are certain duties of the master that are nonassignable that is, when delegated to another, that other occupies the relation of vice-principal, for whose negmaster in his general duty to his servants, the master is liable; while for all such acts as relate to the common employment, and are on a level with the acts of the fellow-laborers-except such acts as are done by the vice-principal against the reasonable objections of the injured servant-the master is not responsible. In other words, the test of liability is the character of the act rather than the relative rank of the servants": Deep Min. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 21 Colo. 543, 43 Pac. 210; Denver Tramway Co. v. Crumbaugh, 23 Colo. 363, 48 Pac. 503; Wells v. Coe, 9 Colo. 159, 11 Pac. 50; Grant v. Varney, 21 Colo. 329, 40 Pac. 771; Colorado etc. R. Co. v. Naylon, 17 Colo. 501, 504, 31 Am. St. Rep. 335, 30 Pac. 249.

Connecticut.-"There is no duty belonging to the master to perform for the safety and protection of his servants that can be delegated to any servant of any grade, so as to exonerate the master from responsibility to a servant who has been injured by its nonperformance": Gerrish v. New Haven Ice Co., 63 Conn. 17, 27 Atl. 235. "The master's responsibility or nonresponsibility is determined, not by the rank or grade of the offending servant, but by the character of the particular act or omission to which the injury is attributable": McElligott v. Randolph, 61 Conn. 164, 29 Am. St. Rep. 181, 22 Atl. 1094. See Sullivan v. New York etc. R. Co., 62 Conn. 215, 25 Atl. 711; Wilson v. Willimantic Linen Co., 50 Conn. 457, 47 Am. Rep. 653.

Delaware.-"As no owner of machinery on anything like a large scale. . . . can run it himself, doing all the services necessary, therefore he must of course employ agents or servants to assist him in that business. He will have a general manager or overseer, a superintendent of machinery, generally, etc. . . . . They stand, generally, in place of the owner, who, as he must act through and by them within their respective spheres, is as much bound by their actions within the scope of their authority as if he acted himself": Foster v. Pusey, 8 Houst. 168, 14 Atl. 545.

Florida. "There are certain duties required of a master to his servants, which, if unperformed, or negligently performed, and personal injury results therefrom to such servant without his fault, will entitle the latter to recover damages." "If the master delegates them to another servant, no matter what his title may be, nor what his grade or rank in the master's service, the master will be responsible for their nonperformance, or for their negligent performance, notwithstanding the master has exercised due care in the selection of the agent to whom these duties are intrusted": Camp

ligence and want of care the master is responsible. Among such duties, with the assumption by the servant of the ordinary hazards in such case, are, that

& Bros. v. Hall, 39 Fla. 535, 563, 22 South. 792. See Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 South. 876; Parish v. Pensacola etc. R. Co., 28 Fla. 251, 9 South. 696.

Georgia.-Master is liable "where the respective situations of the servants allow no opportunity for the exertion of a mutual influence upon each other's carefulness": Cooper v. Mullins, 30 Ga. 146, 76 Am. Dec. 638. "The acts of a person authorized by the master to perform a duty which the master owes to his servant, in so far as they pertain to that duty, are the acts of the master himself": Cheeney v. Ocean Steamship Co., 92 Ga. 726, 730, 44 Am. St. Rep. 113, 19 S. E. 33; citing Atlanta Cotton Factory v. Speer, 69 Ga. 137, 148, 47 Am. Rep. 750. "When the master delegates to one of his employees such authority as subjects the will and discretion of all other employees engaged in and about the particular business to the direction and control of the person to whom that authority is delegated, such person may be well said to be a vice-principal and to stand in the relation of the master himself": Taylor v. Georgia Marble Co., 99 Ga. 512, 517, 59 Am. St. Rep. 238, 27 S. E. 768. See Spencer v. Brooks, 97 Ga. 681, 25 S. E. 480; Mills v. East Tennessee R. Co., 87 Ga. 105, 13 S. E. 205; Prather v. Richmond etc. R. Co., 80 Ga. 436, 12 Am. St. Rep. 263, 9 S. E. 530.

Idaho. "Where an agent is clothed with the control and management of a distinct department, the company is liable to an employee injured by the carelessness of such agent": Palmer v. Utah etc. R. Co., 2 Idaho, 290, 13 Pac. 425.

Illinois. "One who has charge and control of other servants, and has authority to govern and direct their movements in the branch of the principal's business in which they are engaged, is, while acting in pursuance of, and within the scope of, such authority, a vice-principal, so as to make his acts and directions the acts and directions of the principal." "Many servants who have no control over other servants may so represent their principal as to render the latter responsible for their acts and negligences. Such is the case with all servants not standing in the relation of fellow-servants to the plaintiff": Libby, McNeil & Libby v. Scherman, 146 Ill. 541, 37 Am. St. Rep. 191, 34 N. E. 801; The Illinois Steel Co. v. Schymanowski, 162 Ill. 447, 44 N. E. 876; Consolidated Coal Co. v. Wombacher, 134 Ill. 57, 24 N. E. 627; North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 57, 29 N. E. 186; Chicago etc. Brick Co. v. Lobkowiak, 148 Ill. 573, 36 N. E. 572. The quotations given show that the court recognized the inadequacy of the superior servant

he shall exercise reasonable care to see that tools, appliances and machinery are reasonably safe, and must use reasonable care that the place where the

rule to cover all instances. The true rule was recognized in Mobile etc. R. Co. v. Godfrey, 55 Ill. 78, 39 N. E. 590, from which case we have quoted in the text.

Indiana.-"If at the time the offending servant performed the act by which another servant was injured he was in the performance of a duty which the master owed to his servants he was not a fellow-servant, for the rule is fundamental that the master cannot rid himself of the duty he owes to his servants by delegating his authority to another, and if he attempts to do so, the person to whom he delegates the power to act is a vice-principal and not a fellow-servant. . . . . On the other hand, if, at the time of the alleged negligence, the servant was not engaged in the performance of a duty which the master owed to his servant, but was in the discharge of a duty which the servant acting owed to the master, he will be held to be a fellow-servant": Justice v. Pennsylvania Co., 130 Ind. 325, 30 N. E. 303. See Indiana Car Co. v. Parker, 100 Ind. 181; Nall v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 129 Ind. 260, 28 N. E. 183, 611; New Pittsburg etc. Co. v. Peterson, 136 Ind. 398, 43 Am. St. Rep. 327, 35 N. E. 7; Indiana etc. R. Co. v. Snyder, 140 Ind. 647, 39 N. E. 912; Ohio etc. R. Co. v. Stein, 140 Ind. 61, 39 N. E. 246; Robertson v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 146 Ind. 486, 45 N. E. 655.

Iowa.-After giving the duties of a master to use care in furnishing safe appliances, in securing competent servants, making regulations and giving warnings, one court says: "These are duties of which the master cannot relieve himself by showing that he delegated their performance to another servant who was at fault in performing them. In the performance of his duties the servant, agent, or employee stands in the place of the master and becomes a vice-principal, and the master is liable for his negligence": Newbury v. Manufacturing Co., 100 Iowa, 441, 449, 62 Am. St. Rep. 582, 69 N. W. 743; Theleman v. Moeller, 73 Iowa, 108, 5 Am. St. Rep. 663, 34 N. W. 765; Hathaway v. City of Des Moines, 97 Iowa, 333, 66 N. W. 188; Fink v. Ice Co., 84 Iowa, 321, 51 N. W. 155; Wilson v. Dunreath Red-Stone Quarry Co., 77 Iowa, 429, 14 Am. St. Rep. 304, 42 N. W. 360; Haworth v. Seevers Manufacturing Co., 87 Iowa, 765, 51 N. W. 68, 62 N. W. 325; Blazenic v. Iowa etc. Coal Co., 102 Iowa, 706, 72 N. W. 292. But see Treka v. Burlington etc. R. Co., 100 Iowa, 205, 69 N. W. 422; Fosburg v. Phillips Fuel Co., 93 Iowa, 54, 61 N. W. 400.

Kansas.-"At common law, whenever the master delegates to any officer, servant, agent or employee, high or low, the performance of

servants work is reasonably safe; to exercise ordinary care in the selection of superintending fellow-servant, and, where he has notice of the unfitness of a fellow

any of the duties .... which really devolve upon the master himself, then such officer, servant, agent or employee stands in the place of the master, and becomes a substitute for the master, a vice-principal, and the master is liable for his acts or his negligence to the same extent as though the master himself had performed the acts or had been guilty of the negligence": Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 29 Kan. 632; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 31 Kan. 197, 1 Pac. 644; Hannibal etc. R. Co. v. Fox, 31 Kan. 586, 3 Pac. 320; St. Louis etc. R. Co. v. Weaver, 35 Kan. 412, 57 Am. Rep. 176, 11 Pac. 408; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 267; Atchison etc. R. Co. v. McKee, 37 Kan. 592, 15 Pac. 484. "Where the employer places an employee under the control and direction of another and the latter, in the exercise of the authority so conferred, orders the former into a place of unusual danger, and thus exposes him to extraordinary peril, of the existence and extent of which he is not advised, the master is liable": Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Peregoy, 36 Kan. 428, 14 Pac. 7; Walker v. Gillett, 59 Kan. 214, 52 Pac. 442.

Kentucky.-"Where two servants are of the same rank and engaged in the same field of labor, the master is not liable for an injury to one by the negligence of the other, even though the negligence be gross." "Where two servants are engaged in the same field of labor, but are not of the same rank, the master is liable for an injury to the subordinate by the gross negligence of the superior, but not for an injury resulting from ordinary negligence": Cincinnati etc. R. Co. v. Palmer, 98 Ky. 382, 33 S. W. 199. See Volz v. Chesapeake etc. R. Co., 95 Ky. 188, 24 S. W. 119; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Collins, 2 Duvall, 114, 87 Am. Dec. 486; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Filbern, 6 Bush, 574, 99 Am. Dec. 690; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Moore, 83 Ky. 675; Fort Hill Stone Co. v. Orm, 84 Ky. 183; Casey v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 84 Ky. 79; Newport News etc. R. Co. v. Dentzel, 91 Ky. 42, 14 S. W. 958; Greer v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 94 Ky. 169, 42 Am. St. Rep. 345, 21 S. W. 649; Kentucky Central R. Co. v. Ackley, 87 Ky. 278, 12 Am. St. Rep. 480, 8 S. W. 691.

Louisiana.-"A corporation is liable for negligence respecting duties it is required to perform as master. The agent intrusted with their performance occupies the place of the corporation, deemed present": Mattise v. Ice Co., 46 La. Ann. 1536, 49 Am. St. Rep. 356, 16 South. 400. "The master is responsible for the negligence of a servant who stands as his vice-principal and direct

servant, to discharge him; to inform the servant of special dangers of his situation and of the machinery representative, invested with his own authority over inferior servants": Faren v. Sellers & Co., 39 La. Ann. 1011, 4 Am. St. Rep. 256, 3 South. 363. See James v. Rapides Lumber Co., 50 La. Ann. 717, 23 South. 469. Quotation from Atchison Railroad Co. v. Moore, 31 Kan. 197, 1 Pac. 644, given above, cited and approved in Stucke v. New Orleans etc. R. Co., 50 La. Ann. 172, 203, 23 South. 342.

Maine.-"An exception to the [fellow-servant] rule exists if the master has delegated to the foreman or superintendent the care and management of the entire business, or a distinct department of it, the situation being such that the superior servant is charged with the performance of duties toward the inferior servant which the law imposes on the master": Doughty v. Penobscot Logdriving Co., 76 Me. 143; Buzzell v. Laconia Co., 48 Me. 113, 77 Am. Dec. 212; Lawler v. Androscoggin Co., 62 Me. 463, 16 Am. Rep. 492. See, also, Shanny v. Androscoggin Co., 66 Me. 420, 426; Dube v. Lewiston, 83 Me. 211, 22 Atl. 112; Lasky v. Canadian Pacific R. Co., 83 Me. 461, 22 Atl. 367.

Maryland.—“To the general [fellow-servant] rule, however, there is this qualification or exception, that where the middleman or superintendent is intrusted with the discharge of duties incumbent upon the master, as between the latter and the servant, then the master may be liable for the omission or neglect of the manager or superintendent in respect to those duties": State v. Malster & Reams, 57 Md. 287, 308; Wonders v. Baltimore etc. R. Co., 32 Md. 411, 3 Am. Rep. 143; Yates v. McCullough Iron Co., 69 Md. 370, 16 Atl. 280; Cumberland etc. R. Co. v. State, 45 Md. 229; Norfolk etc. R. Co. v. Hoover, 79 Md. 253, 47 Am. St. Rep. 392, 29 Atl. 994.

Massachusetts.-"The servant is not required to take the risk of the carelessness of those who undertake to discharge, under the master's direction, the master's duty toward him, even if they are also servants of the same master": Kelly v. Norcross, 121 Mass. 508. "This obligation which the master assumes is personal and pertains to him in his relation to the business as proprietor, and in his relation to the servant as master. It has been repeatedly held that he cannot discharge it by delegating the performance of his duty to another": Moynihan v. Hills Co., 146 Mass. 592, 4 Am. St. Rep. 348, 16 N. E. 574; Elmer v. Locke, 135 Mass. 577; Holden v. Fitchburg R. R., 129 Mass. 268, 37 Am. Rep. 343; Ford v. Fitchburg R. R., 110 Mass. 240, 14 Am. Rep. 598; Killea v. Faxon, 125 Mass. 485; Snow v. Housatonic R. Co., 8 Allen, 441, 85 Am. Dec. 720; Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 3 Am.