What is Truth?Richard Schantz Walter de Gruyter, 18 de ago. de 2011 - 346 páginas In this collection of original papers, leading international authorities turn their attention to one of the most important questions in theoretical philosophy: what is truth? To arrive at an answer, two further questions need to be addressed in this context: 1) Does truth possess any essence, any inner nature? and 2) If so, what does this nature consist of? The present discussion focuses on the antagonism between substantial or robust theories of truth, with correspondence theory taking the lead, and deflationist or minimalist views, which have been commanding an increasing amount of attention in recent years. Whereas substantial theories proceed from the premise that truth has an essence, and that therefore the objective is to discover this essence, the challenge presented by deflationism is to dispense with this very premise. |
Conteúdo
1 | |
9 | |
11 | |
27 | |
Truth Through Thick and Thin | 38 |
The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth | 60 |
Truth Meaning and Reference | 79 |
II Deflationism Defended | 101 |
The Truth about Truth | 194 |
Generalizations of Homophonic Truthsentences | 205 |
IV Tarski Challenged | 223 |
An Argument Against Tarskis Convention T | 225 |
What is Truth? Stay for an Answer | 238 |
V Alternative Approaches | 247 |
The Two Faces of the Concept of Truth | 249 |
A Prolegomenon to a General Theory | 263 |
Explanatory vs Expressive Deflationism about Truth | 103 |
On Locating Our Interest in Truth | 120 |
Norms of Truth and Meaning | 133 |
On Some Critics of Deflationism | 146 |
III Deflationism Attacked | 159 |
Minimalism and the Facts about Truth | 161 |
Disquotationalist Conceptions of Truth | 176 |
How Not to Misunderstand Peirce A Pragmatist Account of Truth | 283 |
A Problem about Truth | 299 |
An Indefinibilist cum Normative View of Truth and the Marks of Truth | 316 |
333 | |
334 | |
Contributors | 337 |