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But if it be true, as your committee maintain, that the Congress of the United States are restricted to the powers expressly enumerated, it is equally true that they have no power or right to pass any laws but such as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers enumerated, and which promote the general welfare of the United States. In relation to the right of Congress to interfere either directly or indirectly with the subject of slavery, as recognized by the laws of this State, your committee deem it improper and unnecessary to enter into a discussion. This State never can, and never will, so far compromit her interests on a subject of such deep and vital concern to her self-preservation, as to suffer this question to be brought into discussion. Non-interference on this subject was the sine qua non on the part of the slave holding States, in forming the Union, and entering into the Federal Compact. As the Southern States would then, so they must now or hereafter consider any attempt to interfere with this delicate subject, an aggression having a tendency to produce revolt and insurrection of the most hideous character. These states must view with jealousy and distrust, all associations having for their object the abolition of slavery. The principles propagated by the enthusiastic devotees of this project, are calculated to have most pernicious effect—exciting false hopes of liberty; producing discontent and dissatisfaction in the minds of the otherwise happy and contented slave, and a restlessness for emancipation, when the actual state of things forbids the possibility of it at present. The Colonization Society is considered by your committee as one of a dangerous character in this respect. Its schemes of colonization are vain and visionary. Its professed objects never can be accomplished— they are wholly impracticable. This institution, therefore, should not, in the opinion of your committee, receive the support, countenance, or patronage of Congress, and not being a matter of national interest, the Government has no right to take it under its protection, or make appropriations for its support. Your committee therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolutions: o Resolved, That this legislature concur with the legislature of the State of South Carolina, in the Resolutions adopted at their December session in 1827, in relation to the powers of the General Government, and state rights. - Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be requested to transmit copies of this preamble and resolutions to the Governors of the several states, with a request that the same be laid before the Legislatures of their respective states; and also to our Senators and Representatives in Congress, to be by them laid before Congress for consideration.

Approved, Dec. 20, 1828.
JOHN FORSYTH, Governor.

MEMORIAL

ON THE SUBJECT of THE LATE TARIFF; ADDREssed BY THE GENERAL

Assembly of Tile STATE of GEoRGIA To THE ANT1-TARIFF STATEs.

ORDERED TO BE PRINTED WITH THE PAMPHLET LAws, REPORTS, AND RESOLUTIONS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, AT DEC. SESSION, 1829.

(See Pamphlet Laws, Reports and Resolutions of 1829, p. 81.)

House of Representatives, December 17, 1828.

A Memorial from the Senate and House of Representatives, in General Assembly, representing the feelings and opinions of the people of the State of Georgia, upon the Tariff Law passed at the First Session of the 20th Congress; submitting to the States opposed to that obnoxious law, a summary of the principles of the opposition of this State to it, and requesting a concurrent Constitutional opposition to the law, and the system which it is intended to foster. The Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Georgia, in General Assembly met, solicit the concurrence of their sister States opposed to the Tariff lately passed, in resisting the law and its operation, upon the following reasons, and in the manner hereinafter proposed. 1st. We oppose the Tariff Law, last enacted, because we believe it to be both in its object and its spirit, unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional—1st. Because the power “to lay and collect dutics and imposts, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the U. States,” is abused and perverted to the accomplishment of objects not within the sphere of direct federal legislation. The power intended to be given by the Constitution, to Congress, is that of raising a revenue, for objects specified. The late tariff destroys the revenue, and is intended and avowed to have for its object the encouragement and protection of Domestic

Manufactures. As it destroys, or at least, diminishes the Revenue, it is

so far inexpedient. It operates thereby, indirectly, as an onerous tax upon the consumers of Southern productions. So far, it is unequal and oppressive—therefore, it is inexpedient and impolitic, as a general law. It intends to encourage and protect domestic manufactures, by reversing the accustomed course of exchange in trade—viz: the raw materials for manufactured commodities. It thereby intends to effect an entire alteration in the system of our commercial intercourse with foreign nations. Hitherto, the trade of the United States has been comparatively absolutely free; subject only to regulations, expedient, when consid

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ered in relation to the raising of a revenue. The present tariff
restrains its freedom, and therefore lessens both its extent and its profita-
bleness.
2dly. It is unconstitutional—Because, if it be defended under the
power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,” while the avowed
object is to encourage and protect domestic manufactures, it is a palpa-
ble abuse of the power given by the language of the Constitution—For
under a power of prescribing the rules of exchanging foreign and domes-
tic commodities, the power is so perverted as to endanger, not only the
prosperity of our commerce, but almost its very existence, in the anxiety
to accomplish an object altogether domestic, and even sectional. An
object, too, which the Constitution intends to effect, by means prescribed,
and altogether different from those used. For, under the power to pro-
mote “the useful arts,” an ample and effectual general power, with a
prescribed mode of use, resides in Congress, to encourage and protect all
useful arts. To use another and a different power, capable, indirectly, of
effecting such objects, concurrently with that obviously intended to effect
them, is an unconstitutional abuse of the former power.
3dly. Independent of its unconstitutionality, the law is inexpedient,
and oppressive generally, particularly on the Southern division of the
United States.
It is inexpedient, because it brings into premature existence a vast
system of industry, which should be, and which in time would be, the
natural and spontaneous production of circumstances, and the condition
of the country. This is nothing but pure political empiricism. It is
inexpedient, because that industry, having this factious origin, must be
sustained by a continued and like factious support. Law after law will
be required, or demanded, to support that department of labor which
springs up under the encouragement of law—Avarice and cupidity are
extravagant in their schemes of pecuniary adventure—And every
revulsion of their affairs which injudicious or boundless speculation
may produce, will, as the commercial policy of England exemplifies,
be sought to be remedied, by cumulative impositions upon foreign
COmmerce. *
It is oppressive, because one species of industry is directly supported
by government, at the expense of other branches of industry. The
productions of Southern agriculture, which hitherto have mainly supplied
the exportation of this country, and drawn its varied and abundant
importation of manufactured commodities, are almost forced into domes-
tic markets, and confined within one channel. .
A liberal reciprocity of trade, between our own and foreign nations,
being by this means destroyed, the vender of agricultural products is in
effect deprived of a choice of markets, either foreign or domestic, and
compelled to vend in the latter. Confined to that, he is dependant on
the manufacturing consumer, for the price of his raw materials. The
competition of manufacturers cannot sustain their old prices. And the
law operates unequally and oppressively in this—that the agriculturalist
is deprived of the liberty of choosing his market. This liberty, hitherto
enjoyed, and which has hitherto been his security for fair and adequate
prices of his productions, by exciting foreign and domestic competition,
is in effect taken away—For heavy impositions upon foreign imports
exclude foreigners from market, by destroying the equality of recipro-
cal advantages. Thus, the domestic purchaser controuls the market.
The advantage heretofore enjoyed by the agriculturalist, is destroyed—

he no longer can controul his prices by the power of optional disposi

tion at home or abroad, but is controuled by purchasers independent in so

their fortified monopolies.

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This abstraction of an indisputable right of the agriculturalist, under J-2

the free trade intended by the Constitution, is not, and cannot be
compensated by the promised, yet contingent, remote, and improbable
advantages resulting from manufacturing rivalry.—It is inexpedient,
because it brings prematurely into existence those manufactories whose
materials are drawn from the mines of the earth, by imposing duties on
the articles manufactured abroad, with a view to prohibit their introduc-
tion, and protecting the manufacture of the same articles at home. The
prices of manufactured imports are thus regulated by law, to effect an
object in its nature partial and sectional. This, too, is a restriction which
operates unequally. The consumer is deprived of the advantage of
seeking a supply of his wants, on equal terms, at home or abroad, at
his option. The prices of foreign manufactures, and other commodities,
are arbitrarily fixed high, to force the consumer to purchase what under
such restriction can be procured cheapest; which must be, the domestic
manufacture. Here the manufacturer is the favorite of government—
legislation directly confers upon him peculiar advantages—while the
agriculturalist pays him tribute, and is in dependance upon him.
It might be assuming too broad a ground, to say that the Constitution
forbids the encouragement and protection of any object of industry—
that it forbids the protection of any manufacture whatever. It is both
advisable and patriotic, that all the necessaries and impliments of military
use, in protecting and defending our rights, and our honor as a nation,
should be the product of national industry—“To provide for the common
defence and general welfare,” is a power clearly given to the Congress.
The power given is vague, and if taken separately, indefinite; but when
taken in connexion with the cautious, and even jealous limitations, of
federal powers, and considered in reference to the specified general
objects of our confederation, it cannot be deemed to be a power limitable
only by the discretion of a majority of Congress. Does not Congress
provide for the “common defence and general welfare,” in erecting
fortifications ! Is the “general welfare,” something distinct from, and
separable from the “common defence 7" And if so, what class of
objects and measures can be enumerated under it? The power to
“provide” for the “general welfare” certainly confers not a discretiona-
ry power over every object of human legislation. It refers to appropria-
tions of money, for proposed objects, included within the enumerated
federal powers. Whether any proposed measure, or regulation, will
W. the general welfare, is a question entirely speculative—
hether legislative action upon such measure, is within the limit of
constitutional competency, or whether its object be constitutionally pur-
sued, is another question. Measures of an experimental character, and
problematical operation, upon the general good, transcend the prudent
restraints, and violate the spirit of the Constitution. To guard it from
violation, is the proper object of State vigilance: to restore its purity, a
proper and legitimate object of their several or united endeavors.
The spirit and objects of the Federal Compact, place a virtual con-
straint upon latitudinary construction and implication. The power is

clearly limited by its objects. We object, therefore, to the expansion of

federal powers by construction—We deny the right of Congress to restrain the freedom of our commerce, to protect, as it is said, domestic industry; and we affirm, that a power wisely given to Congress, is carried to an extent at once unnecessary, inexpedient, and even abusive.

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4thly. The late Tariff, “altering the duties on imports,” if the power of the Constitution were strictly adhered to, would be a revenue bill. It is calculated to diminish the revenue. In this, the law is inexpedient and injudicious. But the avowed object of the law is to promote manufactures at home. Under the power, therefore, to raise a revenue, for specific national purposes, a different object is pursued. In this the power is perverted. If the law be called a regulation of commerce, it is, in like manner, inexpedient and oppressive.

If the law in question, upon its face, promised a greater prosperity to our external commerce, which the Constitution intended to preserve and extend by wise regulations, we should deem the power to regulate it faithfully fulfilled and executed. But on its very face, the features of ruin are set forth in full relief—And a short experience has realised the consequences which its provisions indicated. Is the law, in this light, calculated to produce its legitimate object? If experience of the contrary proves not merely its inefficiency, but its injurious operation, policy on the first ground requires, justice, expediency and necessity demand it on the second. If the decline and ruin of our commerce is the consequence of an attempt to regulate it, the consequence proves the measure to have been injudicious, either in conception or execution. Either would be a sufficient ground of repeal. If under the pretext of “regulating commerce,” or of “raising a revenue,” the aim is, to effect a collateral and indirect object; if a legitimate power be used in disguise, to accomplish a purpose, which, if the power and right to accomplish it existed, could be accomplished by a direct, overt, and undisguised exercise of the power; then, and in the first case, the legitimate power is abused and perverted: and in the second case, the stratagem resorted to argues the consciousness of using improperly a proper power, and a disregard of the restraints and limitations of the powers of the Constitution. This spirit is censurable, and calculated to impair the vigour of the Constitution, and vitiate the purity of federal legislation; it leads to the use of unconstitutional powers; it leads to illiberal and sectional legislation; and produces a disregard or oblivion of national interests.

While complaining of a law intended solely to promote sectional objects, we will endeavour to avoid an opposition upon sectional interests and feelings. We are aware, that if each State consulted its own interests alone, the consequences might be particularly disagreeable, and injurious to others; so, too, if one section of the Union acted on the same illiberal principle. It might be impracticable in the Federal Government of these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each,

and all the particular interests of an individual State, or section of States,

to their fullest extent, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. To reconcile all to federal legislation, partial and conciliatory compromises of sectional interests must be made. Individuals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. This is the rational and harmonising spirit and doctrine of law. It is strongly applicable to these States, confederated for the great purposes of general defence, general benefit, and general harmony. For the advantages and benefits of union, the interests of particular States, or divisions of States, should be in some measure compromised ; that a spirit of liberal and fraternal conciliation should regulate all measures intended to advance their pecuniary prosperity. Thus, if it be the interest of the Middle and Western divisions of the Union, to manufacture, their interests should not be o by making the agricultural divisions of the Union tributary to them.

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