ever is predicated of a genius may be predicated of every species contained under that genius, and of every individual contained under every such species. On that distribution likewise, the very essence of scientific definition depends: for a definition, strictly and logically regular, "must express the genus of the thing defined, and the specific difference, by which that thing is distinguished from every other species belonging to that genus.

By definitions, if made with accuracy-and consummate accuracy ought to be their indispensable characteristic-ambiguities in expression, and different meanings of the same term, the most plentiful sources of error and of fallacy in the reasoning art, may be prevented; or, if that cannot be done, may be detected. But, on the other hand, they may be carried too far, and, unless restrained by the severest discipline, they may produce much confusion and mischief in the very stations which they are placed to defend.

By some philosophers definition and division are considered as the two great nerves of science. But unless they are marked by the purest precison, the fullest comprehension, and the most chastised justness of thought, they will perplex, instead of unfolding-they will darken, instead of illustrating, what is meant to be divided or defined. A defect or inaccuracy, much more an impropriety, in a definition or division, more especially of a first principle, will spread confusion, distraction, and contradictions over the remotest parts of the most extended system" (9).

• Wilson's Works, pp. 51, 50, 52. By division Justice Wilson means classification.

§ 8. Origin and earliest manifestation of law. Law grows spontaneously, and among a free people is continually adjusting itself to the needs and wants of society. Indeed, the history of the past has shown that not all the efforts of monarchs have been able to check this spontaneous growth of law. As we proceed it will become clear that there is a great difference between law and jurisprudence. Law is the subject matter upon which jurisprudence operates. The province of the legislator is to adjust the form of the expression of the law to the needs of the present conditions. The province of jurisprudence is to discover the fundamental principles, and to give such form and order to the body of law as will better enable those who administer it to understand and apply its rules and principles.

The most logical method of exposition is at the earliest possible moment to bring into view the most fundamental conceptions, those ideas which have operation in every part of the subject, and to present as early as possible an outline which shall display the whole field which the student will be asked to investigate. These outlines in their synoptical form have been placed at the head of this chapter. Our present task will be to make these outlines clearly understandable. This can only be done by showing the development of the principles upon which they are based.

The principles of law and jurisprudence have had an historical development. They cannot be understood apart from their evolution. It will therefore be necessary to notice the development of law sufficiently at least

to enable the reader to understand not only the beginnings of law, but the beginning of that science which has especially to do with law, and it will be well at the beginning to state what in conclusion we shall hope to make plain, namely, that, the jurisprudence of a country is the true exponent of its civilization.

We can imagine a condition existing among men where there was no rule imposed or regarded by which the conduct of one towards the other was regulated, but this condition is so remote as to be beyond the pale even of tradition. The development of man from the rude primeval state is a subject concerning which even the greatest scientist can only conjecture. Man has existed as a gregarious animal and a social being for many centuries beyond the most remote tradition, but modern science does not admit of a political state of nature antedating society.

There have been those who have taken the individual as the original unit of society, but this theory cannot be justified by actual facts. Indeed, Professor Amos tells us: "From the most opposite poles of thought-as for instance, from such diverse writers as Auguste Comte, Sir H. Maine, and Professor Maurice-a remarkable consensus of testimony has appeared within the most recent times to the effect that the integral constituent or atomic element of human society has ever been and is, not the individual citizen, but, the corporate Family" (10).

§ 9. The earliest foundation of government. The germs of modern civilization lay in the seed of law. When

10 Amos' "An English Code," p. 214.

several agreed that they would observe a certain rule of conduct, or when one said to the other "You must do this or that," then you have the beginnings of a social state which has gradually developed into what we term civilization.

A very considerable body of law may exist without reaching that stage of development which is understood when we use the word civilization, and law and civilization may to a considerable extent develop before anything appropriately termed jurisprudence is brought into existence. Law and civilization are so intimately blended that the former is necessarily implicated in the latter. In this age we are so accustomed to see science leading the way of progress that we fail to observe that there was an immensely long period when instinct was the guide and accident the only pathfinder. It is a long step from this period to that where reason is directing empiricism and experiment. Ages of real progress in a true civilization intervened before the time was reached when assumed postulates did not satisfy, and there arose those who demanded a reason for all things, and inductive reasoning was fairly established as the basic principle of science.

While as has been truly said, Aristotle Platonizes, that is to say, draws much of his system from others, yet it may be truly affirmed that modern science had its birth with Aristotle, and no branch of science received a greater impulse than that department of learning within the scope of the word jurisprudence.

However interesting the study of the manners, customs and institutions of the more ancient communities, the

initial point in the development of modern law and government is to be found in that community of Hellenic states surrounding the Aegian Sea, and this real initial impulse which, though at times it seems to have lost its momentum, has at all times and in all parts of the occidental world influenced the course and progress of that civilization of which the Law and Jurisprudence of the United States is a lineal descendant.

It would be futile to attempt in a work of this character to trace the growth of ancient law, even in those early communities which made direct contribution to Grecian and Roman law, and indeed something more useful can be done. These facts and events are the elements of our Histories of the Roman Law. Beyond this the works of Sir Henry Maine furnish ample information. There is, however, a higher reason; the great and fundamental ideas of jurisprudence are not events or facts of the kind noticed by the Historian, and may be entirely passed by, or but obscurely noticed, by one who is a faithful historian.

The great elements of jurisprudence are the philosophic investigation, comprehensive instructions and scientific exposition, which bring into clear view the great and permanent principles which are fundamental and controlling, and against which ordinary legislation strives in vain, and to which societies must and will conform (11).

11 Amos' "An English Code," p. 58. "Savigny's leading position is that the largest portion of the Law of every Nation is the exact product and measure of the whole National character and temper; that each element of that Law has a real, though often secret and undecipherable, relation to the whole, as well as to all the central characteristic Institutions of the Nation; that the study of a mature System of Law is something far more than a mere committing to memory of a number of Legal Rules,