believe the divine conduct to be wise. But how shall this belief be obtained? Firstly and chiefly, by an implicit Faith in the absolute perfection of the divine nature. Which, Secondly, may be strengthened, by a view of the wisdom of such parts of the divine conduct as we can more fully comprehend. Which, Thirdly, may be still more confirmed by right views of the true nature of God's universal plan. All these I have endeavoured to lead my readers to attend to, in my sermons on the wisdom of God in the permission of sin.

And had the author of the Attempt carefully attended the subject, as I had stated it, and entered thoroughly into my reasonings, I should naturally have been led to review the whole, and to retract or confirm, as light and truth appeared. But this he has not done; but rather, to use his own words, according to his professed design, he has exerted himself to the utmost to set out the doctrine, " if possible, in all its horror and deformity." (p. 8.) So that what I have to do, is to take off this ill dress, and array it in its native beauty; that the divine conduct in the permission of sin may not be blasphemed by ignorant and wicked men through his means; and the moral rectitude of the divine nature given up, to the subversion of all religion. Nor shall any thing in his piece that needs an answer, pass unconsidered.

SECTION I.

Several particulars, wherein the author of the SERMONS on the Wisdom of God in the permission of Sin, and the author of the ATTEMPT, are agreed.

WE should always exactly state the point in controversy before we begin to dispute. Wherefore let us see how far this author agrees with us; that the point of difference may be made to stand out in clear view. And,

1. We agree, that sin is in the world, and that dreadful have been the consequences for above 5000 years. And it is likely to issue in the eternal ruin of great multitudes of God's creatures.

We agree, that sin is the very worst of evils in its own mature, and it naturally tends to evil, and only to evil; to dishonour God, and ruin the system.

s. We agree, that the eternal ruin of such great multitudes of God's creatures, considered in itself, is an infinitely dreadful thing.

4. We agree, that all the sin and misery, that has, or ever will take place in the system through eternal ages, (how infinitely dreadful soever the whole must appear to one who has a perfect comprehensive view of it all at once,) even the whole lay open, full, and plain to the divine view, before God areated the world. And that, he had as full, perfect, and lively an apprehension of it, before he began to create, as he ever will have to eternal ages.

5. We agree, that, if God had pleased, he could have hindered the existence of sin, and caused misery to have been for ever unknown in his dominions, with as much ease, as to have suffered things to take their present course.

6. We agree, that God knew with infallible certainty, that things would take their present course, and issue as they will issue, in the eternal ruin of millions, unless he himself should interpose, and effectually hinder it.

7. We agree, that God did, as it were, stand by, and take a perfect view of the whole chain of events, in which his honour and the good of his creation was infinitely interested: and in a full view, and under a most lively sense of the whole, did deliberately forbear to interpose effectually to hinder the introduction of sin into his world, when he could have hindered it, as easily as not.

8. We agree, that angels and men were under the greatest obligations to love and obey God, and were left to their own free choice: and that God was not obliged, in point of justice, to do any more for them than he did. And that the whole blame lies at the creature's door: and that God is righteous in punishing his sinning creatures, according to the declarations of his word. All these particulars I had asserted. None of them has he denied. Nor does it appear that we differ in any of these things.

SECTION II.

The grand point in controversy exactly stated.

THE grand point of difference is precisely this: "I believe that the infinitely holy and wise God, in every part of his conduct, relative to the intellectual system, does that which is really wisest and best for him to do; most for his glory and the good of the system, in the whole; and therefore, that God's present plan is, of all possible plans, the best; most for his glory, and the good of the system." On the contrary, the author of the Attempt believes, that "God is not obliged to do, and that in fact he does not do, that which is most for his own glory, or most for the good of the system; and is fully persuaded that the present plan is so far from being the best, that it had been infinitely more for the glory of God, and the good of the system, if sin had never happened."

In the sermons he objects against (p. 95, 96.) It had been said, that "from the perfections of the divine nature alone, we have such full evidence, that he must always act in the wisest and best manner, as that we ought not in the least to doubt it. Before the foundation of the world, this system now in existence, and all other possible systems, equally lay open to the divine view, and one as easy to the almighty as another. He had his choice; he had none to please but himself. Besides him there was no Being: he had a perfectly good taste, and nothing to bias his judgment, and was infinite in wisdom. This he chose: and this, of all possible systems, therefore was the best, infinite wisdom and perfect rectitude being judges."

But the author of the Attempt esteems this reasoning quite inconclusive, as it proceeds on a false hypothesis. "A fallacy," he says, to suppose that God "must necessarily always will and do that which is most for his own glory." A point he does not believe," that in fact he always does," or that "he is obliged to do it." He thinks it plain in the works of creation, that God has not done what would have been most for his own glory, and that he might have done much better.

128

Which emboldens him to argue, that in the works of provi

dence, he did not mean to do his best.

(p. 12, 13.) And he

atterz pts to prove at large by 9 arguments, that it had been much better, in the whole, more for God's glory and the general good of the system, if sin and misery had been for ever

unknown. (p. 20-24.)

And if it had been better for God

to have hindered sin, it was not wise in God to permit it. So that this is the fundamental and most essential point of difference, and that on which the whole controversy, between hia and me, turns, viz, Whether the whole, and every part of the divine conduct, be agreeable to infinite wisdom. Or, in other words, whether God means in the whole, and every part of his conduct, to do that which he knows to be for the best, most for his glory, and the good of the system on the whole. For we both agree, that God always knows what is for the best, and never acts under mistake. So that the only question really is, whether God always means to do, what he knows to be for the best on the whole? For if he does, the grand point is proved. The wisdom of God in the permission of sin is demonstrated. And it is in vain to raise objections against that which infinite wisdom knows to be best. It is proud and arrogant, it is impious and blasphemous, for a worm of the dust to dispute against his Maker. Isai. xlv. 9. Rom. ix. 20.

SECTION III.

God, who is a Being of infinite wisdom and perfect rectitude, always conducts agreeably to his own most glorious perfections; that is, in the most wise, holy, and perfect manner.Particularly in this case.

WE are agreed, that this affair of the permission of sin was an infinitely important affair. And, indeed, considering it in all its consequences, there, perhaps, never was a more inportant affair that God ever had to decide. It involved in it the welfare of the angelic world, and the welfare of the whole human race; the honour of God was infinitely concerned in the affair; yea, the very life of God's own Son did, as it were,

lie at stake: for if sin was permitted, the Son of God was to die. That if God ever thoroughly considered and weighed any affair whatever, no doubt he did this. And, if ever he was concerned to act according to his best judgment, (if 1 may I be allowed to use such a phrase,) in any one case, no doubt he was in this. And if God is an absolutely perfect being, it was simply impossible, that he should conduct, in this infinitely important affair, contrary to the light of his own mind, and the joint declaration of all his perfections, infinitely to his own dishonour, and infinitely to the damage of the system, absolutely without any motive so to do; yea, against infinite motives to the contrary. Nay, to suppose, that God would deliberately and voluntarily, absolutely without any motive, suffer his own creatures to sin; when he knew it would be, on the whole, infinitely better for him to hinder it; is, in the most bare-faced manner, to give up the moral rectitude of the divine nature.

Did the inhabitants of heaven view the divine conduct in the permission of sin, in this blasphemous light, and firmly believe God to be such a being, instead of crying, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts, the whole earth is full of his glory, as they did when God gave up Israel of old to blindness of mind and hardness of heart, (Isai. 6.) they would rather sink down into amazing grief, and fill all heaven with loud lamentations.

And saints on earth, instead of singing their ancient melodious song, the Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice; let the multitude of isles be glad thereof; might rather, if these things were so, with the captive Jews, hang their harps on the willows, put on sackloth, sit down in sorrow, and refuse to be comforted.

A firm belief of the infinite wisdom and perfect rectitude of the divine nature and government, is essential to the very foundation of all true religion. For it is the very reason of our love to God, of our joy in him, rejoicing in his universal government, acquiescing in all his dispensations, even those which we cannot understand, and of our cheerful obedience to all his commands. If, therefore, we give up this belief, we