of any law to preserve the purity of the ballot-box and to guard against the abuses of the elective franchise, is not to prevent any qualified elector from voting, or unnecessarily to hinder or impair his privilege. It is for the purpose of preventing fraudulent voting. In order to prevent fraud at the ballot-box, it is proper and legal that all needful rules and regulations be made to that end, but it is not necessary that such rules and regulations shall be so unreasonable and restrictive as to exclude a larger number of legal voters from exercising their franchise." Accordingly the law was declared unconstitutional. Similar decisions have been made in other states where the effect of requiring a prior registration has been to exclude voters otherwise qualified, but there is also authority of weight on the other side. § 21. Secret ballot. At the present time some form of the Australian ballot is in use in almost every state of the Union, in Canada, England and even on the Continent. Its cardinal features are two: "First, an arrangement for polling by which compulsory secrecy of voting is secured; second, an official ballot containing the names of all candidates, printed and distributed under state or municipal authority" (2). Its great object has been the securing of secrecy in voting, the avoidance of coercion and bribery, and thus the free expression of the voter's will. Opportunity must be given to vote for names not on the official ballot, but this must not be taken advantage of to make distinguishing marks which shall render the ballot capable of identification. Thus in a Connecticut case (3) it was held that the fact that fourteen ballots had pasters written in ink in the same hand, but with a different name on each paster, pasted over the name of a certain candidate, was a suspicious circumstance, justifying, in the absence of explanation, the rejection of the ballots as if designed for the purpose of identification. Most of the cases where the courts have rejected the ballots because of distinguishing marks have been cases where there was something irregular in the cross marked opposite the name of the candidate. Sometimes this is made on the wrong side of the candidate's name, sometimes just outside the square, and sometimes in some form other than the cross generally prescribed. The folding of the ballots in an unusual and striking manner also invalidates the ballot. § 22. Limited voting. The desirability of the representation of the minority has led to various schemes to bring it about. One of these, that of limited voting, was before the supreme court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Reeder (4). A statute of that state, in providing for the election of seven judges of the superior court, had declared that no elector might vote at any election for more than six of them; and it was claimed, in accordance with a previous Ohio decision, that this violated the constitutional provision that a duly qualified elector should "be entitled to vote at all elections," but the court said that no sound reason had been urged in the argument why they should enlarge the scope of these words by prac (3) State v. Walsh, 62 Conn. 260. tically adding "also for every candidate of a group of candidates for the same office." § 23. Cumulative voting. Another scheme for minority representation was approved in Illinois (5). An act of that state had provided that, in the election of trustees of the sanitary districts organized under it, each qualified voter might vote for as many candidates as there were trustees to be elected, or he might distribute the vote among not less than five-ninths of the candidates to be elected, giving each of the candidates among whom he distributed the same the same number of votes or fractional votes. The court could find no constitutional objection to legislation prescribing a method of voting of this kind and so came to an opposite conclusion from that reached by the supreme court of Michigan (6) at almost the same time. The Michigan court could point to no clause of the constitution which the scheme violated, and the decision is rather an instance of the freedom with which acts of the legislature have sometimes been declared unconstitutional in that state than a precedent to be followed. § 24. Vote necessary to a choice. The general rule is that the votes of a plurality of those voting is necessary to an election. In the case of People v. Clute (7), the defendant had received the greater number of votes for the office of superintendent of the poor, but at the time of the election he was supervisor of the town and so ineligible to election. The other candidate, Furman, who had received (5) People v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565. a minority of the votes, claimed to be elected. The court said: "It is the theory and general practice of our government that the candidate who has but a minority of the legal votes cast does not become a duly elected officer. But it is also the theory and practice of our government that a minority of the whole body of qualified citizens may elect to an office, when a majority of that body refuse or decline to vote for anyone for that office. Those of them who are absent from the polls, in theory and practical result, are assumed to assent to the action of those who go on to the polls; those who go to the polls, and who do not vote for any candidate for office, are bound by the result of the action of those who do; and those who go to the polls and who vote for a person for office, if for any valid reason their votes are as if no votes, they are also bound by the result of the action of those whose votes are valid and of effect. As if, in voting for an office to which one only can be elected, two are voted for, and their names appear together on the ballot, the ballot so far is lost. The votes are as if for a dead man or for no man. They are thrown away; and those who cast them are to be held as intending to throw them away, and not to vote for any person capable of the office. And then he who receives the highest number of earnest valid ballots is the one chosen to the office. We may go a step further. They who, knowing a person is ineligible to office by reason of any disqualification, persistently give their ballots for him, do throw away their votes, and are to be held as meaning not to vote for anyone for that office." But in this case the court said that there was no proof of actual notice of could be implied, save that he was a supervisor; and that to hold Furman elected it would have to be presumed, "as a matter of law, that nearly three hundred of those who voted for Clute had knowledge of the fact that he was supervisor; knowledge of the existence of the act of 1853; knew that, the fact and the law concurring thus, he was ineligible to receive and avail himself of their votes in his favor; and knew that their votes given to him were wasted, without effect upon the count." The court refused to make these presumptions and denied Furman's right to the office. § 25. Compliance with statutory regulations. It is not always the case that failure to comply with a statutory provision will invalidate a vote. Thus in the case of Boyd v. Mills (8) it was provided by law that "the ballots shall be on plain white paper through which the printing or writing cannot be read." The law also provided for sample ballots of some color other than white for the inspection of the candidates and their agents. In a certain township the election officials used the sample instead of official ballots and it was claimed that all the votes so cast should be disregarded, but the court held that the departure from the law in matters which the legislature had not declared of vital importance would have to be substantial in order to vitiate the ballots, that if only a part of the ballots used had been colored, they might on that account have been capable of identification and invalid, but that as all of the ballots were of the same color they were not subject to this objection and could not de |