veniencies not right, all things confidered, to be allowed: or, that fuch would be eftablished whose inconveniencies might even become occafions of good, as the afflictions of human life have a tendency to bring men to fobriety and thoughtfulness, and to teach them fome of the most important virtues. Or, fuppofing the inconveniencies arifing from any neceffary general laws to be in themfelves abfolute evils, we may conceive that there may be direction in various ways, with respect to the inftances in which they shall happen; or that remedies may be provided for them in the original conftitution by particular fecondary laws, as the inconveniencies attending the absence of the fun are remedied by the lights with which we can furnish ourselves in the night, or as the ill effects which would often arife from gravity and other natural caufes, are prevented by the powers and instincts with which animals are endowed. It is, without doubt, abfolutely neceffary that natural caufes fhould operate uniformly and steadily. Were they liable to frequent interruptions, the regu

larity

larity of nature would be deftroyed; there would be no room for the exercise of prudence and forefight, and an universal inactivity would take place among reasonable beings. If then it should be true, that fome evils are impoffible to be feparated by any methods from the uniform operation of any law of nature neceffary to the general good, fuch evils only render this law so much lefs good, while yet it may be the best poffible, and the impoffibility of preventing them without greater harm, becomes itfelf a fufficient vindication of Providence in permitting them, and renders them entirely confiftent with, nay inftances of, a perfect order in the oeconomy of the universe.

In a word. It is felf-evident that if there is one event in nature, of which all the care is not taken that is right to be taken, the administration of the world is fo far defective, and the character of its author imperfect. It will be a contradiction to say, in anfwer to this, that there are caufes and reafons, C which

which render it not possible to take fuch care of every event; for the care right to be taken can be no other than all the care pof fible to be taken. It follows, therefore, that no one who believes a perfect Deity can deny a Providence, or doubt whether it is particular.

pre

Left I fhould not find a properer place, I fhall beg leave to add here, as fome fumption in favour of fuch a perfect order in nature as a particular Providence implies, that there is in order and right an effential tendency to get the afcendant over their contraries. They imply in their natures fuperior force, ftability, and permanency; whereas, confusion and wrong as fuch are neceffarily weak, unstable, and self-deftructive. This alone, I think, might be fufficient to engage an attentive mind to believe, previously to any confideration of the actual state of the world, that the former rather than the latter, must be likely to be prevalent in it. But, perhaps, we may with reafon proceed further in this way of thinking. The very

notion

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notion that there is any circumstance in the courfe and adminiftration of the world as it fhould not be, appears to me to be felf-evidently incredible. It implies an impoffibility like that of destroying space and duration; for it implies the non-existence of what cannot even in thought be destroyed; of infinite, omnipotent, and everlasting reafon and goodness. While we conceive these to remain, (and otherwife we cannot conceive without a contradiction) we must believe that every thing repugnant to them, or not allowed by them, is excluded from nature *But let this be as it will. It feems

to

It would take up too much time as well as lead to a speculation too abftrufe for the prefent discourse to explain my full meaning here, or to fhew that we have an intuitive perception of the existence of infinite, everlasting, omnipotent intelligence and rectitude, which like eternity and immenfity we cannot deftroy, but remain after we have supposed them away, and the ideas of which are included in all our reafonings, and all our notions of truth and morality. I therefore only hint this argument, and leave the reader to judge of it as he pleases. See Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, Chap. V.

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to me, on the whole, fcarcely more certain that events happen at all, than that they do not happen without the Providence of the Deity. As the maker and preferver of the world, he must take cognizance of whatever happens, and have an abfolute dominion over it. Some determination, therefore, of his will there must be with refpect to every event. His knowing that an event happens, and at the fame time not interpofing to prevent it, is a confent that it should happen; and as this consent must be founded on fome reasons, it is the very fame with exercifing a providence over the event. This obfervation will have more weight if we add, that he forefaw the event before it happened, and yet was not pleased so to dispose things as to exclude it; or, that when he established the prefent fyftem of nature, he knew that it would arife in confequence of his establishment, which yet he did not think fit to alter.We ought to poffefs not much less than his omniscience to be able to comprehend the reasons which have guided, in every inftance, the deter

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