current of his anger, br, at least, of not having done his utmost to hasten the delivery of his insane letter; and to punish him, he positively refused to command the combined army. He also refused to send any of his troops "till he had in writing the King of Prussia's sentiments," and "was so much irritated, that nothing could pacify him, till the Russian minister, Alopæus, received the letter, and promised to send it."

We have given this anecdote at length, because it marks, better than any general description, the kind of man whom the allies had to deal with, and the Swedes to suffer under. But there is scarcely a page of the narrative before us that is not illustrative of the same character-varying between drivelling and madness, through all the stages of caprice, vanity, enthusiasm and fury; but never passing the bounds of personal discretion, or exhibiting, even in its utmost extravagance, any symptoms of a rashness uncontrolled by fear. To appear a great man was this weak prince's perpetual object; and to at tain it, he was inclined to do just enough to set himself a dreaming, and to give a slight pretext for issuing proclamations and bulletins. No better illustration of this can be conceived, than. his proceedings on the occupation of Lauenburg. During the negotiations with Berlin, and after having well ascertained that his troops would not be molested, he approached them towards Luneburg. He went into the most minute details himself, always fancying that he had a universal military genius, though ignorant of the very rudiments of war. "'The governor-general," (we are told,)" and others acquainted with the country, were not consulted concerning the order of march; and thus it often happened, that the troops were ordered to take up their quarters in villages which were nowhere to be found but on paper. Thus, the battalions of guards, and the king's regiment, were left without shelter on the 26th of November, and in the most dreadful weather. The same improvidence existed with regard to provi sions; and those who were ordered to form magazines were left ignorant where they were to be situated." P. 21.

After a delay of five weeks, arising from such miserable folly, the Swedish army were ordered to march; and a body of troops seized on Harburg, where they were commanded by the king to double the customs, and appropriate one half to the military chest. This occasioned many complaints, being directly contrary to the treaty of Westphalia, which was so constantly appealed to in the Swedish proclamations. It was accordingly repealed, and the "measure" abandoned, after yielding, with much difficulty, the sum of twenty-six rix-dollars, or about 41. 168. 8d. to the Swedish conqueror. While he was thus carrying on his great plans in the north, that upstart creature, whom he

had treated with such dignified contempt.under the name of Mr. Bonaparte, took occasion to destroy the Austrian and Russian armies at Austerlitz. The immediate consequence of this discourteous and low-bred behaviour was, that the Swedish army was left alone upon the wrong bank of the Elbe, unsupported by either Russians, Prussians, or English, and in the certainty, if it were worth any body's while, of being surrounded and taken. The English had left Hanover to its fate; and their minister represented to the King of Sweden the folly of making any further attempt, under existing circumstances, to defend it. Gustavus considered that this was the fit moment for him to assume the title of "Protector of the Territory of Lauenburg." "For this reason" (continues our author) "he required that the King of England should officially desire him to retreat. It was in vain to represent, that by this step, the King of England would, as Elector of Hanover, appear to authorize the occupation of this country by Prussia. Gustavus Adolphus had resolved to await the determination of the court of London, and, rather than retire, expose himself to an attack from the Prussians, who continued to advance. The only answer, therefore, which he made to such representations, was, "They may either wait or fight.' He himself had, however, the prudence to retire to Ratzeburg; leaving Count Lowenhjelm with less than 1,800 men, with orders to fire on the Prussians should they attempt to cross the Elbe." P.

24. 26.

His grand idea seems now to have been the securing his new conquest of Lauenburg. So he proposed that he should retain it till a general peace; and had formed a plan of declaring it a Swedish territory till then. He withdrew all his troops, however, except a few squadrons of horse, which he left under Count Lowenhjelm, in the full confidence of the Prussians not attacking them. But on receiving accounts of the offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia and France, and the consequent incorporation of Hanover with the former, Gustavus retired himself, and left his unfortunate squadrons, with a pompous proclamation, that any attack on them should be considered in the same light as if it had happened in the Swedish territories. The end of this strange piece of campaigning is thus described:

"The disgust which the King of Sweden had conceived on being deprived of the command of the Russians under General Tolstoy, was particularly manifested on their retreat. Their commander was informed of the position of the Swedes both in Mecklenburg and on the Elbe; and Count Lowenhjelm was strictly ordered to fire the instant he saw a Russian advance. The Russian army must either make a circuitous march of several days, or pass the narrow neck of land occupied by the Swedes, which in that part was not an En

glish mile in breadth. After many inquiries, Count Lowenhjelm at length learns that the motive for these orders was an apprehension which the king entertained, that a Prussian corps followed the Russians; but upon the count's being assured that this was not the case, the Russians were allowed to pass. The king could not be persuaded to recall his troops, although the King of Prussia declared his intention of occupying the German territories of the King of England, in consequence of an agreement with France; and although the Russian minister remonstrated against the longer occupation of a country which it was impossible to defend. At length the Prussians took possession of Lauenburg, and surrounded the little troop of Swedes, which did not exceed 300 men. The Swedes fired first; the Prussians abstained from taking an inglorious advantage of their superior strength, and treated the Swedes with the greatest delicacy. The Prussian commanders, in eight parleys, represented that their king did not wish to attack Sweden; and when the Swedes, finding themselves surrounded, attempted to force a passage, the Prussians opened their ranks, and paid them military honours. After the troops had reached Wismar, an offer was made to return two dragoon horses which had been taken; but the King of Sweden insisted that they should be looked upon as prisoners of war. The English minister declared that no blame could attach to his court in this affair, or its consequences, as he had often advised the Swedes to abandon Lauenburg, and the Swedes had first fired upon the Prussians. But nothing seemed to exasperate Gustavus Adolphus so much as the little importance with which the court of Berlin seemed to consider his declarations and opposition. He had in vain hoped and expected an attack on Pomerania, and would undoubtedly have declared war, could he have supported his declaration with an adequate force: but he was obliged to content himself with maritime hostilities." P. 28-30.

It is perhaps necessary to inform the reader, that this Lauenburg, about which he has heard so much, consists of two hamlets, of extremely vile sandy soil, and a few dozen of the most indifferent houses or cottages. It belongs to Hanover; but even the persons most attached to that important country, are said scarcely to have been aware of its existence, until reminded of it by the sudden and violent liking for it now displayed by Gustavus. (P. 33.) He was resolved at all events, it should seem, to retain it; and he agreed to raise the blockade of the Prussian ports, on condition of the Prussian troops leaving Lauenburg The war which ended in the speedy destruction of Prussia was now beginning; and Gustavus, and his armies, and his conquests, were too inconsiderable to occupy the attention of either party. As soon as the fate of Prussia was decided, his first impulse was to send his whole army to reinforce his handful of men in Lauenburg; but the apprehension of Pomerania being invaded prevented him. He therefore sent orders to his troops to evacuate Lauenburg, and retreat VOL. II. New Series.

35

towards Stralsund. But they were sent too late: for these troops had already been obliged to retire to Lubeck, and were there taken prisoners. When Gustavus was informed of their having begun their retreat, he despatched orders to his commander, to leave sixty dragoons in Lauenburg; with peremptory injunctions that they should "not evacuate the country till they were surrounded and overpowered by the enemy." This notable letter never reached its destination; but it was translated and communicated to the English minister. The capture of the army of Lauenburg (three hundred strong) only served to increase the great conqueror's hatred to Bonaparte. He refused all offers of accommodation, although the most favourable terms were proposed; it being clearly the interest of France to remain at peace with Sweden, and no less so of Sweden to be at peace with France. Among other offers was one of an increase of territory. Indeed, the interest of France always appeared so clearly to be in favour of augmenting the power of Sweden as a counterpoise to Russia, that the reader will find this point expressly stated in a former number of our journal, (see Ed. Rev. for July, 1807,) where we suggested the probability of the two countries not remaining long hostile, and of Sweden being won over by an accession of territory, or a restoration, to speak more properly, of her former dominions. We did not certainly calculate on Gustavus persisting so long in his ineffectual schemes, nor on the catastrophe to which his obstinacy led.

As it turned out, however, the destruction of Prussia only made Gustavus resolve to prosecute the restoration of the Bourbons with new vigour; and as the English ministers had at length discovered that they had to do with one, who, to use the language of our author, "whatever were his accomplishments, was at least no hero"-one who "did not possess science to command, or courage to share the danger of the field"-they refused to increase the subsidy. Gustavus, however, was a financier, as well as a warrior. He now chose to consider himself as having a claim upon Russia; and he stopt the Russian subsidy, then at Gottenburg, on its way from England to St. Petersburgh. In the mean time, the French seemed resolved not to attack Pomerania, let Gustavus do his utmost to irritate them. They barely took a position within the frontier-endeavoured to negotiate were refused-and then offered an armistice, and to withdraw their forces. Every propo sal was rejected with contempt. But the hero of Lauenburg did not venture actually to attack them. They withdrew of themselves: and he then made a sort of attempt on their rear guard; took a few prisoners and stores, with a hospital; and, elated with his triumph, ordered Te Deum to be sung in all the churches. The French being thus compelled to chastise him, turned round upon the Swedes and defeated them-after a most gallant resist

ance by that brave army, who only wanted a chief of talents and courage to show themselves worthy of their descent;-and thus an armistice was forced on them, whether their ridiculous king would or no. There were various opinions and doubts as to this truce. Some criticised the terms of it; others regretted it had not, in the delicate state of the war, been delayed a short time. The Russians predicted the fall of Colberg as likely to follow; the English were discontented with it; but Gustavus, consistent to the last, was only offended at the instrument calling Napoleon emperor and king. He ordered the words not to be used in the Swedish papers, and made his general inform the French marshal that such expressions would not be tolerated in any future transaction.

We cannot afford room for attending so closely on the steps of this infatuated prince, during the remaining part of his reign. The contemplation of folly, and unsupported extravagant pretension, is, when long continued, a very disgusting task. We shall therefore content ourselves with selecting some traits not hitherto sufficiently noted by the public in his character and conduct.

The work before us, repeatedly, and without any hesitation, charges him with a deficiency of personal courage; nor is there any passage in his life, as far as the world are aware of, which tends to refute the charge. This must certainly be esteemed a circumstance of some weight, considering the opportunities which he had of exposing himself to danger, if not of signalizing himself. The following note relates to this subject.

"During the retreat, the king sent to General Brune and proposed an armistice:-The general answered that as the war had not yet lasted thirty-six hours, such a proposal was rather premature from one who aspired to imitate Charles XII.

"Gustavus Adolphus was the first who reached Stralsund, and had not been exposed to the possibility of danger; yet he endeavoured to persuade some people that he had received a contusion in the leg from a musket-ball; and, as a proof of the fact, he exhibited a red spot on his kg, and a corresponding blemish on his boot, which refused to receive the usual polish. This story was sanctioned by the authority of an officious surgeon; but as it seemed to make little impression, it was soon forgotten." P. 57, 58.

His strange enthusiasm is said to have assumed the form of religious fanaticism. He got hold of a commentary on the revelations, which seems to have turned his brain. He persuaded himself that the letters of Bonaparte's name composed the mystic number 666, the number of the beast; that Napoleon was therefore the beast whose dominion should be of short duration, and for whose discomfiture he himself was the chosen instrument of providence. He was very particular in his directions to his ministers, &c. that