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of the affections and the intellect, but the most unfaltering adherence to the old Lutheran doginas, with an assertion of the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures that would have staggered the brave faith of honest-hearted Luther himself. Delitzsch's leading idea is, that the ancient philosophers have always been making mischief with Christian Psychology, by stealing into the Church and calling theologians away from plain revelations to ideal abstractions. He evidently would give more for the psychological data in the opening chapters of Genesis, than for the whole library of metaphysicians, from Pythagoras to Kant. Yet, like most repudiators of theory, he is full of it, and before he gets through his Scriptural exegesis, he swallows the leading ideas of the mystic Jacob Boehme; and, stranger still, in order to enforce his views of the heart as the seat of the soul, he is disposed to take shelter under the wing of modern spiritualism with its marvels of clairvoyance. His book is eminently an orthodox theosophy, and its aim is to give a psychology that shall be Biblical in its form, and bring the light of philosophy to illustrate the condition and needs of the soul, and the nature and working of divine grace.

His system begins with setting forth the Divine nature as in essence one, in persons three, or as will, thought, and affection, in glory sevenfold, or in the seven spirits of Darkness, Fire, Light, and those primeval powers which are archetypes of creation in its lightnings, waters, voices, and which unite with the first three spirits in the harmony of the whole. The nature of man before the Fall was in the image of this one God in three persons or hypostases and in his sevenfold glory. God, according to the author, has made man to be a personal being, or one, by giving him a spirit from his own spirit; he has made him also in the image of his Trinity, by giving him will, thought, and affection as the properties of the human spirit; he has stamped upon man also the mark of his sevenfold glory, by giving him a nature sevenfold in its manifestations, both in respect to the soul, which is the body of the spirit, and the flesh, which is the body of the soul. Accordingly the soul, strictly speaking, is an organism intermediate between spirit and body, and not made directly in the image of God's spirit, but in the

image of his glory. The soul is not the personality, but the organ of the personality, and as such may be self-conscious, perceptive, vital, pervaded by the self-conscious spirit, capable of being variously affected, having powers of expression, and, last of all, having an essential unity in the multiplicity of its powers. The body follows the same sevenfold glory, as being the organ of the soul, as the soul is the organ of the spirit, and reveals this glory in the darkness of the embryo, in the warm breath, in the bright blood, in the beating heart, in the sensitive nerves, in the expressive tongue, and, last of all, in the face, which is the harmonious expression of all bodily senses and powers in one manifestation.

Such being the author's idea of creation, it is easy to see what his scheme of the Fall and Redemption of man must be. The spirit being the seat of personality, the spirit, which in its true state is in harmony with God, loses this harmony by sin, and so falls into subjection to the body and the soul. Eve, who was made not directly from God, but out of Adam, and so had the spirit only second-hand, represents more directly the soul, is thus nearer matter and the body than her mate. She presents the temptation of the senses, and thus begins the descending order of transgression, that subjected the soul to the body, then the spirit to the soul, and finally the spirit was dragged down into the bondage of the flesh. The course of redemption must reverse this descent, and the Divine Spirit, taking the body and soul of man into its possession, must break the chains of bondage, and bring humanity again into harmony with God. The usual doctrine of supernatural regeneration is then described with considerable fulness and power, and some very valuable suggestions are made concerning the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious sides of the work of divine grace, - a distinction too much overlooked by the schools of theologians, who limit religious experience to conscious efforts of the intellect and will, to the neglect of the receptive capacities of the soul and the latent forces of the spirit. On the whole, we find much in Delitzsch to instruct and stimulate us, and, after closing his volume, we must honestly confess that he is, in spite of his retrogressive policy, a thinker of the

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nineteenth century, who has followed the usual course of an invader in taking from his philosophical antagonists whose country he has entered no small measure of their manner and ideas. His book would make a great stir in America, if translated, and, whilst some portions of it would startle Andover by its ultra orthodoxy, other portions of it might instruct Cambridge by its attempt to clothe the old dogmas in new ideas, and take from Liberal Christianity the palm of philosophical honor. The worst feature of its speculation is its doctrine of Traducianism, that denies to men since Adam the birthright of being creatures of God, and its best feature is its doctrine of the divine life of faith and grace, which is capable of better applications than this theology recognizes.

Of a vastly higher order than either work heretofore noticed is the noble book of Richard Rothe, a theologian and moralist too little known to our people. It is called Theological Ethics, yet the work is to us a more profound and practical and satisfactory psychology than we have found in any language.

Its tone is at the outset singularly bold, and the opening two hundred pages, on the idea, foundation, and method of theological ethics, startle the reader by their daring. This introduction is wholly in the a priori vein; and, proceeding from that sense of God's being which is the starting point of theological morals, he proceeds to analyze the attributes of God, the process of creation, and the functions of the human soul. He considers God as Substance, Nature, and Person, or in his essence, functions, and personality, not as in any sense three persons, but as three modes or aspects of one Being. The soul of man illustrates the being of God who made it, since the soul has a substantial ground or constitution; this constitution by its nature has consciousness and volition, and these natural functions develop its true personality. Man's true life is found in reconciling his being with God's being, and thus bringing his reason and will into harmony with the Divine nature, and under the influence of its truth and grace.

Rothe's Ethical System is in three parts, the first part being the Doctrine of Good; the second, the Doctrine of Virtue, or the Moral Power to do Good; the


third, the Doctrine of Duty, or the Practical Rules of Conduct. According to his system, human goodness consists in developing a true personality in the soul, or in bringing man out of his first subjection to material nature into a filial relation with God. The virtues that secure and manifest this true personality are in the line of his two great endowments, intelligence and will. The true man is he whose sentiment and thought are open to the Divine love and truth, and whose desires and deeds accept and embody the Divine commandments and graces. The cardinal virtues are accordingly Geniality, Wisdom, Originality, Force, or, in other words, a genial sensibility, wise understanding, spontaneous purpose, and strong will. These virtues appear in various phases of action, whether secular or religious, and in their highest sphere they receive and manifest the Divine influence. The largest portion of the whole work is given to the Science of Duties, and it is not easy, perhaps not possible, to find so large and rich and practical and spiritual a statement of the obligations of human life, as is given in the third volume, with its more than a thousand pages.

The discussion of social duties is especially full, occupying seven hundred pages, whilst the duties to the Church occupy a little over one hundred pages, and their essential principles are implied

' in the social duties. It must not by any means be supposed that, in his idea, the Church covers the whole ground of religion; for since his theological morality begins with the consciousness of God's being, all duties in his system must of course be religious, if performed with this consciousness. Perhaps he gives the Church as a distinct institution less than its due honor, for he not only looks upon it as under the protection of the State, very much in the spirit of Dr. Arnold, but evidently does not regret the Protestant disposition to identify Church and State, although his hope is not to see the State secularize the Church, but to see the Church spiritualize the State.

Rothe's method differs wholly from that of Delitzsch, and of course leads him to different results. Rothe begins with the religious consciousness, and, with a consecutive logic that gives him a name above all other recent theologians, and makes him first of modern theosophists, not excepting Schleiermacher, proceeds to his conclusions step by step, wholly discarding all empirical testimony, not even submitting his reasonings to the authority of revelation, merely as authority, yet accepting revelation afterwards because according with his a priori reasonings. Delitzsch begins with revelation, and educes, or pretends to educe, his philosophy from the words of Scripture. The point of difference between the two that is most important in its bearing upon psychology is the doctrine of sin and its cure. Rothe accepts the fact of sin as characteristic of the whole race of Adam, on account of the universal disposition of men to come short of their true spiritual personality, and to yield to sensuality and selfishness. According to his view, the cause of sin is not mainly in the transgression of one man, but in the whole tendency and development of the race, and the cure of sin is to be found in a thorough renovation of the race by a new and divine humanity, of which Christ is the head. Delitzsch finds the cause of sin in Adam's transgression, and in the propagation of the fatal taint through all his descendants, until the coming of the only effectual redemption in Christ. In their views of the absolute divinity of Christ, the two do not wholly differ. Both call him God, although the one regards him, like Athanasius, as the second person in the Trinity, whilst the other, like Sabellius, regards him as God manifest in humanity. Rothe's view of Christ does not differ essentially from that of Swedenborg, and that of a considerable class of theologians of various names in this country who believe in the supernatural birth of Christ, his entire union with God, and his continued work by the Holy Spirit, and who yet shrink from using the word Trinity. Our liberal theologians generally, who can hardly use his strong language concerning Christ's Godhead, can object little to Rothe's views of the Atonement, since in his view Christ's death was not so much a vicarious sacrifice or governmental expedient as a dynamic development, by which the divine power in the Sufferer was completed and the Holy Spirit was brought to work effectually upon men. His chapter on the virtue of the regenerate man, in his various relations to the divine grace and per

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