George Tsebelis, Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science George Tsebelis, Jeannette Money, George Money Jeannette
Cambridge University Press, 13 de jun de 1997 - 250 páginas
This book examines some fifty countries to ascertain how the chambers of bicameral legislatures interact when they produce legislation. An understanding of this interaction is essential because otherwise legislative behaviour in each chamber may be unintelligible or incorrectly interpreted. The book employs cooperative game theoretic models to establish that bicameral legislatures, when compared with unicameral legislatures, increase the stability of the status quo and reduce intercameral differences to one privileged dimension of conflict. Non-cooperative game theoretic models are used to investigate the significance of a series of insitutional devices used to resolve intercameral conflict where a bill is introduced, which chamber has the final word, how many times a bill can shuttle between chambers, and whether conference committees are called. Empirical evidence, mainly from the French Republic, is used to evaluate the arguments.
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Introduction to Part I
The institutions of bicameralism
2A Institutional features of the navette nonfinancial
2B Institutional features of the navette financial
Introduction to Part II
The core and the uncovered set of bicameral legislatures
A model of intercameral bargaining
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abortion agreement allies amendments analysis argument assumption bargaining bicameral institutions bicameral legislature bicameral median hyperplane bicameral restrictions bill Bundesrat Bundestag cardioid Chapter closed rule coalition composition compromise concurrent majorities Condorcet winner conference committee Consequently constitution cooperative game Council debate defeated delegation dimension of conflict disagreement discount factor elected electoral European France French Fifth Republic French legislative game theory Gaullist Gaullist Party Giscard Grangé house 1 Lower house Upper house ideal point impatience intercameral intersection introduced issue Joint session legislative outcomes legislative process located Lower house 1/2 Lower house Upper Mastias ment National Assembly navette system number of rounds ORTF parent chambers Parliament parliamentary party percent players political position predictions preferences presented president procedure proposal Proposition qualified majority reform representation represented second chamber Senate senatorial influence shuttle standing committee status quo stopping rules tion U.S. Congress uncovered set unicameral vote winset yolk