Objection 4th. If these demands were granted Spain might think herself entitled to the demand or conquest of Georgia, Penobscot, New York, &c.

Answer. This objection is extravagant, and cannot be seriously made. The most explicit assurances on this point might at any time be obtained.

Objection 5th.

liberal.

Such conduct in Spain neither generous nor

Answer. The Spanish Ministry have probably ere this said to the French Ambassador that the conduct of the Americans is neither generous nor liberal.

Objection 6th. A war, even a long war, preferable to such conditions.

Answer. A patient extremely ill might as well say to his physician death is better than not to drink spirituous liquors, and other things not to be found on the island where he was.

Objection 7th. The Spaniards would hereafter be the sacrifice of their own ambition. No unequal treaty can last long; the injured party will sooner or later break it.

Answer. The cautiousness of Spain may be trusted to provide against this evil. She may, perhaps, upon better ground, suggest the same danger to the States. They will choose rather, however, to confine themselves to their right of conquest upon a country possessed by their enemy.

Objection 8th. The territory cannot be given up without the previous consent of the interested States.

Answer. As this argument is founded on the charters, if it be valid, it would prove that no treaty would be valid unless it secured to the States the lands as far as the South Sea.

In this manner would reason a Minister of the Court of Spain, and it would seem no solid objection could be made to it. If any restrictions ought to be laid on these principles, they ought to be taken from the actual settlement of Americans on the territories claimed by the Spaniards. By settlement is meant, not temporary incursions of a few troops, but actual occupancy, supported by the exercise of jurisdiction, and by building houses, clearing and inhabiting the land, &c., without contradiction. Here an impartial mediator might find the line to be drawn between the contending parties. But I shall confine myself to represent to the friends of this case, that, in missing the present fair opportunity of obtaining solid and lasting advantages, to run after the shadow and a chimerical object, they expose themselves to the everlasting reproaches of their country.

NO. II.

See Page 448.

ADDRESS TO THE STATES, BY THE UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS ASSEM

BLED.

The prospect which has for some time existed, and which is now happily realized, of a successful termination of the war, together with the critical exigencies of public affairs, have made it the duty of Congress to review and provide for the debts which the war has left upon the United States, and to look forward to the means of obviating dangers which may interrupt the harmony and tranquillity of the Confederacy. The result of their mature and solemn deliberations on these great objects is contained in their several recommendations of the eighteenth instant, herewith transmitted. Although these recommendations speak, themselves, the principles on which they are founded, as well as the ends which they propose, it will not be improper to enter into a few explanations and remarks, in order to place in a stronger view the necessity of complying with them.

The first measure recommended is, effectual provision for the debts of the United States. The amount of these debts, as far as they can now be ascertained, is forty-two millions three hundred and seventyfive dollars. To discharge the principal of this aggregate debt at once, or in any short period, is evidently not within the compass of our resources; and even if it could be accomplished, the ease of the community would require that the debt itself should be left to a course of gradual extinguishment, and certain funds be provided for paying, in the meantime, the annual interest. The amount of the annual interest is computed to be two millions four hundred and fifteen thousand nine hundred and fifty-six dollars. Funds, therefore, which will certainly and punctually produce this annual sum at least, must be provided.

In devising these funds, Congress did not overlook the mode of supplying the common treasury provided by the Articles of Confederation; but after the most respectful consideration of that mode, they were constrained to regard it as inadequate, and inapplicable to the form into which the public debt must be thrown. The delays and uncertainties incident to a revenue to be established and collected from time to time by thirteen independent authorities, are at first view irreconcilable with the punctuality essential in the discharge of the interest of a national debt. Our own experience, after making every allowance for transient impediments, has been a sufficient illustration of this truth. Some departure, therefore, in the recommendation of Congress, from the Federal Constitution, was unavoidable; but it

will be found to be as small as could be reconciled with the object in view, and to be supported, besides, by solid considerations of interest and sound policy.

The fund which first presented itself on this, as it did on a former, occasion, was a tax on imports. The reasons which recommended this branch of revenue have heretofore been stated, in an Act of which a copy, No. 2., is now forwarded, and need not be here repeated. It will suffice to recapitulate, that taxes on consumption are always least burdensome, because they are least felt, and are borne, too, by those who are both willing and able to pay them; that, of all taxes on consumption, those on foreign commerce are most compatible with the genius and policy of free states; that, from the relative positions of some of the more commercial States, it will be impossible to bring this essential resource into use without a concerted uniformity; that this uniformity cannot be concerted through any channel so properly as through Congress, nor for any purpose so aptly as for paying the debts of a Revolution from which an unbounded freedom has accrued to commerce.

In renewing this proposition to the States, we have not been unmindful of the objections which heretofore frustrated the unanimous adoption of it. We have limited the duration of the revenue to the term of twenty-five years; and we have left to the States themselves the appointment of the officers who are to collect it. If the strict maxims of national credit alone were to be consulted, the revenue ought manifestly to be co-existent with the object of it, and the collection placed in every respect under that authority which is to dispense the former, and is responsible for the latter. These relaxations will, we trust, be regarded, on one hand, as the effect of a disposition in Congress to attend at all times to the sentiments of those whom they serve, and, on the other hand, as a proof of their anxious desire that provision may be made in some way or other for an honorable and just fulfilment of the engagements which they have formed.

To render this fund as productive as possible, and at the same time to narrow the room for collusions and frauds, it has been judged an improvement of the plan, to recommend a liberal duty on such articles as are most susceptible of a tax according to their quantity, and are of most equal and general consumption; leaving all other articles, as heretofore proposed, to be taxed according to their value.

The amount of this fund is computed to be nine hundred and fifteen thousand nine hundred and fifty-six dollars. Accuracy in the first essay on so complex and fluctuating a subject is not to be expected. It is presumed to be as near the truth as the defect of proper materials would admit.

The residue of the computed interest is one million five hundred thousand dollars, and is referred to the States to be provided for by such funds as they may judge most convenient. Here again the strict maxims of public credit gave way to the desire of Congress to conform to the sentiments of their constituents. It ought not to be omitted, however, with respect to this portion of the revenue, that the mode in which it is to be supplied varies so little from that pointed out in the Articles of Confederation, and the variations are so conducive to the great object proposed, that a ready and unqualified compliance on the part of the States may be the more justly expected. In fixing the quotas of this sum, Congress, as may be well imagined, were guided by very imperfect lights, and some inequalities may consequently have ensued. These, however, can be but temporary, and as far as they may exist at all, will be redressed by a retrospective adjustment, as soon as a constitutional rule can be applied.

The necessity of making the two foregoing provisions one indivisible and irrevocable act, is apparent. Without the first quality, partial provision only might be made, where complete provision is essential; nay, as some States might prefer and adopt one of the funds only, and the other States the other fund only, it might happen that no provision at all would be made. Without the second, a single State out of the thirteen might at any time involve the nation in bankruptcy, the mere practicability of which would be a fatal bar to the establishment of national credit. Instead of enlarging on these topics, two observations are submitted to the justice and wisdom of the Legislatures. First, the present creditors or rather the domestic part of them, having either made their loans for a period which has expired, or having become creditors in the first instance involuntarily, are entitled, on the clear principles of justice and good faith, to demand the principal of their credits, instead of accepting the annual interest. It is necessary, therefore, as the principal cannot be paid to them on demand, that the interest should be so effectually and satisfactorily secured, as to enable them, if they incline, to transfer the stock at its full value. Secondly, if the funds be so firmly constituted as to inspire a thorough and universal confidence, may it not be hoped, that the capital of the domestic debt, which bears the high interest of six per cent. may be cancelled by other loans obtained at a more moderate interest? The saving by such an operation, would be a clear one, and might be a considerable one.

Thus much for the interest of the national debt. For the discharge of the principal within the term limited, we rely on the natural increase of the revenue from commerce; on requisitions to be made from time to time for that purpose, as circumstances may dictate;

and on the prospect of vacant territory. If these resources should prove inadequate, it will be necessary, at the expiration of twenty-five years, to continue the funds now recommended, or to establish such others as may then be found more convenient.

With a view to the resource last mentioned, as well as to obviate disagreeable controversies and confusions, Congress have included in their present recommendations a renewal of those of the sixth day of September, and of the tenth day of October, 1780. In both these respects, a liberal and final accommodation of all interfering claims of vacant territory is an object which cannot be pressed with too much solicitude.

The last object recommended is a constitutional change of the rule by which a partition of the common burthens is to be made. The expediency, and even necessity, of such a change, has been sufficiently enforced by the local injustice and discontents which have proceeded from valuations of the soil in every State where the experiment has been made. But how infinitely must these evils be increased on a comparison of such valuations among the States themselves! On whatever side, indeed, this rule be surveyed, the execution of it must be attended with the most serious difficulties. If the valuations be referred to the authorities of the several States, a general satisfaction is not to be hoped for. If they be executed by officers of the United States, traversing the country for that purpose, besides the inequalities against which this mode would be no security, the expense would be both enormous and obnoxious. If the mode taken in the act of the seventeenth day of February last, which was deemed on the whole least objectionable, be adhered to, still the insufficiency of the data to the purpose to which they are to be applied, must greatly impair, if not utterly destroy, all confidence in the accuracy of the result; not to mention, that, as far as the result can be at all a just one, it will be indebted for the advantage to the principle on which the rule proposed to be substituted is founded. This rule, although not free from objections, is liable to fewer than any other that could be devised. The only material difficulty which attended it, in the deliberations of Congress, was to fix the proper difference between the labor and industry of free inhabitants, and of all other inhabitants. The ratio ultimately agreed on was the effect of mutual concessions; and if it should be supposed not to correspond precisely with the fact, no doubt ought to be entertained that an equal spirit of accommodation among the several Legislatures will prevail against little inequalities which may be calculated on one side or on the other. But notwithstanding the confidence of Congress, as to the success of this proposition, it is their duty to recollect that the event may possibly disappoint them, and to VOL. I.- *