Upon the question of damages in actions for wrongfully mining and carrying away coal, to which we have recently alluded, 21 Alb. L. J. 442, and ante, 2, we note the case of Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. v. Ogle, 92 Ill. 353. The parties seem the same as in the case in 82 Ill. 627; S. C., 25 Am. Rep. 342. In the latter case the element of innocent mistake in the mining entered, and was held to make no difference. In the present case, however, the court say, "it is moreover evident that this trespass was not the result of mere mistake, but was knowingly and willfully done," and the court hold, as in the former case, "the measure of damages to be the value of the coal at the mouth of the pit, less the cost of carrying it there from the place where it was dug, allowing the defendant nothing for digging." But upon this theory, we would ask, why allow the wrong-doer any thing for the carriage of the coal to the mouth of the pit; or if that is allowed for, why must we not allow for the digging? The rule seems inconsistent with its own theory. John Bull and Britannia," and the former publisher of "The Britannia" began to publish "The True Britannia;" Prowett v. Mortimer, 4 W. R. 419; 2 Jur. (N. S.) 414. In Clement v. Maddick, 1 Giff. 98, the plaintiff's newspaper was called "Bell's Life in London," and the defendants' "The Penny Bell's Life and Sporting News." The "London Daily Journal" was too near to the "London Journal; " Ingram v. Stiff, 5 Jur. (N. S.) 947. So "The United States Police Gazette" to "The National Police Gazette," commonly known as "The Police Gazette;"❘ Matsell v. Flanagan, 2 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 459. So "The Bedfordshire Express and General Advertiser for the County" to "The Bedfordshire Express and General Advertiser for the Counties of Cambridge, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, and Middlesex;" Chance v. Sheppard, V. C. M., July 30, 1869. In Clowes v. Hogg, W. N., 1870, p. 268; 1871, p. 40, the former proprietor of "London Society" began to publish "English Society," and was restrained. Again, in Mack v. Petter, 20 W. R. 964; L. R., 14 Eq. 431, the plaintiff's book was called "The Birthday Scripture Text Book," and the defendant's "The Children's Birthday Text Book." In Corns v. Griffiths, W. N., 1873, p. 93, the plaintiff's paper was called "The Iron Trade Circular (Rylands')," and the defendant's "The Iron Trade Circular (Edited by Samuel Griffiths)." In Metzler v. Wood, 26 W. R. 577; L. R., 8 Ch. D. 606, the plaintiff's book was called "Henry's Royal Modern Tutor for the Pianoforte," and the defendant's "Henry's New and Revised Edition of Jousse's Royal Standard Pianoforte;" and lastly, in Weldon v. Dicks, the tale was in each case styled "Trial and Triumph." In all the above cases the infringement was restrained. In the following cases the remedy sought was refused: In Spottiswoode v. Clarke, 2 Ph. 184, the question was between "The Pictorial Almanack" and "Old Moore's Pictorial Almanack;" in Snowden v. Noah, Hopk. 347, between "The National Advocate" and "The New York National Advocate; " in Bell v. Locke, 8 Paige, 75, between "The Democratic Republican New Era" and "The New Era;' in Stephens v. De Couto, 30 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 343, between "La Cronica " and "El Cronista." "Punch" was the property of the plaintiffs in Bradbury v. Beeton, 18 W. R. 33, and "Punch and Judy" of the defendant; in Tallcot v. Moore, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 106, the plaintiff's book was "The Little Red Book, New Series, 1875," and the defendant's "The Red and White Book;" and The American Grocer Publishing Association v. Grocer Publishing Company, 51 How. Pr. 402, was a similar case. Ledger v. Ray, Ct. of App., May 3, 1877, was a somewhat peculiar case, as the question was not confined to the two titles, "The Era" and "Touchstone," or New Era," but Touchstone was also the name of a well-known writer in the plaintiff's paper. And again in Kelly v. Byles, 46 L. T. (N. S.) 623, the plaintiff's compilation was called "The Post Office Directory of the West Riding of Yorkshire,” and the defendant's, "The Post Office Bradford Directory." See, also, 21 Alb. L. J. 446. "The In Davis v. Dudley, 70 Me. 236, it was held that a minor's deed of land not appearing upon its face to be prejudicial to him, is not void but voidable. To avoid it or ratify it, there must be some act on the part of the minor, after becoming of age, indicative of that intention. Mere delay on the part of the minor is not sufficient evidence; but delay coupled with the neglect of the minor, after becoming of age, and having knowledge that the other party is intending to, and does make valuable improvements, to make known his intention to avoid his deed in season to prevent such expenditure, is a sufficient ratification. The court said: "As the deed is voidable at the election of the minor, it follows that until that election is in some way made manifest there is neither a ratification nor an avoidance. Without the one or the other the deed must still remain in force but as a defeasible instrument. This manifestation must be shown by some positive and clear act, intended for that purpose. What that act shall be, or what is sufficient for that purpose, must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case. It therefore follows that mere delay within the time allowed by the statute of limitations, uncoupled with any acts expressive of an intent to confirm, would not be sufficient for that purpose; and this may now be considered as well-settled law; though some decisions may be found holding that unless the deed is repudiated within a reasonable time, ratification will result. 3 Wash. R. Prop. (3d ed.) 226; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 523-4; Jackson v. Carpenter, 11 Johns. 539; Tucker v. Moreland, 10 Pet. 75-6. While mere acquiescence for any length of time within the statute of limitations is no proof of intention to ratify, when coupled with acts or even omissions when duty requires action, it may become not only pertinent, but satisfactory proof of such intention." "In this case the land was sold late in the fall. The grantor became of age in the spring following. The inference is that nearly or quite all the improvements up rain or shine. The umbrella was marked: "G. Rows, Victoria Club, Leeds." A card was exhibited on which were the words: "We pay all bets first past the post." The defendant called out, offering and making bets, and giving tickets for the money. This umbrella was held to be a place," and the court shut it up. One of the judges conceived that a prize-ring, or a wagon with an awning, would not be a "place," and conceived that the umbrella was, properly speaking, an open tent. In Killman V. State, 2 Tex. Ct. App. 222; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 432, it was held that a canvas tent may be a disorderly house." were made at a time when the duties and responsi- | supported by a staff stuck into the ground, and kept bilities of an adult rested upon the plaintiff. The case further shows that his residence was such that he must have known the improvements the tenants were making, the purpose for which they were made, and that they were made relying upon the title derived from the deed now in question. Under such circumstances, if the plaintiff intended to avoid his deed, common honesty required him to make known that intention in season to prevent so great an injury and would forbid his making profit by an omission to do so. This certainly is a case where there is something 'to urge him as a duty toward others to act speedily.' Surely he was required to act within a reasonable time, and failing to do so, he must now be considered as electing to abide by his deed. The tenants might fairly suppose that he so intended, as they were under no obligation to assume that he would act in violation of that rule of law which requires honesty in minors especially after minority has ceased. While then mere delay has no effect of itself, under the circumstances of this case, it became demonstrative proof of an intent to confirm, and certainly as unreasonable in its length and similar in effect as causing loss to the party bound, as well as profit to the party whose duty it was to act, as if the minor had been the purchaser of the land in possession, instead of the seller. In which case it is clear he would have been held as confirming the deed. Boody v. McKeen, supra, 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 258." To the same effect is Gillespie v. Bailey, 12 W. Va. 70; S. C., 29 Am. Rep. 445, where there is a learned examination of the authorities. See, also, note, 25 Am. Rep. 30. "PUBLIC PLACE" AND "PUBLIC HOUSE. N some recent writing on Legal Definitions we alluded to the phrases "public place" and "public house." More extended research has shown us that there has been a good deal of discussion as to what constitutes a "public place" or a "public house," within the statutes against gaming, affrays and indecent exposure. The English statute provides that "no house, office, room, or other place shall be opened, kept or used for betting purposes." In Eastwood v. Miller, L. R., 9 Q. B. 440; S. C., 9 Eng. (Moak) 429, the appellant was the occupant of inclosed grounds, into which persons were admitted on payment of a fee, and where a pigeon-shooting match for ten pounds a sot, and a foot-race took place, persons betting on the n and the race. Counsel contended that the grounus re not a "place," because not covered by a roof. But court did not take that view. It might as well be sa.. that the betters were not persons unless they had their . *s on. A case was cited where one was convicted, under his statute, of keeping a gaming-table under a tree in Hyde Park. In Bows v. Fenwick, L. R., 9 C. P. 339; S. C., 9 Eng. (Moak) 374, one was indicted, under the same statute, of standing at a race-course, on a stool, under an umbrella, seven or eight feet high, It was held in Henderson v. State, 59 Ala. 89, that an out-house in the bushes on the edge of a field, in the corporate limits of a town, about forty yards from a public road, and near and in a view of a path used by school children and other persons, is a So is a steamboat public place," within the meaning of the statute against gaming. So is a barn, 200 yards from a tavern, where many persons are assembled for mustering, and sixty or seventy yards from another barn where the tavern keeper is selling spirits. Farmer v. Commonwealth, 8 Leigh, 741. carrying passengers and freight. 13 Ala. 602. So is an infirmary. id. 551. So is a shoemaker's shop into which many passed, although a few were excluded during the gaming. Campbell v. State, 17 id. 369. And so is an old house formerly used as a jail, on a public square and open to all, and occasionally used by the guards of the new jail. Walker v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 515. A bed-room kept locked so that none can enter but by permission is a public place if accessible to all, by night and day, who wish to indulge in gaming. Smith v. State, 52 Ala. 384. The house of a keeper of a toll-bridge, consisting of two rooms, in one of which is the office for the transaction of the business of the bridge and where persons were privileged to go to settle for tolls, is a public house. Arnold v. State, 29 Ala. 46. So is the office of a justice of the peace. Burnett v. State, 30 id. 19. So where a house has but two rooms, front and back, the front used as a magistrate's office, the back by partners of a dissolved firm for settling their accounts, with an opening between, the back room is a public place. Id. 19. So the back room of a country store, used as a bedroom by one of the proprietors who is unmarried. Huffman v. State, 30 Ala. 532. So of a room back of a broker's office, used and occupied in like manWilson v. State, 31 id. 371. So of a barber's shop on the first story, the gaming being carried on in a room in the second story, accessible only by an exterior flight of stairs, and used by the barber in daguerrean experiments or as a depository for broken apparatus and chemicals. Moore v. State, 30 id. 550. And so of a saddler's shop including a back room situated and accessible in like manner. Bentley. State, 32 id. 596. ner. A privy, belonging to a country school-house, is not, during vacation, a public place within the statute of gaming. McDaniel v. State, 35 Ala. 390. Nor is a spot, surrounded with brush and briers, 200 yards from where a public shooting-match is going on. Com. v. Vandine, 6 Gratt. 689. Nor a room in an out-house within a tavern inclosure, formerly used in connection with the tavern, and a room over which is still so used, but now used independently of the tavern by one who boards there. Purcell v. Commonwealth, 14 id. 679. Nor a hollow 100 yards from a dram shop, not visible therefrom nor from a public road, and not customarily used for gaming. Smith v. State, 23 Ala. 39; Bythwood v. State, 20 id. 47. Nor is a private house, to which the public are not permitted to go without invitation, made a public place by the presence of eight | or ten invited persons. Coleman v. State, 20 id. 51. Nor the office of an unmarried physician, where he eats and sleeps, the gaming being at night with closed doors and a few invited friends. Clarke v. State, 12 id. 492. Nor a lawyer's office, occupied and used in like manner, although during the session of court. Burdine v. State, 25 id. 60. Nor the office of a married physician, adjoining a merchant's counting-room, and occupied at night by another as a sleeping-room, who frequently held invited card parties there. Sherrod v. State, 25 id. 78. The sea-beach, visible from inhabited houses, is a public place. Reg. v. Creusden, 2 Camp. 89. But an indictment charging indecent exposure "in a public place, to wit, a public road," is bad, the publicity having reference to the number of persons rather than the locality. Moffit v. State, 43 Tex. 346. A field in a forest and one mile from a highway or any other public place is not a public place, although three persons are present, two of whom engage in an affray. Taylor v. State, 22 Ala. 15. (So held in respect to an indecent exposure in a barroom, only one other person being present. Reg. v. Webb, 1 Den. C. C. 338. So under the like circumstances in a church-yard. Rex v. Watson, 2 Cox's C. C. 376.) But an inclosed lot, thirty yards from the street of a country town, but visible from the street, is a public place within the common-law definition of an affray. Cariile v. State, 35 Ala. 392. "The tumult could be heard and its exciting scenes witnessed; and persons passing by would be within reach of missiles thrown by the combatants," said the court. In Homer v. State, 49 Md. 277, an indictment for nuisance, it was held that the ordinary and accepted meaning of the words "roads and streets," is " ways for public travel," unless qualified by the adjective "private" or some equivalent expression; and so an allegation of the maintenance of an offensive trade "near unto divers roads and streets," etc., was held to imply a public nuisance. For the purpose of posting notices, houses of public worship, inns, and perhaps in some places, retail Nor the back room used by a register in chan-shops, are public places. Scammon v. Scammon, 28 cery as a bed-room, adjoining and communicating | N. H. 428; Tidd v. Smith, 3 id. 181. with his office, the house having a high fence in the rear, and the persons invited coming in by the back way. Boquemore v. State, 19 id. 528. Nor a storehouse in a village, late at night, after persons have ceased to come for goods, and the door is locked. Commonwealth v. Feazle, 8 Gratt. 585; Windsor v. Com., 4 Leigh, 680. (But it is a "public house." Skinner v. State, 30 Ala. 524.) Nor is a room made a public place by the mere fact that it adjoins and communicates by an open door with another in which are persons who are not gaming. Lowrie v. State, 43 Tex. 602. A "room in a public courthouse" is not necessarily a "public place." Shihagan v. Steele, 9 id. 430. A public omnibus is a "public place" within a statute against indecent exposure of the person. Reg. v. Holmes, 3 Carr. & K. 360. In Reg. v. Orchard, 3 Cox's C. C. 248, it was held that a urinal, with boxes or divisions, for the convenience of the public, situated in an open market, was not a public place within the same statute. But the contrary was held in Queen v. Harris, L. R., 1 C. C. 282. The court said: "It appears that the urinal was open to the public; that it was in Hyde Park, upon a public foot-path, and that the entrance to it was from that foot-path. I think it was just as much a public place, with respect to that portion of the public who use it, as a public highway. Every place must be more or less screened from view on some side, and the size of an inclosure does not necessarily affect the question whether it is a public place or not." Where one indecently exposed himself on the roof of a house in view from the back windows of several other houses, and was seen by seven persons from one of those windows, but could not be seen from the highway, held, that this was in a public place. Reg. v. Thallman, 1 Leigh & C. 326. TREATIES AND THE FEDERAL CONVEN- THE BY SAMUEL T. SPEAR, D.D. THE Madison Papers contain a summary of the daily proceedings of the Federal Convention, from the commencement of its sessions on the 14th of May, 1787, to the signing of a draft of the Constitution on the 17th of the ensuing September, covering a period of a little more than four months. One of the ques tions considered and determined by the Convention relates to the subject of treaties with foreign nations. The purpose of this article is to give a brief history of this question in the Federal Convention as found in the Madison papers. 1. One branch of the question relates to the denial of the treaty-power to the several States, and in regard to this point there does not seem to have been any division of opinion among the members of the Convention. The Articles of Confederation, which preceded and were superseded by the Constitution, while granting, with certain qualifications, to the United States, "the sole and exclusive power" of "entering into treaties and alliances," declared that no State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled," shall "enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with any king, prince or State," and that "no two or more States shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying ac 66 curately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue." Article VI. The plan of a Constitution, submitted to the Convention, May 29th, by Mr. Charles Pinckney, provided, in the eleventh article, that no State shall "enter into treaty, or alliance, or confederation," or "enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers." P. 744. The Constitution, as finally adopted, declares, in article 1, section 10, that "no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation," and that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power." 66 The first of these clauses expressly denies to the States all power to "enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation." This applies, as Mr. Justice Story thinks, "to treaties of a political character, such as treaties of alliance for purposes of peace and war, and treaties of confederation in which the parties are leagued for mutual government, political co-operation and the exercise of political sovereignty, and treaties of cession of sovereignty, or conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or general commercial privileges." Story's Const., § 1403. The other clause-the one relating to "any agreement or compact," etc., is regarded by the same eminent jurist as applying to "mere private rights of sovereignty, such as questions of boundary, interests in land situate in the territory of each other, and other internal regulations for the mutual comfort and convenience of States bordering on each other." Id. Such agreements or compacts the States are permitted to make with each other or with a foreign power, with the consent of Congress. The compact between Virginia and Kentucky is an example to this effect. Thus the treaty power, in the general sense of this phrase, is entirely excluded from the States; and all agreements or compacts of the States with each other or with a foreign State are excluded, except with the consent of Congress. This, as was intended, dispossesses the States of one of the fundamental attributes of nationality. Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; and The People v. Curtis, 59 N. Y. 321. 2. A second branch of the treaty question relates to the proper lodgment of the treaty power in the general government. Excluding the judiciary, the power might have been delegated to the President alone, or to him in connection with one or both houses of Congress, or to either house of Congress exclusively, or to both houses in conjunction. These were possible methods of lodging this power. The matter to be settled was to decide which, on the whole, would be the wisest; and this, at different times during the sessions of the Convention, involved considerable discussion. Mr. Pinckney's plan, proposed May 29th, provided that "the Senate shall have the sole and exclusive power" ""to make treaties." P. 742. That of Alexander Hamilton, proposed June 18th, provided that the President shall "have, with the advice and approbation of the Senate, the power of making all treaties," and that the Senate shall have "the power of advising and approving all treaties." P. 891. The report of a draft of the Constitution by the Committee of Detail, made August 6th, declared that "the Senate of the United States shall have the power to make treaties." P. 1234. Mr. Madison, in the discussion of this part of the report, August 23d, observed "that the Senate represents the States alone, and that for this, as well as other obvious reasons, it was proper that the President should be an agent in making treaties." Gouverneur Morris "did not know that he should agree to refer the making of treaties to the Senate at all, but for the present would move" to amend the section by adding the following words: "But no treaty shall be binding on the United States which is not ratified by law." This motion, after debate, was rejected, and the section was then referred "to the committee of five" for further consideration." Pp. 1412-1415. On the 31st of August the Convention referred such parts of the Constitution as had been postponed, together with such parts of reports as had not been acted upon, to a committee of eleven, consisting of a member from each State. P. 1478. This committee reported on the 4th of September, recommending that the grant of the treaty power should be as follows: "The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall have power to make treaties; but no treaty shall be made without the consent of twothirds of the members present." Pp. 1487, 1488. The Convention on the 7th of September entered upon the consideration of this recommendation. Mr. Wilson moved to amend it by adding the words, "and House of Representatives," immediately after the word "Senate," saying: "As treaties are to have the operation of laws, they ought to have the sanction of laws also. The circumstance of secrecy in the business of treaties formed the only objection; but this, so far as it was inconsistent with obtaining the legislative sanction, was outweighed by the latter." Mr. Sherman thought that the power "could be safely trusted to the Senate," and that "the necessity of secrecy in the case of treaties forbade a reference of them to the whole Legislature." The motion of Mr. Wilson was rejected, and the recommendation of the committee adopted. Pp. 1518, 1519. A draft of the Constitution having been agreed to by the Convention, it was on the 9th of September referred to a committee to revise its style and arrange its several articles and sections in the proper order. This committee reported on the 12th of September, proposing that the clause in respect to the lodgment of the treaty power should be a part of article 2, section 2, and should read as follows: "He (the President) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur.' 19 P. 1555. In this form the clause was adopted by the Convention, and, being subsequently ratified by the people, became a part of the fundamental law of the land. The Convention proposed to commit to the President tho general management of our relations with foreign nations, and, as a part of this idea, to vest in him the treatymaking power, subject, however, in its exercise to the advice and consent of the Senate given by a two-thirds majority of the members present. 3. The third branch of the treaty question, as considered and determined by the Convention, relates to the legal effect of treaties made under the authority of the United States, and the manner of making them operative as laws. The solution of this problem, as contained in Mr. Pinckney's plau of a Constitution presented May 29th, was as follows: "All acis made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and all judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions." Pp. 741, 742. Mr. Patterson's solution, submitted June 15th, read as follows: "Resolved. That all acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby and by the Articles of Confederation vested in them, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, so far forth as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States or their citizens; and that the judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State, or any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the Federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of such treaties." P. 866. Mr. Luther Martin, on the 17th of July, submitted a resolution on the same subject, which appears to have been accepted by the Convention without debate, reading as follows: "Resolved. That the legislativo acts of the United States made by virtue and in pursuance of the Articles of Union, and all treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective States, so far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said States, or their citizens and inhabitants; and that the judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding." P. 1119. This resolution, with others, was, on the 26th of July, referred to the Committee of Detail, charged with the duty of preparing and reporting the form of a Constitution, and on the 6th of August the committee made their report, the eighth article of which read as follows: "The acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the several States and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions any thing in the constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding." P. 1234. This article was, on the motion of Mr. Rutledge, August 23d, amended so as to read as follows: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, and all the treaties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the several States and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding." P. 1408. The article was again amended, August 25th, on the motion of Mr. Madison, by adding after the words, "all the treaties made,' ," the words, "or which shall be made," thus providing that the supremacy intended to be asserted shall attach to all the treaties of the United States, whether made before or after the adoption of the Constitution. P. 1430. The draft of the Constitution having been adopted and referred to the Committee on Style, this committee, on the 12th of September, reported the article as section 2 of article 6, in the following words: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." P. 1559. This is the precise language of the section as found in the Constitution when signed by the members of the Convention, and afterward ratified by the people; and hence it was the final disposition of the question relating to the legal effect of treaties made "under the authority of the United States." Treaties made under this authority are such as were made by the United States in Congress assembled, prior to the adoption of the Constitution, and such as have been made by the President, with the approval of the Senate, under the authority conferred by the Constitution. Whatever these treaties may be, considered as compacts with other nations, and whatever international obligations they may involve, they operate, so long as they continue in force, as supreme laws within the territory of the United States. They are, consequently, supreme laws in every State in the Union. The history of this part of the Constitution, as it passed through its successive modifications in the Federal Convention until it reached its final form, shows that the framers thereof meant to assert the supremacy of treaties, not in contrast with or as superior to the Constitution or laws enacted by Congress, but as supreme laws considered relatively to State constitutions and State laws. They predicate supremacy of three things, namely, the Constitution itself, the laws of Congress, and the treaties of the United States, placing them all in the category of supreme laws, without any formal discrimination between them as to rank. Having done this, they then provide that "the judges in every State shall be bound by all parts of this composite supreme law, "any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." This special reference to State judges, taken in connection with the oath they were to take to support the Constitution, and to the constitutions and laws of the States, clearly indicates that it was the exercise of State authority which was meant to be placed in subordination to "the supreme law," including treaties therein. And in order to secure this end and make "the supreme law" practically effective, it was further provided, in article 3 of the Constitution, that "the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority." The interpretation, application, and enforcement of treaties, considered as supreme laws, were thus placed within the scope of the judicial power of the United States. And still further, Congress, in article 1, section 8, of the Constitution, was authorized to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the "powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." The treaty power is vested in the President, in connection with the Senate; and the judicial power of the United States, extending to cases in law and equity arising under treaties, is "vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." The power to enact laws to carry this executive and this judicial power into effect is given to Congress. This places in the hands of the general government all the necessary legal machinery for making treaties operative as supreme laws. There was a special reason in the antecedent history of the United States, as well as in the complex character of our political system, which led the framers of the Constitution to give to a treaty the attributes of law, and make it a part of "the supreme law of the land." The Articles of Confederation, though bestowing the treaty power on the United States in Congress assembled, and denying it to the States, except with the consent of Congress, nevertheless, contained no provision for the enforcement of treaties, or to prevent their infraction by State authority. Congress could not raise a dollar by taxation to fulfill the stipulations of a treaty, and could not compel the States to supply funds for this purpose. It had the treaty power without the adjuncts necessary to make it effective. The consequence was that treaties made by Congress were regarded by the States as mere compacts, which they were at liberty to observe or not as they should see fit; and, as a matter of fact, they did see fit in several instances to disregard them. This was specially true in respect to the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783. Congress remonstrated, and even implored the States |