Desty, Taxn. 276; People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266; Shaw v. Dennis, 10 Ill. 416; Conwell v. Connersville, 8 Ind. 358; Challiss v. Parker, 11 Kan. 394; Hingham & Q. Bridge & Turnp. Corp. v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen, 353; Malchus v. District of Highlands, 4 Bush, 547;

The power to determine what shall be the taxing district for any particular burden is

Municipal corporations, being creatures of the legislative power, and subordinate parts of the government of the state, are subject to the legislative will to the extent that it may provide for the appointment of a tribunal for the adjustment of claims against them without a jury trial. Ibid.

The legislature has power to arrest work done upon a city reservoir, which is being done partly under contract and partly outside of the contract without legal authority, and compel a settlement, and may also declare what shall be the equitable terms of the settlement, even to the extent of declaring that the contractor shall not be charged with overpayments if any such have been made. Ibid.

State ex rel. Hernandez v. Flanders, 24 La. Ann. 57, upheld the validity of an act directing a city to include in its funded debt all registered certificates owned by bona fide purchasers. The certificate in question in this case was originally unauthorized because in the nature of a gratuity. The court said: "A municipal corporation is created for a political purpose. It is invested with subordinate legislative powers, to be exercised for local purposes connected with the public good, and is subject to the control of the legislature. When it holds specific property for municipal purposes, that property is said by some to be invested with the security of private rights, but in most other respects the state through the legislature has full control."

Guilford v. Chenango County Supers. 13 N. Y. 143, upheld the constitutionality of an act directing the board of supervisors to assess and collect from the taxable property of a town an amount sufficient to pay a claim which was unenforceable at law, and which had been rejected by the voters of the town. This decision rests upon the ground that the act was an exercise of the taxing power. The court said: The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or the sums to be raised by taxation, in favor of individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state, and it can recognize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money whenever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and it is the judge of what is for the public good. It can, moreover, under the power to levy taxes, apportion the public burden among all the taxpaying citizens of the state, or among those of a particular section or political division. It is well settled that the authority to raise money by the exercise of the

The legislature judges finally and conclusively upon all questions of policy, as upon all questions of fact, involved in the determination of a taxing district.

Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 133.

Courts are without power to interfere with the legislative discretion, however erroneous it may be.

Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 138; Gortaxing power is not in conflict with the constitutional provisions protecting private property from seizure.

The legislature may authorize the levy of a tax to pay a sewer contractor an addition to the contract price, which the corporation was forbidden by its charter to pay. Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116.

Municipal corporations are the creatures of the state, and exist and act in subordination to its sovereign power. The legislature may determine what moneys they may raise and expend, and what taxation for municipal purposes may be imposed; and it does not exceed its constitutional authority when it compels a municipal corporation to pay a debt which has some meritorious basis to rest on. New York V. Tenth Nat. Bank, 111 N.Y. 446, 18 N. E. 618.

In this case an act requiring the comptroller of the city of New York to pay back to various banks moneys which had been advanced by them for the use of any of the departments or commissioners of the city or county was held to be a valid exercise of legislative power, although the advances in question were unauthorized, and part of them were misappropriated by conspirators, some of whom were directors of the bank.

The legislature has power to provide for the issuance of bonds by a municipality to pay an assessment against the town for its share of the cost of the construction of a highway, notwithstanding that the act providing for the construction of the highway and the assessment of a portion of the expense against the town was unconstitutional, the highway hav ing been laid out in the meantime. Knapp v. Newtown, 1 Hun, 268.

Hoagland v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. 142, while admitting the power of the legislature to furnish a remedy or remove an impediment preventing the enforcement of a legal or equitable right or duty already existing, denied its right to compel a city to pay a claim which it was under no legal or moral obligation to pay. The distinction is between recognizing an existing claim which has a moral basis but is not legally enforceable, and creating a claim previously

nonexistent.

So, also, the opinion in Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528. 43 L. ed. 796, 19 Sup. "It is not necessary Ct. Rep. 513, supra, said: to say in this case that the legislature had the power to donate the funds of the municipality for purposes of charity alone."

The legislature may require a municipal corporation to audit and allow a judgment pre

The power of apportionment is included in the power to impose taxes, and is vested in the legislature.

Gordon v. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608. Making and improving the public highways, and the imposition of taxes, are among the ordinary subjects of legislation.

People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 406; East Portland v. Multnomah County, 6 Or. 62; Norwich v. Hampshire County Comrs. 13 Pick. 62.

The power of the general assembly to form a bridge district like the one in question, and to provide for the issue and payment of bonds for the construction of a public bridge, is in no way limited by the Federal or the state Constitution. The legislature viously rendered against it. In so doing the legislature neither attempts to create nor to adjudicate in respect to a debt against the corporation. People ex rel. O'Donnell v. San Francisco City & County Supers. 11 Cal. 206.

Johnson v. San Diego, 109 Cal. 468, 30 L. R. A. 178, 42 Pac. 249, held that the legislature had power to change and readjust the burden of municipal indebtedness after the division of a city, so as to impose a heavier burden of indebtedness upon the municipality than existed under the act of separation. The opinion does not deny that in respect to mere local, as distinguished from public, concerns municipal corporations are entitled to the same protection as a private corporation, but holds that the adjustment of the indebtedness related to the political and governmental affairs of the municipality.

It has been held, however, that

The legislature has no power to provide means for the collection of a void obligation of a municipal corporation. Mosher v. Independent School Dist. 44 Iowa, 122.

That the legislature cannot definitely fix the amount due to persons named from a municipal corporation. State ex rel. Arick v. Hampton, 13 Nev. 441. This decision is put upon the ground that such provision is an attempt on the part of the legislature to exercise judicial power.

State ex rel. McCurdy v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664. 9 Am. Rep. 622, holds that an act which attempted to compel a municipality to pay a claim to reimburse the treasurer of a city for the amount paid by him as a bounty to a volunteer whom he supposed was credited on the quota of the city, but who was in fact credited on the quota of the town, was unconstitutional. The court said that the legislature might authorize, but could not compel, a municipality to levy taxes for public purposes not strictly of a municipal character, but from which the public have received or will receive some direct advantage, or where the tax is to be expended in paying claims founded upon natural justice and equity. or upon gratitude for public services or expenditures, or in discharging the obligations of charity and humanity.

Desty, Taxn. 280; People ex rel. McLean v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 406; Williams v. Cammack, 27 Miss. 210, 61 Am. Dec. 508; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 652; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Slack v. Maysville & L. R. Co. 13 B. Mon. 28; State ex rel. Farren v. St. Louis, 62 Mo. 244; Talbot County Comrs. v. Queen Anne County Comrs. 50 Md. 245; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; Com. v. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129; Luehrman v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. 2 Lea, 425; Penple ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103; Baltimore v. State ex rel. Board of Police, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572; Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 706, 26 L. ed. 243.

Statutes regulating the construction and maintenance of highways and bridges are in taxation is the source from which the funds to pay the claims must come. The statutes involved in Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525, and Creighton v. San Francisco City & County Supers. 42 Cal. 446, directed the issuance of warrants to be paid out of the city treasury.

It will also be observed that the Illinois cases treated the power to create a debt as the same thing as the power to direct the levy of a tax, for the purposes of the constitutional provision that the corporate authorities may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes. See Wider v. East St. Louis, 55 Ill. 135, and Gaddis v. Richland County, 92 Ill. 119, supra, II. a.

In People ex rel. Baldwin v. Haws, 37 Barb. 440, however, the court held that a provision of a statute for the appointment of arbitrators to adjust and determine the damages to contractors from the Croton Aqueduct violated §§ 1 and 6 of article 1 of the Constitution providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The court said that Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 615, related, not to the right or power of the legislature to compel an individual or corporation to pay a debt or claim, but to the power of the legislature to raise money by tax and apply such money when so raised to the payment thereof. It said, further, that under the decisions of the court made in that and other cases the court could not hold that the legislature had no authority to impose a tax to pay any claim, or to pay it out of the state treasury, and for that purpose to impose a tax upon the property of the whole state or any portion of it; but that neither that case nor People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 55 Am. Dec. 266, warrants the opinion that the legislature has a right to direct a municipal corporation to pay a claim for damages for breach of a contract out of the funds or property of such corporation without a submission of such claim to a judicial tribunal.

If the bridge company had a contract with the state, this contract cannot be taken advantage of by the respondent in this or any other proceeding.

Changes in the forms of action and modes of proceeding do not amount to an impairment of the obligations of a contract, if an adequate and efficacious remedy is left.

Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 200, 4 L. ed. 549; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 349; ance of bonds to pay therefor by a municipality, although they were previously void.

Grenada County Supers. v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261, sub nom. Grenada County Supers. v. Brown, 28 L. ed. 704, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125, upholds the constitutionality of an act ratifying county bonds which were issued without legislative authority, but at a time when such authority might have been conferred by the legislature.

Dows v. Elmwood, 34 Fed. Rep. 114, Is to the same effect. The court in the latter case says: "It is clear on principle as well as upon the authorities, that wherever the legislature has power to authorize the different municipalities of the state to vote and issue bonds under authority of an act of the legislature, if the people vote those bonds voluntarily, and the action of the electors is afterwards confirmed and approved by the legislature, and their acts made binding upon the town by an express act ratifying their action, it stands precisely on the same footing as though there had been an enabling act in advance."

The legislature may legalize an issue of scrip by a city to a railroad company in payment of a subscription to stock, notwithstanding that the submission of the question to the people was under a wrong law. Campbell v. Kenosha, 5 Wall. 194, 18 L. ed. 610.

The legislature may ratify a subscription by a municipal corporation to the stock of an incorporated company, though originally unauthorized. First Municipality v. Orleans Theater Co. 2 Rob. (La.) 209: State ex rel. Copes v. Charleston, 10 Rich. L. 491.

The legislature has power to ratify bonds issued by a municipal corporation without precedent authority, for the purpose of securing the location of a county seat within the city, and aiding in the erection of necessary county buildings.

Schneck v. Jeffersonville, 152 Ind. 204,

52 N. E. 212.

The legislature has power to ratify a contract entered into by a municipal corporation for a public purpose, which is ultra vires. Brown v. New York, 63 N. Y. 239.

Baker v. Seattle. 2 Wash. 576, 27 Pac. 462, upholds an act validating municipal indebtedness, where the invalidity resulted from the fact that the indebtedness exceeded the amount authorized by the charter. The court held that the case fell within the principle that where a municipal corporation has done an act beyond its statutory powers, but within the powers which it was competent for the legislature to have conferred upon it, the act may be validated by a curative statute.

Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 316, 11 L. ed. 145; Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 553, sub nom. United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 18 L. ed. 409; Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall. 602, 19 L. ed. 510; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 623, 21 L. ed. 215; Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 317, 21 L. ed. 357; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 633, 24 L. ed. 366; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69, 24 L. ed. 610; Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 301, 26 L. ed. 1098; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 132, 24 L. ed. 86; Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 290, 7 L. ed. 683; Cooley, Const. Lim. 443.

The state may by public act interfere with a contract entered into by her agents without authority, and whether void or valid, if the party claiming under it cancels and surrenders it to the state for a valuable and legislature had power to validate a municipal ordinance which was passed for the benent of a contractor but did not conform to the requirements of the charter.

Article 9, § 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1849, contained a provision that the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns, and villages might be invested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes. As already shown, this provision was construed by the courts to prohibit the legislature from creating municipal indebtedness to be paid by taxation.

It was held in Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218, and Wiley v. Silliman, 62 Ill. 170, that the legislature had no power to validate a vote on a proposition as to a municipal subscription to railroad stock, under which bonds had been issued, where such vote was void because the municipality had already exhausted its power by previously voting a subscription to the full amount of the statutory limit. These decisions rest upon the ground that the act attempts to compel a municipal corporation to incur a debt for a purely local municipal purpose, in violation of the foregoing constitutional provision.

A similar decision was made upon the authority of those cases by Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505, although in the latter case the invalidity arose from a departure from the statute, in the proposition submitted to the people, in respect to the time the proposed bonds should run. The opinion admitted that the former cases were stronger, there having been no color of authority for the election involved in them, and a mere excess of power in the case at bar; but the court thought that the same principle governed.

The same principle was applied by Gaddis v. Richland County, 92 Ill. 119, to a case where the election was called and ordered by unauthorized persons.

In Cairo & St. L. R. Co. v. Sparta, 77 Ill. 505, supra, a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the issuance of the bonds. In the other three cases the bonds had been issued.