from being in the like Circumstances with you, see that it was so with them; for Destruction came suddenly upon most of them, when they expected nothing of it, and while they were saying, Peace and Safety: Now they see, that those Things that they depended on for Peace and Safety, were nothing but thin Air and empty Shadows.

The God that holds you over the Pit of Hell, much as one holds a Spider or some lothsom Insect over the Fire, abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his Wrath towards you burns like Fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else but to be cast into the Fire; he is of purer Eyes than to bear to have you in his Sight; you are Ten thousand Times so abominable in his Eyes as the most hateful venomous Serpent is in ours. You have offended him infinitely more than ever a stubborn Rebel did his Prince; and yet 'tis nothing but his Hand that holds you from falling into the Fire every Moment: 'Tis to be ascribed to nothing else, that you did not go to Hell the last Night; that you was suffered to awake again in this World, after you closed your Eyes to sleep: And there is no other Reason to be given why you have not dropt into Hell since you arose in the Morning, but that God's Hand has held you up: There is no other Reason to be given why you han't gone to Hell since you have sat here in the House of God, provoking his pure Eyes by your sinful wicked Manner of attending his solemn Worship; yea, there is nothing else that is to be given as a Reason why you don't this very Moment drop down into Hell.

O Sinner! Consider the fearful Danger you are in: 'Tis a great Furnace of Wrath, a wide and bottomless Pit, full of the Fire of Wrath, that you are held over in the Hand of that God, whose Wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you as against many of the Damned in Hell: You hang by a slender Threed, with the Flames of Divine Wrath flashing about it, and ready every Moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no Interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the Flames of Wrath, nothing of your own, nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare you one Moment.

How dreadful is the State of those that are daily and hourly in Danger of this great Wrath, and infinite Misery! But this is the dismal Case of every Soul in this Congregation that has not been born

again, however moral and strict, sober and religious they may otherwise be. Oh that you would consider it, whether you be Young or Old! There is Reason to think, that there are many in this Congregation, now hearing this Discourse, that will actually be the Subjects of this very Misery to all Eternity. We know not who they are, or in what Seats they sit, or what Thoughts they now have: It may be they are now at Ease, and hear all these Things without much Disturbance, and are now flattering themselves that they are not the Persons, promising themselves that they shall escape. If we knew that there was one Person, and but one, in the whole Congregation that was to be the Subject of this Misery, what an awful Thing would it be to think of! If we knew who it was, what an awful Sight would it be to see such a Person! How might all the rest of the Congregation lift up a lamentable and bitter Cry over him! But alas! Instead of one, how many is it likely will remember this Discourse in Hell? And it would be a Wonder if some that are now present should not be in Hell in a very short Time, before this Year is out; and it would be no Wonder if some Person that now sits here in some Seat of this Meeting-House in Health, and quiet and secure, should be there before To-Morrow Morning. Those of you that finally continue in a natural Condition, that shall keep out of Hell longest, will be there in a little Time! your Damnation don't slumber; it will come swiftly, and in all Probability very suddenly upon many of you. You have Reason to wonder, that you are not already in Hell. 'Tis doubtless the Case of some that heretofore you have seen and known, that never deserved Hell more than you, and that heretofore appeared as likely to have been now alive as you: Their Case is past all Hope; they are crying in extreme Misery and perfect Despair: But here you are in the Land of the Living, and in the House of God, and have an Opportunity to obtain Salvation. What would not those poor damned, hopeless Souls give for one Day's such Opportunity as you now enjoy!

FROM

ENQUIRY INTO THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

A Great Argument for Self-determining Power, is the supposed Experience we universally have of an Ability to determine our Wills, in Cases wherein no prevailing Motive is presented: The Will (as is

supposed) has it's Choice to make between two or more Things, that are perfectly equal in the View of the Mind; and the Will is apparently altogether indifferent; and yet we find no Difficulty in coming to a Choice; the Will can instantly determine it self to one, by a sovereign Power which it has over it self, without being moved by any preponderating Inducement.

Thus the forementioned Author of an Essay on the Freedom of the Will &c. P. 25, 26, 27, supposes, "That there are many Instances, wherein the Will is determined neither by present Uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent Good, nor by the last Dictate of the Understanding, nor by any Thing else, but meerly by it self, as a Sovereign Self-determining Power of the Soul; and that the Soul does not will this or that Action, in some Cases, by any other Influence, but because it will. Thus (says he) I can turn my Face to the South, or the North; I can point with my Finger upward, or downward.— And thus, in some Cases, the Will determines it self in a very sovereign Manner, because it will, without a Reason borrowed from the Understanding: and hereby it discovers it's own perfect Power of Choice, rising from within it self, and free from all Influence or Restraint of any Kind." And in Pages 66, 70, & 73, 74. This Author very expresly supposes the Will in many Cases to be determined by no Motive at all, and acts altogether without Motive, or Ground of Preference. Here I would observe,

1. The very Supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and overthrows it self. For the Thing supposed, wherein this grand Argument consists, is, That among several Things the Will actually chuses one before another, at the same Time that it is perfectly indifferent; which is the very same Thing as to say, the Mind has a Preference, at the same Time that it has no Preference. What is meant can't be, that the Mind is indifferent before it comes to have a Choice, or 'till it has a Preference; or, which is the same Thing, that the Mind is indifferent until it comes to be not indifferent. For certainly this Author did not suppose he had a Controversy with any Person in supposing this. And then it is Nothing to his Purpose, that the Mind which chuses, was indifferent once; unless it chuses, remaining indifferent; for otherwise, it don't chuse at all in that Case of Indifference, concerning which is all the Question. Besides, it appears in Fact, that the Thing which this Author supposes,

is not that the Will chuses one Thing before another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chuses; but also is indifferent when it chuses; and that it's being otherwise than indifferent is not 'till afterwards, in Consequence of it's Choice; that the chosen Thing's appearing preferable and more agreable than another, arises from it's Choice already made. His Words are (P. 30.) "Where the Objects which are proposed, appear equally fit or good, the Will is left without a Guide or Director; and therefore must make it's own Choice, by it's own Determination; it being properly a Selfdetermining Power. And in such Cases the Will does as it were make a Good to it self by it's own Choice, i. e. creates it's own Pleasure or Delight in this Self-chosen Good. Even as a Man by seizing upon a Spot of unoccupied Land, in an uninhabited Country, makes it his own Possession and Property, and as such rejoyces in it. Where Things were indifferent before, the Will finds Nothing to make them more agreable, considered meerly in themselves; but the Pleasure it feels ARISING FROM IT'S OWN CHOICE, and it's Perseverance therein. We love many Things which we have chosen, AND PURELY BECAUSE WE CHOSE THEM."

This is as much as to say, that we first begin to prefer many Things, now ceasing any longer to be indifferent with Respect to them, purely because we have prefer'd and chosen them before.These Things must needs be spoken inconsiderately by this Author. Choice or Preference can't be before it self, in the same Instance, either in the Order of Time or Nature: It can't be the Foundation of it self, or the Fruit or Consequence of it self. The very Act of chusing one Thing rather than another, is preferring that Thing, and that is setting a higher Value on that Thing. But that the Mind sets an higher Value on one Thing than another, is not, in the first Place, the Fruit of it's setting a higher Value on that Thing.

This Author says, P. 36, "The Will may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the Will may determine it self to chuse one or the other.' And again in the same Page, “I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my Will may determine it self to chuse." And again, "Which I shall chuse must be determined by the meer Act of my Will." If the Choice is determined by a meer Act of Will, then the Choice is determined by a meer Act of Choice. And concerning this Matter, viz. that the Act of the Will it self is determined by an Act of Choice, this

Writer is express, in P. 72. Speaking of the Case, where there is no superiour Fitness in Objects presented, he has these Words: "There it must act by it's own CHOICE, and determine it self as it PLEASES." Where it is supposed that the very Determination, which is the Ground and Spring of the Will's Act, is an Act of Choice and Pleasure, wherein one Act is more agreable, and the Mind better pleased in it than another; and this Preference, and superiour Pleasedness is the Ground of all it does in the Case. And if so, the Mind is not indifferent when it determines it self, but had rather do one Thing than another, had rather determine it self one Way than another. And therefore the Will don't act at all in Indifference; not so much as in the first Step it takes, or the first Rise and Beginning of it's acting. If it be possible for the Understanding to act in Indifference, yet to be sure the Will never does; because the Will's beginning to act is the very same Thing as it's beginning to chuse or prefer. And if in the very first Act of the Will, the Mind prefers something, then the Idea of that Thing prefer'd, does at that Time preponderate, or prevail in the Mind; or, which is the same Thing, the Idea of it has a prevailing Influence on the Will. So that this wholly destroys the Thing supposed, viz. That the Mind can by a sovereign Power chuse one of two or more Things, which in the View of the Mind are, in every Respect, perfectly equal, one of which does not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing Influence on the Mind above another.

So that this Author, in his grand Argument for the Ability of the Will to chuse one of two, or more Things, concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same Time, in Effect, deny the Thing he supposes, and allows and asserts the Point he endeavours to overthrow; even that the Will, in chusing, is subject to no prevailing Influence of the Idea, or View of the Thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this Argument without overthrowing it; the Thing supposed in it being inconsistent with it self, and that which denies it self. To suppose the Will to act at all in a State of perfect Indifference, either to determine it self, or to do any Thing else, is to assert that the Mind chuses without chusing. To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say that it can follow it's Pleasure, when it has no Pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any Difficulty in the Instances of two Cakes, or two Eggs &c. which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this