good everywhere, and found Lane not guilty of any crime. But in Kinney v. Commonwealth (11) a court took a contrary view. By the law of Virginia colored persons and whites were prohibited from intermarrying. Kinney married a colored woman in the District of Columbia, where no law against such an intermarriage existed. In a criminal prosecution against Kinney, the court held the marriage between these persons void, taking the view of the Brook case that the marriage, being against the public policy of the state of the domicile, was void, even though no limitation or restriction was placed upon such a marriage by the law of the place of solemnization. SECTION 2. CONTRACTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF TRANSFER.

§ 64. Validity of contract to transfer personal property: Between parties to transfer. If, by the law of the state of the transferor's domicile, a contract to sell a chattel must be in writing, but, by the law of the place where the contract is made, no writing is required, it would seem sufficient, as between the contracting parties, for the contract to be oral. Even though not in writing, if good by the law of the place where made, it should be good everywhere. The difference between a contract with reference to a chattel, and an ordinary contract fixing the relations between parties, such as a marriage contract or a contract for labor, is not sufficient to warrant a different rule.

§ 65. Same: Illustration. In Emery v. Clough (12) a case arose where Emery made a gift of a bond to an

(11) 30 Grattan (Virginia), 858.

other. This gift was made in contemplation of death. By the law of Emery's domicile in New Hampshire such a gift was valid, only if proved by the testimony of two indifferent witnesses, upon petition by the donee to establish the gift, within sixty days after the death of the donor. But, by the law of Vermont, where the gift was made, it was valid without a petition. It was contended that the transfer was in the nature of a contract, and, to be effective to pass title, must be made in accordance with the law of the domicile. The court held it valid though made according to the law of the place of the gift, saying: "If it is a contract, in this case it was executed in Vermont, in the life of plaintiff's intestate. If it is not a contract, as that term is commonly understood, it is a gift which received the assent of both parties, and nothing remained to perfect the conditional title of the defendant before the decease of the donor. The transfer of the bond being therefore either an executed contract or a perfected gift in Vermont, and valid under the laws of Vermont, is valid here." Thus it appears that a transfer of a chattel, whether by contract or as a gift, even though the contract is not executed nor the gift made in accordance with the law of the domicile, is nevertheless good as between the parties to the contract or gift.

§ 66. Same: Against subsequent interest of third parties. Law of situs. The rule where third parties become interested, after the contract or transfer is made, will next be considered. In Langworthy v. Little (13) a party owned a horse and buggy in New York. He was

domiciled in Massachusetts, but went to New York, where his chattels were, and executed a mortgage on them, and this mortgage was recorded. The transfer was perfect, according to the law where the chattels were situated. The owner then took the property to Massachusetts, where it was attached by a third person to satisfy a debt. The attaching party had no knowledge of the mortgage transfer. The mortgagee sued for the value of the horse and buggy and recovered, the court saying: "A party who obtains a good title to property, absolute or qualified, by the laws of a sister state, is entitled to maintain and enforce those rights in this state." In a very similar case a vendor of a chattel contracted to sell it, but the title was to remain in him until paid for. This was a valid contract of transfer by the law of Massachusetts where it was made. The vendee took the chattel to New Hampshire, where a creditor attached it without knowing of the vendor's interest in it. The vendor replevied the property and recovered. A transfer or contract to transfer, if valid by the law of the place where the chattel is at the time, is valid everywhere even as against third persons.

This law of the place where the property actually is at the time is called the "law of the situs" [Lat., place]. § 67. Same: Further illustration. In Green v. Van Buskirk (14) a slightly different set of facts makes it possible to announce the principle of the preceding cases in more imperative terms. It is not only true that, if the transfer is made in accordance with the law of the place where the chattel is situated, it is valid against third per

sons everywhere, but a transfer to be good against such persons must be made in accordance with such law. In that case Bates owned certain safes which were situated in Illinois. Van Buskirk took a mortgage of them in New York, but did not record it as required by the law of Illinois. Green, a creditor of Bates, attached the property and sold it to satisfy his claim. Van Buskirk sued him for the value of the chattels. The court held he could not recover. The case carries the principle of the preceding cases a step further, and shows that a transfer of a chattel, situated in another state than that in which the contract of transfer is made, to be valid against third persons must be made in accordance with the law of the place where the chattel is situated.

§ 68. Same: Choses in action. In an English case (15) an Australian corporation had a claim for subscriptions to its stock against a person domiciled in Scotland. It made a transfer of its claim to another. Such a transfer in Australia was good, even as against attaching creditors, without the necessity of the assignee giving notice to the debtor that the assignment had been made. But, by the law of Scotland, where the property may be said to have been located by analogy to the chattel cases, a notice to the debtor was requisite in order to prevent attaching creditors taking the claim ahead of the assignee. An attaching creditor garnished the claim due the corporation in the Scotch debtor's hands. The court held that the attaching creditor's rights were superior to those of the assignee.

§ 69. Same: Shares of corporate stock. In the case of Masury v. Arkansas National Bank (16) the registered holder of stock in an Arkansas corporation made a transfer of it to another, but no change was made on the books of the company to show the transfer. The transferor still appeared to be the owner. By the law of Illinois the rights of the tranferee are superior to those of an attaching creditor, even though the transfer has not been made on the books, but, by the law of Arkansas, the attaching creditor's rights are superior to those of the transferee. The court held that the law of Arkansas, where the property was deemed to be located, would control. An Arkansas attaching creditor succeeded as against the Illinois transferee of the stock.

§ 70. Validity of contract concerning real estate: Ordinarily determined by law of situs. In Swank v. Hufnagle (17) a married woman owned land situated in Indiana. She executed a mortgage on it in the state of Ohio, where she was domiciled, to secure her husband's debt. By the law of Indiana, where the land was, a married woman could not make a valid mortgage to secure another's debt. This protection was afforded by the law of that state to married women, against the loss of their property by becoming another's surety. But, by the law of Ohio, which was the place of the domicile and also the place of the execution of the mortgage, a married woman could make such a mortgage on land situated there. The court held that, although the mortgage might have been valid if the land had been situated in Ohio, it was invalid

(16) 87 Fed., 381.