" and our sentiments be determined by "the degree in which we fee, or think "we fee, the one to prevail over the "other.". But a little attention will discover this way of arguing, in the present cafe, to be very fallacious. The position on which it is founded, "that unknown "relations may as well fhew seeming "order to be diforder as the contrary," is undoubtedly falfe. Order and regularity, we are fure, wherever they are found, cannot but proceed from defign and wisdom; and it is not poffible that any unknown relations fhould deftroy the appearance of them.-Thus; if we saw a million of things, difpofed regularly at the angles of a polygon of a million of equal fides, we should neceffarily conclude that there was real order here, derived from knowledge and wisdom; nor could we help reckoning it impertinent to object, that, if we knew all the relations of these things to others, we might perceive the contrary. But, on the other hand; fuppofing any number of objects to be dif pofed

H 3

pofed apparently according to no order, we could not from hence conclude that this was really the cafe; because it is not impoffible but that their relations and correspondencies to furrounding objects, did we perceive them, might fhew us that they were disposed in the most beautiful order.In like manner, it would

be

very abfurd to fay, that had we larger views we might discover, perhaps, that the eye was not made for feeing, or that the bodies of plants and animals are not the effects of art. But, it is by no means fo to fay of any appointments of nature, o parts of an animal body which feem irregular or useless, that, had we larger views, we might perceive them to be otherwife. It is, therefore, evident that the relations of objects, or their connexions with other objects, may entirely alter what appears irregular in them, at the fame time that they cannot affect what appears regular; and that, confequently, contrary to what has been ob jected, there is the greateft regard due to

our

our ignorance when we contemplate the former, but none when we contemplate the latter. The one must be the effect of wifdom, and the other may. From the appearance of deformity, or ill contrivance in an object, when seen in one pofition, or confidered by itself, there may not arife the least prefumption, that it will have the fame appearance when seen in another pofition, or when confidered as a part of an extenfive and complicated fyftem. How foolish may the measures taken by the rulers of a ftate, or the inftitutions of a civil polity, though in reality the wifeft poffible, seem to a perfon not enough acquainted with the fituation of the ftate, or with the whole plan of the civil polity? How dull may a single part of a musical com position appear when heard alone, which yet, when heard in concert with the other parts, may make the most delightful harmony? How aukward may a beautiful and neceffary member of a machine appear, when detached from the

reft, or when viewed by one who fees not its reference to the end of the machine? How confufed does the fyftem of the world appear to a spectator on the earth, or according to the Ptolemaick fyftem; but how regular and harmonious is it according to the true fyftem, or as it would appear to a spectator in the fun? Can it be excufable not to bear in mind fuch truths, when we contemplate Divine Providence? Or is it at all judging according to reafon, not to make the allowances they require? Is there any one who, in examining any work of human art, would not impute to his ignorance whatever in it appeared not confiftent with the fkill which the general frame of it discovered? Why is not this equally reasonable with respect to the conftitution of nature, where we find innumerable proofs of infinite wisdom, and in the meanest productions of which is exhibited an incomprehenfible exactnefs of art and workmanship?

It

It may be worth adding here, that, being ourselves part of nature, and deriving from the fame original with it our very notions of order, it seems very incredible that we should be able to correct nature, or to conceive and order greater and better than is to be found in it*.

There are two accounts to be given of the appearance of irregularities in nature. It It may be occafioned either by the reality of these irregularities; or by our ignorance, confined views, and difadvantageous fituation for obferving nature. It may be owing either to a real want of wisdom, or to the infinity and unfathomableness of it. The first of these accounts contradicts numberlefs Phanomena of nature; is inconsistent with the perfection of wisdom apparent in the general frame of the world, and oppofes our moft reafonable apprehenfions concerning the na

* See Characteristics, Vol. II. p. 284.

turę

Τις γαρ αν είη φυσις τεδε (περικαλλέσατε κόσμε) Βρειτών, ην γαρ αν ειποι τις, μέρος αυτό επι Arift. de Mundo, Cap. V,