the collection would be effected with fewer officers under the management of Congress than under that of the States.

Mr. GORHAM observed, that Mr. HAMILTON was mistaken in the representation he had given of the collection of taxes in several of the States, particularly in that of Massachusetts, where the collection was on a footing which rendered it sufficiently certain.

Mr. WILSON, having risen to explain something which had fallen from him, threw out the suggestion that several branches of the revenue, if yielded by all the States, would perhaps be more just and satisfactory than any single one; for example, an impost on trade combined with a land tax.

Mr. DYER expressed a strong dislike to a collection by officers appointed under Congress, and supposed the States would never be brought to consent to it.

Mr. RAMSAY was decidedly in favor of the proposition. Justice, he said, entitled those who had lent their money and services to the United States to look to them for payment; that if general and certain revenues were not provided, the consequence would be that the army and public creditors would have soon to look to their respective States only for satisfaction; that the burden in this case would fall unequally on the States; that rivalships relative to trade would impede a regular impost, and would produce confusion among the States; that some of the States would never make, of themselves, provision for half-pay, and that the army would be so far defrauded of the rewards stipulated to them by Congress; that although it might be uncertain whether the States would accede to plans founded on the

proposition before the House, yet, as Congress was convinced of its truth and importance, it was their duty to make the experiment.

Mr. BLAND thought, that the ideas of the States on the subject were so averse to a general revenue in the hands of Congress, that if such a revenue were proper it was unattainable; that as the deficiency of the contributions from the States proceeded, not from their complaints of their inability,* but of the inequality of the apportionments, it would be a wiser course to pursue the rule of the Confederation, to wit, to ground the requisition on an actual valuation of lands; that Congress would then stand on firm ground, and try a practicable mode.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 28TH.

The subject yesterday under discussion was resumed. A division of the question was called for by Mr. WOLCOTT, so as to leave a distinct question on the words "to be collected by Congress," which he did not like.

Mr. WILSON considered this mode of collection as essential to the idea of a general revenue, since, without it, the proceeds of the revenue would depend entirely on the punctuality, energy and unanimity of the States, the want of which led to the present consideration.

Mr. HAMILTON was strenuously of the same opinion. Mr. FITZSIMMONS informed Congress that the Legis

The papers just read, from Virginia, complained of her inability without mentioning an inequality. This was deemed a strange assertion.

lature of Pennsylvania had, at their last meeting, been dissuaded from appropriating their revenue to the payment of their own citizens, creditors of the United States, instead of remitting it to the Continental Treasury, merely by the urgent representations of a Committee of Congress, and by the hope that some general system in favor of all the public creditors would be adopted; that the Legislature were now again assembled, and, although sensible of the tendency of such an example, thought it their duty, and meant, in case the prospect of such a system vanished, to proceed immediately to the separate appropriations formerly in contemplation.

On the motion of Mr. MADISON, the whole proposition was new-modelled, as follows:

"That it is the opinion of Congress that the establishment of permanent and adequate funds, to operate generally throughout the United States, is indispensably necessary for doing complete justice to the creditors of the United States, for restoring public credit, and for providing for the future exigencies of the war." The words "to be collected under the authority of Congress" were, as a separate question, left to be added afterwards.

Mr. RUTLEDGE objected to the term "generally," as implying a degree of uniformity in the tax which would render it unequal. He had in view particularly a land tax, according to quality, as had been proposed by the Office of Finance. He thought the prejudices of the people opposed the idea of a general tax; and seemed, on the whole, to be disinclined to it himself, at least if extended beyond an impost VOL. I.-19

on trade; urging the necessity of pursuing a valuation of land, and requisitions grounded thereon.

Mr. LEE seconded the opposition to the term "general." He contended that the States would never consent to a uniform tax, because it would be unequal; that it was, moreover, repugnant to the Articles of Confederation; and by placing the purse in the same hands with the sword, was subversive of the fundamental principles of liberty. He mentioned the repeal of the impost by Virginia-himself alone opposing it, and that, too, on the inexpediency in point of time-as proof of the aversion to a general revenue. He reasoned upon the subject, finally, as if it was proposed that Congress should assume and exercise a power immediately, and without the sanction of the States, of levying money on them.

Mr. WILSON rose, and explained the import of the motion to be, that Congress should recommend to the States the investing them with power. He observed that the Confederation was so far from precluding, that it expressly provided for, future alterations; that the power given to Congress by that act was too little, not too formidable; that there was more of a centrifugal than centripetal force in the States, and that the funding of a common debt in the manner proposed would produce a salutary invigoration and cement to the Union.

Mr. ELLSWORTH acknowledged himself to be undecided in his opinion; that, on the one side, he felt the necessity of continental funds for making good the continental engagements, but, on the other, desponded of a unanimous concurrence of the States in such an establishment. He observed, that it was a

question of great importance, how far the Federal Government can or ought to exert coercion against delinquent members of the Confederacy; and that without such coercion no certainty could attend the constitutional mode, which referred every thing to the unanimous punctuality of thirteen different councils. Considering, therefore, a continental revenue as unattainable, and periodical requisitions from Congress as inadequate, he was inclined to make trial of the middle mode of permanent State funds, to be provided at the recommendation of Congress, and appropriated to the discharge of the common debt.

Mr. HAMILTON, in reply to Mr. ELLSWORTH, dwelt long on the inefficacy of State funds. He supposed, too, that greater obstacles would arise to the execution of the plan than to that of a general revenue. As an additional reason for the latter to be collected by officers under the appointment of Congress, he signified, that, as the energy of the Federal Government was evidently short of the degree necessary for pervading and uniting the States, it was expedient to introduce the influence of officers deriving their emoluments from, and consequently interested in supporting the power of, Congress.

*

Mr. WILLIAMSON was of opinion, that continental funds, although desirable, were unattainable, at least to the full amount of the public exigencies. He

*This remark was imprudent and injurious to the cause which it was meant to serve. This influence was the very source of jealousy which rendered the States averse to a revenue under collection, as well as appropriation of Congress. All the members of Congress who concurred, in any degree, with the States in this jealousy, smiled at the disclosure. Mr. BLAND, and still more Mr. LEE, who were of this number, took notice, in private conversation, that Mr. HAMILTON had let out the secret.