levying war. It is not pretended that he would not be punishable for these acts; it is only said that he may be tried and convicted on his own acts in the state where those acts were committed, not on the acts of others in the state where those others acted.

Much has been said, in the course of the argument, on points on which the court feels no inclination to comment particularly, but which may, perhaps, not improperly receive some notice. That this court dares not usurp power is most true.

That this court dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable situation. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny. No man, might he let the bitter cup pass from him without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he has no choice in the case; if there is no alternative presented to him but a dereliction of duty, or the opprobrium of those who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his country, who can hesitate which to embrace.

That gentlemen, in a case the most interesting, in the zeal with which they advocate particular opinions, and under the conviction in some measure produced by that zeal, should on each side press their arguments too far, should be impatient at any deliberation in the court, and should suspect or fear the operation of motives to which alone they can ascribe that deliberation, is, perhaps, a fraility incident to human nature; but if any conduct on the part of the court could warrant a sentiment that they would deviate to the one side or the other from the line prescribed by duty and by law, that conduct would be viewed by the judges themselves with an eye of extreme severity, and would long be recollected with deep and serious regret.

The arguments on both sides have been intently and deliberately considered. Those which could not be noticed, since to notice every argument and authority would swell this opinion to a volume, have not been disregarded. The result of the whole is a conviction, as complete as the mind of the court is

capable of receiving on a complex subject, that the motion must prevail.

No testimony, relative to the conduct or declarations of the prisoner elsewhere and subsequent to the transaction on Blennerhassett's island, can be admitted; because such testimony, being in its nature merely corroborative, and incompetent to prove the overt act in itself, is irrelevant, until there be proof of the overt act by two witnesses.

This opinion does not comprehend the proof by two witnesses that the meeting on Blennerhassett's island was procured by the prisoner. On that point the court, for the present, withholds its opinion, for reasons which have been already assigned, and as it is understood, from the statements made on the part of the prosecution, that no such testimony exists. If there be such, let it be offered and the court will decide upon it.

The jury have now heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the facts, and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may direct.

4 Cr. 507.

THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES v. DEVEAUX AND OTHERS.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1809.

[5 Cranch's Reports, 61-92.]

In 1805 the state of Georgia passed a law taxing the Branch Bank of the United States at Savannah; the tax was not paid, and the state officers entered the bank and seized two thousand dollars. The bank sued Deveaux, the state officer who authorized the entry, and also the one who made the entry, in trespass, before the United States circuit court for the district of Georgia; the defendants denied the jurisdiction of the court, and the case was brought before the supreme bench. The two questions which were made in the case are presented in the following opinion as delivered by the chief justice :

Two points have been made in this cause.

1. That a corporation, composed of citizens of one state, may sue a citizen of another state in the federal courts.

2. That a right to sue in those courts is conferred on this bank by the law which incorporates it.

The last point will be first considered.

The judicial power of the United States, as defined in the constitution, is dependent, 1st, On the nature of the case; and, 2d, On the character of the parties.

By the judicial act, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is extended to cases where the constitutional right to plead and be impleaded in the courts of the union depends on the charac ter of the parties; but where that right depends on the nature of the case, the circuit courts derive no jurisdiction from that act, except in the single case of a controversy between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants from different states.

Unless, then, jurisdiction over this cause has been given to the circuit court by some other than the judicial act, the bank of the United States had not a right to sue in that court, upon the principle that the case arises under a law of the United States.

The plaintiffs contend that the incorporating act confers this jurisdiction.

That act creates the corporation, gives it a capacity to make contracts and to acquire property, and enables it "to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and be defended, in courts of record, or any other place whatsoever."

This power, if not incident to a corporation, is conferred by every incorporating act, and is not understood to enlarge the jurisdiction of any particular court, but to give a capacity to the corporation to appear, as a corporation, in any court which would by law have cognizance of the cause, if brought by individuals. If jurisdiction is given by this clause to the federal courts, it is equally given to all courts having original jurisdiction, and for all sums, however small they may be.

But the ninth article of the seventh section of the act furnishes a conclusive argument against the construction for which the plaintiffs contend. That section subjects the president and directors, in their individual capacity, to the suit of any person aggrieved by their putting into circulation more notes than are permitted by law, and expressly authorizes the bringing of that action in the federal or state courts.

This evinces the opinion of congress that the right to sue does not imply a right to sue in the courts of the union, unless it be expressed. This idea is strengthened also by the law respecting patent rights. That law expressly recognizes the right of the patentee to sue in the circuit courts of the United States.

The court, then, is of opinion that no right is conferred on the bank, by the act of incorporation, to sue in the federal

courts.

8

2. The other point is one of much more difficulty.

The jurisdiction of this court being limited, so far as respects the character of the parties in this particular case, "to controversies between citizens of different states," both parties must be citizens to come within the description.

That invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and consequently cannot sue or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of the members, in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate name. If the corporation be considered as a mere faculty, and not as a company of individuals who in transacting their joint concerns may use a legal name, they must be excluded from the courts of the union.

The duties of this court, to exercise jurisdiction where it is conferred, and not to usurp it where it is not conferred, are of equal obligation. The constitution, therefore, and the law are to be expounded, without a leaning the one way or the other. according to those general principles which usually govern in the construction of fundamental or other laws.

A constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in details. Its framers cannot perceive minute distinctions which arise in the progress of the nation, and therefore confine it to the establishment of broad and general principles.

The judicial department was introduced into the American constitution under impressions and with views which are too apparent not to be perceived by all. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer justice, as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors that it has estab lished national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states. Aliens, or citizens of different states, are not less susceptible of these apprehensions, nor can they be supposed to be less the objects of constitutional provision, because they are allowed to