Imagens da página
PDF
ePub

and no public benefit to be derived from such requirement. And, if it is not required for the public good, it is an unnecessary invasion of the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, ultra vires, and unlawful. Too much stress should not be put upon the fact

for anything except necessary expenses, without a majority vote of the qualined voters. (Clark, J., dissents.)

(March 6, 1900.)

PPEAL by defendant water company

that the plaintiff is a licensed officer, t A from a judgment of the Superior Court

make the connection,-"to tap the main.” That fact supplies only one of the points made in this case, and therefore enters into its consideration. But, had he not been such licensed officer, it seems to us that it would have been only necessary for the plaintiff to have gotten someone licensed by the city to do such work,-to make the connection with the main,—and the other work, such as supplying the material, digging the trench, and covering the pipe, he might have been allowed to do himself, as the city was in no way interested in that. Where a city has the power to erect a public improvement, and to control, manage, and protect the same, the line of demarcation is so small and so delicately drawn between such power and the rights of the individual citizens of the corporation, that it is difficult to run and mark it so as to give the corporation its proper powers without infringing upon individual rights and property rights. But, as delicate as this duty is, it seems to us that in this case the line of demarcation is plainly apparent. But, if it was in doubt, it would have to be resolved against the defendants, and in favor of the plaintiff's individual rights. 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. ¶ 89; State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S. E. 598; Edgerton v. Goldsboro Water Co. (N. C.) 35 S. E. 243.

We are therefore of the opinion that the city had the right to require that this connection should be made by its licensed of ficer; that materials furnished should be proper for such work, and subject to the inspection and approval of the city inspector; and that the work of putting them in should be done under the supervision of the city inspector. But we are also of the opinion that the city had no right to compel the plaintiff to buy the material from it, nor had it the right to compel the plaintiff to pay it to do the work we have specified and pointed out above in this opinion.

The plaintiff was entitled to the mandamus, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

J. B. EDGERTON

v.

GOLDSBORO WATER COMPANY et al., Appts.

(........N. C.........)

The cost of providing water for a city, although expressly authorized by charter, is not a "necessary expense" of the city, within the meaning of Const. art. 7, § 7, which prohibits indebtedness or taxation of a city

for Wayne County in favor of plaintiff in a proceeding brought to enjoin' defendant city from paying to the defendant water company the rentals for water supplies. Modified and affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinions. Messrs. W. C. Munroe and I. F.. Dortch, for appellants:

The state Constitution, art. 8. § 4, provides that "it shall be the duty of the legis lature to provide for the organization of cities, towns, and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessment, and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations."

The grant of such a power carries with it, by necessary implication, the power to endow cities with the usual and necessary incidents of an incorporated city.

Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 757.

The legislature has incorporated the city of Goldsboro, and required its authorities to provide water and to take all necessary steps to prevent and extinguish fires.

This exercise of the power by the legislature was within the discretion of the legislature, and not reviewable by the courts.

Harriss v. Wright, 121 N. C. 181, 28 S. E. 269.

Furnishing water for the use of its inhabitants being a power usually incident to cities, the legislature had the right to require the city authorities to furnish water, and the cost became a necessary expense of this city.

Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 758.

If it was a necessary expense to furnish water, it was not necessary to submit the question to a vote of the people.

Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. Č. 249; Shaver v. Salisbury Comrs. 68 N. C. 292; Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 754: Evans v. Cumberland County Comrs. 89 N. C. 154; Vaughn v. Forsyth County Comrs. 117 N. C. 429, 23 S. E. 354.

Furnishing water was a necessary ex

pense.

Smith v. Newbern, 70 N. C. 18, 16 Am. Rep. 766; Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 267. This principle became a part of the contract, and no subsequent decision could annul it.

Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 331, 18 L. ed. 178; Kenosha v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 19 L. ed. 725: Olcott v. Fond du Lac County Supers. 16 Wall. 678. 21 L. ed. 382.

Messrs. Allen & Dortch and Aycock & Daniels for appellee.

NOTE. As to purposes for which money may v. Jacksonville (Fla.) 30 L. R. A. 540: Sun be raised and expended by municipal corpora- Print. & Pub. Asso. v. New York (N. Y.) 37 L. tions, see Daggett v. Colgan (Cal.) 14 L. R. A. R. A. 788; and Mayo v. Washington (N. C.) 474, and note; Jacksonville Electric Light Co. 40 L. R. A. 163. 1

Furches, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

The plaintiff is a citizen and taxpayer of the city of Goldsboro, and brings this action to enjoin and restrain the city authorities from paying the defendant the Goldsboro Water Company $1,395, this being the semiannual rental for water supplies furnished the city of Goldsboro by said water company, which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant city of Goldsboro is about to do. The plaintiff alleges that this money was collected by the levy of taxes upon the citizens and property of said city, and can only be used and paid out for the lawful necessary expenses of the city government; that the furnishing of water to the city by the water company is not a necessary expense of the city government, and that the same was wrongfully and unlawfully levied and collected, and that it would be unlawful to pay the same to the defendant water company; that defendant city was never authorized by any special act of the legislature to levy any such tax, or to collect the same, or to submit a proposition to the voters of said city, and that in fact no such proposition has ever been submitted or voted upon by said city. It is admitted by defendants that said money was levied and collected as a tax on defendant city; that there has been no act of the legislature authorizing a submission of the question to the vote of the people, and that no such vote has been taken. And it is not denied but what the city was about to make the payment, as alleged by the plaintiff. But the defendants allege and say that the charter of the city of Goldsboro provides (Priv. Laws 1899, chap. 171, 27) "that among the powers hereby conferred on the board of aldermen, they shall provide water, provide for repairing the streets," etc.; that this made it their duty to provide a supply of water for the city, and made water a legislative necessity, and did away with the requirement of article 7, § 7. of the Constitution; that, so understanding the law, the city contracted with the assignor of the defendant water company to furnish the city of Goldsboro a supply of water (as specified in said contract) for the public use of the city and for the private use of its citizens, the citizens paying a stipulated price for the use of the water: that under the terms of the contract the city was to pay the water company $2,790 per year in semiannual instalments, and the payment of the money sought to be enjoined is one of the semiannual payments; that upon these facts the court below granted the injunction, and the defendants appealed.

with approval in State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S. E. 598. But it is contended by defendant that, as the charter of Goldsboro provides that it "shall have power to provide water for the city," this is an express legislative power, and, the power being conferred, the courts will not undertake to direct or supervise the manner in which this shall be done. It must be conceded that, if the first proposition be true, it had the power to levy and collect the taxes, the second proposition is necessarily true, and the courts cannot and will not undertake to supervise their action as to the manner of its execution, unless a manifest abuse of power be shown. It has been held by this court that, where a town levied a tax in aid of the common schools of the town, under and within the provisions of an act of the legis lature not passed according to the requirements of the Constitution, such levy is void, for the reason that the act had not been passed as provided by article 2, § 14, of the Constitution; common schools not being one of the necessary expenses incident to the corporate government. Rodman v. Washington, 122 N. C. 39, 30 S. E. 118. The court has also held that an electric-light plant was not a necessary expense incident to the government of a town, and that an attempt to establish one by the city, to be paid for and supported by taxation without having the required constitutional legislation, was ultra vires, and void. Mayo v. Washington Comrs. 122 N. C. 5, 40 L. R. A. 163, 29 S. E. 343. It has been held by this court that a waterworks plant was not a necessary incident to the administration of the city government, and that an effort to levy and collect a tax out of the city for that purpose, without having the required legislative power to do so, was unconstitutional, and void. Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411, 27 S. E. 109, and this opinion was cited with approval in Mayo v. Washington Comrs. 122 N. C. 5, 40 L. R. A. 163, 29 S. E. 343. From these authorities it must be held that it is not one of the necessary expenses of a city or town government to furnish the city or town with a supply of water. And we do not understand the defendants to seriously contend that this is not generally so, although they cite Tucker v. Raleigh, 75 N. C. 271, Smith v. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14, 16 Am. Rep. 766, and Smith v. Goldsboro, 121 N. C. 352, 28 S. E. 479. But it does not seem to us that these cases sustain the contention that the water tracted for in this case was a necessity to the town government. In Tucker v. Raleigh, it appeared that a part of the little account This presents a constitutional question, sued on was for cleaning and repairing pubthe power of the defendant city to levy, col- lic wells. This is covered by the case of lect, and pay out money. But it seems to Spaulding v. Peabody, 153 Mass. 129, 10 L. us that it has been substantially decided by R. A. 397, 26 N. E. 421, cited with approval the recent adjudications of this court. A in Mayo v. Washington Comrs. 122 N. C. 5, city has no right to levy and collect a tax 40 L. R. A. 163, 29 S. E. 343, as being alunless it has legislative power to do so. lowed by reason of ancient custom. The It has no powers except those given by leg- cases of Tucker v. Raleigh and Smith v. islative authority, in expres terms or by Goldsboro are cited, discussed, and disposed necessary implication, in aid of express of in Mayo v. Washington Comrs. In Smith powers. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 89, quoted' v. Newbern, 70 N. C. 14, 16 Am. Rep. 766, it

con

Clark, J., dissenting: Without calling in question our decisions that waterworks are not a municipal necessity, I think that water for public sanitation and protection of public buildings is such necessity, and that, when the legislature of the state has required the town to procure water, to the above extent at least, it is a necessary purpose. The courts have nothing to do with the wisdom, policy, or necessity of statutes which require an exercise of the police power. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. State ex rel. Omaha (Neb.) 43 Am. St. Rep. 557, 572, and notes (47 Neb. 549, 41 L. R. A. 481, 66 N. W. 624); Morris v. Columbus (Ga.) 66 Am. St. Rep. 243, and notes (102 Ga. 792, 42 L. R. A. 175, 30 S. E. 850).

1.

2.

STATE of North Carolina

v.

Sherwood HIGGS, Appt.

(........N. C.........)

The jurisdiction of the mayor over violation of an ordinance will not be defeated by the fact that a provision in the or dinance attempts to make his jurisdiction exclusive, if the laws give him at least a coordinate jurisdiction.

is incidentally stated, in the argument of | the case, that the city would have the right| to bore an artesian well. If it had held that a city might have such a well, we do not think it would sustain the defendants' contention in this case. But that was not the point in that case, and was in no respect necessary to its decision, and it could, at most, be regarded as no more than an obiter. But it was contended with earnestness by the defendants that, because the charter said it should be the duty of the city authorities to supply the city with water, this made it a necessary expense. We cannot give our assent to this proposition. To put the most favorable construction upon this language, it can only mean that they should do so in a lawful way. To put the meaning upon this provision of the charter that defendants contend for would be to destroy the provisions of article 7, § 7, of the Constitution, which provides that "no county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith, or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein." If the legislature had the power to make a thing necessary by saying that it should be done, or even saying that it was necessary, this wise provision of the Constitution would be utterly destroyed. It seems to us that this proposition is so selfevident that it needs no authority to support it. But we think it is sustained by State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S. E. 598. In that case it was attempted to make the owners of certain houses guilty of keeping houses of ill fame, whether they occupied them or not. The court held this could not be done; that saying they were the keepers of such houses did not make them so. State v. Clay, 118 N. C. 1234, 24 S. E. 492; State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535. The money sought to be enjoined has been collected, but it is still in the possession and control of the city of Goldsboro. But, if it has been illegally levied and collected, the wrongful paying it out may be enjoined. Stanly County Comrs. 'v. Snuggs, 121 N. C. 394, 39 L. R. A. 439, 28 S. E. 539. If the authority of the city to levy and collect this tax was doubtful (which, to us. does not seem to be so), that doubt would have to be resolved against the defendants. 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 91, and note 2. We are therefore of the opinion that the levy| and collection of this money was ultra vires, and unconstitutional; that to pay it out to the waterworks company, as it is proposed It is necessary to the validity of an ordito do, would be unconstitutional and unlaw-nance that it have a penalty. ful, for this reason the injunction should State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. S83: Horr & B. be continued as to the payment of this Mun. Pol. Ord. §§ 77 et seq.; Dillon, Mun. money to the defendant water company for water furnished the city of Goldsboro.

3.

An ordinance is not void for uncertainty by reason of a provision giving the mayor discretion to impose a fine of $50 or imprisonment for thirty days upon convic tion, where the statute makes the violation of the ordinance a misdemeanor, and the Constitution of the state makes exactly the same provision as to the punishment for misdemeanors.

An ordinance making it a penal offense to maintain a sign suspended or projecting over a sidewalk is not included in charter power to See open streets and keep streets and sidewalks free and clear from obstructions, and is unreasonable, oppressive, and void as applied to a sign which does not impede, delay, obstruct, or in any way endanger the use of the sidewalk.

Holding as we do, as to the question of power, wo do not find it necessary to con sider the question as to the quality of the water. The injunction, modified in accordance with the opinion, is continued. Modified and affirmed.

(Clark, J., dissents.)

(March 27, 1900.)

APPEAL by defendant from a judgment of the Superior Court for Wake County convicting him of violating an ordinance forbidding the suspension of signs over sidewalks. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. R. O. Burton and A. Jones, for appellant:

Corp. 336.

The municipality cannot make a violation of its ordinances a crime; it is merely a civil

NOTE. For power of municipal corporation as to encroachments on streets by signboards, etc., or things overhanging streets, see note to Hagerstown v. Witmer (Md.) 39 L. R. A. OD pages 661, 667.

matter, punishable by a pecuniary penalty, and the statute so intends.

State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S. E. 598; State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789, 12 S. E. 426; State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873, 19 S. E. 861; Raleigh Charter, Priv. Laws 1899. chap. 153, §§ 9, 11, 12, 21, 33, 35, 80; Louisburg Comrs. v. Harris, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, L.) 281; Horr & B. Mun. Pol. Ord. §§ 147, 150, 155, 158, 168, 169, 170, 170a; Dillon, Mun. Corp. 353, 429, 432.

If the general assembly attempted to confer the power of imprisonment upon the town board, it was a delegation of legislative power which is unconstitutional and void.

Livingston v. Wolf, 136 Pa. 519, 20 Atl. 551; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 15 L. R. A. 423, 14 S. E. 387.

Messrs. Zeb. Vance Walser, Attorney General, and Watson & Gatling for appellee.

Furches, J., delivered the opinion of the

court:

This is a prosecution commenced before the mayor of the city of Raleigh for an alleged violation of an ordinance of the city. The ordinance under which the defendant is indicted is as follows:

"Sec. 1. That no sign shall be suspended or projected over the sidewalks in the city of Raleigh.

Cooley, Const. Lim. 139 et seq.; Louisburg Comrs. v. Harris, 52 N. C. (7 Jones, L.) 281. If the ordinance has a penalty, it is void for uncertainty. It leaves to the mayor the "Sec. 2. That all signs that are now prodiscretion as to the amount of punishment,jected or that are suspended over the side-whether he shall impose a fine of $50 or walks of the city of Raleigh shall be reimprison for thirty days. This leaves the moved, together with the rods and poles used matter in just as much uncertainty as if the for suspending or swinging said signs, by penalty were not less than $50. the 15th day of August, 1899.

State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 883; State v. Crenshaw, 94 N. C. 877; State v. Worth, 95 N. C. 615.

The board of aldermen has no power under its charter absolutely to prohibit signs. The power is not conferred and it is inconsistent with the abutter's property interests in the street.

Howard v. Robbins, 1 Lans. 63; Yates v.
Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984;
State v. Edens, 85 N. C. 522; Hawkins v.
Sanders, 45 Mich. 491, 8 N. W. 98; Clark v.
Lake St. Clair & N. U. River Ice Co. 24
Mich. 508; People v. Carpenter, 1 Mich.
287; Hisey v. Mexico, 61 Mo. App. 248;
Goldstraw v. Duckworth, L. R. 5 Q. B. Div.
275; Cushing v. Boston, 128 Mass. 330, 35
Am. Rep. 383; White v. Northwestern N. C.
R. Co. 113 N. C. 610, 22 L. R. A. 627, 18
E. 330.

In ascertaining what are the reasonable uses of the streets and highways which belong to the abutter, it is proper to consider the uses that others are allowed to make of them.

"Sec. 3. Any person or firm violating the provisions of this ordinance or failing to comply with the provisions of the same, shall, upon conviction before the mayor. be fined fifty dollars, or imprisoned thirty days."

The legislature of 1899 (chapter 153, Priv. Acts) enacted a new charter for the city of Raleigh, and our attention is called to the following provisions therein for the purpose of showing the power of the city, which, the state contends, authorized the charge of the court and the verdict of the jury in finding the defendant guilty: Sections of the charter:

"Sec. 33. That it shall be the duty of the aldermen to attend all the meetings of the board unless unavoidably prevented from doS.ing so, and when convened, a majority of the board shall have power to make, and to provide for the execution of such ordinances, by-laws, rules, and regulations, and such fines, penalties, and forfeitures for their violation as may be authorized by this act, consistent with the laws of the land and necessary for the proper government of the city: provided, that no penalty prescribed by the A sign is an important part of a mer-board of aldermen for the violation of any chant's business: the right to have a sign is a valuable property right. Any ordinance which declares that it shall not project at all is unreasonable, arbitrary, and void. The city may regulate, but cannot forbid

O'Linda v. Lothrop, 21 Pick. 292; Underwood v. Carney, 1 Cush. 285.

in toto.

Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall. 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Horr & B. Mun. Pol. Ord. § 230: Angell, Highways, § 263; State v. Taft, 118 N. C. 1192, 32 L. R. A. 122, 23 S. E. 970; State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535; 1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 319-321, 327, 328; People v. Carpenter, 1 Mich. 287; Hisey v. Mexico, 61 Mo. App. 248.

If it is competent for the board to forbid all encroachments on the streets, it cannot discriminate. All projections beyond the street line should be forbidden, or none should be.

of the provisions of this act, or of any ordinance, by-law, rule, or regulation made in pursuance hereof, shall exceed fifty dollars fine or thirty days' imprisonment.'

"Sec. 80. That all penalties imposed under the provisions of this act or of any ordinance, by-law, or regulation of the city, unless herein otherwise provided, shall be recoverable in the name of the city of Raleigh before the mayor; and all such penalties incurred by any minor shall be recovered from the parent, guardian, or master, as the case may be, of such minor.”

"Sec. 34. That among the powers conferred on the board of aldermen are these:

[ocr errors]

Ascertain the location, increase, reduce, and establish the width and grade, regulate the repairs, and keep clear the streets, sidewalks, and alleys of the city; extend, lay

"Sec. 38. That they may require and compel the abatement of all nuisances within the city, or within one mile of the city limits, at the expense of the person causing the same, or the owner or tenant of the ground whereon the same shall be.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

The sections in the charter are not produced seriatim, but as they are presented in the brief and argument of counsel who represented the state.

out, open, establish the width and grade, | the outer railing of balconies, and signs prokeep clean, and maintain others; establish jecting a few inches over the sidewalks, to and regulate the public grounds, including exist. There are many of them in the city. Moore Square, Nash Square, and Pullen There are balconies in front of many buildPark, have charge of, improve, adorn, and ings on Fayetteville street, projecting over maintain the same, and protect the shade sidewalk 3 to 4 feet. One over Yarboro trees of the city." House, Henry Building (with J. M. Broughton & Co.'s sign on outer railing; also Foller's, the tailor); one over A. B. Stronach's, with his sign on outer railing. Many awnings in the city which cover the entire sidewalk, some of wood, some of cloth,-some signs on cloth, as Berwanger's stretching Subsection 6 of § 79 provides: "(6) Any clear across sidewalk; and some on wood, as person .; or who shall excavate, con- W. B. Mann's at edge or side of awning, and struct, build, use, keep, or maintain any cel- extending over street. Some other signs were lar, basement, area, passage, entrance, or allowed to set on sidewalk, as of Watts, the way under any sidewalk, or build, construct, barber. A great many signs on the doorfackeep, use, or maintain any veranda, piazza, ing, which project a few inches over the sideplatform, building, or stairway or other pro-walk, as R. B. Raney's Raleigh Savings jection or construction upon or over any Bank's, Boylan, Pearce, & Co.'s, W. E. sidewalk in the city whereby the free and Jones's, a member of the board of aldermen, safe passage of persons may be hindered, de- Cross & Linehan's. Jones & Powell have layed, obstructed, or in any way endangered, steps leading from Fayetteville street down without having first taken out a li- into their cellar. On each side of cellar cense therefor, shall be guilty of a is an iron railing, and till recently they misdemeanor, and upon satisfactory proof had suspended on the railing an ice and before the mayor shall be adjudged to pay coal sign. W. H. King & Co.'s drug store for every such offense a fine not exceeding projects above some distance over sidewalk, fifty dollars, or be imprisoned not exceeding and sign is painted on it, as shown from thirty days." the photograph. Y. M. C. A. building has steps in street. W. Z. Blake, street commissioner, was introduced by the state, and testified that he measured that morning the distance from the front wall of Higgs's store Upon the trial the state introduced the to center of street. It was 49% feet. The charter and the ordinances of the city, and state then introduced the charter of the city the following evidence: "The state then in- of Raleigh, as contained in chapter 153 of troduced Chief of Police Mullins, who testi- the Private Acts of 1899, and thereupon fied that a written notice from the mayor to rested its case. The defendant's counsel take down his sign was served on defendant contended that the ordinance was void; that before the beginning of this proceeding, on the evidence he was the owner to the cenwhich notice was put in evidence. That the ter of the street, subject to the easement of sign was not taken down, and is still up. the public, and had the right to make the On cross-examination, the witness stated customary and proper use of his property; that the sign was an electric sign, which that he was discriminated against, and that spelled out Higgs's name by the passage of a the ordinance was unreasonable and arbicurrent of electricity; that it was an orna- trary and oppressive; that the board of alment to the street, and did not interfere dermen had no power to adopt it, especially with passage or vision. It was at its lower in its form and to the extent they claimed; end about 14 feet above the sidewalk, pro-and that it was an attempt to create a crimjected 4 or 42 feet from building; was 12 to 14 feet long, about 18 inches wide, made of plank, and apparently a very heavy one; was fastened at the top to a bar of railroad iron, and at the bottom to a round bar of iron. The sign itself hung vertically, and he thought it was as practically secure as the house itself. Did not think there was any danger of falling or being blown down. Had never examined closely the fastenings to the bar of railroad iron. Witness identified the photograph of the sign, which was put in evidence, and which was taken before the lower swinging signs on the street were taken down. The sign which Higgs had swinging to the lower rod, as shown in the photograph, was taken down by him before this proceeding was started. The lower rod was also cut off at the end. Witness said it was still common for porticos or balconies, awnings and signs on awnings, and signs on

inal offense, which they had no power to do." His honor charged the jury that if they believed the evidence they should find the defendant guilty. Verdict guilty. Defendant excepted, and appealed from the judgment pronounced.

There were exceptions taken on the argument to the jurisdiction of the mayor of the city to try the case, if the defendant was guilty of a criminal offense, for the reason that he was given exclusive jurisdiction. It was also contended that the ordinance was void for uncertainty, for the reason that it gave the mayor the discretion to fine the defendant, upon conviction, $50, or to impris on him for thirty days. We do not think either of these objections can be sustained. Article 4, § 14, Const., expressly provides for the establishment of such courts for the trial of misdemeanors in cities and towns; and the charter of the city of Raleigh (§ 79,

« AnteriorContinuar »