The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

Capa
Cornell University Press, 1969 - 420 páginas

The first volume of Donald Kagan's acclaimed four-volume history of the Peloponnesian War offers a new evaluation of the origins and causes of the conflict, based on evidence produced by modern scholarship and on a careful reconsideration of the ancient texts. He focuses his study on the question: Was the war inevitable, or could it have been avoided?

Kagan takes issue with Thucydides' view that the war was inevitable, that the rise of the Athenian Empire in a world with an existing rival power made a clash between the two a certainty. Asserting instead that the origin of the war "cannot, without serious distortion, be treated in isolation from the internal history of the states involved," Kagan traces the connections between domestic politics, constitutional organization, and foreign affairs. He further examines the evidence to see what decisions were made that led to war, at each point asking whether a different decision would have been possible.

 

Conteúdo

The Spartan Alliance
9
The Origins of the Athenian Empire
31
Sparta after the Persian War
49
Athens after the Persian War
57
The War in Greece
77
The Crisis in the Aegean
98
The End of the War
120
The Victory of Pericles
133
Corcyra
222
Megara
251
Potidaea
273
Sparta
286
Athens
317
The Causes of the War
345
Thucydides and the Inevitability of the War
357
A The Willingness of the Members of the Delian League
377

The Foundation of Thurii
154
The Samian Rebellion
170
The Consolidation of the Empire
179
Athenian Politics on the Eve of the War
193
Epidamnus
205
G Athenian Actions in the West between the Wars
384
Bibliography
393
General Index
405
Index of Ancient Authors and Inscriptions
413
Direitos autorais

Outras edições - Ver todos

Termos e frases comuns

Sobre o autor (1969)

Donald Kagan is Sterling Professor of Classics and History at Yale University.

Informações bibliográficas