thought if they could be obtained for the foreign debt, it would be as much as could be expected, and that they would also be less essential for the domestic debt.

Mr. MADISON observed, that it was needless to go into proofs of the necessity of paying the public debts; that the idea of erecting our national independence on the ruins of public faith and national honor must be horrid to every mind which retained either honesty or pride; that the motion before Congress contained a simple proposition, with respect to the truth of which every member was called upon to give his opinion; that this opinion must necessarily be in the affirmative, unless the several objects of doing justice to the public creditors, &c. &c., could be compassed by some other plan than the one proposed; that the two last objects depended essentially on the first; since the doing justice to the creditors would alone restore public credit, and the restoration of this would alone provide for the future exigencies of the war. Is, then, a continental revenue indispensably necessary for doing complete justice, &c.? This is the question. To answer it, the other plans proposed must first be reviewed.

In order to do complete justice to the public creditors, either the principal must be paid off, or the interest paid punctually. The first is admitted to be impossible on any plan. The only plans opposed to the continental one for the latter purpose are, first, periodical requisitions according to the Federal Articles; secondly, permanent funds established by each State within itself, and the proceeds consigned to the discharge of public debts.

Will the first be adequate to the object? The contrary seems to be maintained by no one. If reason did not sufficiently premonish, experience has sufficiently demonstrated, that a punctual and unfailing compliance, by thirteen separate and independent governments, with periodical demands of money from Congress, can never be reckoned upon with the certainty requisite to satisfy our creditors, or to tempt others to become our creditors in future.

Secondly. Will funds separately established within each State, and the amount submitted to the appropriation of Congress, be adequate to the object? The only advantage which is thought to recommend this plan is, that the States will be with less difficulty prevailed upon to adopt it. Its imperfections are, first, that it must be preceded by a final and satisfactory adjustment of all accounts between the United States and individual States; and by an apportionment founded on a valuation of all the lands throughout each of the States, in pursuance of the law of the Confederation; for although the States do not as yet insist on these pre-requisites in the case of annual demands on them, with which they very little comply, and that only in the way of an open account, yet these conditions would certainly be exacted in case of a permanent cession of revenue; and the difficulties and delays, to say the least, incident to these conditions, can escape no one. Secondly, the produce of the funds being always, in the first instance, in the hands and under the control of the States separately, might, at any time, and on various pretences, be diverted to State objects. Thirdly, that jealousy which is as natural to the

States as to individuals, and of which so many proofs have appeared, that others will not fulfil their respective portions of the common obligations, will be continually and mutually suspending remittances to the common treasury, until it finally stops them altogether. These imperfections are too radical to be admitted into any plan intended for the purposes in question.

It remains to examine the merits of a plan of a general revenue operating throughout the United States, under the superintendence of Congress.

One obvious advantage is suggested by the last objection to separate revenues in the different States; that is, it will exclude all jealousy among them on that head, since each will know, whilst it is submitting to the tax, that all the others are necessarily at the same instant bearing their respective portions of the burden. Again, it will take from the States the opportunity, as well as the temptation, to divert their incomes from the general to internal purposes, since those incomes will pass directly into the Treasury of the United States.

Another advantage attending a general revenue is, that in case of the concurrence of the States in establishing it, it would become soonest productive, and would, consequently, soonest obtain the objects in view; nay, so assured a prospect would give instantaneous confidence and content to the public creditors at home and abroad, and place our affairs in a most happy train.

The consequences with respect to the Union, of omitting such a provision for the debts of the Union, also claimed particular attention. The tenor of the

memorial from Pennsylvania, and of the information just given on the floor by one of its Delegates, (Mr. FITZSIMMONS,) renders it extremely probable that that State would, as soon as it should be known that Congress had declined such provision, or the States rejected it, appropriate the revenue required by Congress to the payment of its own citizens and troops, creditors of the United States. The irregular conduct of other States on this subject, enforced by such an example, could not fail to spread the evil throughout the whole continent. What, then, would become of the Confederation? What would be the authority of Congress? What the tie by which the States could be held together? What the source by which the army could be subsisted and clothed? What the mode of dividing and discharging our foreign debts? What the rule of settling the internal accounts? What the tribunal by which controversies among the States could be adjudicated?

It ought to be carefully remembered, that this subject was brought before Congress by a very solemn appeal from the army to the justice and gratitude of their country. Besides immediate pay, they ask for permanent security for arrears. Is not this request a reasonable one? Will it be just or politic to pass over the only adequate security that can be devised, and instead of fulfilling the stipulations of the United States to them, to leave them to seek their rewards separately from the States to which they respectively belong? The patience of the army has been equal to their bravery, but that patience must have its limits, and the result of despair cannot be foreseen, nor ought to be risked.

It has been objected against a general revenue, that it contravenes the Articles of Confederation. These articles, as has been observed, presupposed the necessity of alterations in the federal system, and have left a door open for them. They, moreover, authorize Congress to borrow money. Now, in order to borrow money, permanent and certain provision is necessary; and if this provision cannot be made any other way, as has been shown, a general revenue is within the spirit of the Confederation.

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It has been objected that such a revenue is subversive of the sovereignty and liberty of the States. If it were to be assumed, without the free gift of the States, this objection might be of force; but no assumption is proposed. In fact, Congress are already invested by the States with the constitutional authority over the purse as well as the sword. A general revenue would only give this authority a more certain and equal efficacy. They had a right to fix the quantum of money necessary for the common purposes. The right of the States is limited to the mode of supply. A requisition of Congress on the States for money is as much a law to them as their revenue acts, when passed, are laws to their respective citizens. If, for want of the faculty or means of enforcing a requisition, the law of Congress proves inefficient, does it not follow that, in order to fulfil the views of the Federal Constitution, such a change should be made as will render it efficient? Without such efficiency the end of this Constitution, which is to preserve order and justice among the members of the Union, must fail; as without a like efficiency would the end of State Constitutions, which is to