the Court declared that obscenity is not a form of expression protected by the First Amendment, no distinction was made as to the medium of the expression. See Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 481-485 (1957). Obscenity can, of course, manifest itself in conduct, in the pictorial representation of conduct, or in the written and oral description of conduct. The Court has applied similarly conceived First Amendment standards to moving pictures, to photographs, and to words in books. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965); Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra, at 187-188; Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43, 46 (1961); id., at 51 (Warren, C. J., dissenting); Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S. 684, 689-690 (1959); Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U. S. 587, 589 (1954) (DOUGLAS, J., concurring); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U. S. 495, 503 (1952).

Because of a profound commitment to protecting communication of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the printed word or in speech stimulates a traditional and emotional response, unlike the response to obscene pictures of flagrant human conduct. A book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be. But this generalization, like so many, is qualified by the book's content. As with pictures, films, paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the printed word have First Amend

(1967); Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S. 444 (1967); Avansino v. New York, 388 U. S. 446 (1967); Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388 U. S. 448 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States, 388 U. S. 449 (1967); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 388 U. S. 452 (1967); Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 (1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413 (1966); Tralins v. Gerstein, 378 U. S. 576 (1964); Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein, 378 U. S. 577 (1964); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U. S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U. S. 717 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147 (1959); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U. S. 436 (1957).

ment protection until they collide with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not protected by the Constitution. Miller v. California, ante, at 23–25; Roth v. United States, supra, at 483-485.

For good or ill, a book has a continuing life. It is passed hand to hand, and we can take note of the tendency of widely circulated books of this category to reach the impressionable young and have a continuing impact.* A State could reasonably regard the "hard core" conduct described by Suite 69 as capable of encouraging or causing antisocial behavior, especially in its impact on young people. States need not wait until behavioral experts or educators can provide empirical data before enacting controls of commerce in obscene materials unprotected by the First Amendment or by a constitutional right to privacy. We have noted the power of a legislative body to enact such regulatory laws on the basis of unprovable assumptions. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 60-63.

Prior to trial, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that sale of sexually oriented material to consenting adults is constitutionally protected. In connection with this motion only, the prosecution stipulated that it did not claim that petitioner either disseminated any material to minors or thrust it upon the general public. The trial court denied the motion. Today, this Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 68-69, reaffirms that commercial exposure and sale of obscene materials to anyone, including consenting adults, is subject to state regulation. See also United States v. Orito, post, at 141-144; United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 128; United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 376 (1971) (opinion of

See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, at 58 n. 7; Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography 401 (1970) (HillLink Minority Report).

WHITE, J.); United States v. Reidel, 402 U. S. 351, 355356 (1971). The denial of petitioner's motion was, therefore, not error.

At trial the prosecution tendered the book itself into evidence and also tendered, as an expert witness, a police officer in the vice squad. The officer testified to extensive experience with pornographic materials and gave his opinion that Suite 69, taken as a whole, predominantly appealed to the prurient interest of the average person in the State of California, "applying contemporary standards," and that the book went "substantially beyond the customary limits of candor" in the State of California. The witness (xplained specifically how the book did so, that it was a purveyor of perverted sex for its own sake. No "expert" state testimony was offered that the book was obscene under "national standards," or that the book was "utterly without redeeming social importance," despite "expert" defense testimony to the contrary.

In Miller v. California, ante, p. 15, the Court today holds that the "contemporary community standards of the State of California,'" as opposed to "national standards," are constitutionally adequate to establish whether a work is obscene. We also reject in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 49, any constitutional need for "expert" testimony on behalf of the prosecution, or for any other ancillary evidence of obscenity, once the allegedly obscene material itself is placed in evidence. Paris Adult Theatre I, ante, at 56. The defense should be free to introduce appropriate expert testimony, see Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 164–165 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), but in "the cases in which this Court has decided obscenity questions since Roth, it has regarded the materials as sufficient in themselves for the determination of the question." Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U. S. 463, 465 (1966). See United States v. Groner, 479

BRENNAN, J., dissenting

413 U.S.

F. 2d 577, 579-586 (CA5 1973). On the record in this case, the prosecution's evidence was sufficient, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to support petitioner's conviction.i

Both Miller v. California, supra, and this case involve California obscenity statutes. The judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles is vacated, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, Miller v. California, supra, and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra. See United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, post, at 130 n. 7, decided today. Vacated and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Would vacate and remand for dismissal of the criminal complaint under which petitioner was found guilty because "obscenity" as defined by the California courts and by this Court is too vague to satisfy the requirements of due process. See Miller v. California, ante, p. 37 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting).

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.

1

I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with my dissenting opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 73. See my dissent in Miller v. California, ante, p. 47.

5 As the prosecution's introduction of the book itself into evidence was adequate, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to establish the book's obscenity, we need not consider petitioner's claim that evidence of pandering was wrongly considered on appeal to support the jury finding of obscenity. Petitioner's additional claims that his conviction was affirmed on the basis of a "theory" of "pandering" not considered at trial and that he was subjected to retroactive application of a state statute are meritless on the record.

Syllabus

UNITED STATES v. 12 200-FT. REELS OF SUPER

8MM. FILM ET AL. (PALADINI, CLAIMANT)

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. 70-2. Argued January 19, 1972-Reargued November 7, 1972— Decided June 21, 1973

Congress, which has broad powers under the Commerce Clause to prohibit importation into this country of contraband, may constitutionally proscribe the importation of obscene matter, notwithstanding that the material is for the importer's private, personal use and possession. Cf. United States v. Orito, post, p. 139. Stanley v. Georgia, 354 U. S. 557, distinguished. The District Court consequently erred in holding 19 U. S. C. § 1305 (a) unconstitutional. This case is remanded to the District Court for reconsideration in light of the First Amendment standards newly enunciated by this Court in Miller v. California, ante, p. 15, which equally apply to federal legislation, and this opinion. Pp. 124-130.

Vacated and remanded.

BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DoUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 130. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEWART and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 138.

Solicitor General Griswold reargued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General Greenawalt, and Sidney M. Glazer.

Thomas H. Kuchel, by invitation of the Court, 404 U. S. 813, reargued the cause as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. With him on the brief were Edward Weinberg, George Miron, and Ezra C. Levine.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Melvin L. Wulf and Joel M. Gora for the American Civil Liberties Union; by