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because the end might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the constitution.

The government is to pay the debt of the union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe.

This claim of priority on the part of the United States will, it has been said, interfere with the right of the state sovereignties respecting the dignity of debts, and will defeat the measures they have a right to adopt to secure themselves against delinquencies on the part of their own revenue officers.

But this is an objection to the constitution itself. The mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, is the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States on all subjects to which the legislative power of congress extends.

2 Cr. 397.

HEPBURN AND DUNDAS v. ELLZEY.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1805.

[2 Cranch's Reports, 445-453.]

Hepburn and Dundas, who were citizens of the district of Columbia, sued Ellzey, who was a citizen of Virginia, in the United States' circuit court holden in the district of Virginia, and this question arose :

"Are citizens of the district of Columbia citizens of a state within the meaning of the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United States?"

The judges of the circuit court being opposed in opinion upon this question, it was brought before the supreme court; the opinion of which was given by the chief justice, as follows:

The question in this case is, whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the district of Columbia, can maintain an action in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia.

This depends on the act of congress describing the jurisdic tion of that court. That act gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts in cases between a citizen of the state in which the suit is brought and a citizen of another state. To support the jurisdiction in this case, therefore, it must appear that Columbia is a state.

On the part of the plaintiffs it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is therefore "a state," according to the definitions of writers on general law.

This is true. But as the act of congress obviously uses the word "state" in reference to that term as used in the constitution, it becomes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a state in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a conviction that the members of the American confederacy only are the states contemplated in the constitution.

The house of representatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several states; and each state shall have at least one representative.

The senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state.

Each state shall appoint for the election of the executive a number of electors equal to its whole number of senators and representatives.

These clauses show that the word "state" is used in the constitution as designating a member of the union, and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations. When the same term, which has been used plainly in this limited sense, in the articles respecting the legislative and executive departments, is also employed in that which respects the judicial department, it must be understood as retaining the sense originally given to it.

Other passages from the constitution have been cited by the plaintiffs to show that the term "state" is sometimes used in its more enlarged sense. But on examining the passages quoted, they do not prove what was to be shown by them.

It is true, that, as citizens of the United States, and of that particular district which is subject to the jurisdiction of congress, it is extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for judicial consideration.

The opinion to be certified to the circuit court is, that that court has no jurisdiction in the case.

2 Cr. 453.

Ex parte* BOLLMAN AND SWARTWOUT.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1807.

[4 Cranch's Reports, 75-137.]

The circuit court for the district of Columbia having committed to prison Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout on a charge of treason against the United States; C. Lee moved the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus,† directed to the marshal of the district of Columbia, ordering him to bring said Bollman and Swartwout before the supreme court, that the cause of their commitment might be inquired into. The first question was whether the supreme court was empowered to grant a writ of habeas corpus in such a case; upon this the chief justice delivered the opinion of the court as follows:

As preliminary to any investigation of the merits of this mo tion, this court deems it proper to declare that it disclaims all jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States.

Courts which originate in the common law possess a jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common law, until some statute shall change their established principles; but courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to state the reasoning on which this opinion is founded, because it has been repeatedly given by this court; and with the decisions heretofore rendered on this point no

* Ex parte proceedings are those in which only one party appears. †This writ brings any person in confinement before the proper court, and calls upon the one who holds the person in durance to show the ground whereon he does so. To move the court for a rule or writ is merely to ask for it.

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member of the bench has, even for an instant, been dissatisfied. The reasoning from the bar in relation to it may be answered by the single observation, that for the meaning of the term habeas corpus resort may unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States must be given by written law.

This opinion is not to be considered as abridging the power of courts over their own officers, or to protect themselves and their members from being disturbed in the exercise of their functions. It extends only to the power of taking cognizance of any question between the individuals, or between government and individuals.

To enable the court to decide on such question, the power to determine it must be given by written law.

The inquiry, therefore, on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court.

The fourteenth section of the judicial act (Laws U. S. vol. 1, p. 58,) has been considered as containing a substantive grant of this power.

It is in these words: "That all the before mentioned courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs, not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law. And that either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of commitment. Provided, that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless where they are in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify."