determinations of his Providence. It should be enough to us to know that, whatever these reasons are, they must be worthy of infinite intelligence, or at leaft, of a piece with that perfection of wisdom and art which we fee in the whole of the inanimate creation. But thefe obfervations I fhall have occafion to refume in fome of the following fections.

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SECT. II.

Of the arguments for Providence from the general laws and conftitution of the world.

I

T has been fhewn in the preceding

fection, that the perfect character of the Deity cannot be maintained without allowing an all-directing and unerring Providence. It would have been taking much too large a compass to enter, on this occafion, into an account of the evidence for the Divine perfections. 'Tis fufficient if it appears that the doctrine of Providence refts on the fame foundation with them, and follows from them. There is, however, one objection here, of which it will be proper to take fome notice. It may be faid, "that our only "evidence for the Divine perfections is "taken from what we obferve of their ef"fects in the frame of nature, and that there“fore to infer from thefe perfections any

greater

greater order and wisdom in the admini"ftration of nature than we can actually "obferve, is to fuppofe greater perfection in "the Deity than can be proved, and the "fame with first determining the properties "of the caufe by the effect, and then de"termining the properties of the effect by "the cause.".

In answer to this I would obferve, ift, that it is not true that our whole evidence for the Divine perfections is taken from the frame of nature. The difcoveries of reafon, however they may be preceded by observation and experience, and take their rife from them, tranfcend them infinitely; and in many inftances force us to receive truths which they are incapable of suggesting *. But,

* I am under a neceffity of referring again to the Review of the principal Questions and Dif ficulties in Morals, Chap. 1ft and 10th, where I have endeavoured to prove all that is here afferted. The works of creation demonftrate that the Creator is poffeffed of power and intelligence. That he poffeffes them in the higheft poffible degree, follows from his nature as an uncaused Being. Whatever qualities fuch a Be.

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But, 2dly, fuppofing that our whole knowledge of the Deity must be derived from what we fee of his works, it will not follow that we ought to ascribe to him only just that precise degree of the perfections we believe him to poffefs, which is equal to what we can comprehend of their effects in the 'contrivance and order of the world: This would imply, that we ought never to infer from any data more than they immediately contain, and therefore would put an

end

a Being has, he must have neceffarily, and, therefore, in their fource and in infinity. This is capable of the ftricteft proof, and muft, I fancy, appear to every one who has juft views of this fubject. The perfect intelligence of the Deity being in this way discovered, it will follow that he is poffeffed of perfect benevolence and rectitude; for these are included in perfect intelligence; as, I think, is fhewn in the treatise just referred to. And thus, on the principles maintained in that treatise, the complete idea of Deity, confifting of infinite power, intelligence, and goodness effentially united, will be established; and this being eftablished, the doctrine of an unerring providence guiding all events, or of a perfect order in nature, will be likewise established, as is fhewn in the ceding section.

pre

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end to all reafoning. The cause must always have in himself, in a greater degree, thofe perfections which he communicates.

It would be eafy to fhew that from the works of creation we have reason to infer a much higher degree of power, wisdom and goodness in the Creator than they directly exhibit; and therefore it will be right in this cafe, firft to argue upwards from the effect, as a foundation for proving the perfections of the caufe, and then back again from the cause thus difcovered to the effect. Thus, in natural philofophy, by reafoning from particular facts we gain the knowledge of the general laws which obtain in nature, and afterwards apply thefe laws to the explanation of other facts which could not otherwise have been accounted for. For instance; from the fact that gravity is the power which keeps the moon in her orbit, is inferred the general law of gravitation, by the help of which the whole order of the folar fyftem is laid open to us, and all the motions of the bodies that compofe it explained.