27. Conclusion. It is not within the scope of this work to further discuss the rules of pleading relating to actions for malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and the abuse of legal process in the various courts of the United States. These rules depend largely upon local statutes, in most instances modifying the rules of the common law, and in some entirely abolishing them. Reference must therefore be had to local laws, and to works devoted especially to this subject. 3. 4. 5. What can be shown under the plea of the general issue. Justification - The term defined. Applications of the law. (1) Justification under an erroneous judgment. (2) Illegal order of a superior officer, no justification. (3) Officer justifying puts in issue the title to his office. Arrests without process - Justification. 6. 7. Duty of an officer. 8. 9. 10. 11. Waiver - The defense of — The term defined. ' Waiver of the right to sue. Illustrations of the law. (1) Waiver of imprisonment. (2) What does not amount to a waiver of an arrest. (3) Liability of magistrate, etc.— Objections waived. Release - The defense of - The term defined. A release of the right to sue. Applications of the law. (1) What is a sufficient release. (2) Officer neglecting to remove goods attached, locked in a room with them, cannot complain. (1) Satisfaction from one estops the injured person from suing others. (2) Estoppel by false representations. 15. What is a satisfaction. 16. The subject continued. 17. The rule which prevails in a majority of the states. 18. Payment Settlement - Discharge and satisfaction by one of sev § 1. Defenses-The term defined. In general practice the term defense signifies a denial of the truth or validity of the matters set out in the complaint or declaration as constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. In actions of trespass for false imprisonment and the like, general defenses may be divided into several classes, viz.: (1) A general denial of the matters contained in the complaint. (2) Justification. (3) Waiver of the imprisonment. (4) Release of the right to sue. (5) Estoppel. (6) Payment by one of several wrongdoers. (7) Accord and satisfaction. § 2. The general denial, commonly so called, is a plea which denies or traverses at once the whole complaint, without offering any special matter to evade it. It is called the general issue because, by importing an absolute and general denial of what is alleged in the complaint, it amounts at once to an issue. In the early manner of pleading the general issue was seldom used except where the party meant wholly to deny the charges alleged against him. When he intended to excuse or palliate the charge, a special plea was used to set forth the particular facts. But now, since special pleading is generally abolished, the same result is secured by requiring the defendant to file notice of special matters of defense which he intends to set up on trial, or obliging him to use a form of answer adapted to the complaint, the method varying in different systems of pleading. In actions for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment the general issue is, not guilty in manner and form as charged in the complaint.3 § 3. What can be shown under the plea of the general issue. In trespass to the person the defendant can, under the general issue of not guilty, give in evidence any matter which directly controverts the fact of his having committed the acts complained of; as, in trespass for an assault and battery with a tearing of clothes, a plea of not guilty of the assault modo et forma was held to operate as a denial of the battery and tearing of the clothes (laceravit) as well as the 13 Black. Com., 296; Co. Litt., 127; Bouvier's Law Dic., 495. 22 Black. Com., 305. 3 Bouvier's Law Dic., tit. "General Issue." assault, and no person is bound to justify who is not prima facie a trespasser. The plea of not guilty, therefore, is proper in trespass to persons if the defendant committed no assault, battery or imprisonment. But where the acts complained of would at common law prima facie appear to be a trespass, and the facts stated in the complaint cannot be denied, any matter of justification or excuse, or if done by virtue of a warrant or authority, must in general be specially pleaded, and therefore such matters of defense cannot be given in evidence under the plea of the general issue.2 § 4. Joint trespassers may sever in their pleas.- Persons engaged in committing the same trespass are joint and several trespassers, and not joint trespassers exclusively. Like persons liable on a joint and several contract, they may all be sued in one action, or one may be sued alone and cannot plead the non-joinder or the misjoinder of the others in abatement; and so far is the doctrine of several liability carried, that the defendants, when more than one is sued in the same action, may sever in their pleas, and the jury may find several verdicts, and on several verdicts of guilty may assess different sums as damages.3 Justification in § 5. Justification The term defined. legal practice is the allegation of any matter of fact by the defendant to establish his legal right to do the act complained of by the plaintiff. As a plea in actions for false imprisonment it admits the commission of the acts as charged in the complaint, and alleges a right to commit them by the defendant, in effect denying that the commission of the acts constitutes a wrong. In form it is an excuse, showing some legal reasons why the defendant should not respond in damages for the injury which the plaintiff claims to have suffered from his hands. As, where an officer, having a warrant regular on its face and issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, makes 11 Chitty's Pleadings, 500; Tidd's E., 15, 16, 17; Stephen on Pleading Practice, 652. (2d ed.), 377; Tidd's Practice (3d Am. ed.), 652 (1840). 21 Chitty's Pleadings, 501; Waters v. Silley, 4 Pick. (Mass.), 145 (1827); Butterworth v. Soper, 13 Johns. (N. Y.), 443 (1816); Co. Litt., 282b.; 2 Roll. Abr., 682; Com. Dig., Pleader, 3 Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall., 1 (1865). 42 Bouvier's Law Dic., 32. an arrest, the warrant is a complete justification to the officer to whom it is directed for obeying its command, whether it be really valid or void. But where the warrant is absolutely void, or apparently irregular in an important respect, or where the act done under it is one which is beyond the power conferred by the warrant, it is no justification. When the fact of the plaintiff's imprisonment is established, the burden of proving a justification is on the defendant." APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW. (1) Justification under erroneous judgment. Brown et al., as trustees of a school district, had obtained a judgment against Crowl for $3.36 for a school tax. After the judgment Crowl obtained a discharge as an insolvent debtor, exempting his body from imprisonment, and subsequent to obtaining such discharge he was called on by a constable, who held an execution against him on the judgment, to pay it. He told the constable he would pay it as soon as he got able. The constable informed the plaintiffs of the new promise, and they directed him to obtain a summons and serve it on Crowl. The summons was obtained and served; Crowl appeared and pleaded his insolvent discharge. Brown appeared in behalf of himself and co-plaintiffs, and insisted that they were entitled to a general judgment under the new promise, so that they might have an execution against the body of the defendant. After the evidence was closed, Brown told the justice that, if it was illegal, he did not want a judgment or execution against the body of the defendant. The justice entered a general judgment and issued execution thereon, by virtue of which Crowl was arrested. For this arrest an action for false imprisonment was brought by Crowl against Brown and his co-plaintiffs, Lyon and Howard. On the trial these facts appeared in evidence. Defendants insisted that the justice having jurisdiction to render a general judgment, if such judgment was erroneous, it was not void, and was therefore a protection to the defendants. A verdict being rendered for the plaintiffs, the defendant prosecuted a writ of error. Savage, C. J.: "The only question is whether the second judgment was a protection to the parties. It was valid until reversed, although erroneous. The justice had jurisdiction of the cause and of the person, and in admitting or excluding any defense which affected the plaintiffs' remedies he acted judicially. The defendant before the justice had a perfect remedy either by appeal or by certiorari. The question was agitated and judicially decided. . . The liability of the defendant's imprisonment was the point before the justice. It was judicially decided by him, though erroneously, but the error should have been corrected, either by appeal or certiorari, according to the circumstances of the case. I am of opinion, therefore, that the judgment while unreversed justified the execution, and 12 Bouvier's Law Dic., 33. 2 Bassett v. Porter, 10 Cush. (Mass.), 418 (1852); Holroyd v. Doncaster, 3 Bing., 492. |