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By this you will perceive that the president is desirous of removing every obstacle to an accommodation which consists merely of form, securing in a safe and satisfactory manner the rights and interests of the U. States in these two great and essential circumstances, as it is presumed may be accomplished by the proposed understanding; he is willing that it be done in a manner the most satisfactory and honorable to Great Britain, as well as to the United States. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

JAMES MONROE.

Mr. Graham to Mr. Russel.

Department of State, August 9, 1812. Sir, The secretary left this city about ten days ago on a short visit to Virginia. Since that period Mr. Baker has, in consequence of some dispatches from his government addressed to Mr. Foster, made to me a communication respecting the intentions of his government as regards the orders in council. It was of a character, however, so entirely informal and confidential, that Mr. Baker did not feel himself at liberty to make it in the form of a note verbal or pro memoria, or even to permit me to take a memorandum of it at the time he made it. As it authorises an expectation that something more precise and definite, in an official form, may soon be received by this government, it is the less necessary that I should go into an explanation of the views of the president in relation to it, more particularly as the secretary of state is daily expected, and will be able to do it in a manner more satisfactory.

I refer you to the enclosed papers for information as to the maritime and military movements incident to the war, and will add, that the president is anxious to know as soon as possible, the result of the proposals you were authorized to make to the British government respecting an armistice. He considers them so fair and reasonable, that he cannot but hope that they will be acceded to, and thus be the means of hastening an honourable and permanent peace. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN GRAHAM.

Mr. Graham to Mr. Russel.

Department of State, August 10, 1812. Sir, Thinking that it may possibly be useful to you, I do myself the honour to enclose a memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Baker and myself, alluded to in my letter of yesterday's date. From a conversation with Mr. Baker since this memorandum

was made, I find that I was correct in representing to the president that the intimation from Mr. Foster and the British authorities at Halifax was to be understood as connected with a suspension of hostilities on the frontiers of Canada. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) JOHN GRAHAM. Memorandum referred to in the above letter.

Mr. Baker verbally communicated to me for the information of the President, that he had received dispatches from his government addressed to Mr. Foster, dated (I believe) about the 17th June, from which he was authorized to say, that an official declaration would be sent to this country, that the orders in council, so far as they affected the United States, would be repealed on the first August, to be revived on the 1st May, 1813, unless the conduct of the French government and the result of the communications with the American government should be such as, in the opinion of his majesty, to render their revival unnecessary. Mr. Baker moreover stated, that the orders would be revived, provided the American government did not, within fourteen days after they received the official declaration of their repeal, admit British armed vessels into their ports, and put an end to the restrictive measures which had grown out of the orders in council.

The dispatches authorizing this communication to the American government expressly directed that it should be made verbally, and Mr. Baker did not consider himself at liberty to reduce it to writing, even in the form of a note verbal, or pro memoria, or to suffer me to take a memorandum of his communication at the time he made it. I understood from him that the dispatches had been opened by Mr. Foster at Halifax, who, in consequence of a conversation he had had with vice-admiral Sawyer and sir John Sherbroke, had authorized Mr. Baker to say, that these gentlemen would agree, as a measure leading to a suspension of hostilities, that all captures made after a day to be fixed, should not be proceeded against immediately, but be detained to await the future decision of the two governments. Mr. Foster had not seen sir George Prevost, but had written to him by express, and did not doubt but that he would agree to an arrangement for the temporary suspension of hostilities.

Mr. Baker also stated that he had received an authority from Mr. Foster to act as charge des affaires, provided the American government would receive him in that character, for the purpose of enabling him officially to communicate the declaration which was to be expected from the British government; his functions to be understood, of course, as ceasing on the renewal of hostilities. I

replied, that although, to so general and informal a communication, no answer might be necessary, and certainly no particular answer expected, yet, I was authorized to say, that the communication is received with sincere satisfaction, as it is hoped that the spirit in which it was authorized by his government may lead to such further communications as will open the way, not only for an early and satisfactory termination of existing hostilities, but to that entire adjustment of all the differences which produced them, and to that permanent peace and solid friendship which ought to be mutually desired by both countries, and which is sincerely desired by this. With this desire an authority was given to Mr. Russel on the subject of an armistice as introductory to a final pacification, as has been made known to Mr. Foster, and the same desire will be felt on the receipt of the further and more particular communications which are shortly to be expected with respect to the joint intimation from Mr. Foster and the British authorities at Halifax on the subject of suspending judicial proceedings in the case of maritime captures, to be accompanied by a suspension of military operations. The authority given to Mr. Russel just alluded to, and of which Mr. Foster was the bearer, is full proof of the solicitude of the government of the United States to bring about general suspension of hostilities on admissible terms, with as little delay as possible. It was not to be doubted, therefore, that any other practicable expedient for attaining a similar, result would readily be concurred in. Upon the most favourable consideration, however, which could be given to the expedient suggested through him, it did not appear to be reducible to any practicable shape to which the executive would be authorized to give it the necessary sanction, nor indeed is it probable that if it was less liable to insuperable difficulties, that it could have any material effect previous to the result of the pacific advance made by this government, and which must, if favourably received, become operative as soon as any other arrangement that could now be made. It was stated to Mr. Baker, that the president did not, under existing circumstanees, consider Mr. Foster as vested with the power of appointing a charge des affaires; but that no difficulty, in point of form, would be made, as any authentic communication through him, or any other channel, would be received with attention and respect.

The Secretary of State to Mr. Russel.

Department of State, August 21, 1812. [Extract] My last letter to you was of the 27th July, and was forwarded by the British packet, the Althea, under the special

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protection of Mr. Baker. The object of that letter, and of the next preceding one, of the 26th of June, was to invest you with power to suspend by an armistice, on such fair conditions as it was presumed could not be rejected, the operation of the war, which had been brought on the United States by the injustice and violence of the British government. At the moment of the declaration of war, the President regretting the necessity which produced it, looked to its termination and provided for it, and happy will it be for both countries, if the disposition felt, and the advance thus made on his part, are entertained and met by the British government in a similar spirit.

You have been informed by Mr. Graham of what passed in my late absence from the city, in an interview between Mr. Baker and him, in consequence of a dispatch from the British government to Mr. Foster, received at Halifax, just before he sailed for England, and transmitted by him to Mr. Baker, relating to a proposed suspension or repeal of the British orders in council. You will have seen by the note forwarded to you by Mr. Graham, of Mr. Baker's communication to him, that Mr. Foster had authorized him to state, that the commanders of the British forces at Halifax would agree to a suspension, after a day to be fixed, of the condemnation of prizes, to await the decision of both governments, without, however, preventing captures on either side. It appears also that Mr. Foster had promised to communicate with sir. George Prevost, and to advise him to propose to our government an armistice.

Sir George Prevost has since proposed to general Dearborn, at the suggestion of Mr. Foster, a suspension of offensive operations by land, in a letter which was transmitted by the general to the secretary at war. A provisional agreement was entered into between general Dearborn and col. Baynes, the British adjutantgeneral, bearer of gen. Prevost's letter, that neither party should act offensively, before the decision of our government should be taken on the subject.

Since my return to Washington, the document alluded to in Mr. Foster's dispatch, as finally decided on by the British government, has been handed to me by Mr. Baker, with a remark, that its authenticity might be relied on. Mr. Baker added, that it was not improbable that the admiral at Halifax might agree likewise to a suspension of captures, though he did not profess or appear to be acquainted with his sentiments on that point.

On full consideration of all the circumstances which merit attention, the president regrets that it is not in his power to accede

to the proposed arrangement. The following are among the principal reasons which have produced this decision.

1st. The president has no power to suspend judicial proceedings on prizes. A capture, if lawful, vests a right, over which he has no controul. Nor could he prevent captures otherwise than by an indiscriminate recal of the commissions granted to our privateers, which he could not justify under existing circumstances.

2d. The proposition is not made by the British government, nor is there any certainty that it would be approved by it. The proposed arrangement, if acceded to, might not be observed by the British officers themselves, if their, government, in consequence of the war, should give them instructions of a different character, even if they were given, without a knowledge of the arrangement. 3d. No security is given, or proposed, as to the Indians, nor could any be relied on. They have engaged in the war on the side of the British government, and are now prosecuting it with vigour, in their usual savage mode. They can only be restrained by force, when once let loose, and that force has already been ordered out for the purpose.

4th. The proposition is not reciprocal, because it restrains the United States from acting where their power is greatest, and leaves Great Britain at liberty, and gives her time to augment her forces in our neighbourhood.

5th. That as a principal object of the war is to obtain redress against the British practice of impressment, an agreement to suspend hostilities, even before the British government is heard from on that subject, might be considered a relinquishment of that claim.

6th. It is the more objectionable, and of the less importance, in consideration of the instructions heretofore given you, which, if met by the British government, may have already produced the same result in a greater extent and more satisfactory form.

I might add, that the declaration itself is objectionable in many respects, particularly the following.

1st. Because it asserts a right in the British government to restore the orders in council, or any part thereof, to their full effect, on a principle of retaliation on France, under circumstances of which she alone is to judge; a right which this government cannot admit, especially in the extent heretofore claimed, and acted on by the British government.

2d. That the repeal is founded exclusively on the French decree of the 28th of April, 1811, by which the repeal of the decrees of Berlin and Milan, announced on the 5th of August, 1810, to take

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