MR. STEPHENS. I refer specially to a speech made by him before the Supreme Court of the United States, in 1839, and to his speech at Capon Springs, in Virginia, in 1851, as well as some other matters. But, if it is agreeable to all, we will suspend the investigation for the present, take our evening's walk, and resume the subject to-morrow. Reading aloud is much more exhausting than talking, even with the same tone of voice.

COLLOQUY IX.

SUBJECT CONTINUED-WEBSTER'S SPEECH BEFORE THE SUPREME COURTHIS LETTER TO BARING BROTHERS & CO-HIS CAPON SPRINGS SPEECH-THE SUPREME COURT ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY-INTERNATIONAL COMITY— DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF THE STATES AND THE UNION OF ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND-EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE SENATE IN 1838-CALHOUN'S PRINCIPLES OF 1833 SUSTAINED BY TWO THIRDS OF THE STATES IN 1838-EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE SENATE IN 1860-JEFFERSON DAVIS.

PROF. NORTON. Well, Mr. Stephens, we are all ready to resume the subject we were last upon. That was the modification of Mr. Webster's opinions upon the issue between him and Mr. Calhoun in their great debate which we have been reviewing.

MR. STEPHENS. Yes, I have just looked up the argument of Mr. Webster, before the Supreme Court of the United States, to which I referred. I will first call your attention to that, and then some other expressions of opinion by him, bearing on the same subject. The case the Court had under consideration was the The Bank of Augusta vs. Earle. In this case the nature of the General Government and the nature of the State Governments in their relations to each other, came up for adjudication. This was in January, 1839, six years after the discussion with Mr. Calhoun in the Senate. Here is what he then said:*

"But it is argued, that though this law of comity exists as between independent Nations, it does not exist

*13 Peters's Reports, p. 559.

between the States of this Union. That argument appears to have been the foundation of the judgment in the Court below.

"In respect to this law of comity, it is said, States are not Nations; they have no National Sovereignty; a sort of residuum of Sovereignty is all that remains to them. The National Sovereignty, it is said, is conferred on this Government, and part of the municipal Sovereignty. The rest of the municipal Sovereignty belongs to the States. Notwithstanding the respect which I entertain for the learned Judge, who presided in that Court, I cannot follow in the train of his argument. I can make no diagram, such as this, of the partition of National character between the State and General Governments. I cannot map it out, and say, so far is National, and so far municipal; and here is the exact line where the one begins and the other ends. We have no second La Place, and we never shall have, with his Mechanique Politique, able to define and describe the orbit of each sphere in our political system with such exact mathematical precision. There is no such thing as arranging these Governments of ours by the laws of gravitation, so that they will be sure to go on forever without impinging. These institutions are practical, admirable, glorious, blessed creations. Still they were, when created, experimental institutions; and if the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States had set down in it certain general definitions of power, such as have been alleged in the argument of this case, and stopped there, I verily believe that in the course of the fifty years which have since elapsed, this Government would have never gone into operation.

"Suppose that this Constitution had said, in terms after the language of the Court below-all National Sove

reignty shall belong to the United States; all municipal Sovereignty to the several States. I will say, that however clear, however distinct, such a definition may ap pear to those who use it, the employment of it, in the Constitution, could only have led to utter confusion and uncertainty. I am not prepared to say that the States have no National Sovereignty. The laws of some of the States-Maryland and Virginia, for instance-provide punishment for treason. The power thus exercised is, certainly, not municipal. Virginia has a law of alienage; that is, a power exercised against a foreign nation. Does not the question necessarily arise, when a power is exercised concerning an alien enemy-enemy to whom? The law of escheat, which exists in all the States, is also the exercise of a great Sovereign power.

"The term 'Sovereignty' does not occur in the Constitution at all. The Constitution treats States as States, and the United States as the United States; and, by a careful enumeration, declares all the powers that are granted to the United States, and all the rest are reserved to the States. If we pursue, to the extreme point, the powers granted, and the powers reserved, the powers of the General and State Governments will be found, it is to be feared, impinging, and in conflict. Our hope is, that the prudence and patriotism of the States, and the wisdom of this Government, will prevent that catastrophe. For myself, I will pursue the advice of the Court in Deveaux's case; I will avoid nice metaphysical subtilties, and all useless theories; I will keep my feet out of the traps of general definition; I will keep my feet out of all traps; I will keep to things as they are, and go no further to inquire what they might be, if they were not what they are. The States of this Union, us States, are subject to all the voluntary and customary laws of Nations."

[Mr. Webster here referred to, and quoted a passage from Vattel (page 61), which, he said, clearly showed, that States connected together as are the States of this Union, must be considered as much component parts of the law of Nations as any others.]*

"If, for the decision of any question, the proper rule is to be found in the law of Nations, that law adheres to the subject. It follows the subject through, no matter into what place, high or low. You cannot escape the law of Nations in a case where it is applicable. The air of every judicature is full of it. It pervades the Courts of law of the highest character, and the Court of pie poudre; aye, even the constable's Court. It is part of the universal law. It may share the glorious eulogy pronounced by Hooker upon law itself: that there is nothing so high as to be beyond the reach of its power, nothing so low as to be beneath its care. If any question be within the influence of the law of Nations, the law of Nations is there. If the law of comity does not exist between the States of this Union, how can it exist between a State and the subjects of any foreign Sovereignty?"

In this carefully prepared argument Mr. Webster significantly says: that in the Constitution nothing is said about "Sovereignty." This is all important. He admitted, in the debate with Mr. Calhoun, that the States were Sovereign before the Constitution was adopted. In this argument he holds the position that the powers delegated to the United States in the Constitution are specific and limited, and that all not delegated are reserved to the States. He states distinctly, that the Constitution treats the States as States. If the States, then, were

*See Vattel, here quoted, ante, p. 170.