5. The offices of recorder and commissioners of a county are lucrative offices; Dailey v. State, 8 B., 329.

6. The offices of mayor and director of the state's prison are lucrative offices; Howard v. Shoemaker, 35-III.

7. The office of councilman, in a city, is not such a lucrative office as to prevent such an officer from occupying another office; albeit it is such in an ordinary sense; State v. Kirk, 44-401.

8. A lucrative office is one where the pay is affixed to the performance of its duties; State v. Kirk, 44-401.

92. Pro tempore appointments. The limitation of eight years, in section 152, does not embrace time served in either of the offices, named in the section, under a pro tem. appointment, or by simply holding over to fill a vacancy, according to the provisions of this section; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15–327.

95. Time of elections. Where the constitution commands how a right shall be exercised it must be exercised-if at all-as commanded by the constitution. The clause of this section, which provides that the "general assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote" is an implied prohibition against providing for the registration of any class, or for only a part of the voters. One class of voters can not be required to possess qualifications which are not required of all others. Hence, so much of section 13 of the act of 1889 concerning elections which requires the registration of persons absenting themselves from the state for six months or more and persons who have not resided in any one county for six months before any election is void inasmuch as it imposes extra burdens and hardships on the persons named and, in that respect, is unreasonable and not impartial. The unconstitutionality of the provisions named renders the entire section void; Morris v. Powell, 125-288.

96. Three departments. The effect of this provision is to vest in the courts the whole element of sovereignty known as the judicial, established by the constitution and the laws under it, except, in a few instances, where powers of a judicial nature are expressly and specifically lodged elsewhere. The powers of the three departments of the government of the state are not merely equal - they are exclusive, in respect to the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other; Lafayette etc. RR. Co. v. Geiger, 34-197; Wright v. Defrees, 8-298. Wherefore, neither the governor nor the legislature can select persons to assist the courts in the performance of their judicial duties but only the courts have the power to choose such assistants-if any as are necessary to enable judges to discharge their judicial functions. Therefore the legislature can not appoint commissioners of the supreme court to assist the judges of that court in the performance of their duties. It follows that "an act for the appointment by the general assembly' of commissioners of the supreme court and concerning matters connected therewith" etc. (S., 1889, p. 41; post, chap. 3, art. 1a), is unconstitutional and void; State z. Noble, 118-352.

The appointment of a person to an office which is in no manner connected with the discharge of legislative duties, involves the exercise of executive functions, and this is prohibited to the legislative department of the government, by this section; except in so far as the power of appointment is reserved to it by section 223, which provides that "all officers whose appointment is not otherwise provided for in this constitution shall be chosen in such manner as now is or, hereafter, may be prescribed by law." This provision is, evidently, to be construed in the light of the laws in force at the time of its adoption, and as the power to provide, by law, the manner or mode of making an appointment does not include the power to make the appointment itself, it is a limitation on the power of the general assembly to make any appointment except such as it might make under laws existent at the date of the adoption of the constitution; State v. Denny, 118386.

The act of general assembly establishing a department of geology and natural resources, with four divisions, the chiefs of which are to be appointed by a director of the department elected by the general assembly, is unconstitutional and void, as falling within the inhibition of this article, in so far as it seeks to deprive the executive of the state of his constitutional prerogative, to fill, by appointment, vacancies in the offices named. The power to appoint to office is, intrinsically, an executive function; to be exercised by the legislative and judicial departments

of the government as an incident of their principal powers; i. e. d., when necessary to the exercise of the legislative or judicial power. The residuum of the power abides with the people, and each of the three governmental departments have only such power as has been delegated to them in and by the constitution; State, ex rel. v. Hyde, 121-22.

The judiciary is an independent department of government, exclusively invested by the constitution with one element of sovereignty. The supreme court receives its essential and inherent powers, rights and jurisdiction from the constitution and not from the legislature; Smythe v. Boswell, 117-366.

Whether an appropriation shall or shall not be made is a legislative question; over purely legislative questions courts have neither supervision nor control. A question of that character is beyond the touch of the judiciary for one department of government can not enter the domain of another.-Carr v. State, ex rel., 127-208; see State, ex rel. v. Howorth, 122-463, in which case it is held that as to a matter, by the constitution, submitted to legislative control "the judiciary can no more, rightfully, interfere than can the legislature with a decree or judgment pronounced by a judicial tribunal. The decision is as conclusive and inviolable in the one case as in the other, and an interference with the legislative judgment would be a breach of the constitution which no principle would justify nor any precedent excuse." The powers of the three departments of state are not merely equal-they are exclusive in respect to the duties assigned to each. They are absolutely independent of each other. They are equal, co-ordinate and independent; Hovey v. State, ex rel., 127–598.

Judicial powers or functions, within the meaning of the constitution, are such only as courts or judges exercise. A judicial duty, within the meaning of the constitution, is such a duty as legitimately pertains to an officer in the department designated by the constitution as judicial; Wilkins v. State, 113-519; and where the constitution -as by this section-distributes the judicial power it can only be exercised by the tribunals named by the constitution and such others as may be constituted as the constitution provides; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117–6.

The three co-ordinate departments of the state government are absolutely independent of each other. One of them can not inquire into the motives controlling the action of another; Wright v. Defrees, 8-298.

2. The powers of the three departments, of government, are not merely equal; they are exclusive, in respect to the duties assigned to them. They are absolutely independent of each other; Wright v. Defrees, 8-298; Smith v. Myers, 109-8.

3. Constitutional restraints are overstepped where one department of government attempts to exercise powers exclusively belonging to another; Butler v. State, 97-377.

4. The question whether a right has, or has not, vested is a judicial question. It must be tried by judicial authority; Rice v. State, 7–332.

5. It is not within the power of the legislature, by a special act, directed to a particular case then pending in court, to direct or change the course of decision in such case; C. C. & I. C. R. Co. v. Board etc., 65-427; see Waldo v. Wallace, 12-569; Trustees v. Ellis, 38-3.

6. Where the compatibility of a statute with the constitution is in question, the courts must determine whether they can stand together; Rice v. State, 7–332.

7. The duty of courts to give construction to statutes and to declare legislative enactments void or inoperative, grows, ex necessitate, out of the other duty of declaring what the law is; Rice v. State, 7-332; Maize v. State, 4–342.

8. It is well settled that the legislature can not overthrow judgments, by legistive mandate, curative statutes, or otherwise; Johnson v. Board etc., 107-31.

97. The general assembly. The law making power being vested in the general assembly the exercise by any other body of power to make, suspend or give law is, necessarily, excluded; Maize v. State, 4-342; Maize v. Goodman, 7-635.

2. The only limitations on the power, of the legislature, are those imposed by the state constitution, the federal constitution and the treaties and acts of congress, adopted and enacted under it; Beauchamp v. State, 6 B., 299; Doe v. Douglass, 8 B., 10; Lafay. etc. Co. v. Geiger, 34-198, 202; Fry v. State, 63-559; M'Comas . Krug, 81-327;.Campbell v. Dwiggins, 83-480; Mount v. State, 90-29.

3. Whether a statute, enacted, encroaches upon natural rights of the citizen is a legislative, and not a judicial, question. Courts may not overthrow a statute on the ground that it encroaches on natural rights; Hedderich v. State, 101-566.

103. Qualifications. A declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States, with the requisite residence in the state, not only confers, upon male persons of foreign birth, the elective franchise, but, it renders them eligible to any office in the state, except governor, lieutenant governor, senator and representative in the legislature; M'Donel v. State, 90-323; see M'Carthy v. Froelke, 63-507.

112. Powers of each house. Section 1925 does not define libel. Section 237 (enacted May 6, 1853) declares that crimes and misdemeanors shall be defined and the punishment thereof fixed, by statutes of this state and not otherwise. This latter section can not bind subsequent legislation. It is competent for the legislature to prescribe penalties for the commission of an offense without defining it; Hartford v. State, 96-462; Wall v. State, 23-150; State v. Craig, 23-185; State v. Oskins, 28-364; Burk v. State, 27-430; Hood v. State, 56-263; Sanders v. State, 85-318. Section 1925 is valid and its definition is relegated to the common law; Hartford v. State, 96-463.

113. Bills. The constitution of the state, in relation to acts of legislation, is the supreme law of the state. In case of conflict statutes must yield, as being void; Rice v. State, 7-332.

2. The constitution gives, to general assembly, a general power and authority to pass any statute within the ordinary functions of legislation, if not delegated to the federal government or prohibited by the state constitution; L. M. & B. R. R. Co. v. Geiger, 34-185.

3. The legislative authority of the state has a right to exercise supreme and sovereign power, subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the constitution of the state, by the federal constitution and by laws and treaties made under the latter; Beauchamp v. State, 6 B., 299.

4. The state may make police regulations and pass necessary laws, not invading the province of the United States; Fry v. State, 63-552.

115. Subject matter and title. It is necessary that every statute shall have a title, that that title shall designate a single subject, for the act, and that such subject shall be reasonably particular and not too general; I. C. R. Co. v. Potts, 7-681.

2. As a general rule, the title of a statute should not express the end, object or purpose to be accomplished; but, rather means by which such end is to be accomplished; I. C. R. Co. v. Potts, 7-681.

3. Two purposes were had in view, in the adoption of this section; (1) to have the title indicate the subject matter of the act, and (2) to promote the codification of the statutes; I. C. R. Co. v. Potts, 7-681.

4. Where a statutory provision might as well, or properly, appear under any one of many titles as under that where it is found, doubt as to its proper place must fall in favor of the legislative construction, in placing it where it is found; Gillespie v. State, 9-380; State v. Board etc., 26-522.

5. The subject matter in a statute should be, properly, embraced in and connected with the subject embraced in the title, or the act will be unconstitutional; Mewherter v. Price, 11-199; State v. Bowers, 14-195; Igoe v. State, 14-239; Spaugh v. Huffer, 14-305; Robinson v. Skipworth, 23-311; Grubbs v. State, 24-295; State v. Young, 47150.

6. The subject of the statute, and not matters properly connected therewith, is necessary to he embraced in the title; Reed v. State, 12-641; Robinson v. Skipworth, 23311; Bright v. M'Cullough, 27-223.

7. The words" subject" and "matters" are so nearly synonymous as possible. The word "subject" being used to indicate chief things, about which legislation is had, and, the word matters things which are secondary, subordinate, or incidental. The evils, intended to be prevented, were (1) the passage of statutes under false and delusive titles; whereby members of assembly might be deceived into support of them; (2) combining, in one statute, two or more subjects, having no relation one to the other; by which means members might be constrained to support measures, obnoxious to them, in order to procure such legislation as they desired; Hinkle v. State, 24-28;

over'g Lauer v. State, 22-461; see Robinson v. Skipworth, 23-311; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37-122.

8. This section applies, only, to acts of general assembly; it has no relation to bylaws or ordinances of a city; Green v. City Ind'polis, 25-490; Baumgartner v. Hasty, 100-585.

9. When two subjects are embraced in a statute, this section does not authorize a court to say which shall be the subject of the act and hold provisions as to such subject valid and as to the other subject void. In such case the whole statute is void; State v. Tucker, 46-355.

10. Uncertainty in the title will not render a statute void; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37–

122.

II. An act of the legislature is not invalid because the enacting clause is preceded by a preamble; Barton v. M'Whinney, 85-487.

12. A statute may be unconstitutional in part, without invalidating the remainder; Armstrong v. Jackson, I B., 374; Clark v. Ellis, 2 B., 8. The unconstitutional part, however, may be so material as to render the whole act void; Meshmeier v. State, 11-482. 13. Though a statute may be good in part and in part void, yet, where that part of a statute which is void, or unconstitutional, so limits and qualifies the remaining portion that the latter, without it, is essentially different from that which it would be, were the whole statute valid, the whole law must fall; Meshmeier v. State, 11-482; State v. Elff, 49-282.

14. Proceedings based on that portion of a statute that is constitutional are not illegal, for the reason that other portions of the same act are unconstitutional; State v. Newton, 59-173.

15. If the title of an original statute is sufficient to embrace provisions in an amendatory act it is not necessary to inquire whether the title of the latter statute would be, of itself, sufficient; Brandon v. State, 16-197.

16. Where an amendatory statute may be considered as entitled an act, merely, to amend a former act, without, in any manner, indicating amendment, no thing can be introduced except that which might have been incorporated in the original statute, under its title; State v. Bowers, 14-195.

17. The subject matter of a statute being "licenses" an amendatory act (March 7, 1857) concerning licenses to vend etc. and concerning stock and exchange brokers, being a new act, under a new title, is not unconstitutional, as having more than one distinct subject in the title; Henderson v. State, 50-234; State v. Bowers, 14-195. 18. An act may contain more than one subject; State v. Bowers, 14-195. 20. A statute embracing a single subject is constitutional, no matter how fully it may enter into the details of that subject; Crawfordsv. etc. Co. v. Fletcher, 104-99. 21. One statute may, lawfully, define duties, fix compensation of an officer and provide for the future filling of the office; Walker v. Dunham, 17-483.

22. Criminal and civil codes should be distinguished, by distinct titles; I. C. R. Co. v. Potts, 7-681.

23. "Act relating to prosecution by affidavit and information”, providing for prosecution of offenses by affidavit, without information; the title controls the statute and "information" must be in the body of the act; Byrne v. State, 47–120.

24. "Act defining vagrancy and offenses therein specified, providing penalties" etc. "and containing other provisions, pertinent to the subject matter of the act". The subject of such a statute is defining and providing for the punishment of offenses, enumerated, in the act, which are misdemeanors; therefore, the subject of the statute is defining and providing for the punishment of certain misdemeanors. The subject matter of all sections of such an act is embraced in the title; State v. Newton, 59-173. 25. "Act to legalize and make valid certain county bonds and to provide for the payment of the same " (Stats. 1867, p. 26, sect. 3), requiring counties. to give bounties to certain soldiers. The statute is unconstitutional, the title not expressing its subject matter; Board etc. v. Baker, 80-378.

26. Act (March 11, 1867) concerning sinking funds, comprising many enumerated matters, is not limited to particulars enumerated and the legislature is only confined by the subject of providing for the sinking funds; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37-122.

27. A provision for the organization and sitting of courts, in new counties, is properly connected with the subject of the formation of such counties and is embraced in the title of the act (March 7, 1857); Brandon v. State, 16-179.

28. "Act concerning real property and the alienation thereof. Constitutional; the subject is real property; Murray v. Kelly, 27-42.

29. An act establishing a house of refuge properly embraces, in its title, a section by which sale of certain lands is authorized; M'Caslin v. State, 44-151.

30. "An act concerning promissory notes etc." is void as to so much as refers to "other instruments", not embraced in the title; Mewherter v. Price, 11-199.

31. Though some of the sections found in the liquor law, of 1859, may be civil and others penal, in their character, yet, the statute can not be said to embrace more than one subject matter; Thompson v. State, 15-449.

32. Dubitatur, whether surplusage in the title of a statute may be rejected, in the same manner as matter improperly introduced into the body of the statute; Dronberger v. Reed, 11-420.

33. "An act to provide compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any rail road company in this state" (Stat., 1853); is not void for inconsistency with its title. The immediate purpose is expressed in the title, and, the exception, in section 4031, as to railroads that are fenced, is so properly connected with the subject matter of the act, designated in the title, as, rightly, to appear in it, under the title; M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8-217.

34. Crimes may be defined, by an act which does not designate them by their particular names; Peachee v. State, 63-399.

35. "An act providing for the election and qualification of justices of the peace and their jurisdiction, powers and duties, in civil cases" which provides that no constable shall purchase a judgment on the docket of any justice, in the township of which he is a constable, is void, as to that provision, it not being embraced in the title of the act nor, properly, connected with the subject of the justice of peace act; Spaugh v. Huffer, 14-305.

36. "An act authorizing the construction of pike, macadamized and gravel roads", properly expresses the matter of the organization of corporations, for the purpose of constructing such roads; Johnson v. W. & M. etc. Co., 16-389.

37. An act authorizing the construction of plank etc. roads includes in its title, provision as to frauds upon the company; Hunter v. Burnesville T. Co., 56-213. 38. "An act concerning husband and wife" (April 16, 1881) sufficiently expresses, in its title, the subject matter thereof; Barnett v. Harshberger, 105-411.

39. So much of an act for the regulation of the sale of intoxicating liquors as requires the applicant for license to give bond, to the state, conditioned, inter alia, that he will pay all fines and costs that may be assessed against him, for any violations of the provisions of the said act, is matter properly connected with the subject of the act, and is valid; State etc. v. Board etc., 26-522; M'Caslin v. State, 44-15; State etc. 7. Tucker, 46-355; Fletcher v. State, 54-462; O'Kane v. State etc., 69-183; Shipley v. City T. H., 74-297; cited in Kane v. State etc., 78-106.

40. Insertion in an act to regulate the liquor traffic of a section conferring, on particular courts, jurisdiction of cases prosecuted, for its violation (1 G. & H. p. 615, sect. 14), is not in violation of this section; it is matter properly connected with the subject of the act; Hingle v. State, 24-28; Reams v. State, 23-111; re-af. Thomasson v. State, 15-449 and over'g Lauer v. State, 22-461.

41. The first section of an act, of 1852, "for the more uniform mode of doing township business", provides for the organization of townships. There is no inconsistency between the statute and its title in this; Clinton T. v. Draper, 14-295.

42. An act 'for the more uniform mode of doing township business" properly embraces a provision to establish the boundaries of existing counties, as well as others, for the formation of new counties; Haggard v. Hawkins, 14-299.

43. "An act to provide for the assessment and collection of taxes, on the shares of stock owned in banks and banking associations, doing business in this state", sufficiently embraces provisions that “nothing in this, or any other, act shall authorize the taxation of stock. . in any national bank, for municipal purposes "; City Evansv. v. Bayard, 39-450.

14. Fees of a county treasurer, charged by law with the collection of taxes, are matters properly connected with the subject of an act “concerning taxation"; Warren v. Britton, 84-22.

117. Acts, how amended. It is well settled that it is not necessary in amending a statute to set out the section to be amended and that the statutory requirement, prescribed by this section of the constitution, is fulfilled by setting out the section as amended (Greencastle etc. Co. v. State, 28-382, overruling Langdon v. Applegate, 5-327; Rogers v. State, 6-31). The first clause of this section is, in its terms, prohibitory -it prohibits the amendment of a statute by a mere reference to its title; the second clause is mandatory-it requires that the section as amended shall be set forth and published at full length. Where the title of the amendatory act sets out at full length the title to the act to be amended, reciting that it is the intention to amend a certain section