cess conformably to the existing laws of the State for enforcing liens, which no court can annul, destroy, or impair, by any proceeding in bankruptcy. On this subject, the principles established by the Supreme Court, in the case of Bronson v. Kenzie, are replete with the soundest rules of jurisprudence and constitutional law, and directly applicable to the question now under consideration, which is, in all respects, analogous to the one then before that court on the nature of the obligation, of the extent of the mortgage and the rights of the mortgagee; and the validity of the State law, which impaired his rights to enforce the payment of the mortgage money. In that case, the court declared that the obligation of the contract, the rights which the mortgagee acquired in the mortgage premises, depended on the then existing laws of the State, which created and defined the legal and equitable obligation of the mortgage contract.' (1 How., 315.) That the Constitution equally prohibits the impairing them by a State law, acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself, "if it so changes the nature and extent of existing remedies as materially to impair the rights and interests of the owner, they are just as much a violation of the compact as if they directly overturned his rights and interests in it." (1 How., 316.) That it may be seriously impaired by burdening the proceedings with new conditions and restrictions, so as to make the remedy hardly worth pursuing." (1 How., 307.) That the rights and remedies of mortgageor and mort gagee by the law then in force, were a part of the law of the contract without any express agreement of the parties-they were annexed 329*] to the *contract at the time it was made and formed a part of it, and any subsequent law impairing the rights thus acquired, impairs the obligations which the contract imposed.' (1 How., 319.) And on these principles a State law which incumbered the remedy of the mortgagee by conditions imposed after its obligation had attached was null and void. In this case the question presented is, whether a court of the United States, sitting in bankruptcy, can, by any rule, order, or decree, impair the right of a creditor by mortgage or judgment, to enforce the payment of his debts by a sale of the property mortgaged or incumbered by the lien of a judgment, according to the provisions of the State laws. If the right and power to sell can be taken from the creditors and conferred on the assignee of a bankrupt, who is a debtor by a mortgage or judgment existing at the time of the decree of bankruptcy: if the validity of the liens, the time, and terms of sale, and the distribution of the proceeds, can, under the bankrupt law, be determined, and regulated by a judge in a proceeding in bankruptcy, from which there can be no appeal, then the remedy for enforcing a mortgage or judgment is no longer annexed to the contract or a part of it. The empty right still remains in the mortgagee, yet the remedy is taken from him by the assignee of his debtor. The final adjudication, and even his ultimate rights, and the mode of administering the remedy, is made dependent on the discretion of a judge, exercised by the summary proceedings prescribed by the Bankrupt Act, instead of the regular course of the law as administered in the courts of a State. For such a course, there is not only no warrant in the law, but it is a direct viola tion of the prohibition in the section, by so construing the law as to negative its express language, and taking from lien creditors, by mere judicial power, those very rights and remedies which are placed beyond its exercise, in terms positively forbidding it, in as plain and emphatic language as that in which the Constitution declares that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." The principles of the Supreme Court in the case of Bronson, must be repudiated before a judge can exercise a power under the Bankrupt Act which is forbidden to a State by the Constitution. If either the obligation or the remedy is impaired, it matters not by whom it is done; no State has any power to do it; Congress can only do it by a "uniform law on the subject of bankruptcy," nor when the law is silent can the courts do it without the usurpation of legislative power. But the law is not silent; it speaks to the judge; it forbids him to do any act which impairs any lien then existing, and, in deciding the first question submitted in this case, I answer in the affirmative, and repeat the language of the Supreme Court; "and it would ill become this court under any circumstances to depart from the plain meaning of the words used, and to sanction a distinction between the right and the remedy which would render this provision illusive and nugatory; mere words of [*330 form, offering no protection and producing no practical result." (1 Howard, 318.) But were the Bankrupt Act open to construction, and the proviso of the 2d section left out of view, the result would be the same. There is no provision in the act that interferes with the laws of a State, which create and defend the obligation of a contract which is a lien on the property; there is nothing which professes to effect the remedies attached to such contract, one incident of which is the power of the creditor to sell or extend as the laws of the respective States have prescribed; it requires the plenary and unlimited power of Congress over the whole subject of bankruptcies to abrogate State laws relating to liens, or to take from State courts the administration of remedies to enforce them, and above all to prohibit the creditor from resorting for his remedy to that law which prescribed it, and substituting the assignee of a bankrupt, the mere creature and servant of a judge of the District Court, in his place, without and against the will of the creditor. Congress may delegate such power to a judge or a court, but it must be in plain terms, leaving no doubt of their intention to do so; but the proposition is a bold one, indeed, that judicial power is competent to do it, when the Legislature has not given its sanction to its exercise; it would give the Constitution a construction which would authorize the courts to exercise the power granted to the Congress, without the passage of a law delegating it to the judicial department. So far as the Bankrupt Act, by express words, or necessary implication, affects State laws, State rights, the power of State courts, or the rights and remedies of suitors therein, it must be paramount, yet too much caution cannot be observed on this subject by the courts of the United States. The settled course of jurisprudence in the ཤ State is to be overlooked only when such is the intention of the law; no intention to do so is to be presumed, no policy is to be assumed as the basis of the law, other than what its words in dicate, and nothing is to be borrowed from any other system which is not consistent with that which Congress has thought proper to create. A leading feature of that system is the protection of all liens existing at the time of the decree of bankruptcy; they are created by contracts which by their own force create a remedy to enforce them; this remedy is the right of the creditor, the rule for its exercise is the law of the State, the power to sell in this State is the essence of both right and remedy. Congress has not impaired either, and forbidden it to be done by any construction of the Bankrupt Act; a sale made pursuant to the laws of the State must therefore devest the title of the assignee in bankruptcy. If the foregoing views are sound, they dispose of the two questions; an order of the court in bankruptcy can confer on the assignee no power which Congress has not conferred on the court; its powers are what the law has dele331*] gated, and none other; the law *may and must be construed where it is open to construction, but where the law itself forbids construction it must be taken and followed as it reads. If, therefore, an order of court is made that would, in its execution by an assignee, impair a lien protected by the proviso in the 2d section, it is an excess of authority, and therefore void; a fortiori the devesting of a lien in the case put in this question is a much higher act of power than merely impairing it by affecting the remedy. The property bound by the lien is taken from the creditor, his whole right is extinguished, and his debt is lost entirely, unless he comes in for his dividend of the assets of the bankrupt's estate. Every principle established by the Supreme Court in the case of Bronson, as well as the protection given to liens by the Bankrupt Act, would be utterly prostrated, if a sale by an assignee would disencumber property mortgaged or bound by a judgment; such a doctrine would equally militate with other plain provisions of the law, which clearly point out what passes by the decree of bankruptcy to the assignee, when it passes, the extent of his, and the power of the court, and the nature of a purchaser's title. The 3d section vests all the property and the rights of property of the bankrupt in the assignee from the time of the decree of bankruptcy;" he then stands in the position of the bankrupt "before and at the time of his bankruptcy declared;" standing in the place of the bankrupt, the measure of his rights of property is necessarily that of the assignee, who can take nothing which did not belong to the bankrupt when the law made the conveyance of all his rights of property. To the property which was mortgaged, the only right of the assignee was to redeem it; if it was bound by judgment or other lien, the bankrupt held it subject to its payment; he could sell the equity of redemption on the land itself, subject to the lien, but the purchaser could not hold without paying it. The assignee can have no other rights by force of the decree, which is a conveyance by operation of law, than he could acquire by the deed to the bankrupt; nor could the assignee convey a greater interest than the law devolved on him; or the court by their order make his or the estate of a purchaser under him, an absolute one discharged of the lien without payment. The 11th section is framed to meet this view of the 3d; by giving power to the court to authorize the assignee to redeem, and omitting any power to order a sale, it is manifestly intended merely to put the assignee in the place of the bankrupt, but in no other respect than enabling the assignee to appropriate the assets in his hands to disencumber the property by payment. Following the proviso in the 2d section, the 11th withholds the power of sale, as that might impair the lien; we thus find that it was deemed necessary to provide for the power of the assignee to redeem; it cannot have been intended that there should be by implication alone the higher power of sale, that in its exercise would take from the creditor *the protection given so carefully [*332 by the 2d section; the words of the 11th admit of no such construction, and even if they did, the court could not give it without overlooking the plain language of the 15th section. "And be it further enacted, That a copy of any decree of bankruptcy, and the appointment of assignee, as directed by the 3d section of this act, shall be recited in every deed of lands belonging to the bankrupt, sold and conveyed by any assignee under and by virtue of this act; and that such recital, together with a certified copy of such order, shall be full and complete evidence both of the bankruptcy and assignment therein recited, and supersede the necessity of every other proof of such bankruptcy and assignment to validate the said deed; and all deeds containing such recital, and supported by such proof, shall be as effectual to pass the title of the bankrupt of, in, and to the lands therein mentioned and described to the purchaser, as fully to all intents and purposes as if made by such bankrupt himself immediately before such order." Here is as precise and perfect a definition of the title which passes to the purchaser by a sale by the assignee under an order of court, or otherwise by virtue of the Bankrupt Act, with the effect thereof; "it is the same to all intents and purposes as if made by such bankrupt himself immediately before such order," in the words of the 15th section, with or without an order of sale. There is no express provision giving the court power to order a sale. The 3d section authorizes the assignee "to sell, manage, and dispose of the property, to sue for and defend the same, subject to the orders and directions of the court, as fully to all intents and purposes as if the same were vested in or might be exercised by such bankrupt before or at the time of his bankruptcy, declared as aforesaid." Connecting this with the 15th section, declaring the effect of a sale by an assignee, the answer to the second question is most obvious. Such sale has the same effect as if made by the bankrupt, and no other. It can devest no lien existing at the time of the decree or order declaring him a bankrupt. The word "order" in the 15th section refers either to that or to the order of sale; it is not material to which. If to the decree, then the deed of the assignee conveys only such title and estate as the bankrupt then had; if to the order of sale, then that is the time to which his right is referred. But in neither case can a sale devest a lien "existing before or at the time," or "immediately " before such order. Thus taken, the Bankrupt Act is an affirmance of the universal principle as laid down by the Supreme Court in Rankin v. Scott (12 Wheaton, 179), "that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is entitled to a prior satisfaction out of the subject it binds," unless it be defective, or the party holding it has done some act to postpone him; and that a purchaser is bound by the lien unless there is a prior act of the Legislature to protect him from it. (12 Wheat., 80.) The second question, therefore, is answered in the negative. Cited-3 How., 437, 439; 6 How., 506; 13 How., 11; 16 How., 287; 1 Black, 505; 10 Wall., 543: 11 Wall., 80: 14 Wall., 424; 23 Wall., 134; 3 Otto, 135; 5 Otto, 72, 77; 2 Bank. Reg., 239, 460; 3 Bank. Reg., 483; 4 Bank. Reg., 515, 517, 519, 718; 5 Bank. Reg., 316; Bank. Reg., 415; 8 Bank. Reg., 153, 170, 394; 9 Bank. Reg., 311; 11 Bank. Reg., 413; 12 Bank. Reg., 149: Deady, 436; 1 Dill., 503, 505, 507; 2 Biss., 389; 3 Biss., 230; 1 Sawy., 262, 263: 7 Blatchf., 161; 2 Story, 661:3 McLean, 589; 3 Wood. & M., 65; 1 Low., 317. 333*] *WILLIAM OLIVER AND MICAJAH T. WILLIAMS ET AL., Appellants, v. ROBERT PIATT. Where the trust property has been unlawfully property, the latter, in the hands of the trustee, is invested, with other funds of the trustee, in other chargeable pro tanto to the amount or value of the original trust property. What constitutes notice of a trust? An agent, employed by a trustee in the manage ment of the trust property, and who thereby acquires a knowledge of the trust, is, if he afterwards becomes possessed of the trust property, bound by the trust, in the same manner as the trustee. Where, upon the face of the title papers, the purchaser has full means of acquiring complete knowledge of the title from the references therein made to the origin and consideration thereof, he will be deemed to have constructive notice thereof. A coproprietor of real property, derived under the same title as the other proprietors, is presumed to have full knowledge of the objects and purposes and trusts attached to the original purchase, and for which it is then held for their common benefit. A purchaser by a deed of quitclaim without any covenant or warranty, is not entitled to protection in a court of equity as a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice; and he takes only what the vendor could lawfully convey. A warranty, either lineal or collateral, is no bar to an heir who does not claim the property to which the warranty is attached by descent, but as a purchaser thereof. Whether a bill in equity is open to the objection of multifariousness or not, must be decided upon all the circumstances of the particular case. No general rule can be laid down upon the subject; and much must be left to the discretion of the court. The objection of multifariousness can be taken by a party to the bill only by demurrer, or plea, or answer, and cannot be taken at the hearing of the cause. But the court itself may take the objection at any time-at the hearing or otherwise. The objection cannot be taken by a party in the appellate court. Lapse of time is no bar to a subsisting trust in real property. The bar does not begin to run until or right set up by the trustee is brought home to knowledge of some overt act of an adverse claim the cestui que trust. The lapse of any period less than twenty years will not bar the cestui que trust been guilty of some negligence, where the [334 of his remedy in equity, although he may have suit is brought against his trustee, who is guilty of the breach of trust, or others claiming under him with notice. Trusts-option of cestui que trust to take proceeds or follow property into hands of one not a bona fide purchaser not controlled by repur chase by trustee-judgment against trust property-collusion of trustee with purchaser-cestui que trust not party to foreclosure-appointment by two land companies of one agent to buy at sale of public land not a fraud-sub sisting trust-lapse of time no bar-laches of some of the cestuis que trust-joinder of parties it is not necessary for the court formally to allow as defendants-multifariousness-objections- or disallow them on the record. It will be suffi warranty of ancestors no estoppel of heirs claiming by purchase. In cases of trust, where the trustee has violated his trust by an illegal conversion of the trust property, the cestui que trust has a right to follow the property into whosoever hands he may find it, not being a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice. Where a trustee has, in violation of his trust, invested the trust property or its proceeds in any other property, the cestui que trust has his option, either to hold the substituted property liable to the original trust, or to hold the trustee himself personally liable for the breach of the trust. The option, however, belongs to the cestui que trust alone, and is for his benefit, and not for the benefit of the trustee. If the trustee, after such an unlawful conversion of the trust property, should repurchase it, the cestui que trust may, at his option, either hold the original property subject to the trust, or take the substituted property in which it has been invested, in lieu thereof. And the trustee, in such a case, has no right to insist that the trust shall, upon the repurchase, attach exclusively to the original trust property. Where exceptions are taken to a master's report, cient if it appears from the record that all of them have been considered by the court, and allowed or disallowed, and the report reformed accordingly. There is no principle of the common law which forbids individuals from associating together to purchase lands of the United States on joint account at a public sale. THIS HIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio, sitting as a court of equity. The record was very voluminous, consisting of nearly eight hundred printed pages. The acts and declarations of the parties were given in evidence, running through a period of twenty years; and the case being an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court, as a court of equity, all this matter was brought up to the Supreme Court. It is impossible, therefore, to put into this statement all the circumstances which had a bearing upon the point in issue, which was, whether a trust did or did to buy for another cannot buy for himself. His purchase enures to the benefit of the principal. See note to Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch, 148. Deed from cestui qu trust to trustee, ward to guardian, heir to executor, is void. See note to Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat., 103. Length of time is no bar to a trust. When time begins to run. See note to Prevost y. Gratz, 6 Wheat.. 481. not continue in a valuable body of land. The leading incidents in the history of the case are these: In the summer of 1817, two distinct companies were formed at Cincinnati for the purpose of purchasing lands at the public sales of the United States, to be shortly held at Wooster, in the State of Ohio; the object being to ay out and establish a town in the reserve of welve miles square on the Miami of Lake Erie, since called the Maumee River. One company, called the Piatt Company, was composed of the following persons: John H. Piatt, William M. Worthington, Gorham A Worth, and Robert Piatt, the plaintiff in the suit below, and now defendant in error. The other company was called the Baum Company, and composed of the following perSons: Martin Baum, Jacob Burnett, William C. Schenck, William Barr, William Oliver one of the plaintiffs in error), Andrew Mack, and Jesse Hunt. What the articles of agreement were between the members of the Piatt Company the record did not show. On the 7th of June, 1817, the Baum Company entered into the following articles of agreement-Mack being admitted to half a share, the whole interest was divided into thirteen parts, whereof Mack held one thirteenth and each of the other persons two thirteenths: "We, the undersigned, agree to enter into a partnership for the purpose of purchasing Lands and lots at the public sales to be held at Wooster, on the seventh and fifteenth of July next; and for the purpose of effecting the said purchases, we agree to borrow, at the office of discount and deposit at Cincinnati, the sum of Fight thousand dollars, for which sum, and for purchases made by our agents, either at the public sales or otherwise, we hold ourselves 335*] *jointly and equally liable. And we do further agree that William C. Schenck, William Barr, and William Oliver shall be our agents to explore the lands and make the purchases. And we do agree to confirm and comply with any contracts that our agents aforeaid may make on our account. And it is further agreed that our said agents shall be authorized to take in any other partner or partners that they may see proper, on such terms as they may esteem advantageous. And it is further agreed that in consideration of the servres to be performed by the agents above, their expenses, incident to making the purchases aforesaid, shall be defrayed by the other individuals comprising the company. "In witness whereof, we have hereunto set Our hands and seals, at Cincinnati, this the eventh day of June, eighteen hundred and MARTIN BAUM, [SEAL.] "JESSE HUNT, seventeen. SEAL. $4,000 to make the first payment on the lots of land which he might purchase. The agents having made their selections, met at Wooster to attend the sales, and then ascertained that they had each selected the following tracts, viz.: 1, 2, 3, 4, 86, and 87. In consequence of this, the following agreement was entered into, viz.: "We, the undersigned, agree, on behalf of the companies we represent, to wit: William C. Schenck, of Warren County, Ohio, and William Oliver, of Cincinnati, Ohio, for themselves, and for Jacob Burnet, Martin Baum, Jesse Hunt, William Barr, and Andrew Mack, all of Hamilton County, Ohio; and Robert Piatt, of Boon County, Kentucky, for himself, and for William M. Worthington, John H. Piatt, and Gorham A. Worth, all of Hamilton County, Ohio, to purchase at the public sales, in July, 1817, at Wooster, lots numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, at, and including, the mouth of Swan Creek, in township No. 3, in the United States reserve, at the foot of the rapids of the Miami of the Lakes, for the joint benefit of both companies: that is, one company to have one half interest in the whole, and the other company to have the other half; each company paying one half of the purchase money. It is further agreed that Robert Piatt, in behalf of his company and the company of Schenck and Oliver, shall be the bidder for lots Nos. 1 and 2, and William Oliver for lots Nos. 3 and 4, they being the above four lots at the mouth of Swan Creek. *In witness whereof, the parties [*336 have hereunto interchangeably set their hands and seals, this 17th day of July, 1817. ་་ W. C. SCHENCK, [SEAL.] WILLIAM OLIVER, [SEAL. ROBERT PIATT. [SEAL.]" And afterwards the following: 66 The undersigned have agreed to purchase, for the joint benefit of their companies, lots or tracts of land numbered 86 and 87, opposite the mouth of Swan Creek, on the same principles that lots numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, at the mouth of Swan Creek, were purchased, as per agreement between William C. Schenck and William Oliver, for themselves and others, and Robert Piatt for himself and others, bearing date 17th July, 1817. ་་ ROBERT PIATT, [SEAL.] "WILLIAM OLIVER. [SEAL.]” On the 18th of July, 1817.in conformity with the above agreements, William Oliver bid in lots No. 3 and 4, and on the 19th of July, Robert Piatt bid in tracts 1, 2, 86 and 87. The original certificates for the tracts bid in by Oliver, were made out in his name, and for the tracts bid in by Piatt, in the names of himself, John H. Piatt, Worth, and Worthington, in conformity with the letter of instructions addressed to him on the 23d of June. On the 21st of July, 1817, Robert Piatt bid in, for the separate account of the Piatt Company, the following other tracts, viz.: Northwest quarter-section 2, township 3. Southwest quarter-section 2, township 3. Southwest quarter-section 3, township 3. Northwest quarter-section 3, township 3. Southeast quarter-section 3, township 3. The first installment of the purchase money for which was paid by the Piatt Company. On the 4th of August, 1817, Robert Piatt settled an account with the Piatt Company, giving them credit for the four thousand dollars above mentioned, and charging them with one half of the installments which had been paid upon Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, and with the whole of the installments which had been paid upon Nos. 86 and 87, and upon the five quarter-sections. On the same day Baum delivered to Oliver a letter and a set of instructions. The letter is as follows: "CINCINNATI, August 14th, 1817. "Sir: You will observe by the power of attorney this day handed to you, that you are appointed an agent to lay out a town at the mouth of Swan Creek, on the Miami of Lake Erie. Your appointment is for one year, comAfter the return of the agents to Cincinnati, mencing this day; for which services so rena meeting of both companies was held; the acts dered, you are entitled to receive from the proof the agents at Wooster were ratified, and the prietors twelve hundred dollars. And the protwo companies were, in respect to their joint prietors of the lands lying in that country, but purchases, consolidated in a new company call-which is a distinct concern from the [*338 ed the Port Lawrence Company. Martin Baum was appointed trustee, for the purpose of carry. ing out a resolution of the company that a town should be laid out upon a part of the land. It was further agreed that Oliver should be appointed an agent to lay out the town and make sale of the lots; and he was directed, in perform337*] ing this duty, to call to his assistance William C. Schenck, another of the original members of the Baum Company. Each of the companies purchased other lands upon its own private account. On the 14th of August, 1817, Oliver executed a bond to Baum in the penal sum of twenty thousand dollars, the condition of which was as follows: above, have agreed to allow you three hundred "Mr. W. OLIVER. The instructions were as follows: CINCINNATI, 14th August, 1817. "DEAR SIR: As agent for the proprietors of the land recently purchased at Swan Creek, you will, immediately upon the receipt of these instructions, proceed to that place, and commence the laying off a town. General Schenck, who accompanies you, will assist in the survey of the ground, in determining the site, and in the arrangement and formation of the plat. In running the streets, and in the division of the lots, it is not the wish of the proprietors that interest or convenience should be sacrified to form; that the growth of the place should be retarded by useless adherence to any particular figure, or to any fanciful uniformity of squares. The number of lots to be laid off may be from three to five hundred, and, with the exception of water lots and fractional sections, of about sixty feet in front, and one hundred and twenty feet in depth. The principal or central street should be at least one hundred and sixty feet Whereas, the above named Martin Baum hath this day constituted and appointed the before bound William Oliver his agent, with power to lay out a town at the mouth of Swan Creek, on the Miami of the Lakes, and hath authorized the said William to sell and dispose of the lots in said town, agreeably to a letter of instructions, and to receive payment for the same from the purchasers, and to execute and deliver certificates, in the nature of title bonds, for the lots by him sold. Now, the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the said Will-wide; others from eighty to a hundred; the alleys iam Oliver shall in all things well and truly execute the trust reposed in him by the said Martin Baum, and shall render a true account of his proceedings, when required, and shall faithfully pay over to the said Martin all moneys by him received for or on account of sales made in the town to be laid off by him, as aforesaid, when thereto required, then, and in such case, the above obligation shall cease and determine, otherwise remain in full force and virtue." On the same day, Baum executed a power of attorney to Oliver, as follows: "Know all men by these presents, that I, Martin Baum, of Cincinnati, in the State of Ohio, for divers good causes and considerations me thereunto moving, have made, constituted and appointed, and by these presents do make, constitute, and appoint William Oliver, of said place, my true and lawful attorney, for me and in my name, to sell and dispose of the lots in a town to be laid off at Swan Creek, on the Miami of the Lakes, agreeably to a letter of instructions therewith delivered, and to receive payment for the same from the purchasers, and to execute and deliver certificates, in the nature of title bonds, for the lots by him sold, and to do all lawful acts requisite for effecting the premises, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney shall lawfully do therein by virtue hereof. In testimony whereof," &c. from twelve to fifteen. Let there be three lots, each of one hundred and twenty feet square, set off for public uses, churches, schools, &c.; and one, of two hundred and forty feet square, for court-house and jail. There should also be reserved one or two suitable lots out of the town for burying grounds. It is not, however, the intention of the proprietors to tie the agent down to any specific number of feet and inches in the width of the streets or size of the lots, but they leave to him the exercise of his own judgment, and recommend to him the use of that sound discretion which his better knowl edge of the ground, and his practical information, will enable him to display, to the interest and advantage of all concerned. "As soon as the surveys have been made, and a plat of the town formed, it is necessary that a copy of them should be immediately for warded to the proprietors, as also a notice of the time of sale, which, if practicable, should correspond with the time of holding the treaty with the Indians; and on this subject it is neces sary that the agent should obtain the earliest information. In the disposition and arrangements of the lots for sale, let one third of the whole number taken in different sections of the town be reserved for the use and benefit of the pro prietors, or for future disposal. "The terms of sale, one fourth down, and the residue in three equal annual installments, |