in New York. The officer served the bankrupt personally in New Jersey, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court sitting in New York. Edward B. set this fact up as a defense to the proceeding to set aside the mortgage. His theory was, that, if the New York court had not obtained jurisdiction of Thomas M. and had appointed an assignee, the appointment was void, and as a result the assignee was powerless to bring a suit as assignee. The court of Illinois held that the suit must be dismissed, as Stuart had not been appointed assignee of Thomas M., the court that appointed him not having obtained jurisdiction of the bankrupt because the writ was served beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

§ 107. Judgment based on actual service on foreigner in jurisdiction is valid. While a court cannot get jurisdiction, for purposes of a personal judgment, upon a person in another nation, by sending its officer to that nation to serve him with process, it can get jurisdiction of him if he comes into the territory and is served there. The mere fact that he is domiciled in a foreign nation, and chooses to go into the nation where he is served does not give him immunity from service of process. In Darrah v. Watson (15) a suit was brought in Iowa on a judgment of a Virginia court obtained under the following circumstances: Watson was a resident of and domiciled in Pennsylvania. He went temporarily into Virginia where the court was sitting, and while there was served

with process. He did not appear to defend, and a judgment by default was entered against him. The court of Iowa recognized the validity of the Virginia judgment and gave a judgment upon it. This principle is generally recognized among the different states. A judgment of a court of a nation where the defendant was personally served with process, while temporarily there, is binding upon him internationally, although he was not domiciled there.

From the discussion in this Section it appears that judgments are valid when rendered by a court of the nation where the defendant is domiciled, although temporarily absent (if service in his absence can be and is properly made); and also when based upon service upon a defendant not domiciled in the jurisdiction, but merely there temporarily.

§ 108. Same: Exception in case of trespass to land. In British South African Co. v. Companhia De Mocambique (16) the plaintiff company brought suit in England to recover damages it had sustained by the defendant company trespassing upon land it owned in South Africa. The point was raised that the English court could not decide the case, and that the only nation which could provide the court was South Africa. It was held that the English court had no power to give a judgment for the damages. This is the rule with reference to damages to land. The only nation to supply the court is the nation where the land is situated. There is but a single case which holds a contrary view, and in that there was a dissenting